| King v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 16-1621 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Torruella Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit declined to grant Defendant's petition for leave to file a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to once again challenge his 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) conviction and sentence for use of a firearm during a crime of violence, holding that 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under section 924(c)'s force clause. Defendant was convicted of several offenses, including bank robbery and use of a firearm during a crime of violence. In his petition to file a second or successive motion under section 2255 to challenge his section 924 conviction, Defendant argued that section 2113(a) bank robbery is not a crime of violence under section 924(c)'s force clause because it is an indivisible statute setting forth a single offense that may be violated by alternative means, which do not necessarily have as an element the use of physical force against the person or property of another. The First Circuit denied the requested relief, holding (1) section 2113(a) bank robbery is a divisible statute setting forth distinct offenses with alternative elements; and (2) under the modified categorical approach, Defendant's offense of conviction was a crime of violence under section 924(c)'s force clause. |
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| United States v. Capelton |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 19-1613 Opinion Date: July 16, 2020 Judge: Torruella Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court on resentencing pursuant to the 2018 First Step Act that Defendant was a career offender under section 4B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, holding that Defendant failed to establish that the scope of joint venture liability under Massachusetts law is broader than under the generic standard. In classifying Defendant as a career offender, the district court relied on two Massachusetts drug convictions. On appeal, Defendant argued that the two Massachusetts drug convictions did not qualify as predicate controlled substance offenses under the career-offender guideline. Specifically, Defendant argued (1) the convictions implicitly included what was then called joint venture liability, which was broader in scope than generic aiding and abetting liability; and (2) therefore, there could not be a categorical match between the convictions and the definition of "controlled substance offense." The First Circuit disagreed, holding (1) Defendant's contention that his two prior state convictions were over broad and did not qualify as controlled substance offenses was unavailing; and (2) the district court properly sentenced Defendant under the career-offender guideline. |
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| Jack v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Dockets: 18-842, 18-1479 Opinion Date: July 16, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Second Circuit granted petitions for review of the BIA's decisions ordering petitioners removed based on their New York firearms convictions. The court principally concluded that the statutes of conviction, sections 265.03 and 265.11 of the New York Penal Law, criminalize conduct involving "antique firearms" that the relevant firearms offense definitions in the Immigration and Nationality Act do not. Therefore, the court held that this categorical mismatch precludes petitioners' removal on the basis of their state convictions. Accordingly, the court vacated the BIA's decisions and remanded with instructions to terminate the removal hearings. |
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| United States v. Jones |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 19-95 Opinion Date: July 16, 2020 Judge: Pooler Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The term "false or fictitious" as used in 18 U.S.C. 514 refers to both wholly contrived types of documents or instruments and fake versions of existing documents or instruments. The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction under section 514, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. In this case, defendant used fake government transportation requests and purchase orders to various companies while posing as a "Commissioner and Head of Delegation" of a nongovernmental organization he created. |
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| United States v. Jones |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-3800 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Amalya Lyle Kearse Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute narcotics; Hobbs Act robbery and Hobbs Act conspiracy; and possession of a firearm, which had been discharged, in furtherance of the robbery. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the glove DNA evidence. In this case, the five day Daubert hearing exhaustively dissected the Forensic Statistical Tool method of DNA analysis and the district court permissibly found that two Daubert factors favored denial of defendant's motion to exclude the evidence. Even if the district court erred by admitting the Glove DNA evidence, the error was harmless. The court also held that the district court did not err by rejecting defendant's proposed jury instruction on multiple conspiracies and in denying his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence as to the credibility of a government witness. |
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| United States v. Muzio |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 19-33 Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: Park Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's 420 month sentence for child pornography offenses. The court held that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court reviewed the record; considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors; and was well within its discretion in imposing a 35 year sentence for defendant's abhorrent conduct, noting the number of victims and the lengths he went to manipulate them. The court also held that defendant's sentence was procedurally reasonable where the district court's Guidelines calculation error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the sentencing. |
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| United States v. Walker |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-3729 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Pooler Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress statements made and narcotics discovered during a search incident to arrest. The court held that the officers lacked an objectively reasonable belief of legal wrongdoing to justify stopping defendant. In this case, the officers stopped defendant on the basis of a photograph that provided little meaningful identifying information to the police besides the race of a suspect. Consequently, the police lacked specific and articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. The court further held that the resultant taint of illegality was not purged by the officers' subsequent discovery of an unrelated arrest warrant; the search of defendant yielding the narcotics and statements at issue was insufficiently attenuated from the unconstitutional stop; any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise, would have dissipated when the officers approached defendant and could see up close that he did not resemble the photographed suspect; and the subsequent search for outstanding warrants was thus purposeful and flagrant conduct. |
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| Nunez-Vasquez v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-1841 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Roger L. Gregory Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Fourth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision finding that petitioner was removable because he had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. The court held that neither of petitioner's convictions for leaving an accident in violation of Va. Code Ann. 46.2–894 and for use of false identification in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2–186.3(B1) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. The court explained that petitioner's failure-to-stop conviction lacked the required culpable mental state and there is no morally reprehensible conduct. Regardless of the required culpable mental state, the court was not convinced that the offense of false identification has the required moral reprehensible conduct to qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude. Accordingly, the court vacated the BIA's order of removal and remanded with instructions that the government be directed to return petitioner to the United States. |
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| Smith v. Collins |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-7313 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Floyd Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Plaintiff filed suit against various correctional officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of his procedural due process rights. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from the four years that he spent in solitary confinement in prison. The district court granted summary judgment to the officials on the ground that plaintiff had failed to establish a protected liberty interest. The Fourth Circuit vacated and held that plaintiff has presented evidence demonstrating that his confinement conditions were severe in comparison to those that exist in general population and that his segregation status may have had collateral consequences relating to the length of his sentence. Furthermore, although the duration of plaintiff's segregated confinement is not as long as the substantial periods of segregated confinement that this court has found sufficient to support a protected liberty interest in the past, prisoners need not languish in solitary confinement for decades on end in order to possess a cognizable liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, the four-plus years that plaintiff spent in administrative segregation is significant enough to tip the scales in his favor, particularly in light of the other evidence of indefiniteness that he relies upon in this case. Therefore, the court held that there is at least a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether plaintiff's conditions of confinement imposed a significant and atypical hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. The court remanded for further proceedings. |
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| United States v. Bank |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-4356 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Stephanie Dawn Thacker Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Securities Law, White Collar Crime |
| In 2015, the SEC initiated enforcement proceedings in the District of Arizona against appellant for illegitimate investment activities. In 2017, appellant entered into a consent agreement with the SEC, and the United States District Court for the District of Arizona ultimately held appellant liable for disgorgement in the amount of $4,494,900. Then the grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia returned an indictment charging appellant with, inter alia, securities fraud and unlawful sale of securities, based in part on the same conduct underlying the SEC proceeding. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, which the district court denied. The Fourth Circuit joined with every other circuit to have decided the issue in holding that disgorgement in an SEC proceeding is not a criminal penalty pursuant to the Double Jeopardy Clause, such that an individual cannot be later prosecuted for the conduct underlying the disgorgement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment. |
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| United States v. Bolden |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-4140 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Pamela Harris Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm after officers discovered guns and drugs in the bedroom of a private home where defendant was arrested. The court held that, because the district court made no findings linking defendant's possession of a firearm to his felony drug possession, the district court clearly erred when it applied USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)'s four-level enhancement on the ground that defendant possessed a firearm "in connection with" the felony possession of cocaine. |
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| United States v. Coston |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-4242 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Floyd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After the district court sentenced defendant to an above-Guidelines revocation sentence, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2373 (2019)(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment), that a different mandatory revocation provision, 18 U.S.C. 3583(k), was unconstitutional in an as-applied challenge. Defendant relied on Haymond and appealed the revocation of his supervised release, arguing that 18 U.S.C. 3583(g) similarly violates his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Defendant also alleged that his prison sentence is plainly unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence, holding that any constitutional error is not plain at the time of this appeal. The court held that section 3583(g) likely does not meet Justice Breyer's controlling test, and given that no majority of the Supreme Court endorsed the application of Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), in the supervised release context, the court remained bound by this court's prior decision that it does not. The court also held that defendant's sentence was not plainly unreasonable because it reflected his repeated violations of supervised release. |
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| United States v. Curry |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4233 Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: Floyd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| On rehearing en banc, at issue was whether the Fourth Amendment's exigent circumstances doctrine justified the suspicionless seizure of defendant. In this case, the police seized defendant responding to several gunshots that were fired in or near an apartment complex less than a minute earlier. When the police arrived at the scene, they encountered five to eight men, including defendant, calmly and separately walking in the public area behind the complex, as well as several other people standing around closer to the apartments and another man walking toward the rear of the officers' patrol car. The court held that the stop was not justified by exigent circumstances and thus was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress a firearm and other evidence based on the unreasonableness of the seizure that led to its discovery. The court explained that, to hold otherwise would create a sweeping exception to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The court stated that the exigent circumstances exception may permit suspicionless seizures when officers can narrowly target the seizures based on specific information of a known crime and a controlled geographic area. The court further stated that, by allowing officers to bypass the individualized suspicion requirement based on the information they had here—the sound of gunfire and the general location where it may have originated—would completely cripple a fundamental Fourth Amendment protection and create a dangerous precedent. |
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| United States v. Webb |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4446 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Pamela Harris Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for multiple criminal offenses related to drug trafficking and money laundering. However, the court vacated defendant's life sentence and held that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to address his non-frivolous mitigation arguments against a life sentence. In this case, there is no mention in the district court's brief explanation of the sentence of defendant's argument that given his age, a shorter, 20-year sentence would be sufficient to incapacitate him until he is in his 60s and thus less likely to recidivate. Furthermore, the district court did not address defendant's arguments regarding sentencing disparities with his coconspirators. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. |
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| United States v. Bazan |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-40724 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine, he argued on appeal that he should have received a mitigating role adjustment pursuant to USSG 3B1.2. This court held that defendant could not demonstrate plain error because the issue was a question of fact that was capable of resolution by the district court upon proper objection. Thereafter, the Supreme Court concluded in Davis v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1060, 1061 (2020), that there is no legal basis for the Fifth Circuit's practice of declining to review certain unpreserved factual arguments for plain error. The Supreme Court then granted defendant's petition for certiorari. On remand from the Supreme Court, the court affirmed the district court's denial of a mitigating role adjustment and held that defendant failed to show error, plain or otherwise. In this case, defendant exercised decision-making authority by recruiting his brother and coordinating actions with another individual. Furthermore, the plan between defendant, his brother, and another individual suggested that defendant had some discretion regarding his role in the offense. |
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| United States v. Brandon |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-50227 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Stephen Andrew Higginson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, which established for the first time that the government must prove that the person charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm "knew he had the relevant status when he possessed" the firearm. The Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that the district court's error in accepting defendant's guilty plea did not affect his substantial rights. In this case, defendant's state court documents, and especially his behavior at the time of his arrest, established that defendant had knowledge of his status as a convicted felon when he possessed the firearm. Therefore, the court concluded that there is no reasonable probability that defendant would have refused to enter the plea absent the district court's error. |
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| United States v. Lee |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-40435 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Gregg Costa Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions and sentences for charges related to their involvement in a conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendants' convictions; venue in the Eastern District was proper; defendants have not offered any evidence to get past the presumption of jury impartiality; any error the district court committed by admitting the government's experts' testimony was harmless; and any error in giving the deliberate ignorance jury instruction was harmless. The court also held that the district court did not clearly err in calculating the drug quantity involved in the conspiracy; defendants' base offense level of 36 was appropriate under either Guidelines Manual; and the district court did not clearly err in finding that the firearm enhancement applied. |
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| United States v. Luyten |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-40603 Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: Kurt D. Engelhardt Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to transport undocumented aliens within the United States by means of an aircraft. The court held that the district court did not err by applying a sentencing enhancement under USSG 2L1.1(b)(6) for recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. In this case, the aliens were transported on a small aircraft in excess of the seating capacity flown by defendant who had not held a valid pilot certificate for eleven years. Therefore, the totality of these specific facts and reasonable inferences supports the conclusion that the manner in which defendant transported these aliens involved inherently dangerous practices that produced substantial risks of death or serious bodily injury. |
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| United States v. Montgomery |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-20448 Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: Stephen Andrew Higginson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit vacated defendant's conviction for failure to register as a sex offender in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Defendant argued that his New Jersey conviction for second degree sexual assault is a SORNA tier I offense, meaning that he was required to register for only 15 years after his release from custody in 1995 and had no obligation to register as a sex offender when he was charged with failing to do so in 2018. The court held that because the New Jersey Supreme Court has interpreted the state crime of sexual assault in the second degree to cover conduct outside of the federal definitions given in 18 U.S.C. 2241 and 2242, defendant does not qualify as a tier III offender. Because defendant does not meet the definition of a tier III offender, he must be classified as a tier I offender. As a tier I offender, the court explained that defendant was required to register for only 15 years after his release in 1995. |
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| United States v. Perryman |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-10755 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Stephen Andrew Higginson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The court rejected defendant's argument that the district court erred by accepting a constitutionally inadequate factual resume as foreclosed by precedent. The court also held that there was no error in the district court's application of a guideline enhancement for obstruction of justice based on its finding that defendant gave false testimony. |
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| United States v. Redmond |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-10535 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: James L. Dennis Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to bank robbery. The court held that the district court erred by imposing a four-level sentencing enhancement to defendant's base offense level for an abduction during the robbery under USSG 2B3.1(b)(4)(A), because a victim was not forced to accompany defendant to a different location. However, no remand is required because the error was harmless where the government has demonstrated that the district court would have imposed the same sentence had it not made the same error and that it would have done so for the same reasons it gave at the prior sentencing. Finally, the court held that defendant's 180-month sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court analyzed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. |
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| United States v. Toure |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-10505 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Jennifer Walker Elrod Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendants' conviction for forced labor, conspiracy to harbor an alien for financial gain, and harboring an alien. The court held that defendants have failed to identify any authority holding that under current law—the standard they must meet on plain-error review—the forced-labor statute's definition of "serious harm" is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; the evidence was sufficient to support the forced-labor conviction; the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to give defendants' requested jury instruction; and the district court did not err by imposing a restitution award of $288,620.24. |
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| United States v. Ashrafkhan |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 17-1918 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Danny Julian Boggs Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| Ashrafkhan came to the U.S. in 1991 after receiving a scholarship to study at Michigan State University. He earned a Ph.D. with a research focus on pathology and the genetics of cancer. In 2006, he founded Compassionate Doctors, a medical practice outside of Detroit, that was actually a “pill mill,” where unscrupulous doctors wrote fraudulent prescriptions for fake patients. Compassionate billed Medicare for the fake patient visits and collected millions of dollars in Medicare payments over the course of several years. The fraudulent prescriptions were filled by individuals recruited by Compassionate at pharmacies that paid Compassionate kickbacks. Those drugs were then sold on the street, resulting in hundreds of thousands of opioid-based drugs being distributed onto the illegal drug market. Ashrafkhan was convicted of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, and money laundering and was sentenced to 23 years of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the jury instruction on “reasonable doubt.” The instruction stressed to the jury the need to base its decision on “the evidence or lack of evidence” and that a reasonable doubt was one that was “still standing” after all of the evidence had been considered. |
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| United States v. Fugate |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-6163 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Karen Nelson Moore Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Fugate sold stolen firearms and other property that he acquired from co-defendants conducting thefts from automobiles across Kentucky, Ohio, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Authorities recovered 25 firearms from Fugate’s residence. Fugate’s wife turned over an additional seven firearms. Fugate admitted that he sold firearms to drug traffickers and gang members and that he knew that some of the firearms were stolen. Fugate pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), The government dropped a charge of receipt, possession, or trafficking of firearms and ammunition, “knowing and having reasonable cause to believe the firearms and ammunition were stolen.” Fugate had a prior conviction for felony possession of firearms by an unlawful user of controlled substances. The court applied a six-level sentencing enhancement because the offense involved at least 25 firearms; a two-level enhancement because some firearms were stolen; a four-level enhancement because Fugate engaged in the trafficking of firearms; and a four-level enhancement because Fugate possessed or trafficked the firearms “in connection with another felony offense.” The calculated Guidelines range was 78-97 months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced him to 97 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the sentence. Applying an enhancement for possessing or trafficking firearms in connection with another felony—knowingly trafficking stolen firearms was impermissible double-counting under the Sentencing Guidelines. |
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| United States v. Garth |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5658 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: McKEAGUE Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Garth pled guilty to possessing crack cocaine with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). His sentencing guidelines range was originally 70-87 months’ imprisonment. Garth’s prior Tennessee convictions for aggravated assault and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver triggered the “career-offender enhancement,” which applies when a defendant has more than one prior conviction for either crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, which resulted in a range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a sentence of 110 months’ imprisonment. Garth’s Tennessee conviction for possessing marijuana with intent to deliver counts as a sentence-enhancing controlled-substance offense. |
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| United States v. Raymore |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-3703 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Nalbandian Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Lorain Police Department officers, responding after hearing gunshots, spotted the man (Raymore) that McCollough (victim) had seen. They recovered a gun near where McCollough heard a “gun hitting the concrete,” ammunition in that gun, and a magazine with more ammunition in the black Nissan that rolled over McCollough’s hand earlier that night. Testing and DNA evidence connected that evidence with Raymore, who was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Raymore had previous convictions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for terms exceeding one year: possession of drugs, assault, aggravated robbery, felon in possession of a firearm, and aggravated burglary. Raymore was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment for violating his supervised release, consecutive to 110 months for the firearm possession. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was evidence that allowed a jury to conclude Raymore constructively possessed the gun and the ammunition in that gun. Rejecting an argument that the indictment failed to allege a mens rea element required after the Supreme Court’s “Rehaif” decision and that the jury instructions were erroneous for the same reason, the court noted that Raymore stipulated to his felony convictions. The court appropriately enhanced Raymore's Sentencing Guidelines range because Raymore’s prior Ohio assault and aggravated robbery convictions qualified as crimes of violence. |
