| United States v. Gonzalez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1597 Opinion Date: January 31, 2020 Judge: Selya Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's federal drug-trafficking conviction and his twenty-year mandatory minimum recidivist sentence, holding that Defendant's claims on appeal lacked merit. A federal grand jury sitting in the District of New Hampshire indicted Defendant on a charge of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the conspiracy charge. The district court imposed a twenty-year mandatory minimum recidivist term of immurement. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to a new trial because one of the seated jurors was not a New Hampshire resident; and (2) Defendant's claims of sentencing error were unavailing. |
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| United States v. DiMartino |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-2053 Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: Dennis G. Jacobs Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's 70-month sentence for tax offenses. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his post‐trial request for a competency hearing based chiefly on his adherence to the Sovereign Citizen movement. The court held that the record supported the district court's conclusion that defendant's words and actions reflected his anti‐government political views and legal theories rather than an inability to understand the proceedings against him. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to give no weight to the report of defendant's expert, because the report was based on insufficient facts and data, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the expert employed unreliable principles and methods. Finally, even if the court were to conclude that the district court improperly relied on another expert's testimony without explicitly ruling on its admissibility or reliability under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the error would be harmless. |
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| United States v. Hightower |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-2238 Opinion Date: February 6, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's revocation of defendant's term of supervised release after finding by a preponderance of the evidence that he had violated the conditions of his supervised release by committing a state crime. The court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in revocation of federal supervised release proceedings. The court explained that the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule are significantly outweighed by the costs involved in applying the rule in this context. The court also held that defendant's remaining argument, that the district court erred in refusing to give him access to grand jury minutes, was without merit because he impermissibly seeks to attack his underlying conviction. |
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| United States v. Pilcher |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-3444 Opinion Date: February 6, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The denial of a motion to file a habeas petition under a pseudonym is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The Second Circuit affirmed the magistrate judge's denial of defendant's motion to file a habeas petition through the use of a pseudonym. The court joined several of its sister circuits in holding that such denials were appealable under the collateral order doctrine. In this case, the district court's decision conclusively determined the issue of whether defendant could proceed under a pseudonym; the issue was completely separate from the merits of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion; and it will be effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment on his section 2255 motion. On the merits, the court held that the magistrate judge considered the proper legal principles governing the motion, including a presumption in favor of public access to court proceedings and records, and the exceptions to that presumption. The court held that the district court properly held that the magistrate judge's order did not rest on an error of law or a clearly erroneous factual finding; the conclusion was within the range of permissible decisions; the circumstances identified by defendant were insufficient to support an exception; and there was no error, clear or otherwise, in the magistrate judge's decision. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the denial of the motion. |
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| United States v. Smith |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 17-3930 Opinion Date: February 3, 2020 Judge: Richard J. Sullivan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| A district court is not required to complete a written statement of reasons form for a sentence upon violation of supervised release because neither the Judicial Conference nor the Sentencing Commission has issued a form for that purpose. The Second Circuit held that defendant's sentence was not procedurally unreasonable where the district court articulated its reasons for imposing the above-Guidelines sentence, focusing on defendant's possession and use of a firearm. The court also held that defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court acknowledged the various mitigating factors, and the two-year sentence did not shock the conscience or constitute a manifest injustice. |
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| United States v. Tabb |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-338 Opinion Date: February 6, 2020 Judge: Rakoff Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant's prior convictions for attempted assault in the second degree under N.Y. Penal Law 120.05(2) and federal narcotics conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. 846 constitute predicate offenses for purposes of the career offender sentencing enhancement under USSG 4B1.1. The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence, holding that the district court's application of the career offender sentencing enhancement was appropriate. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that the New York conviction constituted a predicate "crime of violence" and that the federal conviction constituted a predicate "controlled substances offense." |
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| United States v. Apple Mac Pro Computer |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 17-3205 Opinion Date: February 6, 2020 Judge: Julio M. Fuentes Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law |
| Officers executed a search warrant at Rawls’ residence, yielding an iPhone 6 and a Mac Pro Computer with attached external hard drives, all protected with encryption software. With a warrant, forensic analysts discovered the password to decrypt the Mac Pro but could not determine the passwords for the external hard drives. The Mac Pro revealed an image of a pubescent girl in a sexually provocative position, logs showing that it had visited likely child exploitation websites and that Rawls had downloaded thousands of files known to be child pornography. Those files were stored on the external hard drives. Rawls’ sister stated that Rawls had shown her child pornography on the external hard drives. A Magistrate ordered Rawls to unencrypt the devices. Rawls cited the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court denied Rawls’ motion, reasoning the act of decrypting the devices would not be testimonial. Rawls decrypted the iPhone, which contained 20 photographs that focused on the genitals of Rawls’ six-year-old niece. Rawls stated that he could not remember the passwords for the hard drives. The Third Circuit affirmed a civil contempt finding. Rawls, incarcerated since September 2015, moved for release, arguing that 28 U.S.C. 1826(a) limits the maximum confinement for civil contempt to 18 months. The Third Circuit ordered his release, rejecting the government’s argument that Rawls was not a “witness” participating in any “proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury.” The proceedings to enforce the search warrant fall within the statute’s broad description of any “proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury," the Decryption Order is “an order of the court to testify or provide other information,” and section 1826(a) applies to the detention of any material witness, even if that person is also a suspect in connection with other offenses. |
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| United States v. Hendrickson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 19-1843 Opinion Date: February 3, 2020 Judge: Patty Shwartz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Hendrickson was a pretrial detainee in the custody of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections. During a routine pat-down, a guard found a cell phone in Hendrickson’s pocket. When the phone was activated, it displayed an AT&T logo and asked for a password. The phone was missing its SIM card, a removable chip that allows the phone to connect to a cellular network. Without the SIM card, the phone was unable to receive calls and could make calls only to 911. Hendrickson stated that he had been using the phone to play music. Because the phone was password-protected, the government did not search it for text messages, emails, or other data. Hendrickson was convicted of possession of prison contraband, 18 U.S.C. 1791(a)(2). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that no reasonable juror could find that the phone was a “prohibited object” or that Hendrickson was “an inmate of a prison” Hendrickson possessed a “phone” within the meaning of section 1791(d)(1)(F); an electronics technician confirmed that the device was “definitely” a phone. The U.S.Marshalls contract with the Virgin Islands to house prisoners at Hendrickson’s facility, so Hendrickson was an inmate of a facility where persons were held “in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the Attorney General.” |
