On September 11, 2001, within hours of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., Russian President Vladimir Putin was on the phone with U.S. President George W. Bush, offering his condolences. He was the first international leader to call Bush. Later that day in a televised address, Putin declared, “Russia knows directly what terrorism means, and because of this we, more than anyone, understand the feelings of the American people. In the name of Russia, I want to say to the American people—we are with you.” As the United States ramped up its war on terrorism, it appeared that it might also be ushering in a new era of partnership with Russia.
But as early as November 2001, Timothy Colton and Michael McFaul already saw cause for concern. In an essay published shortly after the 9/11 attacks, they wrote, “it is becoming increasingly evident that, just as America’s competition with the Soviet Union defined the second half of the last century, so will its new relationship with Russia help determine the contours of the new one.” As Washington threw itself into a global campaign against terrorism, they warned, “inattention to the fragility of Russian democracy would be a huge mistake—and one that could have serious negative consequences for American security.”
At the time, Russian President Vladimir Putin had been in office for just two years, but had consistently shown solidarity with Washington. The United States, however, should not take such support for granted, Colton and McFaul warned. Despite Putin’s early cooperation, and support for the United States and democracy among the Russian people, “senior Russian military and intelligence officers are already pushing Putin to retreat to old ways of thinking about international politics,” regarding the West with hostility and suspicion. “Backsliding in Moscow is still a danger and could pit Russia against the United States,” they wrote.
A political science professor at Stanford University in 2001, McFaul would go on to become the U.S. ambassador to Russia from 2012 to 2014. By that point, Russia had descended into full-fledged authoritarianism, and it launched its invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is impossible to say how the world would be different if the United States had chosen a different foreign policy path after 9/11. But as Colton and McFaul pointed out in November 2001, Russian democracy was not dead yet—it just needed all the help it could get to stay alive.
