Latest Case: Clark v. Delaware (Constitutional Law)

You Have the Right to the Silent Treatment

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb proposes the psychological effects of the “silent treatment” as a possible reason that arrested individuals who understand their Miranda rights nevertheless confess to the police. Rather than seeking to dispute or displace other explanations of the phenomenon, Colb suggests that when police leave a suspect alone in his cell, he may experience their exit as the silent treatment and confess as an attempt to end it.

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Clark v. Delaware

Docket: 114, 2019

Opinion Date: January 14, 2020

Judge: Traynor

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Jeffrey Clark and two associates, Rayshaun Johnson and Christopher Harris, were indicted for first degree murder , conspiracy in the first degree, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited, for their roles in the shooting death of Theodore “Teddy” Jackson. After Harris pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge and entered into a cooperation agreement with the State, the Superior Court granted Clark’s request that his case be tried separately from Johnson’s. Johnson’s case went to trial first, and a jury convicted him on all indicted charges. Then, after a nine-day trial in September 2017, a jury found Clark guilty of attempted assault in the second degree—purportedly a lesser-included offense of murder in the first degree, and conspiracy in the second degree, a lesser included offense of conspiracy in the first degree. Before he was sentenced, Clark moved the Superior Court for acquittal. When that was denied, Clark was sentenced to four years’ incarceration, followed by descending levels of supervision. On appeal, Clark argued that despite the inescapable fact that Teddy Jackson, the only victim identified in the indictment, was dead, the State failed to present sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury’s finding that Clark, at the time of the alleged crime, intended to cause “serious physical injury.” And because intent to cause “serious physical injury,” as opposed to mere “physical injury,” was an element of attempted assault in the second degree, according to Clark, the Superior Court erred when it denied his post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal. Finding no merit to Clark's claims, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence.