Table of Contents | Donahue v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n Real Estate & Property Law US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | St. Paul Park Refining Co. LLC v. Domeier Real Estate & Property Law, Tax Law Minnesota Supreme Court | Meine v. Hren Ranches, Inc. Real Estate & Property Law Montana Supreme Court | Peters v. Hubbard Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law Montana Supreme Court | Douglas County School District No. 10 v. Tribedo, LLC Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law Nebraska Supreme Court | State v. Buffalo Chip Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law South Dakota Supreme Court | Bison Interests, LLC, v. Antero Resources Corp. Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Real Estate & Property Law Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia | EQT Production Co. v. Antero Resources Corp. Contracts, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Real Estate & Property Law Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia | McElroy Coal Co. v. Dobbs Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia |
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Real Estate & Property Law Opinions | Donahue v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n | Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 19-1618 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: David J. Barron Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law | The First Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC in Josephine Donahue's suit against Ocwen and the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA), holding that summary judgment was properly granted on the only claim at issue here. Donahue executed a mortgage for her home that was assigned to Ocwen. Donahue later defaulted on the mortgage. Ocwen held a foreclosure auction and was the highest bidder. Donahue subsequently field suit against GNMA and Ocwen, alleging three counts. The district court granted summary judgment to Ocwen on all claims but did not address Donahue's still-pending claims against GNMA. Donahue appealed, seeking review of only the grant of summary judgment to Ocwen on Count III of her complaint. Donahue subsequently dismissed her claims against GNMA. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the prudent course is to assume appellate jurisdiction, despite the parties' disagreement as to whether this Court has appellate jurisdiction, given how clear the merits are; and (2) there was no disputed fact precluding summary judgment on the only claim at issue here. | | St. Paul Park Refining Co. LLC v. Domeier | Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A19-0573 Opinion Date: November 4, 2020 Judge: Chutich Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law, Tax Law | The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment to Respondent on Appellant's adverse possession claim, holding that a claim of adverse possession to a portion of a separately assessed parcel requires the adverse claimant to pay taxes for at least five consecutive years unless a statutory exemption under Minn. Stat. 541.02 paragraph 3 applies. Appellant asserted adverse possession over a portion of two separately assessed parcels owned by Respondent. The district court ruled against Appellant's claim for both parcels. The court of appeals affirmed the court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant on Appellant's adverse possession claim for the west parcel but reversed the grant of summary judgment to Respondent as to the east parcel on the grounds that the percentage claimed did not trigger the tax payment requirement in section 541.02. Appellant appealed the court of appeals' decision that his adverse possession claim to fifty-two percent of the west parcel failed, arguing that the statute requires tax payment only for a claim to an entire separately assessed parcel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of section 541.02 requires tax payment on a portion of a parcel. | | Meine v. Hren Ranches, Inc. | Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 284 Opinion Date: November 10, 2020 Judge: Sandefur Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law | The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court interpreting and modifying a prior 2014 judgment that previously adjudicated that Plaintiffs had established various prescriptive easement rights over certain land before Defendants acquired it in the 1980s, holding that the court misinterpreted the 2014 judgment. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err when it concluded that Mont. R. Civ. P. 59-60 did not apply to Defendants' motions for subsequent interpretation and clarification of the 2014 judgment; (2) the district court erred when it construed the 2014 judgment as ambiguous on its face or in effect; and (3) the district court erroneously altered and amended the substance of the 2014 judgment inconsistent with its manifestly intended original meaning and effect. | | Peters v. Hubbard | Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 282 Opinion Date: November 10, 2020 Judge: Gustafson Areas of Law: Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law | In this case involving a grant of easement and easement agreement between Roger Peters and Carrie Peters and Douglas Hubbards and Nathan Hubbards the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the Peterses, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion. The easement agreement in this case granted the Hubbards an easement to use a road crossing the Peterses' land. The Peterses later rescinded the agreement, but the Hubbards continued to use the road. The Peterses subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the rescission was proper and that the Hubbards' rights under the agreement were terminated. The Hubbards filed a counterclaim asserting claims for a private prescriptive easement and a public prescriptive easement. The district court granted summary judgment for the Peterses on all issues. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in interpreting the language of the easement agreement; (2) the Hubbards did not establish either a private or public prescriptive easement across the Peterses' property covered in the easement agreement; and (3) the district court properly awarded attorney fees to the Peterses. | | Douglas County School District No. 10 v. Tribedo, LLC | Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 307 Neb. 716 Opinion Date: November 6, 2020 Judge: Lindsey Miller-Lerman Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law | The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding compensation totaling $4,625,967 for Elkhorn School District's taking of forty-three acres of Tribedo, LLC's property, holding that the district court did not err in its trial rulings nor in accepting the jury verdict for total compensation due to Tribedo. After the board of appraisers awarded $2,601,600 for the taking Tribedo appealed, alleging that the award did not reflect the fair market value of the property taken and did not adequately compensate for damages to the remainder of Tribedo's property. Following the jury's verdict, Elkhorn moved for a new trial. The district court denied the motion and granted Tribedo's posttrial motions for an award of interest and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no error in the proceedings below; (2) the district court did not err when it accepted the jury verdict; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Tribedo $590,925 in attorney fees. | | State v. Buffalo Chip | Court: South Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 S.D. 63 Opinion Date: November 10, 2020 Judge: Kern Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law | The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dissolving Buffalo Chip's municipal incorporation, holding that the State had the authority to petition the court for such relief and that the circuit court did not err in holding that Buffalo Chip failed to satisfy the residency requirements in S.D. Codified Laws 9-3-1. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court properly allowed the State to institute this action against Buffalo Chip under S.D. Codified Laws 21-28-2(3) and S.D. Codified Laws 9-3-20; and (2) the circuit court did not err in its interpretation of S.D. Codified Laws 9-3-1. | | Bison Interests, LLC, v. Antero Resources Corp. | Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 19-0527 Opinion Date: November 10, 2020 Judge: Margaret L. Workman Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Real Estate & Property Law | The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment for Antero Resources Corp. and declaring that Bison Interests, LLC was entitled to no overriding royalty interest in the Marcellus shale formation underlying certain gas wells, holding that the declaratory judgment sought by Antero was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and judicial estoppel. The circuit court found Antero's action was barred neither by res judicata nor collateral estoppel because the issue of Bison's entitlement to an overriding royalty in the Marcellus shale production had not been finally adjudicated in prior litigation. The court further found that Antero was not judicially estopped from bringing its claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Antero's action for declaratory relief was barred by the doctrine of res judicata; and (2) Antero's action was similarly, and independently, barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel. | | EQT Production Co. v. Antero Resources Corp. | Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 19-0572 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Margaret L. Workman Areas of Law: Contracts, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Real Estate & Property Law | The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting Antero Resources Corporation partial summary judgment on its claim for declaratory judgment, holding that the court did not err in concluding that the Antero top lease took priority over the EQT Production Company base lease covering the same property. Larry and Linda Lemasters, who owned the oil and gas underlying a tract of land, entered into an oil and gas lease (the base lease) with an LLC that later assigned the lease to EQT. The Lemasters subsequently entered into an oil and gas lease with Antero (the top lease). The lease was made effective immediately upon expiration of the primary term of the base lease. The Lemasters and EQT (together, Defendants) subsequently entered into a base lease amendment agreeing to extend the primary term of the base lease. Antero filed a complaint against Defendants asserting claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and declaratory judgment. The circuit court awarded summary judgment for Antero on its declaratory judgment claim, determining that the base lease and its amendment were subject to the Antero top lease. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err in declaring that the top lease was the valid and existing oil and gas lease covering the subject property. | | McElroy Coal Co. v. Dobbs | Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Dockets: 18-0134, 18-0135 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Armstead Areas of Law: Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law | The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of partial summary judgment finding that Gary Dobbs retained his right to purchase pasture land under a 1976 option agreement and that Terry and Catherine Dobbs triggered that right to purchase when they signed a 2007 option agreement, holding that the circuit court did not err. After Lyle Hobbs died, the land he owned passed to his wife and two sons, Terry and Gary. The trio conveyed a small parcel to the sons for a slaughterhouse. The remaining land, including a pasture, was conveyed to Terry and his wife, Catherine. Gary reserved the right to buy back the pasture land if Terry died or if Terry and Catherine decided to sell or assign the pasture land. Gary subsequently purchased the slaughterhouse property at auction. Decades later, Terry and Catherine entered into an option agreement with McElroy Coal Company to either sell the pasture land or provide McElroy Coal a waiver of liability for the company's mining operations. McElroy Coal chose a waiver and paid Terry and Catherine. Thereafter, Gary sued McElroy Coal and Terry and Catherine, alleging that they breached the 1976 option agreement. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Gary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err. | |
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