| Caniglia v. Strom |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 19-1764 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Selya Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit held that the special measure of constitutional protection to which police officers, in the motor vehicle context, performing community care taking functions are entitled extends to police officers performing community caretaking functions on private premises, including homes. Plaintiff's person and firearms were allegedly seized after Defendants, police officers, entered his home. Plaintiff brought several claims against Defendants, including claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and under state law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff's federal and state-law claims, concluding that the officers' conduct at Plaintiff's residence constituted a reasonable exercise of their caretaking responsibilities and thus did not violate Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendants' actions did not exceed the proper province of their community caretaking responsibilities. |
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| United States v. Rumley |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-4412 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Niemeyer Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence as an armed career criminal subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that reliance in his 2019 sentencing on a prior conviction that had not been designated as an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) predicate in his 2008 presentence report violated United States v. Hodge, 902 F.3d 420 (4th Cir. 2018). The court held that Hodge was not controlling in this case, because Hodge is grounded on the defendant's lack of notice and opportunity to contest an ACCA predicate identified for the first time during a collateral proceeding. In this case, defendant had both notice and a meaningful opportunity to challenge the designated predicate convictions prior to the resentencing hearing. The court also held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that, taken together, the documents demonstrated that defendant was in fact convicted of unlawful wounding in 1979. Furthermore, a conviction of Virginia Code 18.2-51 is a violent felony for the purpose of applying ACCA's sentencing enhancement, as it involves the use of physical force required by 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i). |
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| United States v. Eustice |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-11519 Opinion Date: March 18, 2020 Judge: Stephen Andrew Higginson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's 84 month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute an unspecified amount of methamphetamine. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in calculating the quantity of meth attributable to defendant; the district court did not err by applying a two-level sentencing enhancement for maintaining a drug premises under USSG 2D1.1(b)(12); and the district court properly assigned two criminal history points. |
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| United States v. Jiminez-Garcia |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-10625 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Stephen Andrew Higginson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) motion for relief from the 2010 judgment convicting him of, and sentencing him for, bank robbery. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for the district court to determine in the first instance whether it has jurisdiction to consider defendant's Rule 60(b) motion and whether it should issue a certificate of appealability (COA). Because the district court has not ruled on whether defendant should be granted a COA to challenge the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion, the court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to consider the district court's denial of defendant's Rule 60(b) motion. |
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| United States v. Rodriguez-Leos |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-40161 Opinion Date: March 16, 2020 Judge: James L. Dennis Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for unlawful possession of ammunition by a person admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa. After determining that defendant's challenge was properly preserved, the court held that defendant was entitled to a three-level sentencing reduction for attempt under USSG 2X1.1(b)(1) because when he was arrested, he was not about to complete all the acts necessary for the separate offense of exportation of ammunition. In this case, all defendant had done was buy ammunition and, at the time of his arrest, he was not en route to deliver the ammunition. Furthermore, there was no definitive evidence of a temporal timeframe here. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. |
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| Vetcher v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-60449 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Carl E. Stewart Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal under Section 241 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and Section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act. The court held that, although petitioner's state law conviction is not a facial categorical match to the federal schedule of controlled substances, there is no realistic probability that Texas courts will apply its statute to conduct that falls outside of the scope of the federal analog; petitioner is ineligible for withholding of removal because his state law conviction is a "particularly serious crime" within the meaning of the statute; and petitioner's due process rights were not violated where, as a pro se litigant, petitioner successfully secured an initial stay of removal from this court and none of the perceived hindrances he pointed out stopped him from being able to research the law, draft, mail and file his pleadings, and appeal his claims for the better part of four years without the assistance of legal counsel. |
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| Howse v. Hodous |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-3418 Opinion Date: March 18, 2020 Judge: Thapar Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Howse claims Officers Hodous and Middaugh stopped in front of his home in an unmarked vehicle. Middaugh asked Howse if he lived there, got out of the vehicle, and told Howse to put his hands behind his back. Howse disobeyed and began screaming. Howse claims Middaugh grabbed Howse and threw him down. The officers tried to handcuff Howse, who resisted, “stiffening up” his body. The officers claim they saw Howse lingering suspiciously at a house that appeared to be boarded up. Middaugh suspected that Howse might be engaged in criminal activity and, when Middaugh reached the porch, Howse clenched his fists and assumed a fighting stance. The officers allege that Howse struck Hodous in the chest and tried to rip off Middaugh’s flashlight and handcuff case, so Middaugh used a leg sweep to take Howse down to arrest him. Middaugh charged Howse with assaulting a police officer. The stated eventually dismissed the charges. Howse sued the officers and the city, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. It is not clearly established that officers cannot tackle a non-compliant suspect and use additional force if he resists arrest, so the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Howse admitted that he tried to make it difficult for the officers to arrest him, which provided probable cause. |
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| Leavy v. Hutchison |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-6246 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 1997, Leavy and friends broke into the home of 71-year-old Terry and waited for Terry to return from visiting his wife at a nursing home. The young men ambushed him, binding his hands and feet with duct tape and weighted him down in a bathtub they had filled with water and kerosene. Terry died. Leavy and his friends took $20 and some household items. A Tennessee jury convicted Leavy of first-degree murder and other crimes. He was sentenced to life in prison. Leavy's habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, was denied in 2006. Leavy moved for relief from that judgment under Civil Rule 60(b) in 2017. The district court denied the motion and entered a formal judgment on September 12, 2018. The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal, filed on October 9, as untimely. Litigants generally have 30 days from the entry of a final judgment or final order to file a notice of appeal, 28 U.S.C. 2107(a). Leavy claimed that he mailed a timely notice of appeal in September but no record of this filing appears on the district court’s docket and Leavy’s application for a certificate of appealability makes no mention of it. He did not submit a copy of the purported document with his show-cause response and gave only a vague description of mailing the document, saying only that he handed it to prison officials, not that he paid for postage. |
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| Bennett v. Dart |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 20-8005 Opinion Date: March 16, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Class Action, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Bennett was assigned to Cook County Jail Division 10, which houses detainees who need canes, crutches, or walkers. He filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12131–34, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.794, alleging that Division 10 lacks grab bars and other necessary fixtures. Bennett claims that he fell and was injured. He unsuccessfully sought to represent a class. The court reasoned that the appropriate accommodation of any detainee’s situation depends on personal characteristics, so common questions do not predominate under FRCP 23(b)(3). Bennett proposed an alternative class to avoid person-specific questions, contending that Division 10, which was constructed in 1992, violates 28 C.F.R. 42.522(b)'s requirement that as of “1988 … construction or alteration of buildings” must comply with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards. The Standards require accessible toilets to have grab bars nearby and accessible showers to have mounted seats. The district court rejected this proposal, reasoning that to determine whether the Structural Standards control, thereby mooting the reasonable accommodation inquiry, would require a ruling on the merits, which would “run afoul of the rule against one-way intervention.” The Seventh Circuit vacated. The "view that a class cannot be certified unless the plaintiff has already prevailed on the central legal issue is a formula for one-way intervention rather than a means to avoid it." Bennett proposes a class that will win if the Standards apply and were violated, to detainees’ detriment and otherwise will lose. |
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| Lord v. Beahm |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1346 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Scudder Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Lord, an inmate at Wisconsin’s Waupun Correctional Institution, exposed himself to a female guard. After the guard told him that she would write him up and walked away, Lord began yelling that he had a razor blade and intended to kill himself. A short while later, a male guard went to Lord’s cell, ordered him out, and saw he had minor scratches treatable with a gauze bandage. Lord sued four guards for money damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they acted with deliberate indifference to a material risk to his life by not responding faster to his suicide threat. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. “Prison suicide is very real and very serious, but any fair reading of this record, even in the light most favorable to Lord, shows that he leveled an insincere threat of suicide to get attention and demonstrated no recoverable injury.” |