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| Brown v. Polk County |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2698 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Scudder Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Brown, a detainee at Wisconsin’s Polk County Jail, underwent a physical search of her body cavities. The institution had a written policy authorizing such a search to be conducted by medical personnel when there was reasonable suspicion to believe an inmate was internally hiding contraband. Fellow inmates had reported that Brown was concealing methamphetamine inside her body, which prompted jail staff to invoke the policy. Officers took Brown to a hospital, where a doctor and nurse first conducted an ultrasound, then inspected both her vagina and rectum in a private room without officers present. The search revealed no drugs. Brown sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendants had reasonable suspicion that Brown was concealing contraband, their suspicion justified the cavity search, and the ensuing search was reasonable. |
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| Fayemi v. Roberson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1241 Opinion Date: July 16, 2020 Judge: Frank Hoover Easterbrook Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| While in a hospital, Mintner entered a coma and seemed on the brink of death. Her blood and urine contained vastly more thallium than the natural concentration. Her fiancé, Fayemi had been providing some of her food, including in the hospital. Seven of Minter’s friends who occasionally ate with her also suffered from thallium poisoning. Her dog died of thallium poisoning after it ate table scraps. Fayemi had purchased enough thallium sulfate to kill about 50 people. Fayemi told the supplier that he needed the substance for research but later asserted that he and Minter wanted it to kill mice, a forbidden use, and that Minter had been careless with the poison. Fayemi often ate at Minter’s house without showing any traces of thallium poisoning. Thallium was found in a salt shaker in Fayemi’s kitchen. Fayemi had threatened to kill Minter if she left him. The jury convicted Fayemi of attempting to murder Minter plus seven counts of aggravated battery. The convictions were affirmed on appeal; a state court rejected a collateral attack. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas corpus petition. Fayemi claimed that his lawyer was ineffective by telling the jurors, in his opening statement, that Fayemi would testify that Minter asked Fayemi to get the thallium for her. After the judge decided that some of his prior convictions, plus evidence that he had annotated a book about poisoning people, could come in on cross-examination, counsel persuaded Fayemi not to testify. Fayemi waived that right in open court. The state’s appellate judges reasonably concluded that there was no possibility of prejudice. |
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| Gysan v. Francisko |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1471 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Frank Hoover Easterbrook Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Officer Francisko, checking hunters’ licenses, approached a van parked on the side of a road. Armed hunters had just emerged from the woods. The driver, Cataline, was acting strangely but handed Francisko his driver’s license. While Francisko was doing a license check, Cataline called 911 and said: “I am in a lot of trouble … I think I am going to be disappearing.” He then hung up. Francisko told Cataline that he was free to go. The 911 operator reached Officer Kuehl’s supervisor, who told him to stop Cataline to check whether he was fit to drive. The officers followed Cataline’s van, pulled it over, and asked Cataline to turn off the engine. He did not comply but stared straight ahead. After ignoring three requests, Cataline put the van into reverse, turned, and pointed the van west in the eastbound lanes of the Interstate. Cataline then made another turn and plowed the van into the side of Kuehl’s car. Kuehl and Francisko say that Kuehl was pinned behind the door. Francisko shot Cataline, who died at the scene. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Cataline’s behavior and the odd 911 call would have led an officer to be concerned that he posed a danger to himself and others. Francisko and Kuehl testified that they saw the van cross the white line on the highway several times. The stop was reasonable and compatible with the Fourth Amendment. |
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| Lee v. Watson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 20-2128 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Diane S. Sykes Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 1996, Lee and Kehoe, members of a white supremacist organization, traveled from Washington to the Arkansas home of Mueller, a firearms dealer. After stealing about $30,000 worth of weapons and $50,000 in cash and coins, the two stunned Mueller, his wife, and his eight-year-old daughter and sealed plastic bags over their heads, then threw them into the Illinois Bayou. The bodies were discovered months later. The two were convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(1). Kehoe’s jury returned a verdict of life in prison. At Lee’s sentencing, prosecutors introduced evidence of his involvement in a 1990 Oklahoma murder; the government’s expert testified that Lee had a test score in the psychopathy range. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Lee’s death sentence. Lee pursued collateral review. The government scheduled Lee’s execution for December 2019. He again sought relief. The district court stayed Lee’s execution. The Seventh Circuit vacated the stay, stating that Lee’s likelihood of success on the merits was “slim” because both claims—Brady claims alleging suppression of exculpatory evidence and Strickland claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel—are “regularly made and resolved under section 2255,” so the remedy cannot be called “inadequate or ineffective” for purposes of the Savings Clause in section 2241. The evidence Lee claims is “newly discovered” was known to him and publicly available in the court record of his Oklahoma murder case. Lee’s execution was rescheduled for July 13, 2020. The judge denied Lee’s Rule 59 motion. The Seventh Circuit denied relief, finding Lee’s arguments frivolous. |
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| Marling v. Brown |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-3077 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Frank Hoover Easterbrook Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Marling was arrested while driving his car. Police took an inventory. The trunk held a locked box. An officer opened the box with a screwdriver and found illegal drugs. Marling was armed, despite felony convictions. After unsuccessfully moving to suppress the box's contents, Marling received a 38-year sentence, as a habitual criminal. He filed an unsuccessful state court collateral attack, arguing that his lawyers furnished ineffective assistance by not arguing that opening the box damaged the box, in violation of police policy. The court of appeals found that the record did not establish damage to the box. A federal district court issued a writ of habeas corpus, ruling that a photograph showed damage to the box. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A factual mistake by a state court does not support collateral relief unless a correction shows that the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties” of the U.S. Not every departure from any policy violates the Fourth Amendment. The policy at issue states an officer “should avoid” opening a container when that would cause “unreasonable potential damage.” The policy is valid: it combines a presumptive rule of opening everything with a discretionary exception. Because the policy is valid, the search is valid. A district judge’s disagreement about whether the officer followed the local policy is not a sufficient ground for collateral relief. |
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| Peterson v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 20-2252 Opinion Date: July 12, 2020 Judge: Diane S. Sykes Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| In 1996 Lee murdered an Arkansas family of three in pursuit of funds for a white supremacist organization. Lee was convicted of capital murder in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(1), and sentenced to death. His execution was scheduled for December 9, 2019, but was stayed by one district judge in connection with Lee’s 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition, and another who was hearing a challenge to the federal execution protocol. In December 2019, the Seventh Circuit vacated the stay in the section 2241 proceeding. The D.C. Circuit vacated the injunction in the execution-protocol case in April 2020. Lee’s execution was rescheduled for July 13. On July 7, family members of the victims sought an injunction; they want to attend the execution although they oppose it. The Warden authorized them to be witnesses, but they object to carrying out the execution during the COVID-19 pandemic. They raise health concerns, citing age, underlying medical conditions, and the need to travel interstate to reach the Terre Haute prison. A district judge issued a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit vacated that injunction, finding the Administrative Procedures Act claim frivolous. The challenged action—setting an execution date—may not be judicially reviewable; the Bureau of Prisons observed the minimal regulatory requirements and has the unconstrained discretion to choose an execution date. In addition, the plaintiffs have no statutory or regulatory right to attend the execution and are not “adversely affected or aggrieved,” 5 U.S.C. 702. |
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| Pulera v. Sarzant |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2291 Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: St. Eve Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Police arrested Pulera on suspicion of bail jumping and took him to the Kenosha Pre-Trial Facility. About 48 hours later, Pulera attempted to hang himself in his cell. Correctional officers swiftly cut him down and called for an ambulance that saved his life. While at the facility, Pulera never told any official that he was contemplating suicide. Pulera did submit three requests for his prescription medications--clonazepam, apparently prescribed for anxiety, and tramadol, an opioid pain-reliever for his chronic pain from a back injury. He reported physical symptoms relating to not having those drugs and was seen by a nurse, who recorded that he had normal vital signs. Pulera was not given the pills because several of his pills were missing and the doctor inferred that Pulera could have already taken them. Pulera alleges that he had previously been on suicide watch at the facility and that his brother and his mother had recently committed suicide. The district court rejected Pulera’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Given Pulera’s express statement that he was not considering suicide and the absence of more significant indirect signs, no rational jury could find that Pulera was unreasonably placed in the general population. A jury could not infer that depriving Pulera of his medications might be deadly from the mere fact that a physician had prescribed them. |
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| United States v. Blake |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2508 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Brennan Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Tax Law, White Collar Crime |
| Blake, who has an MBA, engaged in a fraudulent tax scheme but claims unnamed users in internet chat rooms persuaded him to pursue his hidden federal “legacy trusts.” Blake filed eight different individual tax returns using fraudulent information, at one point faking his own death. He was convicted of presenting a false or fictitious claim to a U.S. agency, 18 U.S.C. 287, and theft of government money, 18 U.S.C. 641. Blake’s base offense level was six; 16 levels were added for an intended loss in excess of $1.5 million (U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1)(I)). Two more levels were added for obstruction of justice (3C1.1). Blake’s guidelines range was 51–63 months' imprisonment. Blake objected to including in the loss calculation $900,000 in claimed refunds in the 2008–2010 filings, arguing he was not responsible for those filings. He also claimed $300,000 should be the intended loss amount because he intended to obtain only his “legacy trust” funds which he believed were about that amount. Under Blake’s calculations, his guidelines range was 33–41 months. The district court rejected his arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence of 36 months in prison plus restitution. The district court did not commit reversible error. Blake's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was dismissed without prejudice as “better raised on collateral review.” |
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| United States v. Felders |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2867 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Seventh Circuit affirmed Felders’s conviction as a felon possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and his 96-month sentence, rejecting an argument that his statements should have been suppressed because the police did not give him the required “Miranda” warnings. Felders testified that the police had not given him warnings of any kind. Officer Price testified that he had taken from his credential case a card, issued by the state police, with warnings and read Felders the advice on that card. On appeal, Felders no longer denied that Price read him warnings from a card but claimed that the record does not show that the statements read from the card satisfy Miranda. The Seventh Circuit held that Felders had the burden of persuasion and, on a silent record, he cannot show that any error occurred. The district judge could have asked Price to read the card aloud, but the absence of this information cuts against Felders given the plain-error burden. The court stated that it had no “reason to believe that Indiana, or any other state, distributes warning cards that fail to satisfy the Supreme Court’s requirements.” |
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| United States v. Khan |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Dockets: 19-1745, 19-1734 Opinion Date: July 16, 2020 Judge: ROVNER Areas of Law: Banking, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| In 2006-2009,, Ghuman and Khan “flipped” 44 gas stations. Ghuman would recruit a buyer before they purchased the station. The buyers lacked the financial wherewithal to qualify loans. Ghuman and Khan's co-defendant, AEB loan officer Brahmbhatt, arranged loans based on fraudulent documentation. They also created false financial statements for the gas stations. Co-defendant Mehta, an accountant, prepared fictitious tax returns. The loans, which were guaranteed by the Small Business Administration, went into arrears. In 2008-2009 the SBA began auditing the AEB loans; the FBI began looking into suspected bank fraud. AEB ultimately incurred a loss in excess of $14 million. Khan cooperated and pled guilty to one count of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, in connection with a $331,000 loan. Ghuman pleaded guilty to another count of bank fraud in connection with a $744,000 loan and to one count of filing a false tax return, 26 U.S.C. 7206. The district court denied Ghuman credit for acceptance of responsibility and imposed a below-Guidelines prison term of 66 months. The court ordered Khan to serve a 36-month prison term and ordered Ghuman to pay $11.8 million and Khan to pay $10.8 million in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentences with an adjustment to Ghuman’s term of supervised release. |
