Early on in a $3,000 buy-in poker tournament with the blinds at 100-200 with a 25 ante, I looked down at A
 A
 from first position and raised to 600 out of my 20,000 stack.
A strong player called from middle position out of his 16,000 stack, as did the small blind and big blind. Both players in the blinds were reasonable players who also had around 20,000 stacks.
The flop came K
 8 2
 and both blinds checked. I decided to bet 1,500 into the 2,625 pot.
While a smaller bet is usually ideal in multi-way pots from a GTO (game theory optimal) point of view, I often bet larger when playing against players who I do not think are world-class because most of them will call with roughly the same range regardless of my bet size.
Only the good player in middle position called. The caller’s range is likely somewhat wide, including any pair (besides pocket pairs worse than middle pair) and all flush draws. I can discount K-K, 8-8, and 2-2 because many players will raise those on the flop. K-8, K-2, and 8-2 are unlikely because those hands would not call my initial preflop raise. This led me to believe that I was either up against a worse made hand or a flush draw.
The turn was the 3. Given this card is highly unlikely to improve my opponent to a better made hand than my aces, and I thought my opponent could easily call a turn bet with most pairs and flush draws, I opted to bet 2,600 into the 5,625 pot.
My opponent called. Looking back, I should have bet a bit larger on the turn because any decent pair or flush draw will probably call a bet of 3,500 or so. I left a bit of value on the table.
The river was the 6, completing the obvious flush draw. While it is unlikely that my opponent’s made hands improved on the river, any flush draws improved to beat me.
If I thought my opponent was the type of player who would call a small bet with top or middle pair even when an obviously scary card arrives, I should make a small bet of 4,000 into the 10,825 pot. Given I thought my opponent was good (and unlikely to pay off a small bet), I instead decided to check.
After some thought, my opponent pushed all-in for 11,275 into the 10,825 pot. That was not what I wanted to happen!
At this point, I have to figure out my opponent’s river pushing range and see how my pocket aces fare, which implies I have to figure out which hands he would be checking. Most players would not go all-in with top pair in this situation, opting instead to check and win at the showdown most of the time. Many players would also not turn a hand like 9-9 or 8-7 into a bluff, although some excellent players would (because those hands are now at the bottom of their range). Notice that there are very few other hands in my opponent’s range that could be turned into a bluff, given I rarely expect my opponent to get to the river with an unpaired hand that didn’t improve to a flush.
Because of this, I decided to fold to my opponent’s all-in. Of course, my opponent may have made a sophisticated bluff with top or middle pair, but I think I am beat most of the time in this spot.
It is important to constantly assess your opponent’s range and see how your hand fares. In this situation, I think folding is the only play that makes sense.
Just be sure you structure your river checking range so you can call the all-in in an un-exploitable manner. If you fold to an all-in every time you check, you are ripe for being exploited. â™
Â
If you want to increase your poker skills and learn to crush the games, check out Jonathan Litte’s elite training site at PokerCoaching.com/CardPlayer.
Â
Â
Â