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| United States v. Dridi |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-3334 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: KANNE Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| Before acquiring cars for resale, Elite obtained financing; its lenders held the title of each car until it received payment for the car. Lenders dispatched auditors to ensure the dealership was not selling cars without repaying the loan after each sale. From 2012-2015 Elite’s employees obtained copies of car titles from the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles online portal. If a copy could not be acquired, employees could avoid asking lenders to release car titles by continually issuing the customer temporary license plates. Employees would call customers and request that their cars be returned to the lot for a free oil change before an auditor’s inspection or would lie to the auditor, saying that the car was out for a test drive or repairs. Elite’s employees also defrauded consumer lenders by helping customers submit fraudulent applications and defrauded insurance companies by using a chop shop behind the dealership to disassemble their own vehicles before reporting the vehicles as stolen. Elite employee Dridi was convicted of conspiring to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and interstate transportation of stolen property, 18 U.S.C. 2314, sentenced to 72 months in prison, and ordered $1,811,679.25 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Dridi’s prison sentence but vacated the restitution order, The district court should have made specific factual findings about Dridi’s participation in the conspiracy. |
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| United States v. Geary |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2299 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Barrett Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| David, Sheila’s husband, raped, sexually abused, and took pornographic photos of their daughter (MF) when she was between the ages of five and eight. Sheila viewed those pictures and found other images of child pornography to share with David. Ultimately, Sheila pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment, and ordered to pay $55,600 in restitution jointly and severally with David. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(c)(1), which applies to various forms of the sexual exploitation of children, starts at a higher base level than section 2G2.2 and advises a two-level increase if the defendant was a parent who “permitt[ed]” her minor child to engage in sexually explicit conduct. There was ample evidence that Sheila “permitted” David to use their daughter for the production of child pornography. The district court exercised appropriate caution in taking the word of an abusive husband against that of his wife and, even without David’s statements, there was enough evidence to support the application of section 2G2.2. One need not “participate” or “assist” in an activity to “permit” it. The court granted Sheila a substantial downward departure as an abuse victim and imposed a sentence at the bottom of the advisory range that would have applied under the guideline that Sheila requested. The court employed the restitution calculation made in David’s sentencing-- the estimated cost of providing counseling and therapy to MF. Sheila could have challenged that calculation. |
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| United States v. O'Brien |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1004 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Joel Martin Flaum Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| O’Brien was convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, based on a 2004-to-2007 scheme in which O’Brien misrepresented her income and liabilities to cause lenders to issue and refinance loans related to two Chicago investment properties O’Brien owned., O’Brien was a licensed attorney with a background and experience in the real estate industry, including as a registered loan originator, mortgage consultant, and licensed real estate broker. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting O’Brien’s arguments that the charges against her were duplicitous and that under a properly pled indictment the statute of limitations would have barred three of the four alleged offenses. She also argued that the district court should not have admitted evidence offered to prove those time-barred offenses and that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict. The government appropriately acted within its discretion to allege an overarching scheme to commit both bank fraud and mail fraud affecting a financial institution. Each count included an execution of the fraudulent scheme within the applicable 10-year statute of limitations, and the jury’s guilty verdict rested upon properly admitted and sufficient evidence. |
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| Rodriguez Infante v. Martel |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-55286 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Marsha Siegel Berzon Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition in which petitioner alleged that the trial judge dismissed the juror for race-related reasons and so ran afoul of the prohibition on racial discrimination in jury selection. As a preliminary matter, the panel held that Haney v. Adams, 641 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011), did not bar consideration of the merits of petitioner's equal protection claim where he challenged a judge's jury strike for cause, rather than an attorney's peremptory challenge. On the merits, the panel held that the state courts correctly determined that the judge's concerns reflected the juror's own statements of race-related bias, not discriminatory reliance by the judge on the juror's race. Likewise, petitioner's due process and Sixth Amendment claims also failed. |
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| United States v. Chatman |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-5038 Opinion Date: March 16, 2020 Judge: Paul Joseph Kelly, Jr. Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Petitioner-Appellant John Chatman, Jr. was convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition (Count One), obstruction of justice by attempting to kill a witness (Count Two), and using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (Count 3). He was sentenced to 480 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Count Two arguing that the government failed to provide sufficient evidence in accordance with Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668 (2011). Under Fowler, “the [g]overnment must prove (1) a killing or attempted killing, (2) committed with a particular intent, namely, an intent (a) to 'prevent’ a 'communication’ (b) about 'the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense’ (c) to a federal 'law enforcement officer or judge.’” Under the facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit determined the statute (quoted in Fowler) did not fit the crime. The Court remanded this case to the district court to vacate and dismiss Chatman’s convictions under both Counts Two and Three and resentence him under Count One alone. |
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| Wellmon v. CDOC |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-1002 Opinion Date: March 18, 2020 Judge: Carson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Petitioner Jimmie Wellmon sought to set aside his state court convictions for attempted first-degree murder, assault, menacing, and witness tampering. The Tenth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability so Petitioner could appeal whether he validly waived his right to counsel and, if so, whether the state trial judge reasonably rejected his pretrial motion to retract his waiver. The federal district court rejected Petitioner’s claims and dismissed his petition. Acknowledging that Congress has given federal appellate courts an ability to review state criminal convictions, federal courts' power to grant relief was "limited to correcting extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems," the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found no reversible error in the district court's decision to dismiss Petitioner's petition in this case, and affirmed judgment. |
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| United States v. Pazos Cingari |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-12262 Opinion Date: March 17, 2020 Judge: Grant Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendants' sentence for defrauding hundreds of undocumented aliens into paying about $740,000 for falsified federal immigration forms. The court held that the district court committed no plain error in holding defendant jointly and severally liable for repaying the proceeds of their illegal conduct. In this case, defendants failed to establish that they did not mutually obtain, possess, and benefit from their criminal proceeds. The court also held that defendants' sentences were not procedurally unreasonable and that the Sentencing Guidelines direct that they be sentenced for fraud and deceit. The court wrote that United States v. Baldwin, 774 F.3d 711, 733 (11th Cir. 2014), was controlling here. In Baldwin, the court upheld the district court's application of USSG 2B1.1 on facts comparable to those in this case. |
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| Ex parte State of Alabama |
| Court: Supreme Court of Alabama Docket: 1180639 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Mendheim Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The State of Alabama petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to grant mandamus relief to R.E.D. R.E.D. had asked the Court of Criminal Appeals to vacate a circuit court order denying his request for a jury trial on the issue whether the State intentionally committed misconduct during R.E.D.'s first trial so as to goad R.E.D. into requesting a mistrial and to enter an order granting his jury-trial request. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' order vacating the trial court's ruling was in conflict with Ex parte Adams, 669 So. 2d 128 (Ala. 1995), and/or Pettibone v. Alabama, 91 So. 3d 94 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011). After that review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision was in conflict with both Ex parte Adams and Pettibone, and, thus, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals' order. |
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| Darrough v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 119 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's petition to correct an illegal sentence "imposed in an illegal manner," filed pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-111, holding that the trial court did not err. Defendant was found guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. Defendant's sentences were enhanced under Ark. Code Ann. 5-64-408 for a subsequent controlled-substance conviction. Defendant was sentenced to 840 months' and 240 months' imprisonment, to be served consecutively. The court of appeals affirmed. In his petition to correct an illegal sentence, Defendant argued that the sentences imposed exceeded the statutory maximum for the offenses for which he was convicted. The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's sentences were legally enhanced under section 5-64-408(b), and Defendant did not establish that his sentences were facially illegal. |
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| Hall v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 123 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Womack Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying and dismissing Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-101, holding that Appellant stated no ground in the petition on which the writ could issue under Arkansas law. Appellant was convicted of two counts of capital murder and, in a separate trial, one count of second-degree murder. In his habeas corpus petition, Appellant alleged that the judgment of conviction for capital murder was void because he was detained without lawful authority. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's request for habeas relief was clearly without merit. |
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| Randle v. Straughn |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 117 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Karen R. Baker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying and dismissing Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-101, holding that Appellant stated no ground in the petition on which the writ could issue under Arkansas law. Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Appellant later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the judgment was void because the felony information was signed by a deputy prosecutor rather than the prosecutor. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's challenge to the validity of the felony information did not establish a ground for the writ. |