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| United States v. Crumble |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2197 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Raymond W. Gruender Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of ammunition. The court held that defendant failed to meet his burden to prove that his substantial rights were affected by the Rehaif error. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the government to present photos of individual frames of the surveillance video and there was no Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 violation. Finally, the court held that defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court carefully considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, including both the mitigating and aggravating factors. |
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| United States v. Esquibel |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-3177 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the district court did not err by applying a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense under USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) & cmt. n.14(c), and a two-level enhancement for recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer under USSG 2A1.4 cmt. n.1. The court also held that the district court did not err in finding defendant's prior Iowa controlled substance conviction was an enhancing predicate. |
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| United States v. Freeman |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2055 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Lavenski R. Smith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The court applied the Supreme Court's analysis in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981), and Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 200 (2013), holding that defendant's brief detention was permissible and that the police had valid justifications for the detention. In this case, the officers' brief detention of the vehicle's passengers and approach of the car were constitutionally permissible; during the approach, the officers developed probable cause to search the car when they smelled marijuana and saw defendant's furtive movements; and thus the brief seizure and subsequent search of the vehicle based on probable cause was constitutional. |
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| United States v. Kenton Eagle Chasing |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2420 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Kobes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's revocation sentence after he violated the terms of his supervised release. The court held that a revocation sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e) does not violate defendant's constitutional rights; defendant failed to demonstrate that the district court judge was impartial and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for recusal; the evidence was sufficient to show that defendant violated the conditions of his release by failing to reside at his residential re-entry center and by eluding the police; even if the district court's conclusion that defendant's conduct amounted to eluding the police was incorrect, the error did not affect defendant's sentence and was harmless; and the revocation sentence was neither procedurally unsound or substantively unreasonable. |
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| United States v. Natysin |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2684 Opinion Date: July 16, 2020 Judge: Grasz Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after she pleaded guilty to nine counts of wire fraud, two counts of tax evasion, and one count of making and subscribing a false tax return. The court held that the district court did not err by applying a two-level sentencing enhancement pursuant to USSG 3B1.3 for abusing a position of private trust. In this case, it is clear that defendant would not have been able to commit or conceal her fraud if not for the discretion she was granted through her position as an office manager and bookkeeper in the company. |
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| United States v. Owens |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1516 Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for drug trafficking and firearms offenses. The court rejected defendant's contention that he was convicted in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment to trial by an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community, because defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of systemic exclusion; the district court did not abuse its discretion in defining reasonable doubt or in rejecting defendant's proposed instruction on the burden of proof; defendant's Rehaif claim failed because there was ample evidence that he was aware of his status as a person convicted of an offense punishable by more than a year in prison where he had served 22 years in prison; defendant was not prejudiced by the district court's supplemental instruction to the jury; sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction; the district court did not err in applying a two-level sentencing enhancement under USSG D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a drug premises; and defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable. |
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| United States v. Redditt |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3660 Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that defendant's three prior Minnesota first degree aggravated robbery convictions qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The court explained that Minnesota aggravated robbery is an indivisible offense that includes the lesser included offense of simple robbery and is therefore categorically a violent felony. |
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| United States v. Ringland |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2331 Opinion Date: July 16, 2020 Judge: C.J. Williams Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of receipt of child pornography and the denial of defendant's motion to suppress. In this case, law enforcement officers seized and searched defendant's devices under authorized warrants based on information furnished by Google, Inc. and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). The court held that the district court did not err when it found that Google's search of defendant's email accounts constituted a private search. In this case, Google did not act as a government agent because it scanned its users' emails volitionally and out of its own private business interests. Furthermore, Google did not become a government agent merely because it had a mutual interest in eradicating child pornography from its platform. Therefore, Google's continued actions in its own interest and the government's continued receipt of the reports does not give rise to some form of agency. Finally, the court held that because the investigator searched only the same files that Google searched, the government did not expand the search beyond Google's private party search. |
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| United States v. Rodd |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-3498 Opinion Date: July 16, 2020 Judge: Lavenski R. Smith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for compassionate release under Section 603(b) of the First Step Act. Defendant was convicted of four counts of wire fraud and one count of mail fraud for defrauding investors. The court need not determine whether the district court erred in adhering to the policy statements in USSG 1B1.13, because the district court knew its discretion. The court rejected defendant's contention that the district court abused its discretion in denying his compassionate release motion, stating that the court does not require district courts to mechanically recite the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The court held that the district court appropriately reviewed the record evidence and found defendant's case not sufficiently persuasive to warrant relief. |
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| Silva v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 16-70130 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Sandra S. Ikuta Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of the BIA's December 2015 order of removal, holding that the BIA did not err in relying on binding precedent to conclude that petitioner was removable on the ground that he was convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude. The panel discussed that, if it were writing on a clean slate, what categorical analysis it would use. However, because the panel was not writing on a clean slate, the panel held, according to binding precedent, that petty theft under section 484(a) of the California Penal Code is a crime involving moral turpitude. The panel also denied the petition for review of the BIA's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case for asylum or withholding of removal. Finally, the panel held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case for protection under the Convention Against Torture. |
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| United States v. Pisarski |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 17-10428 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: M. Margaret McKeown Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's pre-sentencing order enjoining the government from spending additional funds on the prosecution of defendants, who pleaded guilty to federal conspiracy to manufacture and possess with intent to distribute marijuana. The panel held that the appropriations rider that prohibited the Department of Justice from using congressionally-allocated funding to prevent states from implementing their medical marijuana laws does not bar the government from spending funds on this appeal. The panel also held that the district court did not err in concluding that defendants met their burden to show that they were strictly compliant with the Medical Marijuana Program Act at the time of their arrest. In this case, the district court properly focused the McIntosh hearing on the conduct underlying the charge, and the district court's analysis of state law was not in error and its factual findings were not clearly erroneous. |
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| United States v. Reyes-Moreno |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Dockets: 19-2058, 19-2059 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Timothy M. Tymkovich Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| After a routine traffic stop in New Mexico led to Raquel Cortez and Josefina Reyes-Moreno’s indictment for conspiring to transport undocumented aliens, both defendants jointly moved to suppress evidence based on Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations they alleged occurred during the stop. The district court found no constitutional violations and denied the motion. After review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit concurred no constitutional violations occurred during the stop. "No Fourth Amendment violation occurred because none of the law enforcement officers’ initial questions impermissibly delayed the stop and, during the stop, the officers developed reasonable suspicion the defendants were transporting undocumented aliens, justifying a further detention until Border Patrol arrived. No Fifth Amendment violation occurred because neither Cortez nor Reyes-Moreno faced custodial interrogation during the stop, rendering the absence of Miranda warnings harmless." |
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| United States v. Wyatt |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 18-1135 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: David M. Ebel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Richard Wyatt challenged two convictions for conspiring with others to deal in firearms without a federal firearms license. The Government conceded that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that, in order to convict Wyatt of these conspiracy offenses, the jury had to find that Wyatt and his alleged co-conspirators acted willfully -- that they knew they were agreeing to do something unlawful. The Government further conceded that this error warranted vacating Wyatt’s conspiracy convictions and remanding for a new trial. But Wyatt contended that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial for a reasonable jury to find that he and his co-conspirators acted willfully and, therefore, the Tenth Circuit court should instead, dismiss the conspiracy counts charged against him with prejudice. The Tenth Circuit declined to dismiss, concluding there was sufficient evidence presented at trial that, if believed, would have supported a reasonable jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Wyatt and his co-conspirators knew they were agreeing to violate the law. Wyatt’s two conspiracy convictions were vacated and the matter remanded to the district court for further proceedings. |
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| Bates v. Secretary, Department of Corrections |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-14960 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr. Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 as untimely. The court held that its decisions in Hall v. Secy, Dep't of Corr., 921 F.3d 983, 988–90 (11th Cir. 2019); Green v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 877 F.3d 1244, 1247–49 (11th Cir. 2017), issued after the district court dismissed the petition, foreclosed the government's arguments. Hall and Green held that the one-year limitations period tolled the day a petitioner filed a procedurally noncompliant Rule 3.850 motion if he was permitted to and did later file a compliant motion. Therefore, a compliant Rule 3.850 motion relates back to the date of filing of a noncompliant motion, such that the compliant motion was "properly filed" and "pending" as of that date for purposes of tolling the limitations period in section 2244 of Title 28. In this case, because the limitations period tolled on the date of petitioner's initial motion, the court held that he timely filed his petition in federal court. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Dallas v. Warden |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-14570 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Marcus Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and denial of habeas relief to petitioner. Petitioner was convicted of capital murder for leaving an elderly woman in the hot trunk of a car, where she eventually suffered a heart attack and died, after robbing her. The court held that the state court's determination that petitioner's counsel was not encumbered by an actual conflict that adversely affected his performance was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also held that the petition failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his capital trial where his lawyers failed to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence, because petitioner failed to establish prejudice. |