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| United States v. Blakeney |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4921 Opinion Date: February 6, 2020 Judge: Pamela Harris Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motions to suppress evidence of a toxicology analysis of blood drawn from defendant just after a car accident, and a review of defendant's car's event data recorder. Defendant was convicted of vehicular homicide while impaired by alcohol. The court agreed with the district court that the warrant applications established probable cause and that the search warrants were sufficiently particularized. In any event, the court held that suppression would be inappropriate under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), because the officers relied in objective good faith on the search warrants to obtain the evidence in question. |
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| Leonard v. Deville |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-30374 Opinion Date: February 3, 2020 Judge: Stuart Kyle Duncan Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| When a state prisoner is implicitly granted extra time to seek supervisory writs from the denial of his state post-conviction application—and he does so within that time—his initial application therefore remains "pending" under the tolling provision in 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2). The Fifth Circuit relied on its own precedents and by the Supreme Court's teaching that a state post-conviction application remains pending for statutory tolling purposes as long as the ordinary state collateral review process is in continuance. The court vacated the district court's dismissal of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition as time-barred and held that petitioner was entitled to statutory tolling and thus his petition was not time-barred. |
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| United States v. Butler |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-10065 Opinion Date: February 5, 2020 Judge: Costa Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, the district court sentenced him under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Fifth Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) is divisible, and thus the district court properly used the bank robbery indictment to narrow defendant's robbery convictions to the violent felonies of taking bank property from another through intimidation. Consequently, defendant had at least three qualifying violent felonies and was properly sentenced as an armed career criminal. |
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| United States v. Williams |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-60159 Opinion Date: February 5, 2020 Judge: Stephen Andrew Higginson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he was convicted of one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The court held that defendant failed to show that the government breached his plea agreement. Furthermore, defendant failed to point to anything in the record showing that the parties made an ancillary agreement limiting the government's ability to use the information he provided. Finally, information given before the existence of any agreement between defendant and the government could not have been given as a result of the agreement. The court also held that defendant waived his challenge to the district court's imposition of a two-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2D1.1(b)(5), and dismissed the claim. The court also dismissed defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. |
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| Fox v. Washington |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-1398 Opinion Date: February 6, 2020 Judge: Richard Allen Griffin Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Plaintiffs, Michigan inmates adhere to a religion called Christian Identity. Plaintiffs believe that their religion requires the observance of seven “Biblical Holy Days,” weekly group worship on the Sabbath, baptism by full-body immersion, and that Caucasians not mix with other races “in marriage and worship” and that people of different races not cohabitate. In other areas of life, plaintiffs apparently have no objection to interacting with people of other races. Plaintiffs contend they cannot engage in group worship because the Department of Corrections does not recognize Christian Identity as a religion. While they are allowed to attend the services of other religions that have been recognized, they do not because of the differences between Christian Identity and other faiths. One inmate believes that not being baptized “affects [his] salvation of [his] eternal soul." The district court rejected a challenged under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc (RLUIPA). The Sixth Circuit reversed. The sincerity of the plaintiffs’ beliefs is not at issue. Under RLUIPA’s second step, the plaintiffs have established that the policy substantially burdens their exercise of religion. At step three, the burden shifts to the Department to prove that the imposition of the substantial burden on plaintiffs’ religious exercise was “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and that it used “the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” The district court made no findings on those questions. |
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| United States v. Marshall |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-2267 Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: Jeffrey S. Sutton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2008, Marshall pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute oxycodone and was sentenced to 118 months of prison plus six years of supervised release. After completing his sentence, Marshall began supervised release. Although required to stay in Kentucky, Marshall moved to Illinois, violating a release condition. The district court briefly revoked Marshall’s release. Marshall moved, with permission, to Michigan. For the next year, Marshall made progress. The probation office recommended an early end to his supervised release. Marshall filed an unopposed motion to end the supervision. The court denied his request, reasoning that Marshall had completed little of the release term and had violated the conditions before. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. There is no statute authorizing the review of a district court’s decision to deny a motion for early termination of supervised release. The court reviewed the challenges available under 18 U.S.C. 3742(a) and concluded that none of the four categories applies. Marshall never appealed his original or his new sentence; the district court did not issue a new sentence or an amended sentence before this appeal. It merely denied Marshall’s request to reduce the supervised release provision in his sentence. |
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| United States v. Woods |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5685 Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: McKEAGUE Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2001, Woods pled guilty to possessing and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute cocaine and to distribute marijuana, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The parties stipulated to Woods’s possession of 125 grams of crack cocaine, .73 grams of powder cocaine, and 660.1 grams of marijuana. Under the then-Guidelines, the PSR recommended a range of 121-151 months of imprisonment and an additional mandatory 60-month consecutive term for the firearm charge. The district court sentenced Woods to 121 months plus the consecutive 60- month sentence. In 2008, in response to Guidelines amendments, the district court reduced Woods’s sentence from 181 months to 120 months. Woods began his supervised release in 2015. While on release, he tested positive for cocaine and marijuana and pled guilty to new felony state charges—trafficking in controlled substances, possessing a handgun, and tampering with physical evidence. The court revoked Woods’s supervised release and imposed a 37-month sentence. Woods moved, under the 2018 First Step Act, 132 Stat. 5194, to reduce his sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Woods’s motion. Although he is currently serving a post-revocation sentence, Woods is eligible for consideration of a reduction but is not entitled to one. The court adequately considered factors warranting denial of a reduction: respecting the law, protecting the public, and adequately deterring similar conduct. |
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| Dotson v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-1701 Opinion Date: February 3, 2020 Judge: Scudder Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2011, Dotson was indicted for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The indictment listed six prior felony convictions and alleged that Dotson qualified for the 15-year minimum sentence mandated in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The PSR identified three convictions as qualifying for ACCA enhancement (Indiana armed robbery, dealing in cocaine, and attempted robbery) but was silent on whether any of Dotson’s other convictions (Indiana burglary, marijuana possession, and theft and receipt of stolen property) qualified. Nobody raised the issue. The district court sentenced Dotson as a career offender to 188 months and denied his subsequent post-conviction petition, finding that Dotson had four qualifying ACCA predicates—the three originally designated as such in the PSR plus one for burglary. After the district court’s decision, one of the predicates the PSR originally determined qualified under ACCA (attempted robbery) was eliminated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The government can save the enhanced sentence by substituting another of Dotson’s convictions—one listed in the PSR as part of Dotson’s criminal history but not designated as or found to be an ACCA predicate at sentencing. The court reasoned that the substituted conviction included in the indictment and the PSR and Dotson recognized in legal filings and apparently believed that his burglary conviction had served as an ACCA predicate at his sentencing. |