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| California v. Cruz |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E070518(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: March 18, 2020 Judge: Fields Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant-appellant Mario Cruz, Jr. was found by jury guilty as charged of committing several offenses against his former girlfriend, Jane Doe: stalking Jane while a restraining order prohibiting defendant from contacting Jane was in effect (count 1); vandalism of more than $400 (count 2); violating a criminal protective order, by an act or credible threat of violence, within seven years of suffering a prior conviction for violating such an order (counts 3, 6, 7, & 9); and making criminal threats (counts 5 & 8). The court found defendant had one prison prior, and sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of six years four months in prison. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the prosecution failed to authenticate the Facebook messages as having been sent to Jane by defendant; (2) his criminal threats convictions in counts 5 and 8 should have been reversed because making a criminal threat was a lesser included offense of stalking, and a person cannot be convicted of both a greater offense and a necessarily included lesser offense; (3) the court erroneously failed to stay, under Penal Code section 654, his sentence on his criminal threats convictions in counts 5 and 8, and his convictions for violating restraining orders in counts 3, 6, 7, and 9, because these convictions arose from the same indivisible course of conduct, and were based on the same intent and objective, as his stalking conviction, namely, his threats to harm Jane and his attempts to convince Jane to resume his and Jane’s romantic relationship between April and August 2016; and (4) the judgment had to be modified to strike defendant’s one-year prison prior enhancement in light of the October 8, 2019 enactment of Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which applied retroactively to all judgments, including defendant’s judgment, which were not final on appeal when the legislation went into effect on January 1, 2020. To the last point, the Court of Appeal concurred, the enhancement should have been stricken in light of the Bill. In all other respects, the Court affirmed judgment. |
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| California v. Cruz |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: G057564(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: March 18, 2020 Judge: Raymond J. Ikola Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Alfredo Cruz was convicted of second degree murder in 2010. In 2019, he filed a petition to vacate his murder conviction and asked for resentencing under newly enacted Penal Code section 1170.95, enacted as part of Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, sec. 4) which took effect January 1, 2019. Senate Bill 1437 amended the natural and probable consequences doctrine for murder and the felony-murder rule “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” Senate Bill 1437 also provided for retroactive application of these amendments by creating a process through which qualifying defendants could have their murder convictions vacated and be resentenced. The trial court did not determine whether Defendant qualified for relief, but instead denied the petition on the ground that Senate Bill 1437 was unconstitutional. On appeal, Defendant argued the trial court erred by finding Senate Bill 1437 unconstitutional. The California Attorney General filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Defendant, defending the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1437 by arguing it amended neither Proposition 7 nor Proposition 115. The Orange County District Attorney (District Attorney), representing the State in this appeal, contended Senate Bill 1437 amended both propositions and was therefore an unconstitutional “intrusion into the voters” initiative powers. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Legislature’s enactment of Senate Bill 1437 did not undo what the voters accomplished with Proposition 7 or Proposition 115 and therefore the legislation did not violate the constitution. In this opinion and in the concurrently published opinion filed in California v. Solis (Mar. 18, 2020, G057510) __ Cal.App.5th __, the Court of Appeal concluded Senate Bill 1437 was constitutional. The trial court judgment was reversed denying Defendant’s petition, and the matter was remanded for a hearing on the petition’s merits. |
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| California v. Henderson |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D076200(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Terry B. O'Rourke Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A jury convicted Ian Henderson and codefendant Zavier Marks of attempted murder (count 1) and shooting at an inhabited dwelling (count 2). With respect to count 1, the jury found true allegations that the attempted murder was committed by both defendants willfully and with deliberation and premeditation. It found not true allegations as to both counts that the defendants committed the offenses for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang. The court dismissed allegations that as to both counts, a principal either used a firearm, discharged a firearm, or discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury. However, it found true allegations that Henderson and Marks each suffered a single conviction constituting both a serious felony prior conviction, and a prior strike conviction. The court sentenced Henderson to a 29-year-to-life prison sentence: seven years to life on count 1 doubled to 14 years to life by his strike prior, plus a consecutive middle term of five years on count 2 doubled to 10 years, and an additional consecutive five years for the serious felony prior conviction. It sentenced Marks to 19 years to life in prison: seven years to life on count 1 doubled to 14 years to life by the strike prior conviction, plus a concurrent midterm of five years on count 2 doubled to 10 years, and a five-year enhancement for the serious felony prior conviction. Both defendants appealed their respective sentences. In supplemental briefing, both Henderson and Marks asked the Court of Appeal that the matter be remanded for resentencing so that the trial court may exercise its discretion whether to impose or strike the five-year sentence for their prior serious felonies. Pointing out the court did not indicate at sentencing whether it would have stricken the five-year terms if it knew it had discretion to do so, the State conceded the matter should have been remanded so the court could exercise its discretion whether to strike those terms. The Court of Appeal agreed with the concession, vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing. |
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| California v. Solis |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: G057510(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: March 18, 2020 Judge: Richard D. Fybel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Rogelio Solis, who had been convicted of second degree murder based on the doctrine of natural and probable consequences, filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to the newly enacted Penal Code section 1170.95, enacted as part of Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, sec. 4) which took effect January 1, 2019. Senate Bill 1437 amended the natural and probable consequences doctrine for murder and the felony-murder rule “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” Senate Bill 1437 also provided for retroactive application of these amendments by creating a process through which qualifying defendants could have their murder convictions vacated and be resentenced. The Orange County District Attorney opposed defendant’s petition on the ground Senate Bill No. 1437 unconstitutionally amended two voter-approved initiatives. The trial court agreed and denied the petition. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding Senate Bill No. 1437 addressed the elements of the crime of murder and is directed to the mental state and conduct of those accused of murder. "It does not authorize anything the two initiatives prohibited, nor prohibit anything they authorized. Senate Bill No. 1437 neither adds any particular provision to nor subtracts any particular provision from either initiative." The trial court judgment was reversed denying Defendant’s petition, and the matter was remanded for a hearing on the petition’s merits. |
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| In re S.E. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: F078904(Fifth Appellate District) Opinion Date: March 18, 2020 Judge: Jennifer R.S. Detjen Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| The Court of Appeal affirmed the district court's restitution order against defendant, then age 16, who admitted to making criminal threats in violation of Penal Code 422. The court held that the juvenile court erred by applying the presumption of causality contained in Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(A) to victim restitution ordered under section 730.6. However, the court rejected defendant's claim that his conduct was not shown to be a substantial factor in an injury to the so-called derivative victims. The court also held that the juvenile court properly imposed interest on the amount of restitution. |
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| People v. Garcia |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B293491(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: March 18, 2020 Judge: Brian M. Hoffstadt Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| A trial court does not have the discretion to substitute the firearm enhancement found true by the jury for a lesser enhancement never presented to that jury. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal applied People v. Tirado, (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 637, which held that Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (h) does not grant a trial court the discretion to substitute lesser included enhancements, at least where the greater enhancement is legally and factually valid. The court wrote that this is the result dictated by the statute's plain language; by the separation of powers absent a legislative override; and by the rules governing when to instruct the jury on lesser offenses and enhancements. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. |
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| People v. Lopez |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: F076295(Fifth Appellate District) Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Rosendo Peña, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition, attempted robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and a violation of the gang conspiracy statute, Penal Code section 182.5. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in using conflicting jury instructions to explain the gang conspiracy charge, but the error did not prejudice defendant. The court modified the judgment to reflect a violation of section 182.5 based on the act of attempted first degree robbery. The court also held that counts 19 and 162 for conspiracy to commit home invasion robbery was duplicative, and thus vacated count 162 for insufficient evidence. The court remanded for resentencing in light of the reversal of count 162 and the modification of count 20. The court affirmed in all other respects. |
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| People v. Sanchez |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: F076838(Fifth Appellate District) Opinion Date: March 16, 2020 Judge: Snauffer Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant appealed his conviction of attempted murder and assault with a firearm after his acquaintance fired a shotgun during a confrontation with other men. The Court of Appeal held that the evidence was sufficient to prove attempted murder, and that the natural and probable consequences theory did not violate his due process rights. However, the court held that the natural and probable consequences doctrine cannot prove attempted murder. The court wrote that Senate Bill 1437 now prohibits imputing malice to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime. Therefore, because malice in the murder context is no longer imputable, the Legislature has eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a viable theory to prove attempted murder. The court additionally reasoned that limiting SB 1437's malice imputing prohibition to murder has the absurd consequence of incentivizing murder. In this case, defendant was prosecuted under both a valid direct aiding and abetting legal theory and an invalid legal theory because the natural and probable consequences doctrine is no longer a viable theory to prove attempted murder. Therefore, the resulting prejudice requires reversal of the attempted murder conviction. |
