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After Russia invaded Ukraine last February, the United Nations voted on a General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s actions. It passed with overwhelming support — but only about half of Africa’s nations voted for it, compared to more than 80% of countries from the rest of the world. In fact, 17 African nations abstained from the vote, underscoring a much more favorable view of Russia than in Europe. Some of that is a legacy of the Cold War, during which the Soviet Union supported many African freedom struggles and helped nations in their post-independence years. Both Mali and Guinea, for example, benefited from extensive industrial and military support during this period. | Popular support for Russia in West Africa in particular has soared, with street protests in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, regularly calling for more Russian involvement in their politics. | But in recent years, a new dynamic has emerged. Popular support for Russia in West Africa in particular has soared, with street protests in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, regularly calling for more Russian involvement in their politics. Indeed, demonstrations accompanying the coup that removed the Burkinabe interim president on Sept. 30, 2022, involved protesters demanding greater Russian military assistance and Russian flags could be seen flying around the capital city of Ouagadougou. The extent of support for Russia has become so pronounced that, during the Dakar International Forum on Peace and Security in October, Senegal’s President Macky Sall felt the need to declare that Africa was “not [taking sides with Russia] against Ukraine.” Russia’s growing prominence coincides with the declining influence of former colonial ruler France, which has traditionally wielded immense clout in the largely francophone West Africa and Sahel regions. After months of acrimonious diplomatic disputes with Mali, France withdrew its military from the country, where it had been helping fight an Islamist insurgency that has spread across the Sahel in recent years. Mali has since accused France of supporting jihadis in the region. Burkina Faso’s recent announcement that some of its partners have not “always been loyal” appeared to be another dig at France. The forced shutdown of several French broadcasters in Burkina Faso and Mali over the past couple of years underscores how French presence in the Sahel has declined. |
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The decline of French influence in the Sahel is closely tied to a security situation that has gradually deteriorated since the European power first launched Operation Serval in 2013, followed by Operation Barkhane in 2014. Jihadi groups predominantly linked to al-Qaida and Islamic State have expanded their areas of influence, and the number of internally displaced persons has increased tenfold since 2013 from 217,000 to 2.1 million by late 2021. “Ten years of Western-led stabilization strategy has more or less totally failed,” Franklin Nossiter, Sahel researcher at International Crisis Group, told OZY. This situation has led many West African countries to search for other partners that might be able to support them more effectively in their fight against jihadi groups. | Wagner is … an attractive partner because it doesn’t question or put conditions for collaborations. - Rida Lyammouri, senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South. | Enter Russia and its notorious Kremlin-linked private military outfit, the Wagner group. “Mali and Burkina Faso are both looking for new partners to try to secure their territories,” said Rida Lyammouri, senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South. “Wagner is … an attractive partner because it doesn’t question or put conditions for collaborations.” Russian assistance is also a lot more politically advantageous domestically, given the widespread anti-French sentiment throughout the region because of the history of colonialism and the efforts by Paris to interfere in the region’s countries even after they won their freedom. Indeed, in Burkina Faso, the most recent coup appeared to be linked to frustrations in some parts of the military that the former ruling junta was not developing close enough ties with Russia. Meanwhile, the Nigerien president has faced anti-government protests over his continuing strong relationship with France. Yet Russia’s assistance carries its own risks. Wagner operatives have increasingly been implicated in human rights abuses in Mali, including the massacre of over 300 people in Moura last March. Additionally, “Russian engagement in the Sahel is very low-cost [financially],” said Nossiter. The gains for Russia are clear. “It is distracting the West and diminishing the West’s symbolic power,” Nossiter said. “This is an influence battle that may also help them diplomatically, especially at the U.N.” But Russia’s lack of willingness, or capacity — considering its war in Ukraine — to assist in a more in-depth manner may prevent it from being particularly helpful militarily in the Sahel. Russian operatives, “do not have the same level of training, expertise or technical nous as the French. They have no air support either,” contended Nathaniel Powell, Africa analyst at Oxford Analytica, speaking with OZY. |