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| Glover v. Carr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-3028 Opinion Date: February 6, 2020 Judge: ROVNER Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Wisconsin inmate Glover sued prison medical staff and Department of Corrections officials for deliberate indifference and for violating his right to equal protection after they denied him medicine prescribed for post‐surgical erectile dysfunction, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Glover alleges that treatment of his erectile dysfunction following his prostate cancer surgery was necessary for penile rehabilitation and time-sensitive because he was at risk of suffering permanent loss of erectile function if his condition was left untreated for too long following surgery. Glover unsuccessfully moved to substitute the Department’s new medical director, Dr. Holzmacher, as a defendant. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court abused its discretion by not allowing Glover to amend his complaint: “It is difficult to see why, under these circumstances, it would not be in the interest of justice for Glover to be able to sue the person that all agree is responsible for denying him access to Cialis.” The defendants argued that, absent precedent specifically recognizing that erectile dysfunction is a serious medical need, it would not have been clear to Holzmacher that the prison was obligated to heed the advice of Glover’s off‐site urologist and prison physician and approve a Cialis prescription; the court declined to resolve the matter of qualified immunity. The answer to the question is not so obvious that permitting Glover to bring Holzmacher into the case would necessarily constitute a futile act. |
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| Hartsfield v. Dorethy |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-1736 Opinion Date: February 3, 2020 Judge: Joel Martin Flaum Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2004, Martinez was shot dead. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Hartsfield's convictions for first-degree murder and home invasion. Hartsfield claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, insisting that he repeatedly told counsel that he wished to testify, that counsel asked his mother to “convince” him not to testify, and counsel told Hartsfield that he would “get his chance” when the judge admonished him about his right to testify, but the judge never did that. Hartsfield claims counsel “shushed” him. Hartsfield’s mother supported his statements. The Illinois court affirmed the dismissal of Hartsfield’s postconviction petition, applying the “Strickland” standard and finding that counsel made “a tactical decision,” that Hartsfield was aware that testifying was ultimately his decision, and that Hartsfield’s failure to contemporaneously assert his right barred his claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Hartsfield’s federal habeas petition, first agreeing that the “Strickland” standard applied to the allegation. Without clearly established federal law, it is not clear that the Illinois court unreasonably decided that Hartsfield did not meet his burden of proving that his attorney actually prohibited his testimony. It is not reasonably probable that his proposed testimony would have affected the verdict. Two eyewitnesses placed Hartsfield at the scene of the crime, armed with a weapon and a motive. Hartsfield’s comments later that night further implicated him. Hartsfield’s uncorroborated story, that he was alone, driving around during the time of the murder, is “little more than a generic denial of guilt," insufficient to establish prejudice. |
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| Robertson v. French |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 17-3579 Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: Diane Pamela Wood Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Pontiac inmate Robertson was held in isolation, allegedly in deplorable conditions, for several days before he attempted suicide. He filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and a motion, seeking to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). He claimed he had no assets other than $219 in his prison account and no income except an occasional allowance from his mother. The court granted the motion. Years later, days before trial, the state moved to dismiss his case because he had failed to disclose in his IFP affidavit that the state had agreed to pay him $4,000 to settle previous cases. Robertson actually received the money about a year after filing the affidavit. In addition, the prison never sent the required filing fee. The district court dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a), requires only disclosure of assets that may currently be used to pay the filing fee, and in the alternative, even if expected payments should have been included, the affidavit is “untrue” only if the prisoner’s statement was a deliberate misrepresentation. |
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| United States v. Dozier |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-3447 Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: Diane S. Sykes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2017, Dozier was indicted for conspiracy and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Under the Controlled Substances Act then in effect, Dozier faced increased penalties if he had a prior conviction for a “felony drug offense,” 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A),(b)(1)(B)(viii)--a drug‐related offense “that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State.” Dozier had a 2006 conviction for unlawful possession of cocaine, a “state jail felony” punishable by imprisonment of six months to two years. In a plea bargain, the prosecutor agreed to a nine‐month sentence; Texas Penal Code 12.44(a) gives the judge discretion to punish a person convicted of a state jail felony with a period of confinement permissible for a Class A misdemeanor— a term not to exceed one year. Dozier pleaded guilty but objected to using the 2006 conviction to enhance his sentence. The judge imposed a 20-year sentence, rejecting Dozier’s argument that the Texas conviction was not a qualifying predicate because the terms of his plea agreement exposed him to confinement of not more than one year. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Dozier pleaded guilty to and was convicted of a two‐year state jail felony. It does not matter that the sentencing judge accepted the plea bargain and exercised the discretion conferred by state law to sentence Dozier as if he were a misdemeanant. |
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| United States v. Jehan |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1975 Opinion Date: February 6, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Jehan led a Chicago street gang's conspiracy to distribute drugs. After he and others were indicted, Jehan fled and remained a fugitive for four years. After Jehan was arrested, the parties entered a plea agreement: Jehan admitted responsibility for conspiring to distribute more than 150 kilograms of cocaine, more than 30 kilograms of heroin, and more than 1.5 kilograms of crack, matching the thresholds for the highest base offense level on the drug‐quantity table, yielding a guidelines range of life in prison. In exchange for his acceptance of responsibility and aid to the government in other cases, the agreement specified that Jehan would receive a 300‐month sentence. In 2015, the court reduced Jehan’s sentence to 240 months because of his assistance in another case. In 2016, Jehan moved to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), citing Guidelines Amendment 782, which retroactively increased the drug quantities required for each base offense level for most federal drug offenses. The court denied Jehan’s motion because his sentence was “based on” the parties’ Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, not the Guidelines. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. After the Supreme Court held, in 2018, that section 3582(c)(2) relief should be available to defendants with plea agreements, Jehan filed a second, unsuccessful motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the district court held Jehan responsible for the quantities of narcotics necessary for the highest base offense level on the current drug‐quantity table. In deciding Jehan’s second 3582(c)(2) motion, the court determined that the same base offense level applied and let Jehan’s sentence stand; the court did not “retroactively increase” Jehan’s punishment, but only held that he was not entitled to the benefit of new policy changes. |
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| United States v. Lebeau |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Dockets: 18-1656, 18-3366 Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: Diane Pamela Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| Around 2004, LeBeau's health club located on 10 acres in Aurora, Illinois, ran into difficulties. LeBeau teamed up with Bodie to redevelop the land as a condominium project. Bodie ran two mortgage companies. They submitted a loan application to Amcore, a federally insured financial institution. The bank gave them a $1,925,000 mortgage loan. LeBeau and Bodie executed full personal guarantees on the loan and listed Bodie’s two companies as guarantors. LeBeau failed to disclose more than $130,000 in outstanding personal loans. The two fell behind on the loan and obtained a forbearance agreement (later amended) from Amcore. The two men were indicted in 2014 on multiple counts of bank fraud and making false statements to the bank in connection with the loan and forbearance agreements. In 2017, they were convicted. The court sentenced each one to 36 months’ imprisonment and restitution of more than a million dollars. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred by failing to give the jury an instruction on materiality for the bank-fraud offenses; that the court should not have admitted evidence related to certain victims’ losses in the scheme and their status as prior victims of fraud; and that LeBeau received ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing stage, where his lawyer failed to challenge the amount of restitution. The court also rejected Bodie’s argument that his superseding indictment was time-barred and his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. |