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| Colorado v. Lindsey |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 21 Opinion Date: March 16, 2020 Judge: Samour Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| William Lindsey persuaded six investors to advance roughly $3 million toward a new technology that he claimed would harness the energy of bioluminescent algae to light signs and panels. In soliciting these funds, Lindsey told his investors that he had already secured contracts to sell his lighting products to several large clients. As it turned out, neither the technology nor the contracts existed; Lindsey diverted the funds he collected to his own personal use. Trial setting was continued at least seven times in three years. David Tyler was Lindsey’s fourth attorney in this case, and judges had admonished Tyler and Lindsey there would be no more continuances. A month before trial, Tyler moved to withdraw from the case, but his motion was denied after a hearing in front of a different judge who found no irreconcilable conflict. On the eve of trial, Tyler filed another motion, this one challenging Lindsey’s competency. The factual assertions in this motion were the same factual assertions on which Tyler relied during the hearing on the motion to withdraw ten days earlier: Lindsey had failed to be completely forthright with him, to keep promises to furnish information and funds for an effective defense, and to diligently work and communicate with him. In all the years the case had been pending, this was the first time anyone had ever raised a question about Lindsey’s competency. During the hearing on the competency motion, just as during previous hearings, Lindsey was lucid and coherent, showing no signs of incompetency. Tyler believed that Colorado's competency statutes required the trial court to either make a preliminary finding regarding competency or indicate that there was insufficient evidence to do so. But the trial judge found the motion’s factual assertions had nothing to do with competency and did not support a good-faith doubt about Lindsey’s competency. Accordingly, the judge refused to postpone the trial. The case thus proceeded to a jury trial, where Lindsey was convicted of securities fraud and theft. Lindsey then appealed, and a division of the court of appeals vacated his convictions. Because the Colorado Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court, it reversed the appeals court's judgment. |
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| In re Colorado v. Rosas |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 22 Opinion Date: March 16, 2020 Judge: Samour Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Based on an incident that occurred between January 3 and 4, 2018, the State of Colorado charged Paul Rosas with two counts of second degree assault on a peace officer (class 4 felonies), two counts of attempted second degree assault on a peace officer (class 5 felonies), and one count of obstructing a peace officer (a class 2 misdemeanor). Rosas filed a notice of the affirmative defense of “impaired mental condition” pursuant to section 16-8-103.5, C.R.S. (2019), asserting that at the time of the offenses he was suffering from a mental disease or defect that made him incapable of forming the requisite culpable mental state. But this affirmative defense hadn't existed in Colorado "for a quarter of a century." The State objected to Rosas’s notice of the defense of impaired mental condition, but only on the ground that it was untimely. After a hearing, the district court overruled the State's objection and “allow[ed] [Rosas] to enter an affirmative defense of impaired mental condition.” It then ordered an examination “for impaired mental condition.” The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether a defendant charged with specific intent crimes had to plead not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) in order to introduce evidence that, as a result of a mental disease or defect, he was incapable of forming the requisite culpable mental state on the dates of the offenses charged. The district court said “no.” The Supreme Court ruled the answer was “yes.” "Evidence that a mental disease or defect prevented a defendant from forming the culpable mental state required by an offense charged is evidence relevant to the issue of insanity. And a defendant—even one charged with specific intent crimes—cannot introduce evidence relevant to the issue of insanity without first pleading NGRI." |
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| Boyd v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC18-1589 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court summarily denying Appellant's successive motion for post conviction relief pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 and, alternatively, to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a), holding that there was no error in the trial court's summary denial of relief. In his postconviction relief motion, Appellant sought relief from his sentence of death, raising claims predicated on Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 S. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). The trial court summarily denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claims were procedurally barred, and even without the procedural bar, this Court's recent decision in State v. Poole, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S41 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2020), foreclosed relief. |
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| Reed v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC19-714 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court denying Appellant's successive postconviction motion filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 seeking relief from his sentence of death pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), holding that State v. Poole, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S41 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2020), was dispositive in this case. Appellant's death sentence became final in 1990, before the Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). The Supreme Court subsequently decided Poole, pursuant to which there was no Hurst error in Appellant's case because a unanimous jury finding establishes the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the Supreme Court held that two of the four statutory aggravating circumstances found by the trial court - that the capital felony was committed during the commission of a sexual battery and for pecuniary gain - were established because Appellant's jury found him guilty of the contemporaneous crimes of sexual battery and robbery. |
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| Bundel v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0173 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Rosano Bundel appealed his convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the 2011 shooting death of George Tabetando. Bundel argued that the weight of the evidence did not support his convictions and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial without conducting a hearing. Finding the evidence entered into the trial court record sufficient to support Bundel's conviction, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. Furthermore, the Court determined Bundel's second claim was also without merit because a trial court is required to hold a hearing on a motion for new trial only when one is requested, and Bundel did not do so. |
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| Corley v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0214 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Vivian Corley was conned by jury of murder, aggravated assault, and the unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the fatal shooting of Lorraine Manuel. Corley appealed, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions, that she previously had been acquitted of murder with malice aforethought and could not be retried for that crime, that the trial court erred when it excluded certain evidence, and that the prosecuting attorney made improper comments to the jury. Upon review of the record and briefs, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error related to these claims. The Court did note, however, that the trial court erred when it failed to merge the aggravated assault into the murder. The Court therefore vacated the conviction and sentence for aggravated assault, but otherwise affirmed. |
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| Georgia v. Gates |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Dockets: S19A1130, S19X1131 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Both the State of Georgia and Johnny Lee Gates appealed the grant of Gates’ extraordinary motion for new trial by the trial court. In Case No. S19A1130, the State argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that Gates should receive a new trial because of the discovery of new DNA evidence that was material and exculpatory. The State also argued that the trial court erred when it also appeared to grant Gates’ extraordinary motion on the basis of Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), due to destruction of evidence by the State. In Case No. S19X1131, Gates cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court should have also granted him a new trial on his claim that the process by which the jury at his 1977 trial was selected was marred by racial discrimination. Because the Georgia Supreme Court found no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in its grant of a new trial to Gates on the basis of the newly discovered DNA evidence, it affirmed that judgment in Case No. S19A1130. In light of that determination, the Court did not consider the State’s argument in Case No. S19A1130 relating to Gates’ Youngblood claim or the arguments raised by Gates in Case No. S19X1131. |
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| Georgia v. Goff |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0248 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Todd Goff was convicted of malice murder for killing his girlfriend, Tiffany Salter. The trial court granted Goff a new trial on the basis that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by: (1) advising Goff not to testify; (2) failing to move for a mistrial after the jury heard that Goff was on probation; and (3) failing to introduce Goff’s booking photos. The State appealed. Because the trial court erred in finding that Goff’s trial counsel performed deficiently in any of these respects, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed. |
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| Georgia v. Remy |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1410 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In March 2018, Paul Remy was tried for murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Jenario Stark. After the jury had deliberated for a full day without reaching a verdict, the trial court declared a mistrial. Four days later, Remy filed a motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA 16-3-24.2, arguing that he shot Stark in defense of himself and others. Before the hearing on the immunity motion occurred, the State re-indicted Remy for the same incident, omitting a count of aggravated assault and adding a second charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. After the hearing, the trial court granted Remy immunity. The court then dismissed the new indictment on the ground that it was issued after a court-ordered deadline for the filing of new indictments. On appeal, the State raised three alleged errors: (1) Remy was not entitled to file a motion for immunity after a mistrial; (2) even if an immunity motion may be considered after the declaration of a mistrial, Remy was not entitled to immunity on the merits; and (3) the trial court erred when it dismissed the second indictment. Because the trial court failed to provide a legal basis for dismissing the charges in the second indictment, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed that ruling. Furthermore, the Court vacated the felon-in-possession charge for the trial court to conduct further analysis in light of Johnson v. Georgia, Case No. S19A1404, 2020 WL 966592 (Feb. 28, 2020). The Court affirmed as to all other issues. |
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| Glenn v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0058 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Demarquis Glenn was convicted by jury for the murder of Quantieria Knight, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. On appeal, Glenn argued the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to suppress certain evidence. Finding n reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. |