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To be sure, West Africa is not entirely in favor of Russia’s expanding presence in the Sahel. Ghana’s President Nana Akufo-Addo expressed concerns in December over Wagner’s expanding presence in the Sahel, while Niger’s government has repeatedly defended France, even allowing it to relocate its troops from Mali to Niger in August. Côte d’Ivoire’s government also remains staunchly pro-France with regular bilateral meetings occurring between the two countries. As such, a split has begun to form between nations that are aligned with Russia and those that favor France or the West. “I don’t see much collaboration between Mali and Burkina with countries working closely with France, U.S., and the EU, such as Niger, Côte d’Ivoire and Chad,” said Lyammouri. | We will witness further division rather than unity between countries in the region, which will complicate further the fight against al-Qaida and IS at the regional level. - Rida Lyammouri, senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South | Indeed, Mali withdrew from the regional G5 Sahel grouping — which also includes Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania and Niger — in June amid concerns of excessive French influence. Mali has held 46 Ivorian soldiers in prison since July, claiming they were seeking to destabilize the Malian capital of Bamako. And in September, Mali accused the Nigerien president of not really being Nigerien, while Niger halted oil product deliveries to Mali. This split in the region creates an obstacle for counterterrorism, even as West African leaders agreed in December to form a new regional peacekeeping force to intervene against jihadism. “We will witness further division rather than unity between countries in the region, which will complicate further the fight against al-Qaida and IS at the regional level,” said Lyammouri. If it is established that, as Ghana’s president claimed in December, Burkina Faso is deploying Wagner operatives on its territory, things could get worse, said experts. “There will be some impact regionally if Burkina Faso gets involved with Wagner,” explained Powell. “This could have an impact on regional military cooperation not just with Niger but elsewhere.” |
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Critics of France in the region might get their wish if Russia continues to entrench itself in the Sahel. Militarily, France and the West might withdraw, especially if they fear that their weapons might fall into Wagner hands. “France will not offer much assistance [to nations in the Sahel] if Russia gets involved,” said Powell. Meanwhile, Russia’s motivations for being in West Africa make it unlikely to expend huge resources helping in the fight against jihadi forces. “It’s like a game of chess,” suggested an anonymous French source based in the Sahel. “Can the Russians deploy a lot of mercenaries here in Burkina? ... This is not such a big priority of Russia. It’s a way to make the French panic. They don’t have the resources and it costs too much.” But the West also won’t want to vacate space in the region for Russia to deepen its footprint even more. In November, French President Emmanuel Macron accused Moscow of spreading “predatory influence” in Africa. During a visit to the West African nation of Benin in July, Macron called Russia one of the “last colonial powers,” in a reference to the Ukraine war — seemingly attempting to link memories of Africa’s horrific experience with colonialism to the Kremlin’s present-day actions. | A stabilization strategy must be about governance and dialogue first and then security. The arrival of Russia has not changed things that much; the governance aspect has just become more distant. - Franklin Nossiter, Sahel researcher at International Crisis Group | And amid the heightened competition for Africa, U.S. President Joe Biden declared in December that Washington was “all in” on the continent, while hosting leaders from African nations for a rare summit. But the interests of African — and especially West African — states are likely to be forgotten in this greater geopolitical scramble for influence, warned experts. “The idea that Russia’s gain is the West’s loss is not how West African states see it, and creating a zero-sum mentality makes it very clear that West African interests are not being taken into account,” said Nossiter. At the same time, Western outrage and attempts to prevent Russian involvement are patronizing and unlikely to change West African interest in Russia, he said. Powell concurred, adding, “The problem is that in Paris and Washington there is such a focus on the Russian dimension. Yes, Wagner are doing a lot of bad stuff … but they are one factor among many factors that can explain the local political dynamic.” As Russia and France battle for clout, the ultimate winner will likely be jihadi groups as such tension “will only complicate any regional collaboration” against these terror outfits, warned Lyammouri. But Nossiter raised another concern too. The tussle between Moscow and Paris is focusing attention on security assistance from the two powers, while a more appropriate solution to the crisis is fading. “A stabilization strategy must be about governance and dialogue first and then security,” he said. “The arrival of Russia has not changed things that much; the governance aspect has just become more distant.” |
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