What Colombia’s Shift Left Means for America

For decades Colombia has been a political ally to the U.S., acting as an important counterbalance to Venezuela. Outgoing Colombian President Iván Duque sided with Washington on everything from Iran’s nuclear activities to Russia’s war in Ukraine.

That might change at least a bit under incoming President Petro, experts say. According to David Castrillón-Kerrigan, an international relations professor at Externado University in Bogotá, the new administration might review existing policies, such as Colombia’s role as a NATO global partner, and “take some symbolic acts to mark an independent, progressive foreign policy that is not subservient to the U.S.”

U.S. President Joe Biden has already spoken with Petro by phone, checkmarking the usual areas where he hopes to continue cooperation — from security to counternarcotics and Colombia’s 2016 peace deal with the leftist rebel group FARC.

For his part, Petro has said bilateral relations with the U.S. remain of “supreme importance.” He has underscored the need to create a bilateral agenda that focuses on the climate crisis — protecting the Amazon rainforest, in particular — and that revisits some agreements that have underpinned the U.S.-Colombia relationship for decades.

Colombia’s war on drugs is failing: The country is producing record levels of cocaine, while drug-trafficking networks are growing and civilians continue to be displaced and killed at record numbers. Even Biden’s senior adviser for Latin America, Juan Gonzalez, has said the two countries need to “denarcotify” their relationship and focus on creating opportunities for local farmers.

Petro’s vision goes further. He wants Colombia to reduce its reliance on drug extraditions, stop criminalizing rural producers of coca leaves and continue to prohibit the aerial fumigation of coca crops, following a 2015 constitutional court decision. As reported by The Economist, he also wants to re-examine Colombia’s 2012 trade deal with the U.S. “Does it help to increase narco-trafficking, or does it help to increase agricultural and industrial production?” he asked.

But Marcos Peckel, a professor at Rosario University, expects more bark than bite from the new president. There might be some tensions, he admits, but the depth of U.S. aid and military assistance to Colombia will limit how far Petro can push. Issues like extradition and free trade are also cemented by agreements that are not easy to overturn. “Years ago, Petro would affect the relationship with the U.S.,” Peckel told OZY. “Now that will not happen. The relationship between U.S. and Colombia is very strong.”

Amid 2019 peace negotiations in Havana between the Colombian government and the leadership of the leftist guerilla National Liberation Army (ELN), a bomb exploded at a police academy in Bogotá and killed 21 cadets. The Duque administration accused the ELN of orchestrating the attack and demanded Cuba extradite the negotiators. When Cuba refused, relations between the two countries tanked.

But Colombia has traditionally enjoyed a good relationship with Cuba and this grudge is unlikely to persist into the Petro administration. One central reason to expect a shift, explains Rafael Piñeros, an international relations professor at Externado University, is the strategic role Cuba can play as a mediator between Colombia and the ELN. Petro has said he wants a peace agreement with the ELN within four months of taking office. Moreover, recent U.S. overtures to the communist island nation give Colombia “more of an argument to say that Cuba isn’t the enemy, it isn’t the problem of Colombia,” adds Piñeros.

On the other hand, Colombia’s relationship with its eastern neighbor has never been worse. Channels of communication were severed in February 2019 and since then border crossings have been limited, international trade curtailed and Duque tried unsuccessfully to propel Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó to the presidency.

Petro recognizes that the two nations need a working relationship. There are 1.8 million Venezuelans living in Colombia, 3.4 million Colombians in Venezuela, and the countries share a 1,379-mile border infiltrated by a litany of armed, criminal groups. “A border that big, complicated and alive,” Petro has said, “cannot tolerate the absence of communication points and collaboration between the two governments.”

But getting things back on track will take time, says Ronal Fabián Rodríguez, an investigator at Rosario University’s Venezuelan Observatory. “All the institutions — consulates, diplomatic missions, border commissions — have been lost,” Rodríguez told OZY. The first orders of business for Petro, he says, will be to decide which consulates to open, how to scale up trade, and how to go back to recognizing Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro as the legitimate head of state.

Petro’s victory is likely to strengthen Latin America’s “pink tide.” In a telling sign of what such a development may deliver, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador recently agreed with Petro to pursue an agenda that would echo the European Union by allowing all countries of the American continent “to complement each other with natural resources, workforce, technology, and markets.” A united bloc may embolden leftist governments during negotiations with key partners such as the U.S. and China. After his victory, for example, Petro rebuked the exclusionary American position during the recent Summit of the Americas by calling for a dialogue with all countries from the region, without exceptions.

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Under Duque, Colombia and Russia frequently traded jabs. Colombia has accused Russia of flying without authorization over its airspace and of meddling in its elections, while Russia’s parliament has openly condemned Colombia’s position on Venezuela. Duque recently called the war in Ukraine a “genocide” and said Russian President Vladimir Putin should be tried as a war criminal. Petro is likely to be less combative, says Mauricio Jaramillo Jassir, a political science professor at Rosario University. “The homework of the next president is easy. We’re going back to before. No fighting. Respect. No comment about internal issues,” he says. Like many leaders in South America, he expects Petro to condemn the war in Ukraine without taking sides.

Should Russia follow through on sending military assets to Cuba or Venezuela, a possibility Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has refused to rule out, Colombia’s relationship with Russia could become more complicated. “There is a lot of concern amongst Colombia’s military intelligence over Russian participation in Venezuelan military activities along the border,” says Fabián Rodríguez.

Over the past few decades China has emerged as Colombia’s second-biggest trading partner. Chinese businesses and banks are building Colombian highways, hospitals, water treatment plants and a $3.9 billion metro system in Bogotá. Castrillón-Kerrigan expects the Petro administration to expand that partnership to assist in poverty alleviation, multilateralism, and the fight against climate change.

“A key challenge for President Petro will be to find a fair balance between China and the U.S., especially at a time when the U.S. continues to shift inward while demanding that partners reject Chinese opportunities,” Castrillón-Kerrigan explains. He also points out that Petro is not ideologically beholden to the U.S., unlike previous Colombian administrations. And Colombia faces an international order in which “China is no longer a rising power but is an established great power with strong ties to the region.”

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