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| Jones v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0372 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Tracy Jones, who pleaded guilty to murder and other offenses, filed a motion for out-of-time appeal, claiming that her plea counsel abandoned her after sentencing and that her right to appeal was thereby frustrated. The trial court denied Jones’s motion on the basis that she did not allege that her failure to file a timely appeal was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. But the Georgia Supreme Court concluded, after review of the trial court record, that she did sufficiently state such an allegation in her pro se motion, so the Court vacated and remanded for a hearing as to whether counsel’s ineffectiveness in fact frustrated her right to appeal. |
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| Mattox v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0026 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Charles “Dre” Mattox was tried by jury and convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the fatal shootings of Dewayne Bacon and John Bacon. Mattox appealed, claiming: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel; and (3) his due process rights were violated by a lengthy delay in the disposition of his motion for new trial. Upon its review of the record and briefs, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. |
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| Moore v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0115 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Marcus Moore pled guilty to, and was convicted of murder. He moved for an out-of-time appeal. The trial court later sua sponte dismissed Moore’s notice of appeal from the order denying his motion for an out-of-time appeal, based on its determinations that the judgment was not then appealable and that the questions presented had become moot. Moore filed a timely notice of appeal of the dismissal order. Because trial courts are not authorized to dismiss appeals for the reasons given in the dismissal order, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed that order. And because the record reflected that the trial court failed to conduct a factual inquiry into the allegations in Moore’s motion for an out-of- time appeal, as required under the circumstances, the Supreme Court vacated the order denying his motion for an out-of-time appeal and remanded to the trial court for consideration of the merits of the motion. |
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| Simmons v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0232 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Eric Simmons was convicted by jury for murder and the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Simmons argued the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by not granting his motion for a mistrial following “emotional outbursts” from the victim’s family and friends. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Simmons' convictions and sentence. |
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| Stubbs v. Hall |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1253 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2005, Henry Stubbs was convicted of armed robbery and hijacking a motor vehicle, among many other crimes, and was sentenced to life imprisonment plus 31 years. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions in 2008. In 2012, Stubbs filed a writ of habeas corpus through an attorney, which the habeas court dismissed as untimely. He then filed an application for a certificate of probable cause with the Georgia Supreme Court to appeal that dismissal. The issue the Supreme Court considered on certiorari review was whether the habeas court erred in dismissing Stubbs' petition as untimely when Stubbs presented evidence, via a verified habeas petition, that he had not been advised of the time limitations governing habeas corpus actions. Although the Supreme Court concluded that the habeas court’s ruling about the exact date that Stubbs’s convictions became final was erroneous, the Court nonetheless affirmed the habeas court’s dismissal of Stubbs’s petition because it was untimely under OCGA 9-14-42(c)(1) — a fact that neither party disputed. The Court also concluded that Stubbs’s untimely petition was not subject to statutory or equitable tolling. The Court therefore answered the question presented “no” and affirmed the habeas court’s dismissal of Stubbs’s petition. |
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| Watkins v. Ballinger |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1506 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Georgia Supreme Court granted Joseph Watkins’ application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal a superior court order dismissing Watkins’ second petition for writ of habeas corpus. The issue presented for the Georgia Supreme Court's review centered on whether the habeas court properly dismissed Watkins’ petition as both untimely and successive. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the habeas court erred in dismissing Watkins’ petition, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Wilson v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0027 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Robert Wilson was convicted by jury for the murder of his infant son. As appeal. He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, specifically that the evidence presented against him was entirely circumstantial, and that the evidence did not exclude his reasonable hypothesis that the victim's mother fatally injured their son. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed conviction. |
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| State v. Baker |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-18-0000454 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Richard W. Pollack Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction for failing to comply with the requirements of Haw. Rev. Stat. 291C-13, holding that both the complaint and the evidence were insufficient. Section 291C-13 requires that when an accident occurs, the driver that causes damage must stop the vehicle at, or as close as possible to, the accident scene and remain there until the driver has provided certain identifying information. The statute also requires that every such stop be made without obstructing traffic more than necessary. On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to sustain her conviction because, where it was necessary for the parties to move their vehicles out of traffic, the State was required to prove that the stop at the accident scene could have been made without obstructing traffic more than necessary. Defendant further argued that because the complaint and charge did not allege that "[e]very stop shall are made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary" she was not fully informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the complaint was insufficient; and (2) the State failed to prove that Defendant did not provide the required statutory information to the police after the accident in this case. |
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| People v. Hill |
| Court: Supreme Court of Illinois Citation: 2020 IL 124595 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Lloyd A. Karmeier Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Officer Baker testified that he activated his lights to initiate a stop of Hill’s vehicle based on his reasonable belief that the passenger was a known fugitive, Lee. Hill finally came to a stop. Based on his experience and training, Baker knew vehicles that take a little while to stop often are concealing or destroying contraband or producing a weapon. Baker approached the passenger side of the vehicle and had the passenger lower the window. He immediately smelled the strong odor of raw cannabis. He saw a loose bud on the backseat. Baker could not recall when he realized the passenger was not Lee. Baker searched Hill’s vehicle based on the smell of raw cannabis. The search revealed cannabis and a small rock that tested positive for crack cocaine. There was a video of the stop. The trial court found the basis of the stop too tenuous and granted, in part, a motion to suppress. The appellate court reversed, finding Baker had reasonable suspicion to stop Hill’s vehicle and probable cause to search the vehicle. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed and remanded, noting the legalization of medical cannabis and decriminalization of small amounts of cannabis. Facts available to the officer would put a reasonably prudent person on notice that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime. |
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| People v. Jackson |
| Court: Supreme Court of Illinois Citation: 2020 IL 124112 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Neville Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| On April 1, 2010, before 6 a.m., Thornton, mayor of Washington Park, Illinois, was fatally shot at close range while seated in his car. Witnesses told police that they heard gunshots, saw Thornton’s car crash into a tree, and then saw Jackson exit Thornton’s vehicle and get into a waiting vehicle, which drove from the scene. No firearm was recovered, but police found three spent bullets inside the vehicle. After a mistrial, Jackson was convicted of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)) and was sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. The prosecutor’s mischaracterization of two pieces of evidence during closing arguments was “brief and isolated” and not so prejudicial that real justice was denied or that the jury’s verdict may have resulted from those statements. The trial court properly concluded that “[t]he sufficiency of the allegations made by the defendant fail on their face to substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” |
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| People v. McLaurin |
| Court: Supreme Court of Illinois Citation: 2020 IL 124563 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Mary Jane Theis Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Chicago sergeant Fraction testified that she was sitting alone in an unmarked police vehicle and observed McLaurin leave a building “carrying a silver handgun.” McLaurin entered a white van, which drove away. Calling for backup, Fraction followed and never lost sight of the van. Within minutes, the van was stopped by officers. McLaurin and two other men were ordered out of the vehicle. Fraction identified McLaurin and described a handgun that was recovered by police as “the same color [and] size of the handgun I saw.” Rodriguez, among the officers who stopped the van, testified that he had looked underneath the vehicle and saw the 9-millimeter chrome handgun on the ground but that he did not see anyone place or throw anything underneath the vehicle. McLaurin argued that no officer had seen any of the van's doors open, nor did any of them see an object being thrown underneath the van and that Fraction could only describe the gun's color and size. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed McLaurin’s convictions: armed habitual criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a)), unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (5/24-1.1(a)), and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (5/24-1.6). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, it was not so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that McLaurin possessed a firearm as defined by the FOID Act. |
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| State v. Galloway |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 117941 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Eric S. Rosen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for premeditated first-degree murder, arson, and interference with law enforcement but vacated Defendant's controlling hard fifty life sentence, holding that the district court erred by not considering mitigating factors before deciding not to depart from the presumptive sentence. Defendant moved for a downward departure from a hard fifty sentence, arguing that she had no criminal history. The district court stated that it would not consider the absence of Defendant's criminal history as a mitigating factor because the legislature had rejected that argument as grounds for mitigation. The State conceded that the court's statement conflicted with the statutory sentencing scheme and incorrectly stated the law. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence, holding that the error was not harmless. |
