Latest Case: State v. Nelson (Criminal Law)

The Ministerial Exception Allows Racial Discrimination by Religions

LESLIE C. GRIFFIN

UNLV Boyd School of Law professor Leslie C. Griffin describes the ministerial exception—a First Amendment rule created by courts that bars the application of anti-discrimination laws to religious organizations’ employment relationships with its “ministers”—and enumerates some of the cases in which the exception led to dismissal of a lawsuit. Griffin argues that we as a society cannot achieve full justice as long as courts interpret religious freedom to include a ministerial exception that condones racial discrimination lawsuits.

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State v. Nelson

Citation: 2020-Ohio-3690

Opinion Date: July 15, 2020

Judge: Maureen O'Connor

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the sentence imposed on Defendant for violating the conditions of his community control, holding that Defendant's violation of the condition that he obey all orders of his supervising officer was not a "technical violation," and therefore, the 180-day cap on a prison sentence for a technical violation in Ohio Rev. Code 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(ii) did not apply. Defendant pled guilty to four drug charges and was sentenced to four years of community control. The community control included certain standard conditions that Defendant was alleged to have violated. The trial court found that Defendant's action violated three standard community-control conditions, revoked Defendant's community control, and imposed a thirty-four-month aggregate prison sentence. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, Defendant argued that the 180-day cap on prison sentences set forth in section 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(ii) applies to all community-control violations that are not felonies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plain language of the statute does not support Defendant's interpretation that all noncriminal violations constitute "technical violation[s]" under the statute; and (2) Defendant's violation of the second standard condition was not a "technical violation" under section 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(ii).