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| Rendon v. U.S. Attorney General |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-10197 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Martin Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| Approximately 25 years after his guilty plea to resisting a police officer with violence, an IJ found petitioner removable and ruled he was no longer eligible for cancellation of removal on account of the stop-time rule. The Eleventh Circuit held that it was error to retroactively apply the stop-time rule to petitioner's pre-Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) conviction. The court found no clear congressional statement that the stop-time rule should be applied retroactively to pre-IIRIRA plea agreements like petitioner's and held that in the circumstances presented here—specifically, where petitioner's pre-IIRIRA plea agreement did not render him immediately deportable—applying the stop-time rule to his 1995 conviction would have an impermissibly retroactive effect. Therefore, the court reversed the BIA's decision and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| United States v. Chalker |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-15102 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Marcus Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for healthcare fraud and conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud. The court held that sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions, and that the indictment was plainly sufficient. The court rejected defendant's two evidentiary claims, holding that the district court did not err in permitting an FBI forensic accountant to testify as a lay witness or in allowing a government witness to testify as an expert. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motions for continuance; there was no cumulative error requiring reversal; and the district court did not clearly err in calculating the loss amount and thus the guidelines range. |
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| United States v. Gumbs |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-13182 Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: Luck Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for two counts of using a deadly weapon to forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with a federal officer. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to give defendant's requested "forcibly" jury instruction, use of a deadly weapon instruction, and lesser included offense instruction. The court also held that the district court's response to the jury's question -- regarding whether a car is still a deadly weapon if you do not intend to use it that way -- correctly stated the principle of law. Finally, the court held that evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction and there was no error in the district court's denial of defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on count two of the indictment. |
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| United States v. Martinez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-12950 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Luck Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence and held that USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applies if the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant knew, intended, or had reason to believe (rather than hoped, wished, or dreamed) the gun was going to be used to buy drugs, and the sale would have (rather than may or might have) happened but for the defendant's arrest or something else getting in the way. In this case, the district court found that defendant intended that his stolen shotgun would be bartered for a pound of dope. Therefore, the court held that the district court's finding was supported by the evidence and was not clearly erroneous. |
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| United States v. Stein |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Dockets: 14-15621, 18-13762 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Marcus Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for multiple counts of mail fraud, securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering, as well as conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud and conspiracy to obstruct justice. This case comes before the court a second time, because defendant claims that the district court did not remedy the original errors found in his sentence. After review, the court held that the district court addressed and entirely solved the issues raised by the previous panel. The court declined to address defendant's challenges to his conviction based on the mandate rule and the law of the case doctrine. The court affirmed the district court's calculation of loss, holding that the district court reasonably relied on evidence and analysis provided by a qualified expert who had earlier served as the acting division director and chief economist of the SEC's Division of Economic and Risk Analysis. The court held that defendant's remaining due process and forfeiture claims fall outside the scope of the limited remand in this case. Finally, the court rejected defendant's challenges to the district court's forfeiture order. |
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| United States v. Xiulu Ruan |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Dockets: 19-11508, 19-12661, 17-12653 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Coogler Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| Defendants Ruan and Couch, pain management physicians, appealed their convictions for charges related to their involvement in a health care fraud scheme. Defendants were convicted of conspiring to run a medical practice constituting a racketeering enterprise in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; conspiring to violate the Controlled Substances Act by dispensing Schedule II drugs, fentanyl, and Schedule III drugs outside the usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose; conspiracies to commit health care fraud and mail or wire fraud; and conspiracies to receive kickbacks in relation to a Federal health care program. Ruan and Couch were individually convicted of multiple counts of substantive drug distribution in violation of the Controlled Substances Act and Ruan was convicted of a money laundering conspiracy and two counts of substantive money laundering. The court vacated defendants' convictions on Count 16 of the Superseding Indictment for conspiring to violate the Anti-Kickback statute based on their operation of their medical clinic’s in-house workers' compensation dispensary. In this case, the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that an insurance provider paid for prescriptions with federal funds or that federal monies otherwise passed through the clinic's workers' compensation dispensary. The court remanded for resentencing and affirmed defendants' remaining convictions and sentences. |
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| People v. Vargas |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S101247 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Cuellar Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first degree murder and other crimes and sentence of death, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the trial proceedings. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless probation search of his home; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to sever the capital charges from his remaining charges; (3) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (4) Defendant's challenges to the trial court's guilt phase instructions lacked merit; (5) a failure of consular notification under the Vienna Convention occurred in this case, but no prejudice resulted from it; (6) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to modify the verdict; and (7) Defendant's challenges to California's death penalty law were unavailing. |
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| California v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E072188(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: July 16, 2020 Judge: Fields Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant-appellant Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (Surety), appealed an order denying its motion to set aside the summary judgment against Surety on a $25,000 bail bond. Surety claimed the court did not have jurisdiction to enter the summary judgment on the bond, because it lost jurisdiction over the bond on two prior occasions. Surety first claims the court lost jurisdiction over the bond on May 9, 2017, when the jury returned verdicts of conviction and the court allowed the defendant to remain released on bail pending judgment and sentence - without taking evidence or making express factual findings concerning the five factors listed in Penal Code section 1166. Surety argued that the failure to comply with Section 1166 was a jurisdictional error which exonerated the bond by operation of law. Alternatively, Surety claims the court lost jurisdiction over the bond on June 30, 2017, when the defendant failed to appear for judgment and sentence. At that time, the court declared the bond forfeited and continued sentencing to July 6, 2017. Surety argued the court "held" the June 30 forfeiture, along with its hold on a bench warrant for the defendant's arrest, until July 6, 2017. Surety argued the trial court lost jurisdiction over the bond because it did not expressly declare the bond forfeited in open court on July 6, 2017, or at any later time. The Court of Appeal disagreed on both arguments, concluding that the failure to comply with section 1166 did not exonerate the bond by operation of law. Pursuant to the terms of the bond, Surety agreed to be liable on the bond if the defendant failed to appear for judgment and sentence. Further, the Court found the trial court record plainly showed the court did not "hold" its June 30 order declaring the bond forfeited. Rather, it only held issuance of the bench warrant for the defendant’s arrest, pending his appearance at the continued sentencing hearing on July 6, 2017. Thus, the court never lost jurisdiction over the bond and properly entered summary judgment on the bond against Surety. |
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| California v. Gomez |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D076101(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Terry B. O'Rourke Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant-defendant Joanna Gomez appealed an order summarily denying her petition to vacate her 2009 murder conviction and to be resentenced on any remaining counts under Penal Code section 1170.95. She argued: (1) the summary denial of her petition was error because she made the required prima facie showing that she was entitled to relief under section 1170.95; and (2) the court violated state law and her constitutional right to due process by summarily denying her petition in her absence and without giving her the opportunity to file a reply to the prosecution's response to her petition. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. |
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| California v. Hishmeh |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: G057045(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Richard D. Fybel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| After police found thousands of photographs and videos containing child pornography, defendant Joseph Hishmeh was eventually charged in an information with two counts of using his finger to sexually penetrate the victim (a female child between two and three years of age at the time the crimes were committed)(counts 1 and 2), and five counts of touching her in a lewd or lascivious way while photographing and/or videotaping her (counts 3 through 7). After being instructed with CALCRIM No. 3517, the jury asked the trial court how to address lesser included offenses. In its response, the court twice instructed the jury that unless it found the defendant not guilty of the charged crimes, it could not consider the lesser included offenses. By doing so, the Court of Appeal found the trial court erred. Under the circumstances of this case, the error was prejudicial, and convictions were reversed for the charged crimes in counts 1 and 2 of the information. |
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| In re Raymundo M. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D076158(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Judith L. Haller Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| Raymundo M. was charged in juvenile court with assault with a deadly weapon, making a criminal threat, and brandishing a weapon after he raised a switchblade-like knife head-high and chased another minor while orally threatening him. The juvenile court found the charges and certain of the enhancement allegations true, declared Raymundo a ward of the court, and placed him with his mother under the supervision of the probation department. On appeal, Raymundo contended: (1) insufficient evidence supported the true finding on the assault count because he never got within striking distance of the victim or made stabbing or slashing motions with the knife; (2) the juvenile court failed to expressly declare whether it was treating the "wobbler" assault count as a felony or a misdemeanor, as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 702; and (3) the court erred by imposing duplicative punishment on the criminal-threat and assault counts, in violation of Penal Code section 654. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. |
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| People v. Arias |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A156360(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: Sanchez Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2006, Alonzo attempted to steal Packnett’s cell phone. Someone else approached and stabbed Packnett while Alonzo was grappling with Packnett’s friend, Hopkins. The man ran around the car and stabbed Hopkins, who later identified the assailant as Arias. Arias and Alonzo drove away in Hopkins’s car. Hopkins recovered his vehicle; it was damaged. A laptop computer and other property had been stolen. An expert witness opined that the assailants were affiliated with the Sureño criminal street gang and committed the offenses to benefit the gang. Arias entered a negotiated plea of no contest to assault with a deadly weapon and unlawful driving or taking a vehicle and admitted to the gang and great bodily injury enhancements. He received a stipulated sentence of 224 months' imprisonment. Years later, during resentencing under Penal Code 1170(d)(1), because Arias’s sentence may have been unlawful under People v. Gonzalez, the court held a hearing, stayed the great bodily injury enhancements, imposed gang enhancements on each assault count, and reduced Arias’s sentence by four months. The court of appeal concluded that an appeal may be taken from a resentencing under section 1170(d)(1), without a certificate of probable cause and affirmed. The court was not bound by the earlier plea agreement and section 654 did not prohibit multiple gang enhancements although Arias acted with a single intent to benefit his gang in committing the assaults. |