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| State v. Parker |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 118349 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Eric S. Rosen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of premeditated first-degree murder, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. During trial, the court instructed the jury on premeditated first-degree murder and on the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. The jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress self-incriminating statements he made during an interrogation that took place immediately after his arrest; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's request for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter committed upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. |
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| State v. Sesmas |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 119862 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Carol A. Beier Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and aggravated interference with parental custody, holding that Defendant's post-arrest confession was voluntary and that any violation of Defendant's due process rights was harmless. On appeal, Defendant argued that her confession was involuntary and that its admission at trial was reversible error. Defendant also argued that the State violated her due process rights at trial by mentioning her invocation of her rights. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) substantial competent evidence supported the foundation of the district court's decision that Defendant's confession was voluntary and admissible; and (2) where the State thoroughly undermined Defendant's credibility, any fleeting mention of Defendant's invocation of her rights was harmless error. |
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| State v. Sholes |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 35 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Andrew M. Mead Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for unlawful sexual contact and domestic violence assault, holding that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant the opportunity to call as a witness the district attorney's victim witness advocate (VWA). On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor committed multiple instances of misconduct and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying him the opportunity to call the VWA to testify. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) even if a statement made by the prosecutor was improper, it did not amount to harmful error; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion for a new trial; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's request that the VWA testify. |
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| Attorney General v. District Attorney for Plymouth District |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12722 Opinion Date: March 12, 2020 Judge: Ralph D. Gants Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part the superior court's grant of summary judgment for the Attorney General and entering a judgment declaring that Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC's (Globe) request for data tables containing certain information for each criminal case tracked by the Commonwealth's eleven district attorneys sought public records that must be disclosed, holding that the district attorneys must disclose to the Globe twenty-two of the twenty-three categories of information requested, excising from the disclosure the docket number for each case requested. Specifically, the Court held (1) the data sought by the Globe would be "specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure" under the Criminal Offender Record Information Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, 167-178B if the individuals whose cases were tracked by the data could be directly or indirectly identified; (2) if the docket number for each case were redacted from the remaining categories of information, those individuals could not be directly or indirectly identified from this data; and (3) the request in this case, which required the traction of categories of information from an existing database, does not impose a burden on public record holders that exceed what is required under the public records law. |
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| Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC v. Department of Criminal Justice Information Services |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12690 Opinion Date: March 12, 2020 Judge: Ralph D. Gants Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of a superior court judge declaring that booking photographs of police officers arrested for alleged crimes and police incident reports involving public officials were not exempt from disclosure under the public records law, holding that the superior court did not err. Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC (Globe) made public records requests to the State police seeking booking photographs and police incident reports related to the arrests of law enforcement officers. The State police refused to comply with the requests, stating that the records were "criminal offender record information" (CORI) and were therefore not "public records" as defined in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 4, 7. The Globe also made a public records request to the Boston police department for the names of officers charged with driving under the influence and the related booking photographs and incident reports. The Boston police withheld the records on the same grounds used by the State police. The Globe brought suit. The superior court granted summary judgment for the Globe. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that requested booking photographs and incident reports were not absolutely exempt from disclosure as public records under exemption (a) or exemption (c) of the CORI Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, 167-178B. |
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| Commonwealth v. McGann |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12742 Opinion Date: March 17, 2020 Judge: Cypher Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences for assault and battery on a family or household member and assault by means of a dangerous weapon, holding that that a trial judge may order a defendant to pay restitution to a third party in certain circumstances. On appeal, Defendant argued that her right to a fair trial was violated and that the trial judge erred in ordering her to pay restitution to the victim's mother, who was a third party and non victim. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant received a fair trial; and (2) a trial judge may order a defendant to pay restitution to a third party, and the order in the instant case satisfied the causation requirement. |
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| Commonwealth v. Norman |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12744 Opinion Date: March 17, 2020 Judge: Gaziano Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the trial judge granting Defendant's motion to suppress certain GPS location data and its fruits, holding that the initial imposition of a GPS device as a condition of pretrial release violated article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. In 2015, Defendant was charged with possession of a class B substance with the intent to distribute, as a subsequent offense, and motor vehicle violations. Defendant was ordered to wear a GPS monitoring device as a condition of release. Defendant was later arrested and indicted on charges of armed robbery while masked. Defendant moved to suppress the GPS location data used to identify him as being present at the scene of the crime. After finding that Defendant had consented to the use of GPS location data only for the purposes of enforcing conditions of release and not for general law enforcement purposes the judge concluded that the search was not supported by probable cause and granted the motion to suppress. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that the search was impermissible because the GPS monitoring did not further any legitimate governmental interests. |
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| Michigan v. Sammons |
| Court: Michigan Supreme Court Docket: 156189 Opinion Date: March 16, 2020 Judge: Michael F. Cavanagh Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Travis Sammons was convicted by jury of conspiracy to commit murder in connection with the shooting death of Humberto Casas. DyJuan Jones and Rosei Watkins witnessed the shooting, which occurred on a street around 1 p.m. Jones was riding in the backseat of a car being driven by his mother when he heard the shots, and Watkins was driving with her grandson in her own car. About 10 to 20 minutes later, the police pulled over defendant and Dominque Ramsey in a silver Jeep. Both men were taken to the Saginaw Police Department, where they were detained. A photo of the Jeep was taken and shown to Watkins, who identified it as the Jeep from the shooting. Several hours later, Jones and his mother went to the police station, where Michigan State Police Detective Sergeant David Rivard organized a showup identification of defendant and Ramsey. According to Jones, he could identify neither man as having been involved in the shooting, while Rivard claimed that Jones identified defendant as the shooter but did not identify Ramsey. No one witnessed the conversation between Jones and Rivard, the conversation was not recorded in any way, and Jones did not sign any kind of statement or report indicating that he had made an identification. At the preliminary examination, Jones repeatedly denied having identified the shooter. Defendant objected to Rivard’s testimony about the showup identification and filed a motion to suppress this evidence. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress and, after a trial, the jury found both men guilty of conspiracy. Both men filed motions for a directed verdict or a new trial. The circuit court denied defendant’s motion but granted Ramsey’s, ruling that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the showup identification procedure employed in this case was suggestive because it indicated to the witness that the police suspected defendant. "The suggestiveness was unnecessary because there was no reason, except perhaps police convenience, to use a suggestive procedure, and the showup was not reliable under Neil v Biggers, 409 US 188 (1972). This error was not harmless because the prosecution’s case was significantly less persuasive without the showup." Accordingly, the Court of Appeals judgment was reversed. |
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| State v. Smith |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A19-0695 Opinion Date: March 18, 2020 Judge: Chutich Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for eight crimes relating to the break in, robbery, and murder at James Herron's home but reversed the sentence imposed on Defendant for the first-degree aggravated robbery of Herron, holding that Defendant could not properly be sentenced for both first-degree murder while committing an aggravated robbery and first-degree aggravated robbery. Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court properly admitted Spreigl evidence at trial; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's proposed defense of duress; (3) even assuming without deciding that the district court erred by admitting evidence from Defendant's Facebook account, including business records and photos, the error was harmless; but (4) the district court erred by sentencing Defendant for more than one of the additional crimes committed against Herron after the initial burglary. |
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| Newell v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-KA-01689-SCT Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Leslie D. King Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Orlando Newell shot and killed Michael Woods. At trial, he argued self-defense, and the jury convicted him of murder. The trial court gave a pre-arming jury instruction, which precluded Newell’s self-defense theory. Because this instruction was not supported by the evidence and improperly impaired Newell’s self-defense claim, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the trial court’s grant of the pre-arming instruction was made in error. Consequently, Newell's conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. |
