Must Read: The Last Days of Intervention

The Last Days of Intervention

Afghanistan and the Delusions of Maximalism

By Rory Stewart

In military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, “U.S. and European officials insisted that there could be a formula for success, a ‘clearly defined mission,’ and an ‘exit strategy,’” writes Rory Stewart in a new essay. “From the very beginning, the international plans were surreally detached from the local reality.”

The delusion proved fatal in Afghanistan. Failing to take the right lessons from earlier operations, Western policymakers “so overstated their case that once they were revealed to be wrong, they could not return to the moderate position of a light footprint and instead lurched from extreme overreach to denial, isolationism, and withdrawal,” Stewart argues. “In the end, they walked out, blaming the chaos that followed on the corruption, ingratitude, and the supposed cowardice of their former partners.”

Read more from Foreign Affairs on the end of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan:

“How the Good War Went Bad” by Carter Malkasian
“Afghanistan’s Corruption Was Made in America” by Sarah Chayes
“We All Lost Afghanistan” by P. Michael McKinley
“Chronicle of a Defeat Foretold” by Christina Lamb
“Bin Laden’s Catastrophic Success” by Nelly Lahoud

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