After leaving the G7 summit a day early, skipping meetings with Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the Nato chief, Mark Rutte, Donald Trump made a confounding leap in his public messaging on the new conflict in the Middle East.
In Alberta on Monday, he had suggested that a nuclear deal with Tehran remained “achievable”; on the overnight flight back to DC, he said he was “not too much in the mood to negotiate”; when he landed, he told reporters that he was “not looking for a ceasefire”, but a “complete give-up” by Iran. Meanwhile, he posted on social media that “IRAN CAN NOT HAVE A NUCLEAR WEAPON” and that “everyone should immediately evacuate Tehran!” Later yesterday, he demanded Iran’s “unconditional surrender” and mused on how easy it would be to kill the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
“It has shifted in the last day in a very significant way,” Andrew Roth said. Meanwhile, as Dan Sabbagh explains in this analysis piece, the US has stepped up its military presence in the region. “The rhetoric has risen exponentially, and the pieces to do it are there,” Andrew said. “We don’t know if that’s a pressure tactic or a statement of intent, but either way it makes US involvement more likely.”
What happened at the G7?
The Alberta summit was meant to be an opportunity for the group of wealthy nations to reach useful agreements on major international issues: Ukraine, Gaza and Trump’s tariffs were all on the table. But even before Trump’s early exit, that agenda was torpedoed by Israel’s new attack on Iran.
Trump co-signed a brief statement before his departure calling for a “de-escalation of hostilities in the Middle East, including a ceasefire in Gaza”, and asserting that “Iran can never have a nuclear weapon”.
“There’s nothing the president said that suggests that he’s about to get involved in this conflict,” Keir Starmer said. “On the contrary, the G7 statement was about de-escalation.” That analysis would appear to be based on a touching faith in Trump’s commitment to international diplomatic norms rather than abiding by whatever he’s said last.
What do we know about what Trump wants?
Trump is reportedly obsessed with winning the Nobel peace prize. His consistent message to voters during the 2024 election campaign was that a vote for him was a vote to end foreign wars – and many took him at his word.
As the news of Israel’s strikes on Iran broke last week, Trump’s secretary of state, Marco Rubio, emphasised that the US was “not involved in strikes against Iran”; but Trump himself declined to comment on whether the US participated, and said that the White House had been fully apprised of Benjamin Netanyahu’s plans. Israeli officials have briefed the media that public statements by the US and Israel were “strategically coordinated to lull Tehran into a false sense of security” – but that should be treated with scepticism, since it has not been corroborated by reporters in Washington.
In any case, the arc of Trump’s comments in recent days has been to imply closer cooperation with Israel as Iran has appeared weakened. “His shift towards Israel reflects the facts on the ground,” Andrew said. “The most important thing for Trump is always to come out with a win: if he tries to restrain Israel and fails, he looks weaker than if he endorses an option he was against a month ago.”
But with Iran so far avoiding any provocative strike on US interests in the region, it isn’t clear what would prompt him to cross the line into direct military involvement. The simplest path might be to continue to use militaristic rhetoric in support of Israel’s operation, but refrain from ordering US forces to attack Tehran.
Israel would dearly love to have the US as a full ally in the conflict, since it is unable to penetrate Iran’s most deeply buried nuclear facilities without US bunker-busting bombs. And with reports that Trump has encouraged new talks between his Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff and his Iranian counterparts, it is also possible that Trump will present Tehran with an ultimatum: commit to ending all nuclear enrichment in Iran, or face US bombing.
How does this play out politically in the United States?
Trump is seeking to balance a tension that goes to the heart of the modern Republican party’s identity crisis: on the one hand, pressure from traditional conservative hawks who have long yearned for an all-out assault on Iran; on the other, the isolationist tendency in his Maga movement, which viewed his stated aversion to new military adventures as a key tenet of his appeal.
“There was never really a coherent strategy, because he has surrounded himself with people with very different views, and their influence waxes and wanes,” Andrew said. “And he’s finding out that he has a lot of support from across his base that’s very hawkish on Iran, or very pro-Israel. At the moment, he is empowering those people, and sidelining the Maga isolationist wing.”
In this piece, Andrew lays out how public that schism has now become. Prominent Maga pundits like Tucker Carlson have accused the hawks of being “warmongers”; senior advisers like the vice-president, JD Vance, are also thought to be averse to military action, fearful that a major Middle East entanglement will derail their hopes of a strategic pivot to the containment of China in the Pacific.
But, Andrew writes, “traditional Republicans such as Senator Tom Cotton, as well as senior Pentagon officials … have continued to impress upon Trump the need for a more hawkish Iran policy”. And Trump himself derided Carlson’s position as “kooky”.
He has also dismissed the assessment of his spy chief Tulsi Gabbard - who, Andrew writes here, “he nominated specifically because of her skepticism for past US interventions in the Middle East” - that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon. And yesterday he posted a truly unsettling text message from his ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, that sought to compare him to Harry Truman in 1945 – the US president who decided to drop nuclear bombs on Japan.
Vance, meanwhile, tied himself in knots as he sought to explain Trump’s stance to the Maga base: “People are right to be worried about foreign entanglement after the last 25 years of idiotic foreign policy,” he said. But he claimed that Trump had “earned some trust on this issue”, and added: “He is only interested in using American military to accomplish the American people’s goals.”
What impact are his comments having on the ground?
Iranian civilians are not the only ones hanging on Trump’s every word. In Tehran, there are still some hopes Trump will act as a brake on Netanyahu’s offensive: Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, said on Monday that “it takes one phone call from Washington to muzzle someone like Netanyahu”.
On the other hand, that same ambiguity is allowing Netanyahu to present Israel’s attack as coming with the approval of the White House – and may be extending the conflict as Israel hopes that the longer it drags on, the more likely it is that an Iranian escalation forces Trump’s hand. If that happens, it would suggest that however aggressive Trump’s posture is publicly, he is ultimately leaving American foreign policy to be decided by the belligerents in a conflict which he has long claimed he wants to avoid.
“Iran is also an unpredictable actor here,” Andrew said. “There’s always a risk when missiles are flying both ways. And the longer this goes on, the higher the chance of an escalatory event.”