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| People v. Bowen |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A155630(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: Jackson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Bowen was charged with attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. With count one, the information alleged personal use of a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife, and that Bowen committed the attempted murder willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. With respect to both counts, the information alleged a great bodily injury enhancement. A jury found Bowen guilty and the enhancements to be true. He was sentenced to seven years to life imprisonment for attempted murder plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement and one year for the use of a deadly and dangerous weapon enhancement. On count two he was sentenced to four years plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement. The court stated the time imposed for count two. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that evidence (knives) should have been excluded because they were the product of a warrantless search in which the police requested that Bowen’s mobile service provider “ping” his phone and provide location data. The court cited exigent circumstances. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing arguments, so Bowen’s attorney was not ineffective for failing to object. There was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation and Bowen’s sentence for attempted murder was authorized. |
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| People v. Collom |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A155688(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Peter J. Siggins Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Following extensive online communications, including sharing sexually explicit pictures, Collom was arrested while arriving at a meeting with an undercover officer who was posing as a 14-year-old girl. Collom was convicted of multiple counts for meeting a minor for lewd purposes (Pen. Code 288.4(b)), sending harmful matter to a minor (313.1(a)), and arranging a meeting with a minor for lewd purposes (288.4(a)(1)). The court of appeal reversed his misdemeanor convictions under section 313.1(a) which can be violated only when harmful matter is transmitted to a minor, and not when it is transmitted to an adult posing as a minor. Had the legislature intended to punish defendants who attempt to distribute harmful matter to minors or individuals they believe to be minors, it could clearly so state. The trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that his mistaken belief as to the purported minor’s age, even if unreasonable, was a complete defense, was not prejudicial. The evidence that Collom actually believed the officer was 14 years old, and not an adult playing a 14-year-old, was very strong. On the other counts, the court amended the sentencing order. |
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| Smith v. Superior Court |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C088817(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Ronald B. Robie Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| Petitioner Shaun Smith filed, as an indigent defendant representing himself in propria persona (pro. per.) in a pending criminal action, a petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief against respondent Sacramento County Superior Court, challenging respondent’s policies and procedures pertaining to pro. per. defendants then in effect. Central to petitioner’s grievance were the duties the court assigned to the pro. per. coordinator -- an individual hired and supervised by, and subject to the control and direction of, Sacramento County (the county). The court revised its policies and procedures pertaining to pro. per. defendants in response to a Court of Appeal order to show cause. The revisions did not quell petitioner’s concerns pertaining to the pro. per. coordinator’s role in the disposition of investigative and ancillary defense services requests and the review of subpoenas. Considering the nature of those duties delegated to the pro. per. coordinator, as provided in respondent’s revised policies and procedures, the Court of Appeal concluded respondent impermissibly delegated its judicial powers in contravention of the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution. The Court of Appeal thus issued a writ of mandate directing the respondent-trial-court to cease and desist from applying and implementing the pertinent portions of its revised pro. per. policies and procedures, and directed the trial court to revise those policies and procedures in a manner consistent with the Court of Appeal's opinion in this case. |
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| Idaho v. Bonner |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 46097 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Moeller Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A district court granted Michael Bonner's motion to suppress evidence following a traffic stop that lead to his arrest for driving without privileges and for DUI. Bonner argued that the arresting officer lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime had occurred or was about to occur, and had seized Bonner by taking his identification and ordering him to sit on the curb. The State argued that Bonner had waived his Fourth Amendment rights in his parole agreement, and therefore lacked standing to object to the seizure. Alternatively, the State argued the police officer had made consensual contact with Bonner, and if the instruction for Bonner to sit on the curb constituted a detention, it was a seizure supported by reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in ruling that the police officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to detain Bonner. "Accepting the findings of the district court as true, we nonetheless conclude that the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that the officer articulated a reasonable basis for suspecting that illegal conduct was taking place. Therefore, while we acknowledge that this is a very close question, we conclude that the district court erred in granting the motion to suppress. In light of this ruling, it is unnecessary to address the State’s alternative theory that the stop was consensual." |
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| Idaho v. Gneiting |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 46781 Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: Roger S. Burdick Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Nicole Lyn Gneiting appealed her conviction for possession of major contraband within a correctional facility under Idaho Code section 18-2510(3). Police responded to a call to a potential burglary at an Idaho Falls motel. They eventually questioned Gneiting, who said she was not staying there, but visiting a friend who was. Officers found a "hard bulgy object" on Gneiting's upper thigh after a pat down search. The object turned out to be a flashlight. A search of the motel room netted a purse containing marijuana, Xanax and Adderall pills. Gneiting was ultimately placed under arrest and taken to the station. When asked whether she had anything illegal on her person, and after given warnings that if she took anything illegal into the jail, she Gneiting would receive an additional charge. Police suspected Gneiting was still carrying something underneath her clothes; she was strip searched and police found a white paper envelope between Gneiting's legs. The envelope was later determined to contain three small plastic bags totaling over 30 grams of methamphetamine. Gneiting was convicted by a jury after a four-day trial on drug possession charges. On appeal, Gneiting argued the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she knowingly possessed contraband within a correctional facility because she did not enter the county jail voluntarily. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Gneiting's conviction. |
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| State v. Brazzle |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 116649 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Marla J. Luckert Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for, among other things, possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of oxycodone, holding that the trial court's admission of Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-455 was evidence was not error and that sufficient evidence supported Defendant's possession of oxycodone conviction. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the trial court erred in admitting section 60-455 evidence related to two prior methamphetamine sales to undercover detectives approximately one week before his arrest, (2) the trial court clearly erred in instructing the jury on possession of oxycodone, and (3) his conviction for possession of oxycodone was supported by insufficient evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting the prior crimes evidence; (2) invited error precluded Defendant's jury instruction claim; and (3) sufficient evidence supported Defendant's conviction for possession of oxycodone. |
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| State v. Carter |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 119315 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Eric S. Rosen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for first-degree felony murder, criminal discharge of a firearm, aggravated battery, and criminal threat, holding that any error during the proceedings below was harmless. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by (1) declining to give his proffered instruction clarifying the definition of aiding and abetting, and (2) erred in granting the State's motion to consolidate his charges for trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any possible error in failing to give Defendant's requested jury instruction on aiding and abetting was harmless; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in consolidating Defendant's charges for trial. |
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| State v. Armstrong |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 97 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Ellen A. Gorman Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the trial court's judgment on remand after Defendant successfully argued that his two convictions of felony murder and robbery violated his right to be free from double jeopardy, holding that the trial court erred by allowing the State to dismiss the robbery count on remand rather than merging it into the felony murder count. On remand, instead of the trial court merging the counts, the robbery count was dismissed by the State. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) when a trial results in multiple verdicts for the same offense, the appropriate procedure to prevent a double jeopardy violation is to merge, not dismiss, the duplicative counts; and (2) the trial court's failure to hold a new sentencing hearing on remand and conduct a new sentencing analysis pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A, 1602 deprived Defendant of a substantial right. |
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| State v. Day |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 67/19 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Shirley M. Watts Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals remanded this case, without affirming or reversing, to the court of special appeals with instruction to explain the basis of its order reversing the circuit court's judgment denying postconviction relief and remanding and granting permission for the filing of a belated motion for modification of sentence, holding the Court was unable to determine the basis underlying the court of special appeals' order. Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. Defendant later petitioned for postconviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied postconviction relief. The court of special appeals summarily reversed and remanded with instruction to permit Defendant to file a belated motion for modification of sentence. At issue on appeal was whether trial counsel's failure to timely file a motion for modification of sentence pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(e) constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court remanded the case without reaching the merits, holding that the order of the court of special appeals was unclear and the case must be remanded for clarification. |
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| State v. Frazier |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 45/19 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Hotten Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals held that, under the merger rule articulated in State v. Lancaster, 631 A.2d 453 (Md. 1993), offenses and their sentences merge for purposes of sentencing, and therefore, Defendant's convictions for fourth-degree sexual offense and second-degree assault merge, leaving the only permissible punishment the sentence for fourth-degree sexual offense. Defendant was convicted of second-degree assault and fourth-degree sexual offense and sentenced to ten years' incarceration for the assault count and one year for the sexual offense charge, to run consecutively. The court of special appeals reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court for resentencing, holding that the convictions merged. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the offenses of second-degree assault and fourth-degree sexual offense and their sentences merge; and (2) there is no reason to overturn Lancaster. |
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| Michigan v. Vanderpool |
| Court: Michigan Supreme Court Docket: 158486 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Michael F. Cavanagh Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| While conducting a probation compliance check on defendant John D. Vanderpool’s house, a probation agent found heroin. Defendant admitted that the heroin belonged to him. A few weeks later, defendant was arrested and was again found in possession of heroin. He was charged with two counts of possession with intent to deliver heroin and with violating probation. Defendant moved to suppress evidence from the compliance check, arguing that the search was illegal because he was not on probation at the time of the search, but the circuit court denied the motion. Defendant pleaded no contest to having violated probation and to having possessed less than 25 grams of a controlled substance, second offense. Defendant appealed, arguing that because he was not on probation when his home was searched, the search was unlawful. The Michigan Supreme Court agree: while the circuit court attempted to extend defendant’s probation before the compliance check, because the term of probation had already expired, the court did not have the authority to extend it. Consequently, the warrantless search of defendant’s home was not justified. |
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| Peltier v. State |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A19-1685 Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: David L. Lillehaug Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed under the second prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), holding that, even if Appellant had offered to plead guilty to second-degree murder, Appellant made no showing that there was a reasonable probability that the State would have entered into a plea agreement. A jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder while committing child abuse, second-degree felony murder, and second-degree manslaughter. Appellant later filed a postconviction motion, alleging that her counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to recommend that she plead guilty to second-degree murder and by failing adequately to inform her about the power of the State's case. The district court concluded that Appellant had satisfied the first but not the second prong of Strickland. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even assuming that defense counsel's recommendation could have persuaded Appellant to make a qualifying offer, Appellant failed to show that any such offer would have been accepted by the State and presented to the court. |
