Latest 9 Cases This Week: Mitchell v. Dakota County Social Services (8th Cir.), Jill Y. v. Casey Y. (Alaska), In re E.E. (Cal. Ct. App.)

Joint Employer Liability: Notes from Australia

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, NICHOLAS SAADY

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and Nicholas Saady, LLM, conduct a comparative analysis of the doctrine of joint employer liability, looking at the rules adopted by the U.S. Department of Labor and National Labor Relations Board as compared to the approach Australia has taken in an analogous context, “accessorial liability” doctrine.

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Mitchell v. Dakota County Social Services

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 19-1419

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Erickson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Family Law

Plaintiff, his three children, and Stop Child Protection Services from Legally Kidnapping filed suit against the county, DCSS, nine county officials, and three officials. Plaintiffs' constitutional, federal, and state law claims stemmed from a Child in Need of Protection of Services (CHIPS) proceeding by DCSS. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the facial constitutionality of three Minnesota child welfare statutes; plaintiff was not entitled to monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, because he failed to establish a due process violation, an equal protection claim, and municipal liability and conspiracy; and the children are also not entitled to damages under section 1983. The court also held that, even if the complaint was sufficiently pled and established a constitutional violation, defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. Furthermore, the court held that no conduct by the individual defendants, as alleged in the amended complaint, rose to the level of maliciousness required to deny official immunity under Minnesota law. Finally, plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory relief.

Jill Y. v. Casey Y.

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17071

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Carney

Areas of Law: Family Law

At the end of a marriage marked by allegations of domestic violence and substance abuse, a couple sought protective orders as well as a divorce and custody decision regarding their young daughter. After a series of hearings over six months the superior court granted a decree of divorce and issued its custody, visitation, and support order. The mother appealed two aspects of the court’s order: (1) the court’s findings that she did not prove allegations that her ex-husband sexually assaulted her on two occasions; and (2) the court’s restriction of her use and possession of alcohol and controlled substances while she has custody of the child. Because the Alaska Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not clearly err by finding the mother had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence the alleged sexual assaults occurred, it affirmed that decision. The Court also concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by restricting the mother’s use of alcohol and controlled substances, and affirmed the superior court’s custody decision.

In re E.E.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E073284(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Slough

Areas of Law: Family Law

K.L. (mother) and J.P. (father) had three young children together as well as an infant son named E. Mother tested positive for amphetamine at a prenatal visit for E., and when the child was born a few months later, he tested positive for amphetamine and marijuana. At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared all four children dependents and removed them from the parents’ care. Mother appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used to support the removal order. She argued there was insufficient evidence E.’s siblings were at risk of harm, as well as insufficient evidence all of the children could not live safely with father, with her out of the home. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence supported the challenged findings and orders, and therefore affirmed.

Mathenia v. Brumbelow

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S19G0426

Opinion Date: May 18, 2020

Judge: Harold D. Melton

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law

Joshua Brumbelow petitioned the Superior Court of Habersham County to legitimate his biological son, E.M. The superior court denied the petition, concluding that, under In re Eason, 358 SE2d 459 (1987), Brumbelow had abandoned his opportunity interest to pursue a relationship with his son. Brumbelow appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in finding that he had abandoned his opportunity interest. The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the trial court. The Court of Appeals further remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Brumbelow’s legitimation petition should be granted based on Brumbelow being a fit parent for E.M., instead of being evaluated under the best interests of the child standard. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the superior court’s decision that Brumbelow had abandoned his opportunity interest to pursue a relationship with his son; and (2) if not, whether the Court of Appeals properly concluded that Brumbelow’s legitimation petition should have been assessed on remand under the parental fitness standard rather than the best interests of the child standard. The Supreme Court determined that, because evidence supported the superior court’s finding that Brumbelow abandoned his opportunity interest, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying the legitimation petition. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in its decision on that issue, and the Supreme Court reversed that portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment. With respect to the second question, the Supreme Court concluded that the portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion relating to the standard that had to be applied to assess a biological father’s right to custody of his child in a legitimation action should be viewed as dicta only.