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| Woodson v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2019-KA-00199-SCT Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Ishee Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| After Kendal Woodson’s wife said she was going to leave him, he beat her severely and poured hot cooking oil on her. Woodson was convicted of domestic aggravated assault. Woodson’s trial counsel filed no posttrial motions, but Woodson later obtained an out-of-time appeal. His appointed counsel filed "Lindsey" brief, certifying she found no arguable issues supporting an appeal. Woodson did not file a pro se brief. After reviewing the record, the Mississippi Supreme Court concurred there were no appealable issues, accepted counsel's Lindsey certification, and affirmed Woodson's conviction and sentence. |
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| State v. Waters |
| Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC97910 Opinion Date: March 17, 2020 Judge: Patricia Breckenridge Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal challenging his convictions for first-degree statutory sodomy and attempted first-degree statutory sodomy, holding that, because two counts as to which the jury could not reach of verdict remained pending, the circuit court's judgment was not final. A jury convicted Appellant of the two sodomy charges but could not reach a verdict on the charges for first-degree statutory rape and incest. The circuit court declared a mistrial as to the rape and incest charges. The court then entered a judgment disposing of and imposing sentences on the two sodomy charges. The judgment, however, was silent as to the two counts on which the court had ordered a mistrial. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because Appellant was charged with four counts and two of those counts remained pending before the circuit court, the court's judgment of conviction on only two of the counts was not final for purposes of appeal. |
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| State v. Ghostbear |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 60 Opinion Date: March 17, 2020 Judge: Shea Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of felony sexual assault, holding that the court did not err by denying Defendant's for-cause challenge of a prospective juror. During voir dire, defense counsel moved to remove Juror G. for cause based on her responses to the question of whether jurors would be inclined to believe a child witness's testimony regarding sexual abuse. The district court denied the motion, and defense counsel subsequently used a peremptory challenge to remove Juror G. The jury found Defendant guilty of sexual assault. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that because Juror G.'s voir dire statements evinced an inability to act with impartiality and without prejudice toward Defendant the district court erred by denying Defendant's for-cause challenge of Juror G. |
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| State v. Holder |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 61 Opinion Date: March 17, 2020 Judge: James A. Rice Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Appellant's motion to strike a prior conviction for purposes of enhancing Appellant's DUI charge to a felony, holding that the district court did not err by relying on a 1990 Texas DWI conviction for purposes of enhancing Appellant's penalty. Appellant pled guilty to felony DUI and other offenses. On appeal, Defendant challenged the denial of his motion to strike his prior conviction, arguing that the district court erred by concluding that the State provided competent proof of his 1990 Texas DWI conviction because Defendant's National Crime Information criminal record report did not also include information about a sentence or judgment. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the State provided competent proof of the Texas conviction under application of the presumption of regularity, which Appellant did not rebut. |
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| State v. Sierra |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 249 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Freudenberg Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part Defendant's convictions and sentences for burglary, conspiracy to commit burglary, and theft involving a truck, a trailer, and several tools from a garage, holding that Defendant's convictions and sentences pursuant to counts III and IV of the State's amended information, which each asserted a separate offense of theft by unlawful taking ($5,000 or more) violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Specifically, the Court held (1) two of Defendant's three convictions and sentences for theft by unlawful taking ($5,000 or more) based on the theft of tools from the garage must be vacated because allowing three convictions for the same offense is a clear violation of both the Nebraska and United States Constitutions; (2) the trial court did not err by excluding defense witnesses who were not disclosed by counsel until five days before trial; (3) Defendant's assertion relating to his attorney's generalized failure to communicate with Defendant while preparing for trial were unavailing; and (4) there was either no merit to Defendant's remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or the record was insufficient for the Court to address the claims. |
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| Caster v. North Dakota |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 61 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Lekemia D’Andre Caster appealed from a district court order summarily denying his application for post-conviction relief. In 2015, Caster pleaded guilty to two counts of child neglect or abuse and was sentenced to eighteen months’ probation. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court failed to explain its reasoning in its order. The matter was therefore remanded for further proceedings. |
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| North Dakota v. Cook |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 69 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Jerod E. Tufte Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In early April 2019, Berthold Police Chief Allen Schmidt and Reserve Officer Greg Pinske stopped a car driven by Richard Cook for an unilluminated license plate. At the time of the stop, Pinske was not a licensed peace officer. Officer Pinske approached the car and obtained Cook’s driver’s license. Officer Pinske returned to the squad car with Cook’s license. Officer Pinske did not report to Chief Schmidt that he observed any suspicious behavior by Cook during the initial encounter. Officer Pinske ran a records check using Cook’s driver’s license, which revealed Cook had a 2016 drug conviction. At that point, Chief Schmidt took over the traffic stop. Chief Schmidt approached Cook’s vehicle and explained to Cook that he was performing drug interdiction that evening. Chief Schmidt asked Cook if he could search his car. Cook refused. Chief Schmidt then ordered Cook out of the car so he could perform a canine sniff around the car. The canine alerted to drugs in the car; Cook would ultimately be arrested and charged with several offenses. The State of North Dakota appealed after a district court granted Cook's motion suppressing evidence from the initial stop. Because the district court properly concluded Chief Schmidt’s seizure of Cook was not justified by reasonable suspicion, the Supreme Court affirmed suppression. |
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| North Dakota v. Eggleston |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 68 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Jensen Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Alex Eggleston appealed a district court’s amended judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Eggleston argued there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty of murder. Eggleston also contended his sentence was illegal because N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-09.1 and N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 51, which applied to his sentencing, were unconstitutionally vague, and because the district court improperly calculated his life expectancy. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s amended judgment in part, reverse in part, and remand for recalculation of Eggleston’s life expectancy. The Supreme Court determined the district court did not err in dismissing Eggleston’s motion for an acquittal because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Eggleston of murder and for the jury to conclude he was not acting in self-defense. Thus, the district court’s judgment of conviction was affirmed. However, the district court referenced an incorrect life table to compute Eggleston’s remaining life expectancy, thus, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s amended judgment, and remanded to the district court for a proper computation of Eggleston’s remaining life expectancy consistent with N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 51. |
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| Green v. Shoop |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-873 Opinion Date: March 12, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's second petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the warden of the Chillicothe Correctional Institution, holding that the court of appeals correctly granted the warden's motion to dismiss. In dismissing the petition, the court of appeals concluded that Appellant's claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus and that res judicata barred Appellant's successive habeas corpus petition. Appellant appealed the dismissal and also filed a motion to strike the warden's brief for lack of a valid certificate of service. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and denied the motion to strike, holding that the court of appeals' analysis was correct in both respects and that Appellant presented no evidence to support his motion to strike. |
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| State ex rel. Holman v. Collins |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-874 Opinion Date: March 12, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting summary judgment to the warden of the Pickaway Correctional Institutional and dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the court of appeals correctly granted summary judgment to the warden and dismissed Appellant's complaint for a writ of habeas corpus. Appellant, an inmate, filed a complaint for writ of habeas corpus asking the court to order his release from prison. In his complaint, Appellant challenged the actions of the Adult Parole Authority and alleged that because he had not been considered for parole since the completion of his sentence the warden was unlawfully restraining him. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for the warden. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's arguments rested on his mistaken belief that his sentence expired upon the completion of his minimum sentence and that Appellant's complaint for a writ of habeas corpus was correctly dismissed. |
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| State ex rel. Johnson v. Bureau of Sentence Computation |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-999 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and denying his complaint for a writ of mandamus, holding that the court of appeals did not err and declaring that Appellant a vexatious litigator. Appellant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter with a firearm specification. While on parole, Appellant was convicted of new offenses and received multiple definite prison sentences. In his habeas corpus petition Appellant claimed that the Bureau of Sentence Computation (BSC) miscalculated his sentence. Treating Appellant's motion as a request for mandamus relief, the magistrate concluded that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over Appellant's claim and that his claim was barred by res judicata. The court of appeals adopted the magistrate's recommendation, dismissed the habeas corpus portion of the complaint, and denied the writ of mandamus. Appellant appealed, and BSC requested that the Supreme Court declare Appellant a vexatious litigator. The Supreme Court affirmed and declared Appellant a vexatious litigator, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief. |