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| State v. Degroot |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A18-0850 Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: McKeig Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the court of appeals' decision reversing in part Defendant's convictions, holding that the district court did not violate Minn. Stat. 609.04 when it convicted Defendant of both an electronic solicitation offense and an electronic distribution offense and did not violate Minn. Stat. 609.035 when it sentenced Defendant on both the electronic solicitation conviction and an attempted third-degree sexual assault conviction. Defendant was convicted of attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct, electronically soliciting a child to engage in sexual conduct, and electronically distributing any material, language, or communication that relates to or describes sexual conduct to a child. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that the district court violated section 609.04 and section 609.035. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to support the attempt conviction; (2) the offense of electronic solicitation necessarily includes the offense of electronic distribution; and (3) the State proved that the electronic solicitation conviction and the attempted third-degree sexual assault conviction were not part of a single behavioral incident. |
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| State v. Ezeka |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A18-0828 Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: McKeig Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for of first-degree premeditated murder and attempted first-degree premeditated murder but reversed Defendant's 360-month sentence for attempted first-degree premeditated murder, holding that the sentence was error because it exceeded the statutory maximum. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress his post-Miranda statements; (2) the jury instruction on the elements of premeditated murder was not erroneous, and the district court did not err by failing to give a jury instruction on accomplice testimony; and (3) because the statutory maximum for the offense of attempted first-degree premeditated murder is 240 months, Defendant's sentence on this offense is remanded for resentencing. |
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| State v. Wilkie |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A18-0288 Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: McKeig Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct, holding that the State proved that Defendant committed an act that was "a substantial step forward, and more than preparation for" the commission of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) in the statutory phrase "a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for" in the attempt statute, Minn. Stat. 609.17, the substantial step must be strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, but it need not objectively reveal the nature of the intended crime; and (2) the evidence in this case proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant intended to commit the crime of third-degree criminal sexual conduct and that he committed an act that was a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for, the commission of the intended crime. |
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| State v. Scott |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 178 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Gustafson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court designating Defendant as a persistent felony offender (PFO) and imposing an enhanced sentence under Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-502 , holding that the PFO designation failed. Defendant was convicted of distributing dangerous drugs. The State sought to designate Defendant as a PFO based on a 2014 Montana conviction for burglary and a 1994 federal conviction for bank robbery. The district court sentenced Defendant to the minimum PFO sentence enhancement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's federal bank robbery conviction was not reasonably equivalent to a Montana robbery conviction, and therefore, it may not be used as a predicate violent offense under Mont. Code Ann. 46-1-202(18) to impose a persistent felony offender sentence enhancement. |
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| State v. Devers |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 429 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to first degree felony murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony, holding that there was no merit to Defendant's claims on appeal. On appeal, Defendant raised claims regarding the admission fo controlled substance and firearm evidence, the termination of a witness' deposition, sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in overruling Defendant's motions in limine and in admitting evidence of controlled substances from Defendant's home and evidence of a firearm; (2) the admission of a single reference to "multiple packages of marijuana" was, at most, harmless error; (3) the evidence supported Defendant's convictions; and (4) the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel reached on direct appeal lacked merit. |
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| State v. Ely |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 461 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Papik Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Defendant postconviction relief, holding that there was no merit to Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder on a felony murder theory and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Defendant filed multiple motions for postconviction relief, which the district court denied without a hearing. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that Defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for counsel's failure to advise him of his right to testify and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for counsel's failure to assert on appeal that his right to self-representation was violated at trial. On remand, the district court found that Defendant was not entitled to relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error in denying relief on Defendant's two remaining claims. |
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| State v. Liming |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 475 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Papik Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order overruling Defendant's motion for absolute discharge in which he contended that the State failed to bring him to trial within the time required by Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1207, holding that Defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated. In overruling Defendant's motion for absolute discharge, the district court concluded that a period of delay that resulted from a continuance of a settlement conference granted at the State's request but to which Defendant's counsel consented did not count toward the six-month speedy trial deadline. On appeal, Defendant argued that the delay brought about by the continuance of a settlement conference does not result in a period of excluded time. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the continuance of the settlement conference resulted in excluded time; and (2) Defendant statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated. |
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| State v. Street |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 380 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Freudenberg Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the restitution component of Defendant's sentence, holding that the county court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution, but remanded the matter with directions to modify the written judgment to conform to the pronounced sentence. Defendant was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident and reckless driving after crashing into the victim's unoccupied vehicle and fleeing the scene by foot. The county court ordered restitution in the amount of $10,347, the cost of repairing the vehicle. The district court affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing the district court erred in affirming the restitution order because there was insufficient evidence of actual damages to warrant the restitution and because he was not capable of paying the restitution ordered. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the case, holding (1) the county court did not abuse its discretion in its calculation of the amount of the victim's "actual damages"; (2) the county court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of Defendant's ability to pay the sentence of restitution; and (3) there was plain error in the county court's failure to conform the written judgment to the pronounced judgment. |
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| Figueroa-Beltran v. United States |
| Court: Supreme Court of Nevada Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 45 Opinion Date: July 16, 2020 Judge: Mark Gibbons Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court accepted questions certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and answered that the identity of a substance is an element of the crime articulated in Nev. Rev. Stat. 453.337 such that each schedule I or II controlled substance simultaneously possessed with the intent to sell constitutes a separate offense. Section 453.337 prohibits a person from possessing, for the purpose of sale, flunitrazepam, gamma-hydroxybutyrate, or any schedule I and II controlled substance. Defendant pleaded guilty to being a deported alien found unlawfully in the United States. The federal district court imposed a 16-level sentencing enhancement due to Defendant's previous conviction in Nevada for violating section 453.337. Defendant appealed, arguing that his section 453.337 conviction did not qualify as a predicate drug trafficking offense under the federal sentencing guidelines. The Ninth Circuit concluded that no controlling Nevada precedent clearly resolved whether a substance's identity is an element of the crime described in section 453.337 and filed its certified questions with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the identity of a substance is an element of the crime set forth in section 453.337. |
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| Lofthouse v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Nevada Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 44 Opinion Date: July 16, 2020 Judge: Stiglich Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part Defendant's conviction of ten counts of sexual conduct between a teacher and student and two counts of first-degree kidnapping, holding sexual conduct between school employees and students who are old enough to consent to sexual conduct is not a predicate offense for first-degree kidnapping, and therefore, Defendant's first-degree kidnapping convictions cannot stand. Appellant, a high school history teacher, developed a sexual relationship with a seventeen-year-old female student. The sexual conduct was consensual, but consensual sexual conduct between a teacher and a seventeen-year-old student is a crime under Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.540. Defendant was charged with ten counts of violating section 201.540 and two counts of first-degree kidnapping because on two occasions Defendant transported the student to hotels to have sex. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's first-degree kidnapping convictions, holding that a violation of section 201.540 is not a predicate offense for first-degree kidnapping. |
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| Pundyk v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Nevada Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 43 Opinion Date: July 16, 2020 Judge: Cadish Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of guilty but mentally ill on charges of murder with the use of a deadly weapon and discharging a firearm at or into an occupied structure, holding that the district court improperly limited a psychiatric expert witness's testimony by not allowing her to opine about Defendant's mental state at the time of the offense. Defendant was indicted for fatally shooting his mother and for discharging a firearm into a neighbor's home. The jury found Defendant guilty but mentally ill on both charged offenses. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court should have allowed his psychiatric expert witness, Melissa Piasecki, M.D., to opine about his mental state. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion by preventing Dr. Piasecki from opining about Defendant's mental state for purposes of supporting his not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity plea; and (2) the error was not harmless. |
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| State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3686 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied Jerone McDougald's original action for a writ of mandamus to compel Larry Greene, the administrative assistance for the warden at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, to produce two public records and denied McDougald's request for an award of court costs and for statutory damages, holding that McDougald's request for a writ of mandamus was moot and that McDougald was not entitled to statutory damages. After McDougald filed his complaint for a writ of mandamus, Greene provided both documents to McDougald. Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the mandamus claim seeking those documents. The Supreme Court also denied McDougald's request for an award of statutory damages, holding (1) because McDougald did not deliver his two public-record requests by one of the qualifying statutory delivery methods, he was not entitled to an award of statutory damages; and (2) McDougald was not entitled to an award of court costs. |
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| State ex rel. Stuart v. Greene |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3685 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied Keontae Stuart's request for a writ of mandamus to compel Larry Greene, the public-records custodian for the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, to provide Stuart with a document from his public-records request, holding that because Greene eventually did provide a redacted copy of the document to Stuart, this aspect of the case was moot. In his merit brief, Stuart did not challenge the propriety of the redactions but, instead, argued that he was entitled to statutory damages due to Greene's alleged failure to make the record available promptly. The Supreme Court denied Stuart's request for a writ of mandamus compelling the payment of statutory damages, holding that, as a pro se litigant, Stuart was ineligible for an award of attorney fees. The Court also granted Greene's request to keep the supplemental notice sealed to keep the information confidential. |