Nelson v. Evans

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47069

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Family Law

"Although seemingly a simple question of statutory interpretation, at its essence this case concerns a profound family tragedy that has left three young girls caught in the middle of a legal battle between four people who love them." The Nelsons were the grandparents of three girls, ages thirteen, eleven, and eight. The Nelsons’ daughter, Stephanie Evans, and their son-in-law, Brian Evans, are the girls’ parents. The Nelsons petitioned a magistrate court seeking to establish visitation rights, but the court dismissed the petition, ruling: (1) the Nelsons lacked standing to file a petition under Idaho’s grandparent visitation statute); and (2) even if the Nelsons had standing, it would still grant summary judgment in favor of the girls’ parents because the Nelsons would be unable to overcome the presumption that fit parents make decisions in their children’s best interests. On intermediate appeal, the district court affirmed the magistrate court’s rulings. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the visitation statute, Code section 32-719, did not restrict when a grandparent could petition for visitation rights. Further, the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court's grant of summary judgment to the Evanses because the Supreme Court found genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Evanses’ decision to terminate all contact between the Nelsons and their children was in their children’s best interests. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to the magistrate court for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the Nelsons' petition.

Dobbins v. Dobbins

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2020 ME 73

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Humphrey

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court granting Pamela Dobbins's motion to enforce the terms of a divorce judgment and a later court order acceptable for processing (COAP) federal retirement benefits, holding that the court lacked the authority to order Mark Dobbins to retire. In the COAP, the court stated that Mark was required to retire at age sixty-two. When Mark turned sixty-two years old, Pamela filed a motion to enforce the divorce judgment and COAP. Mark filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing that the divorce judgment and COAP were ambiguous and that the court was not authorized to require him to retire at a specific age. The district court denied relief, finding that the divorce judgment and the COAP were enforceable as written. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court lacked the authority to order Mark to retire at a certain age.

Libby v. Estabrook

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2020 ME 71

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Horton

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing, for lack of standing, Appellant's petition to establish de facto parentage of his stepson, holding that Appellant was entitled to a hearing to determine his standing. Appellant filed a petition to be adjudicated the child's de facto parent after the mother died unexpectedly. With the petition, Appellant included an affidavit alleging facts to support the existence of a de facto parent relationship with the child. The court dismissed the petition for lack of standing, concluding that Appellant could not establish a necessary element of standing even if the facts in his affidavit were true. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant's assertions, if believed, could have led to a find that he had standing; (2) Respondent's affidavit generated disputed material facts that must be resolved to determine Appellant's standing; and (3) the court abused its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve those factual disputes.

In re C.S.

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 MT 127

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Gustafson

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the family court terminating Mother's parental rights to her child, C.S., holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in the proceedings below. After a hearing, the district court implicitly determined C.S. was an abused or neglected child, found the Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services Division, need not make reasonable efforts to provide preservation or reunification services due to Mother's chronic, severe neglect of C.S., and terminated Mother's parental rights to C.S. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) C.S. was properly determined to be an abused or neglected child; and (2) Mother was not denied due process in determining reunification efforts were not necessary and terminating Mother's parental rights to C.S. due to chronic and severe neglect.

In re D.D.

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 MT 126

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Gustafson

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court reversed the termination of Mother's parental rights to her child, D.D., holding that D.D. was not an abused or neglected child as provided in Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-102(2)(a), (7)(a)(i)-(iii) and (21)(a)(i)-(vi), and therefore, the district court erred in terminating Mother's parental rights to D.D. D.D. was residing with his father and had not been in Mother's care for nearly eight years when the Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services Division filed is petition for termination of Mother's parental rights. At the close of a hearing, the district court implicitly determined D.D. was an abused or neglected child, found the Department need not make reasonable efforts to provide preservation or reunification services, and terminated Mother's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because D.D. was not residing with mother at the time of her alleged neglectful conduct and was not at risk of doing so, D.D. was not an abused or neglected child.