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| State ex rel. Newell v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-967 Opinion Date: March 18, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus against the Ohio Adult Parole Authority and its chairman (collectively, the APA), holding that the court of appeals correctly held that Appellant failed to preserve his claim alleging that the trial court failed to order that his sentence be served in a prison institution. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the APA incorrectly calculated his aggregate prison sentence. The court of appeals concluded that the APA correctly calculated Appellant's aggregate maximum term and rejected Appellant's contention that that APA had no authority to include the maximum term in its aggregate-sentence calculation because the sentencing entry did not specify that Appellant had to serve the sentence in a prison institution. The Supreme Court affirmed, Appellant failed to preserve his only claim on appeal. |
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| State v. Horn |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-960 Opinion Date: March 18, 2020 Judge: Donnelly Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of four counts of rape of S.M., his step-daughter, and two counts of rape of J.M., his niece by marriage and six sexually-violent predator specifications, holding that a familial relationship is not a "mental or physical condition" for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.02(A)(1)(c). On appeal, Defendant argued that the State had not established that his victim's "ability to resist or consent [was] substantially impaired because of a mental or physical condition," Ohio Rev. Code 2907.02(A)(1)(c). The Supreme Court concluded that a familial relationship is not a mental or physical condition, and therefore, it was impossible for the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant violated section 2907.02(A)(1)(c) based on the theory that a familial relationship was the condition that caused the victims' substantial impairment. |
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| State v. Chandler |
| Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court Docket: 19-28 Opinion Date: March 17, 2020 Judge: Paul A. Suttell Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court denying Defendant's motion to vacate an illegal sentence and judgment, holding that the hearing justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when he found that Defendant violated the conditions of his probation to which he was sentenced after his 2009 conviction. In 2009, Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment plus a suspended sentence, with probation. In 2018, Defendant pled nolo contendere to other offenses. Because Defendant was on probation at the time of the 2018, the hearing justice found Defendant to have violated the conditions of his 2009 probation and sentenced him on the same sentence previously imposed. Defendant filed a motion to vacate an illegal sentence, which the hearing justice denied. Before the Supreme Court, Defendant asserted that there were no conditions of probation prior to the enactment of R.I. Gen. Laws 12-19-8.1 in 2017. Therefore, Defendant argued that because he was sentenced to probation before 2017, he could not have violated any probation condition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 12-19-8.1 codified what had long been recognized as conditions of probation in Rhode Island. |
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| South Carolina v. Smith |
| Court: South Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 27958 Opinion Date: March 18, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In October 2013, a young woman (the victim) was shot by Petitioner Michael Smith in the Five Points area of Columbia, South Carolina. It was undisputed Smith did not intend to harm her. Rather, Smith claimed he was acting in self-defense by shooting at a group of men who had threatened him. Smith missed his intended target, for which he was subsequently charged with the attempted murder of the victim and a host of other gun-related charges. Smith denied the attempted murder charge, implicitly acknowledging he had an express intent to kill the men at whom he was shooting, but asserted his action were justified given his believe he faced an imminent threat to his own life. The State ultimately conceded Smith presented evidence he acted in self- defense, and therefore a jury charge to that effect should have been given. Nonetheless, the State inexplicably requested the trial court charge the jury on implied malice. The law at the time of trial precluded an implied malice jury charge (based on the use of a deadly weapon) when a viable self-defense claim existed. The South Carolina Supreme Court surmised that recognizing this, the State sought to create a new category of implied malice for "felony attempted-murder," with the predicate felony being the felon-in-possession charge. As noted, Smith had already conceded guilt to this charge. Thus, in requesting the new felony attempted-murder charge, which the trial court accepted over Smith's objection, the State essentially circumvented then-existing law expressly precluding an implied malice charge. The Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in accommodating the State's request for an implied malice charge. "The error was compounded, for the State relied on a crime—the so-called crime of felony attempted-murder—which South Carolina has not adopted." Furthermore, the Court held that trial courts could not give an implied malice charge when there has been evidence presented that the defendant acted in self-defense. Smith's convictions were reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. |
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| State v. Wolf |
| Court: South Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 S.D. 15 Opinion Date: March 18, 2020 Judge: Jensen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on his aggravated assault conviction, holding that there was sufficient evidence on the record, and inferences that could have been drawn therefrom, to sustain a reasonable theory of guilt of aggravated assault by extreme indifference beyond a reasonable doubt. A jury convicted Defendant of aggravated assault and simple assault. The circuit court denied Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on both charges at the close of the State's evidence. The court, however, granted Defendant's renewed motion for judgment of acquittal on the aggravated assault conviction after the trial. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the circuit court with instructions to reinstate the jury's verdict, holding that the circuit court erred in granting Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal because there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict. |
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| State v. Ray |
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2020 UT 12 Opinion Date: March 9, 2020 Judge: Petersen Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that Defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during Defendant's criminal trial, holding that defense counsel's performance was not deficient. Defendant was convicted of forcible sexual abuse of a fifteen-year-old. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, concluding that because counsel did not object to the jury instruction for forcible sexual abuse Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that counsel's acquiescence to the jury instruction could not have been sound strategy and that Defendant failed to overcome the strong presumption that his counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment. |
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| State v. Scott |
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2020 UT 13 Opinion Date: March 9, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for the murder of his wife on grounds that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that there was insufficient information to conclude that counsel's course of conduct was deficient or prejudicial. During trial, when Defendant tried to testify about a threat he claimed his wife had made a few days before he shot her, the trial court excluded the testimony on hearsay ground. On appeal, Defendant argued that his lawyer's failure to argue that the threat was not hearsay constituted ineffective assistance. The court of appeals agreed and reversed Defendant's conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the court of appeals did not know or consider the specifics of the threat, it was impossible to determine whether Defendant's trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). |
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| Vermont v. Davis |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2020 VT 20 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Howard Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant appealed after she was convicted for conspiracy to commit heroin trafficking. On appeal, she argued the trial court erred in: (1) denying her motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to prove the weight of the seized drugs; (2) admitting an out-of-court statement by a deceased co-conspirator; and (3) responding to a question raised by the jury regarding the elements of the conspiracy charge. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Vermont v. Gates |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2020 VT 21 Opinion Date: March 13, 2020 Judge: Carroll Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree aggravated domestic assault. On appeal, he argued the trial court denied him the right to a fair trial by refusing to grant immunity to his witness or to compel the State to do so. In addition, he contended the trial court’s supplemental instruction improperly pressured the jury to reach a verdict. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Weatherholt v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Supreme Court of Virginia Docket: 190206 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr. Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding Defendant's convictions for conspiracy to distribute oxycodone and distribution of oxycodone, third or subsequent offense, holding that Defendant was not deprived of his right to counsel during a critical stage of a criminal prosecution. On appeal, Defendant alleged that at a hearing, at which Defendant appeared without counsel, he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The reason for the hearing was to advise Defendant as to the status of his case and to ascertain what his wishes were with respect to having counsel of his choice after his attorney was suspended. Defendant argued that he should have been afforded the assistance of counsel before being required to make a decision about whether to proceed with the scheduled trial without the assistance of his then-suspended counsel. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing did not require Defendant to have the assistance of counsel to formulate his response, and thus, this was not a critical stage of the criminal proceedings that would give rise to a presumption of prejudice as a result of Defendant not having counsel at that time. |
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| Washington v. Whitaker |
| Court: Washington Supreme Court Docket: 96777-6 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Steven González Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| John Whitaker was convicted of aggravated first degree murder based on the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping. He unsuccessfully sought to argue to the jury that he committed the kidnapping under duress. "Faced with such grave danger, a person may be excused for choosing the lesser evil. But because killing an innocent person is never the lesser of two evils, a duress defense is not available when a person is charged with murder." Because Whitaker was charged with murder and not kidnapping, the Court of Appeals held he was not entitled to assert a duress defense. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Ferch v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 37 Opinion Date: March 12, 2020 Judge: Boomgaarden Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his home, holding that the district court did not err when it concluded that the warrantless search of Defendant's home was constitutional under the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. After the district court denied his suppression motion, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to various drug crimes, including possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, possession of methamphetamine, and possession of marijuana. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that intrusion into Defendant's home was lawful and justified by the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. |
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