| European defence spending has risen since then, particularly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – but it still falls short of the Nato 2% of GDP benchmark in most countries. The US spends 3.3% of its GDP on defence, while Trump has called for other Nato powers to hit 5%, a figure that would probably significantly increase budget deficits in a period of weak economic growth. What can Europe do in response? The question of increased defence spending is at the heart of the agenda for Europe’s approach to Ukraine and its own security in the future. Yesterday, the Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk, whose country spends 4.7% of GDP on defence, said: “If we, Europeans, fail to spend big on defence now, we will be forced to spend 10 times more if we don’t prevent a wider war.” Meanwhile, reports from Copenhagen suggested that Denmark is aiming to increase its spending to 3% in 2025 and 2026. But even if that approach was adopted across Europe, it would take “at least a decade” to see a shift on the ground, Arnold said. “A good example is the Germans moving to 2% and introducing a one-off €100bn defence fund in 2022. That hasn’t really touched the sides. So this is not really a short-term solution.” In the meantime, French officials briefed yesterday that the meeting was intended to show Ukraine that European countries would stand by their commitments to Kyiv regardless of bilateral talks between the US and Russia. And, Jon Henley reported, host Emmanuel Macron wanted to avoid any language deepening the US-European split. He said last night that he had spoken to Trump and Zelenskyy and that “we will work on this together”. “It is important for European leaders to act collectively and avoid the ‘bilateralisation’ of their relationships with the US,” said Arnold – that is, to ensure that they do not end up in individual talks with Washington that might weaken their collective position. “They need to recognise that this is not about ‘surviving Trump’ any more, that Vance is probably the Republican nominee for president in 2028, and that better defence-industrial cooperation across Europe will be essential to strengthening their hand.” What about the prospect of sending European troops to Ukraine? Starmer’s statement that the UK is willing to “put our own troops on the ground if necessary” is obviously significant, and there are other European countries taking a similar position: Sweden’s prime minister, Ulf Kristersson, also said contributing to a force in Ukraine was “absolutely a possibility” yesterday, while Macron raised the possibility last year. But other countries, including Germany, have sounded a more cautious note: chancellor Olaf Scholz – who is a week away from an election he is likely to lose – said yesterday that while Germany would be prepared to commit soldiers he was “a little irritated” by the “completely premature” debate. Jon Henley’s analysis here lays out some of the divisions within Europe. One significant factor is that it appears unlikely that any force would be under Nato’s umbrella, with Hegseth saying last week that the organisation’s article 5 guarantee – that an attack on any member would be deemed an attack on all – would not apply. “The danger is that if it is not properly thought out or resourced, or doesn’t have a proper command structure, it fails,” Arnold said. He warned that it would be too optimistic to simply view any mission as a peacekeeping exercise: “You plan for the worst-case scenario. It is possible that Russia acts in the Baltic, and then the mission changes quickly to a warfighting role.” There would be major hurdles to putting together such a force in an effective way. “You’re probably talking about 100,000 troops, and that’s really 300,000 given the need to rotate and train troops away from the frontline. Europeans have never been able to muster those kinds of numbers on their own – 300,000 is roughly the total of high readiness forces across all of Nato including the US. “At the height of Afghanistan, there were about 35,000 non-US troops on the ground. And then there’s the fact that if the Europeans are going to put forces in, they need a real say in what they’re going to do.” In this piece looking at what a European force might look like, Dan Sabbagh reflects some other views on the necessary scale, including the idea that a much smaller “tripwire” force could deter a Russian attack. Starmer appeared to recognise the limits on Europe’s capacity last night when he said that a US “backstop” would be needed: Patrick Wintour reports here that UK defence officials say that no deployment would be possible without air cover and logistics provided by the US through Nato. What does all this mean for the future of Ukraine? It would be premature to view the talks in Riyadh between the US and Russia as peace negotiations, Arnold said. “These are preparatory talks. There seems to be some confusion among what they want to do.” Last week, Trump’s envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg admitted that the US has no plan in mind, but is in “listening mode”. Nonetheless, the mood music is clear: the US views European – and Ukrainian – interests as secondary to getting a deal done and shifting its focus elsewhere. “The really striking thing, if you stand back, is that Russia and indeed China are seeing transatlantic disunity without having had to do anything to make it happen themselves,” Arnold said. “They will be thinking that they might be watching the Nato alliance crumbling before their eyes.” For now, at least, it is hard to see what European countries can do quickly that will force Trump to view the situation differently. Continuing Russian occupation of the Ukrainian territory it holds already looked likely – but the prospect of meaningful security guarantees that would protect Ukraine against aggression in the future looks further away than ever. | 