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| State v. Nelson |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3690 Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: Maureen O'Connor Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the sentence imposed on Defendant for violating the conditions of his community control, holding that Defendant's violation of the condition that he obey all orders of his supervising officer was not a "technical violation," and therefore, the 180-day cap on a prison sentence for a technical violation in Ohio Rev. Code 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(ii) did not apply. Defendant pled guilty to four drug charges and was sentenced to four years of community control. The community control included certain standard conditions that Defendant was alleged to have violated. The trial court found that Defendant's action violated three standard community-control conditions, revoked Defendant's community control, and imposed a thirty-four-month aggregate prison sentence. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, Defendant argued that the 180-day cap on prison sentences set forth in section 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(ii) applies to all community-control violations that are not felonies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plain language of the statute does not support Defendant's interpretation that all noncriminal violations constitute "technical violation[s]" under the statute; and (2) Defendant's violation of the second standard condition was not a "technical violation" under section 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(ii). |
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| State v. Wilson |
| Court: South Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 S.D. 41 Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: Salter Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of aggravated assault (domestic), simple assault (domestic), interference with emergency communications, and disorderly conduct but remanded with instructions to issue a new judgment removing the domestic designation from Defendant's assault convictions, holding that the court lacked authority to designate the assault conviction as domestic and order payment of the statutory domestic violence fees. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant did not establish plain error through the admission of certain evidence; (2) Defendant did not demonstrate the existence of plain error regarding the prosecutor's closing argument; (3) the circuit court correctly denied Defendant's judgment for acquittal on the assault charges, but the assault convictions should not have been designated as domestic, and the court should not have imposed two $25 domestic violence fees for Defendant's assault convictions; and (4) Defendant did not demonstrate prejudicial error resulting from his absence at a stipulated post-judgment sentence modification meeting. |
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| Howard v. State |
| Court: Tennessee Supreme Court Docket: W2018-00786-SC-R11-PC Opinion Date: July 16, 2020 Judge: Page Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of criminal appeals concluding that Petitioner was entitled to postconviction relief based on trial counsel's failure to file a timely motion for new trial, holding that the postconviction court properly considered whether Petitioner was prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficiency, and the postconviction court did not err in concluding that Petitioner was not. In his postconviction petition, Petitioner claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file a motion for new trial. The postconviction court concluded that trial counsel was deficient but that Petitioner was not prejudiced. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Petitioner was presumptively prejudiced by his counsel's deficiency. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) trial counsel's failure to timely file a motion for new trial does not require a presumption of prejudice, and this Court's decision to the contrary in Wallace v. State. 121 S.W.3d 652 (Tenn. 2003), is overruled; and (2) the postconviction court in this case properly denied Petitioner's request for postconviction relief. |
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| State v. Norton |
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2020 UT 46 Opinion Date: July 13, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court largely affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions of violating a protective order, aggravated sexual assault relating to rape and digital penetration, kidnapping, burglary, and assault but held that the district court erred in refusing to instruct on sexual battery as a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual assault based on forcible sexual abuse. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeals (1) did not err in concluding that any error in the jury instructions on aggravated sexual assault, rape, and forcible sexual abuse did not prejudice Defendant; (2) did not err in affirming the district court's refusal to instruct the jury on additional lesser included offenses of aggravated sexual assault based on rape, aggravated burglary, and aggravated kidnapping but erred in affirming the district court's refusal to instruct on sexual battery as a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual assault based on forcible sexual abuse; (3) did not err in affirming the district court’s sentence of fifteen years to life on both convictions of aggravated sexual assault; (4) did not err in concluding that the district court conducted a proper interests of justice analysis at sentencing; and (5) did not err in rejecting Norton’s claim of cumulative error.` |
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| State v. Peraza |
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2020 UT 48 Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this criminal case, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the court of appeals that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the State's expert witness, holding that the court of appeals conflated the requirements and remedies of the Expert Notice Statute, Utah Code 77-17-13, and Utah R. Evid. 702 and in shifting the burden to the State to disprove prejudice. The court of appeals vacated Defendant's convictions of four counts of sodomy on a trial, holding (1) the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the State's expert witness to testify in violation of Rule 702; and (2) the State did not meet its burden to prove that Defendant had not been prejudiced by the denial of his motion for a continuance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals' Rule 702 analysis was erroneous; and (2) the court of appeals erred in shifting the burden to the State to disprove prejudice. |
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| In re Joseph S. Benoit v. (State of Vermont, Appellant) |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2020 VT 58 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Beth Robinson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The issue presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review in this interlocutory appeal centered on the available legal means for collaterally challenging a predicate conviction to an enhanced charge in light of two distinct lines of case law. Petitioner Joseph Benoit pled guilty to driving under the influence, third offense (DUI- 3), and subsequently challenged his underlying predicate convictions in a petition for post- conviction relief (PCR). The State sought summary judgment on the basis that by pleading guilty to DUI-3, petitioner waived his PCR challenges to any of the predicate convictions. The trial court denied summary judgment, concluding that Vermont case law required petitioner to raise his challenges in a post-sentencing PCR proceeding. The Supreme Court concluded defendant could raise collateral challenges to predicate convictions by preserving the challenge on the trial court record. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of summary judgment on different grounds than the trial court, and remanded for the court to consider whether petitioner's waiver was knowing and voluntary. |
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| Vermont v. Allcock |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2020 VT 60 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Beth Robinson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Christina Allcock appealed her convictions for aggravated assault on a police officer, simple assault on a police officer, and impeding a police officer. Law enforcement responded to an emergency call in March 2015 and discovered a man stabbed in defendant’s residence. Defendant, her boyfriend, her parents, and her adult son were present when the officers responded to the call. While the officers were investigating the scene, defendant and some of the others left the residence and went to sit in defendant’s father’s car, which was parked outside. At some point an officer approached the vehicle, where defendant, her boyfriend, and her son were sitting in the back seat of the car. The doors were unlocked. When the officer tried to persuade defendant’s son to get out of the car to speak with him, defendant resisted. The officer testified at trial that defendant wrapped her arms around her son to prevent his exit; yelled at the officer; “slapp[ed],” “claw[ed],” and “gouged” his hands; held a lighter, which was lit, against his hand; and punched him in the mouth. Another officer also testified that defendant held the lighter against the first officer’s hand and sleeve. A jury found defendant guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent sentences of eighteen months to six years for the aggravated assault, twelve to twenty-four months for the simple assault, and eighteen months to three years for the impeding-officer offense. On appeal, defendant argued her conviction for aggravated assault on a police officer had to be reversed because the trial court erred in admitting Facebook messages that were not properly authenticated, and that the trial court should not have allowed the State to alter the elements of the impeding charge after the evidence was closed. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the aggravated assault conviction, but affirmed the simple assault and impeding a police officer convictions. |
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| Washington v. Jackson |
| Court: Washington Supreme Court Docket: 97681-3 Opinion Date: July 16, 2020 Judge: G. Helen Whitener Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2017, John Jackson Sr. was charged with assault in the second degree, domestic violence, for strangling his fiancee. At every court appearance, Jackson was forced to wear some form of restraints pursuant to jail policy. The trial court did not engage in any individualized determination of whether restraints were necessary for courtroom safety but, instead, filed a consolidated opinion adopting the jail policy for all superior court appearances for all incarcerated defendants. After a jury found Jackson guilty, he appealed, arguing that his constitutional right to due process was violated for being forced to wear restraints without an individualized inquiry into their necessity. The Court of Appeals concurred with this argument, but held the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. With respect to the latter portion of the appellate court's holding, the Washington Supreme Court revered, finding the State did not prove the harmlessness of the shackling, and did not show the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The matter was remanded for a new trial with instructions that at all stages of the proceedings, the trial court make an individualized inquiry into whether shackels or restraints were necessary. |
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| Fox v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 88 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Boomgaarden Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of three counts of felony theft stemming from her use of two credit cards to purchase personal items and services, holding that sufficient evidence supported the convictions. Defendant, the chief operating officer and executive director of the Buffalo Chamber of Commerce, used two credit cards issued in the Chamber's name and approved to carry out the Chamber's business for personal purchases. A jury convicted Defendant of felony theft. On appeal, Defendant argued that her conduct was lawful because the Chamber authorized each personal purchase by voluntarily paying each credit card bill, and therefore, the evidence did not satisfy the statutory definition of "property." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the value of available credit on a credit card is intangible property subject to theft under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-3-402(a); and (2) sufficient evidence showed that Defendant exercised unauthorized control over the Chamber's property. |
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| Nelson v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 89 Opinion Date: July 10, 2020 Judge: Michael K. Davis Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of one count of first degree sexual abuse of a minor, holding that the district court did not err in allowing the State to withdraw from its plea agreement with Defendant and that Defendant was not denied the right to testify in his own defense. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant agreed to plead no contest to third degree sexual abuse of a minor. The State subsequently filed a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement. After a hearing, the district court granted the motion. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first degree sexual abuse of a minor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the State withdraw from its plea agreement before Defendant acted on his promise to change his plea and Defendant did not otherwise assert that he detrimentally relied on the agreement before the State withdraw from it, the agreement wasn't to an enforceable contract, and the district court did not err in granting the State's motion to withdraw from it; and (2) Defendant did not assert a cognizable claim that his right to testify was denied. |
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| Vinson v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 93 Opinion Date: July 15, 2020 Judge: Boomgaarden Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of aggravated assault and battery, holding that Defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence without the required analysis under Gleason v. State, 57 P.3d 332 (Wyo. 2002). On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that Defendant had sexual intercourse with the complaining witness twice without her consent on the evening of the altercation. Specifically, Defendant argued that that the evidence was uncharged misconduct evidence subject to Rule 404(b) and that the trial court failed to conduct the required Gleason analysis before admitting the evidence. The Supreme Court held that Defendant was not prejudiced by admission of the sexual intercourse evidence and that there was no reasonable possibility the verdict would have been more favorable to Defendant had the sexual intercourse evidence been excluded. |
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