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| Love v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3457 Opinion Date: January 31, 2020 Judge: Erickson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute and possess methamphetamine. The court rejected defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, because the court could not say that counsel acted unreasonably by failing to reach a final plea agreement or by failing to find a way to preserve the plea offer during the mental health evaluation; defendant's claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to request a second competency evaluation after a brief period without medication failed, because the Forensic Report contained no conclusion that defendant's legal competency was dependent on a specific medication regime; and the district court did not err by rejecting defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing. |
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| United States v. Clausen |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3081 Opinion Date: February 5, 2020 Judge: James B. Loken Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After defendant pleaded guilty to assaulting a federal agent and damaging an aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States, the district court sentenced him to 60 months in prison and ordered him to pay restitution for the government's actual loss. In this case, defendant opened fire on a CBP helicopter, injuring a sheriff's deputy and causing extensive damage to the helicopter. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting an extension of time to finally determine the amount of restitution because the extension did not prejudice defendant's ability to challenge the government's restitution claim; the district court did not clearly err in finding that defendant's offense caused the claimed losses; and the district court did not clearly err in finding that the government substantiated its claim for restitution in the amount of $19,619.45. |
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| United States v. Keleta |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-2896 Opinion Date: February 6, 2020 Judge: Jane Louise Kelly Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for conspiring to defraud the United States and willfully aiding and assisting in the filing of a false tax return. The court held that there was probable cause to issue the warrant to search defendant's tax return business. Furthermore, even without the statements that defendant disputes, the affidavit still established probable cause to search the office. In this case, the affidavit provided a detailed description of the unusual pattern of returns and the record supported the magistrate judge's conclusion that, taken together, the circumstances described in the affidavit were sufficient to establish probable cause. The court also held that the government's improper argument, which rebutted an argument that was not even raised to a witness, could not have reasonably affected the jury's determination. However, the court vacated defendant's sentence, holding that the government failed to carry its burden of proof and the district court erred by imposing a four-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(a), for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity. |
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| United States v. Chavez-Diaz |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-50391 Opinion Date: February 5, 2020 Judge: Bress Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit held that defendant waived his right to appeal his equal protection and due process claims by entering an unconditional guilty plea. Therefore, the panel reversed the district court's holding to the contrary and remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal. In this case, defendant pleaded guilty before a magistrate judge to one count of illegal entry into the United States, but then attempted to raise on appeal to the district judge certain due process and equal protection challenges to the handling of his prosecution in the Southern District of California. The panel held that the district court misinterpreted Class v. United States , 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018), and that the Menna-Blackledge exception -- which allows for constitutionally-based appeals, despite an unconditional guilty plea, where the appeal, if successful, would mean that the government cannot prosecute the defendant at all -- did not apply here. Finally, the panel rejected defendant's argument that if his appeal is held to be waived, his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary. Accordingly, the panel remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal. |
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| United States v. George |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-50268 Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: Miller Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| USSG 2B1.1(b)(2) requires the sentencing court to determine whether the victims suffered a loss that was significant in light of their individual financial circumstances. The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy. Defendant co-owned and operated companies that defrauded nearly 5,000 homeowners out of millions of dollars. The panel affirmed the district court's imposition of a six-level sentence enhancement for an offense that resulted in substantial financial hardship to 25 or more victims under USSG 2B1.1(b)(2)(C). In this case, some of the victims lost their homes, some filed for bankruptcy, and many others borrowed money to avoid foreclosure, fell further behind on mortgage payments, renegotiated their loans on worse terms, or paid additional penalties and fines. The panel also held that the district court did not have to identify specific victims by name even if it had been asked to do so. Furthermore, it was sufficient for the government to produce evidence for enough of the victims to allow the sentencing court reasonably to infer a pattern. Finally, the panel held that the sentence was not substantively unreasonable and the restitution order did not violate Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). |
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| Vazquez v. County of Kern |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-15060 Opinion Date: January 31, 2020 Judge: Paez Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action brought by plaintiff, alleging that a Juvenile Corrections Officer violated her constitutional rights. Plaintiff alleged that the officer made sexual comments to her, groomed her for sexual abuse, and looked at her inappropriately while she was showering. The panel held that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, plaintiff has presented sufficient facts to establish a violation of her right to bodily privacy, right to bodily integrity, and right to be free from punishment as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The panel also held that the district court erred when it concluded that there was no evidence supporting a causal link between the supervisor's conduct and the officer's alleged violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. Therefore, the panel remanded for further proceedings. |
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| United States v. Blackbird |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-7007 Opinion Date: February 5, 2020 Judge: Carson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Donald Blackbird attempted to sexually abuse his fifteen-year-old granddaughter. He pleaded guilty to the offense, and the district court sentenced him to sixty months’ imprisonment. At sentencing, the district court applied a sentence enhancement, which increased his base offense level because “the minor was in the custody, care, or supervisory control of the defendant” at the time of the attempted sexual abuse. Defendant appealed, arguing the government presented no evidence he had custody, care, or supervisory control of his granddaughter at the time of the attempted abuse. The Tenth Circuit concurred with this reasoning, finding that because the government failed to show that Defendant exercised “custody, care, or supervisory control” over the victim, it vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. |
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| United States v. Gonzalez-Fierro |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 18-2168 Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: David M. Ebel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| Defendant Rodolfo Gonzalez-Fierro, a Mexican citizen, challenged his conviction for unlawfully re-entering the United States after a prior removal. That conviction was based in part on Gonzalez-Fierro’s prior expedited removal from the United States in 2009. Due process required that, before the United States can use a defendant’s prior removal to prove a 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) charge, “there must be some meaningful review” of the prior administrative removal proceeding. In light of that, Congress provided a mechanism in section 1326(d), for a defendant charged with a section 1326(a) offense to challenge the fundamental fairness of his prior unreviewed removal. But, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(D), the section 1326(d) mechanism applied only to prior formal removal orders, and not to prior expedited removal orders like Gonzalez-Fierro’s. "Expedited removals apply to undocumented aliens apprehended at or near the border soon after unlawfully entering the United States. Different from formal removals, expedited removals are streamlined - generally there is no hearing, no administrative appeal, and no judicial review before an expedited removal order is executed." Applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987), the Tenth Circuit concluded section 1225(b)(1)(D) was unconstitutional because it deprives a defendant like Gonzalez-Fierro of due process. Without section 1225(b)(1)(D), the Court reviewed Gonzalez-Fierro's 2009 expedited removal order, and concluded he failed to establish that removal was fundamentally unfair. On that basis, the Court affirmed Gonzalez-Fierro's section 1326(a) conviction. |
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| Johnston v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 14-14054 Opinion Date: February 3, 2020 Judge: Edward Earl Carnes Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Petitioner was sentenced to death for first degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, sexual battery, and burglary of a conveyance with assault. Petitioner subsequently filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, which the district court denied. The Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's ineffective assistance claims, holding that petitioner has not shown that his counsel's failure to investigate and call a witness prejudiced his defense at either the guilt or sentence stage. |
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| Martin v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-12643 Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: William H. Pauley, III Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas relief. Petitioner argued that he would not have pleaded guilty to access device fraud and aggravated identity theft but for his counsel's erroneous advice concerning the deportation consequences of his plea. The district court assumed, without deciding, that petitioner's attorney's performance was deficient. The court declined to assume that counsel's performance was deficient and held, instead, that counsel's performance was not deficient and petitioner failed to satisfy his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. In this case, counsel could not have predicted the district court's fraud loss findings. Furthermore, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. 2255. |
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| United States v. Lorenzana-Cordon |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 18-3019 Opinion Date: January 31, 2020 Judge: David S. Tatel Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The DC Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions for conspiring to traffic wholesale quantities of cocaine into the United States. The court found no grounds for reversal, holding that the evidence presented at trial did not materially diverge from the charges contained in the indictment. Furthermore, even if the district court erred by rejecting defendants' request for a multiple conspiracies jury instruction, defendants failed to show that the error substantially prejudiced them. |
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| Fowlkes v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 56 Opinion Date: February 6, 2020 Judge: Rhonda K. Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for rape, third-degree domestic battery, and other convictions, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain testimony and that Defendant's remaining arguments were not preserved. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in allowing a witness to testify that she had also been raped by Defendant and that the trial court's exclusion of sexually explicit text messages and photographs of the witness, which were located on her phone, violated the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in admitting the witness's testimony as independently relevant evidence proving Defendant's intent, motive, or plan was more probable than without the introduction of her testimony; and (2) Defendant's remaining arguments were not preserved. |
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| McCullough v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 49 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Womack Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's pro se petition to recall the mandate to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis, holding that Petitioner's allegations failed to raise cognizable grounds for coram nobis relief or to recall the mandate. Petitioner was convicted of burglary, attempted burglary, and revocation of suspended sentences and subsequently convicted of rape, kidnapping, and residential burglary. Petitioner later filed his petition seeking coram nobis relief, alleging that both his trial and his direct appeal were defective. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that Petitioner's claims were not grounds for the writ. |
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| Reed v. Straughn |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 52 Opinion Date: February 6, 2020 Judge: Kemp Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal from the Jefferson County Circuit Court's denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-101 to -123, holding that a writ of habeas corpus issued by the Jefferson County Circuit Court could not be returned because Appellant was no longer within its jurisdiction. Appellant, who was incarcerated in Jefferson County when he filed his petition, lodged an appeal from its denial and was later transferred to a prison facility in Lincoln County. The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal, holding that although Appellant was incarcerated in Jefferson County when he filed the habeas petition and proceeded with his appeal, the Jefferson County Circuit Court no longer had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. |
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| Stalnaker v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 54 Opinion Date: February 6, 2020 Judge: Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court denying Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Petitioner did not meet his burden of demonstrating that he was being illegally detained and entitled to issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to effect his release from custody. Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court of appeals affirmed. After Petitioner unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief he filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus in the county where he was incarcerated. Petitioner's ground for the writ was that, subsequent to his trial, the trial judge was accused of failing to abide by certain ethical and legal standards and was thus shown to be unqualified to preside as a judge. The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner did not state a ground upon which the writ could issue. |
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| People v. Frederickson |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S067392 Opinion Date: February 3, 2020 Judge: Ming Chin Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of first-degree murder, finding Defendant was sane at the time of the crimes, and sentencing Defendant to death, but struck an improperly imposed restitution fine, holding that the restitution fine should be stricken from the abstract of judgment and that any other error was not prejudicial. The trial court imposed a $10,000 restitution fine but did not impose the fine at the sentencing hearing. Rather, the fine was later added to the abstract of judgment. The Supreme Court ordered the restitution fine stricken from the record and the minutes because the trial court never imposed the fine in open court in Defendant's presence. The Court assumed other errors during the trial proceedings but found no prejudice. Further, the Court held that the error regarding the restitution fine and any assumed error were not cumulatively prejudicial. |
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| California v. Flores |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D075826(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 3, 2020 Judge: Judith McConnell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| At issue before the Court of Appeal was whether an otherwise qualified person convicted of voluntary manslaughter, as opposed to murder, could invoke the resentencing provision of Senate Bill 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.). Defendant Fallon Lupe Flores was charged with murder, but pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Years later, she filed a petition to have her conviction vacated and to be resentenced under the resentencing provision of Senate Bill No. 1437. The trial court denied Flores's petition on grounds that the resentencing provision was available only to qualifying persons who were convicted of murder - not persons who were convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court, and therefore affirmed denial of Flores' petition. |
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| California v. Mendoza |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E071835(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 5, 2020 Judge: Slough Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Blanca Luna Mendoza was convicted by jury of transporting for sale more than four kilograms of cocaine based on evidence a U.S. Customs and Border Protection agent acquired after a stop on Interstate 15 in California. Mendoza sought to exclude the evidence, arguing the agent did not have reasonable suspicion she was engaged in criminal activity when he stopped her. The agent said he decided to stop Mendoza because she was driving in a known smuggling corridor in a vehicle which had crossed the United States-Mexico border in the prior week; she slowed and changed lanes after he pulled alongside her in an unmarked car, rolled down his window, and stared at her; she drove at approximately 50 miles per hour to stay behind him; and she then refused to look at him when she ultimately passed him a few minutes later. The trial court held, with reservations, that the stop was justified, and a jury later convicted her of transporting narcotics for sale. Mendoza appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded the agent based his decision to stop Mendoza on insufficient evidence she was engaged in criminal activity. "At bottom, the agent acted on a hunch, which is improper, even though - in this case - it proved correct." |
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| People v. Palomar |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B292450A(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 3, 2020 Judge: Kenneth R. Yegan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| On rehearing, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's conviction for second degree murder based on an implied malice theory. Defendant punched the victim, the victim fell and hit his head on the curb, and then defendant walked away without taking any measures to assist the victim, who had blood coming from out of his ears, mouth, and the back of his head. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of implied malice. In this case, the physical component of implied malice was satisfied where defendant's act of violence was predictably dangerous to human life, and the mental component of implied malice was satisfied where defendant knew that his conduct endangered the victim's life and he acted with a conscious disregard for life. |
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| People v. Torres |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B296587(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 6, 2020 Judge: Frances Rothschild Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Penal Code section 1237.2, which was enacted to allow trial courts to correct errors in fines and assessments notwithstanding a pending direct appeal, does not apply after the defendant's direct appeal has concluded. The Court of Appeal dismissed defendant's appeal of the trial court's denial of his motion to modify his sentence by reducing his restitution fine based on his inability to pay it. The court held that defendant's motion to modify his sentence was filed after the conclusion of his direct appeal and there was no other basis for trial court jurisdiction over his motion, and thus the order denying his motion was nonappealable. |
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| People v. Wear |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A152732(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: Jim Humes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Wear arranged to meet an acquaintance, Rossknecht, and went to the meeting with a friend, Lowell. Wear apparently intended to buy or steal a gun from Rossknecht and possibly to supply him with heroin. The evidence suggested that an argument arose during the meeting, and Rossknecht, who had two guns with him, shot Lowell once with one of them. Wear, who was unarmed, then seized that gun, shot Rossknecht twice with it, and fled with the other gun. Lowell and Rossknecht died of their injuries. Wear was charged with two murders. As to Lowell, the jury was unable to return a verdict. As to Rossknecht, the jury found Wear guilty of first-degree murder and found true an allegation that Wear personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing the death; it was unable to return a verdict on a special-circumstance allegation that Wear murdered Rossknecht during a robbery. Wear admitted two prior convictions, one of which was a strike. The trial court sentenced him to 80 years to life in prison. The court of appeal reversed. While there was sufficient evidence to establish felony murder during a robbery, there was not sufficient evidence of premeditated murder. The record shows that some jurors convicted Wear based on the insufficiently supported premeditated-murder theory. |
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| Salcido v. Superior Court of San Mateo County |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A158016(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: Brown Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Proposition 66, the Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016, changed the procedures governing petitions for writs of habeas corpus in capital cases. It ended the practice of capital defendants initiating habeas proceedings in the Supreme Court, in favor of having the “court which imposed the sentence” decide the petitions in the first instance. (Pen. Code 1509(a).) Proposition 66 authorized the Supreme Court to transfer pending petitions to the sentencing court. After the passage of Proposition 66, the Supreme Court transferred Salcido’s pending petition to San Mateo County, where Salcido was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The state sought transfer of the petition to Sonoma County, which is where Salcido was initially charged before the case was transferred due to pretrial publicity. The trial court granted the transfer. The court of appeal granted Salcido mandamus relief; his habeas petition must remain in San Mateo County. The Supreme Court, by transferring Salcido’s petition to San Mateo County pursuant to Proposition 66, has already determined that San Mateo County is the “court which imposed the sentence” and must decide the petition. No lower court may second-guess that decision. There is no statutory basis supporting the position that San Mateo County, as the sentencing court, may transfer the petition to another county. |
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| Saavedra v. Delaware |
| Court: Delaware Supreme Court Docket: 165, 2019 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Traynor Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Elder Saavedra was convicted by jury of the first-degree murder of Lester Mateo and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony. The court sentenced Saavedra to life in prison for the murder conviction and ten years in prison for the weapons charge. Saavedra argued on appeal that his convictions should be overturned because of the prosecutor’s misconduct and the trial court’s erroneous admission of evidence during his trial. Saavedra also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing another officer to offer lay opinion testimony under D.R.E. 701 regarding the meaning of a phrase uttered in Spanish by Saavedra at the scene, when, according to Saavedra, the opinion was not “rationally based on the witness’s perception.” Finally, Saavedra argued the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he asked a question that implied that the witness, despite his denial, had identified Saavedra in a video clip during a pretrial interview. Although the Delaware Supreme Court found Saavedra raised some legitimate concerns regarding the officer’s narrative testimony that accompanied the important video evidence, it disagreed with his conclusion that the admission of that testimony, much of which came in without objection and was the subject of two curative instructions, was grounds for reversal. Nor was the Court persuaded that the challenged opinion testimony and the prosecutor’s question that purportedly implied a fact that was not supported by the evidence affected the fairness of Saavedra’s trial. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| State v. Domut |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-16-0000402 Opinion Date: January 31, 2020 Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| On Defendant's appeal from his convictions of driving without a license and of no motor vehicle insurance, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court and the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) and remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings, holding that there was no knowing and intelligent waiver of Defendant's fundamental right to a jury trial. Specifically, the Court held (1) the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was not in constructive possession of a license from Mexico or Canada, which would have exempted him from licensing requirements pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 286-105; (2) the ICA erred by requiring Defendant to present evidence of a "borrower/lender relationship" with the registered owner of the vehicle to assert the "good faith lack of knowledge" defense, but this error did not require vacating Defendant's no motor vehicle insurance conviction; but (3) there was no valid waiver of Defendant's right to a jury trial on the charge of driving without a license, and therefore, Defendant's convictions must be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Idaho v. Dobbs |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 46335 Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: Stegner Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Shane Lee Dobbs appealed his conviction and the resulting sentence imposed after he pled guilty of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. On appeal, Dobbs contended the district court abused its discretion in fashioning a sentence based in part on a desire to “deter[ ] private vengeance” against him. Dobbs also contended his unified sentence of twenty-two years, with ten years fixed, was excessive in light of the mitigating factors. Finding no reversible error or abuse of discretion, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Dobbs’ judgment of conviction and sentence. |
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| Savage v. Idaho |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 46266 Opinion Date: January 31, 2020 Judge: Brody Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| This appeal stems from a criminal defense attorney’s failure to adequately advise his client about the client’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination during a related civil deposition. Melvin Savage was convicted of first-degree arson and misdemeanor stalking. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that his trial counsel failed to adequately advise him about his rights under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution during a deposition in the civil case initiated by the victims of the arson. The district court granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal of the post-conviction petition. Savage then filed a pro se motion for relief from judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) which was not considered. Savage then timely appealed the district court’s grant of summary dismissal and its order refusing to consider his Rule 60(b) motion. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court erred in summarily dismissing Savage’s petition for post-conviction relief because Savage raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding his counsel’s deficient performance. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court’s decision granting the State’s motion for summary dismissal. |
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| State v. Meyers |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 18-2222 Opinion Date: January 31, 2020 Judge: Edward M. Mansfield Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of boating while intoxicated in violation of Iowa Code 462A.14(1), holding that Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR) officers had probable cause to stop Defendant's vessel. Two DNR officers were patrolling Lake Panorama, a recreational lake that was created by damming the Middle Raccoon River, when they stopped Defendant's pontoon boat for displaying blue lights in violation of Iowa Code 462A.12(4). The stop revealed that Defendant, the operator of the boat, appeared to be intoxicated. Defendant was charged with boating while intoxicated. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing section 462A.12(4) did not apply because Lake Panorama was not "waters of this state under the jurisdiction of the conservation commission" and there was no probable cause for the stop. The district court denied the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officers had probable cause to stop the boat because Lake Panorama belongs to the people of Iowa and is not a privately owned lake as defined in section 462A.2(31). |
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| State v. Veverka |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 19-0603 Opinion Date: January 31, 2020 Judge: McDonald Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this criminal case in which Defendant was charged with sexually abusing his fourteen-year-old daughter, S.V., the Supreme Court reversed the district court's preliminary ruling that a video recording of a forensic interview of S.V. was not admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule, holding that the district court committed two overarching error in its analysis of the preliminary question. After the district court granted Defendant's motion to exclude the forensic interview the State sought a definitive ruling on four of the findings requisite for evidence to be admitted under the residual exception - trustworthiness, materiality, notice, and service of the interests of justice. The district court concluded that the video was not admissible under the residual hearsay exception. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that it had discretion regarding the admission of the videotape and that the district court's analysis of the preliminary question was contaminated with extraneous considerations relating to confrontation clause jurisprudence. |
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| State v. Smith |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 115321 Opinion Date: January 31, 2020 Judge: Eric S. Rosen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing for lack of jurisdiction Appellant's appeal challenging his convictions, holding that the court of appeals did not err when it dismissed Appellant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3602(a) provides that a defendant cannot appeal a conviction after pleading guilty. Appellant pleaded guilty to refusing to submit to a test to determine the presence of alcohol or drugs and driving while a habitual violator. In a second case, Appellant again pleaded guilty to refusing to submit to a test to determine the presence of alcohol or drugs and driving under the influence. Appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to render them. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to consider a direct appeal from a guilty plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly found that it lacked jurisdiction to review Appellant's claim. |
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| Commonwealth v. Diaz Perez |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-10581 Opinion Date: February 3, 2020 Judge: Barbara A. Lenk Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions entered by the trial court after a second trial, at which Defendant had different counsel, holding the second trial judge did not err in granting Defendant's motion for a new trial on the basis that Defendant's second attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant was charged with murder in the first degree and related offenses. Then the jury was unable to reach a verdict Defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial. The second trial resulted in Defendant being convicted. Defendant then filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that successor counsel's failure to call or investigate an alibi witness constituted constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. The second trial judge allowed the motion, determining that the testimony necessarily would be important to the jury's deliberations. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, the judge was not unreasonable in finding successor counsel's performance ineffective, and the error was prejudicial. |
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| Commonwealth v. Goncalves-Mendez |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12743 Opinion Date: February 3, 2020 Judge: Barbara A. Lenk Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court allowing Defendant's motions to suppress evidence seized during an inventory search of his vehicle and his subsequent statements to police, holding that, where officers are aware that a passenger lawfully could assume custody of a vehicle, it is improper to impound the vehicle without first offering this option to the driver. Defendant, the driver of the vehicle in this case, was properly stopped for a motor vehicle violation and then arrested on an outstanding warrant. The vehicle's sole passenger was a duly licensed and qualified driver. The officers arranged for the vehicle to be impounded without inquiring of Defendant as to whether he preferred to have the passenger take custody of and move the vehicle. After conducting an inventory search the officers discovered Defendant's gun. The motion judge suppressed the gun and Defendant's statements, finding the impoundment to be unreasonable. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that suppression was appropriate under the circumstances of this case. |
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| Commonwealth v. Heywood |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12724 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Budd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of assault and battery causing serious bodily injury, holding that there was no error with respect to the seating of a blind individual on the jury and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Defendant's conviction stemmed from an incident in which Defendant, without warning, punched the victim in the face. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that his right to a fair and impartial jury was violated because the blind juror that served on the jury was unable to see the physical evidence and had to have the documentary evidence read to him. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) seating the blind juror was not an abuse of the trial judge's discretion; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant caused serious bodily injury to the victim. |
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| Commonwealth v. Kelly |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12710 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Gaziano Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of discharging a firearm within 500 feet of a building, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, 12E, and unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, 10(h), holding that that section 12E does not require any mens rea as to the element of discharge and that the trial judge properly declined to instruct on an exemption for temporarily holding a firearm. Defendant's convictions stemmed from an incident in which, while showing a firearm to one of his friends, Defendant accidentally discharged it in a home, shooting his friend through the hand. On appeal, Defendant argued that section 12E includes a mens rea requirement and that the trial judge erred in declining to instruct on an exemption for temporarily holding a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 12E does not require any mens rea as to the element of discharge; and (2) the trial judge did not err in declining to give the requested instruction on the exemption for temporary possession. |
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| Bergman v. Caulk |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A18-1784 Opinion Date: February 5, 2020 Judge: Chutich Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that James Bergman was not disqualified from receiving a permit to carry a firearm, holding that the sealing of judicial records under a court's inherent authority does not satisfy the federal requirement of expungement. In 2007, a Minnesota district court issued an expungement order under its inherent authority sealing the judicial records of Bergman's prior conviction of domestic assault. Thereafter, Bergman applied for a permit to carry a firearm. Bergman was granted the permit. In 2017, the Isanti County Sheriff denied Bergman's permit-to-carry application because of his prior domestic assault conviction. The district court denied Bergman's petition for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the sealing of judicial records under a district court's inherent authority is not sufficient under federal law to expunge a previous conviction and thereby reinstate an applicant's right to carry a firearm in Minnesota. |
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| Fox v. State |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A19-1140 Opinion Date: February 5, 2020 Judge: David L. Lillehaug Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Appellant's second petition for postconviction relief, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant's petition. Appellant was found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. This appeal concerned Appellant's second petition for postconviction relief, in which Appellant requested a new trial based on four theories of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The district court denied the petition, concluding, among other things, that Appellant's claims were time barred under Minn. Stat. 590.01, subd. 4(a). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's petition was time-barred and Appellant did not meet the interests of justice exception to the time bar. |
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| State v. Barthman |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A17-1191 Opinion Date: February 5, 2020 Judge: Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's sentence on count two, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, holding that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a greater than double durational departure on count two. The district court imposed 360-month, consecutive sentences for Defendant's two convictions of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, imposing these greater-than-double durational departures on the sentences based on the aggravating factors of particular cruelty and the particular vulnerability of the victim. In reversing the sentence on count two, the court of appeals determined that imposing a greater-than-double durational departure on a consecutive sentence when both counts involved a single victim unduly exaggerated the criminality of Defendant's conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding that this was not an extremely rare case involving severe aggravating circumstances, and therefore, the district court erred in imposing a greater-than-double durational departure on count two. |
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| Zumberge v. State |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A19-0593 Opinion Date: January 31, 2020 Judge: Chutich Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court summarily denying Appellant's petition for postconviction relief, holding that the alleged facts, even when viewed in a light most favorable to Appellant, conclusively showed that he was entitled to no relief. Appellant was convicted of murder and attempted murder. Appellant later filed his postconviction petition alleging that several reversible errors were committed by the judge, prosecutor, and his counsel during his jury trial. The district court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing and without addressing the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's claims were procedurally barred by State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976); and (2) the failure to address the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim did not require a remand because the facts alleged conclusively showed that Appellant was not entitled to relief on his claim. |
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| Mitchell v. Phillips |
| Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC97631 Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: Patricia Breckenridge Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining the chairman of the Missouri board of probation and parole's motion to dismiss Appellant's petition for declaratory judgment in which he sought a declaration of his right to a parole hearing, holding that the repeal of Mo. Rev. Stat. 195.295.3 did not render Appellant parole eligible. In 2013, a jury found Appellant guilty of drug trafficking in the second degree for acts committed in 2009. Defendant was sentenced under section 195.295.3 as a prior drug offender to a term of imprisonment without eligibility for parole. After the general assembly repealed section 195.295 in January 2017, Appellant filed his petition for declaratory judgment arguing he was eligible for parole because the statute that had rendered him parole ineligible had been repealed. The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that the repeal of the statute could not be applied retroactively because it would alter Appellant's sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant's parole ineligibility was part of his sentence, the repeal of section 195.295.3 did not render him eligible for parole. |
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| Woods v. Missouri Department of Corrections |
| Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC97633 Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: Patricia Breckenridge Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining Respondent's motion for judgment on the pleadings and granting Respondent a hearing on his single-count petition for declaratory judgment claiming his parole eligibility should no longer be governed by Mo. Rev. Stat. 195.295 and releasing Respondent on parole, holding that the repeal of section 195.295 had no effect on Respondent's parole eligibility. Respondent was found guilty of trafficking drugs in the second degree for acts committed in May 2006. Respondent was sentenced as a prior drug offender to twenty-five years' imprisonment without eligibility for parole under section 195.295. On January 1, 2017, section 195.295 was repealed. At issue was the legal effect section 195.295's repeal had on Respondent's eligibility for parole. The Supreme Court held that, for the reasons set forth in Mitchell v. Jones, __ S.W.3d __, also decided today, Respondent was not eligible for parole. |
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| State v. Cherry |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 25 Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: Mike McGrath Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming a justice court verdict finding Appellant guilty of failure to obtain landowner permission for hunting, holding the district court correctly affirmed Appellant's conviction. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) under Mont. Code Ann. 87-6-415, the justice court and the district court did not err when they declined to adopt Appellant's argument that "hunting" and "taking or attempting to take" a game animal are separate, distinct actions that the State has the burden of proving; and (2) the justice court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to submit its jury instructions after the deadline. |
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| State v. Running Wolf |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 24 Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: Laurie McKinnon Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part Appellant's designation as a persistent felony offender (PFO) and corresponding enhanced sentence, holding that Appellant was improperly sentenced as a PFO. Because a fourth or subsequent driving under the influence (DUI) offense constitutes a felony under Montana law, the State charged Appellant's fourth and fifth DUI offenses, committed in 2015, as felonies. Before Appellant was convicted of either felony offense, the State gave notice of its intent to seek PFO designation for Appellant. In 2017, approximately two weeks after a new law took effect changing the definition of a PFO, Appellant pleaded guilty to both felony DUIs. Appellant argued that the 2015 PFO statute no longer applied and that he did not satisfy the requirements necessary to trigger PFO status under the new definition. The district court concluded that the 2015 PFO statute applied and designated Appellant a PFO. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) properly applied the 2015 version of the PFO statute at Appellant's sentencing hearing; but (2) erred in sentencing Appellant as a PFO because Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-501 expressly requires the existence of a felony conviction before the commission of the principal offense to effectuate a valid PFO designation. |
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| Flowers v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Nevada Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 1 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Kristina Pickering Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction and amended judgment of conviction convicting Defendant of first-degree murder and other crimes and denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that any error was harmless. A jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder, sexual assault, and burglary and denied Defendant's motions for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in admitting evidence of other bad acts; (2) did not violate Defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause; (3) did not violate Defendant's due process right to a fair trial by admitting autopsy photographs; (4) did not deny Defendant a fair trial by invoking Nevada hearsay rules to exclude certain testimony; (5) erred by not allowing Defendant to introduce certain evidence, but the error was harmless; and (6) did not tolerate prosecutorial misconduct. Further, the conviction was supported by sufficient evidence, and the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. |
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| New Hampshire v. Candello |
| Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court Docket: 2019-0103 Opinion Date: January 31, 2020 Judge: Gary E. Hicks Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2007, defendant Jason Candello was sentenced on two felonies pursuant to a negotiated plea. On one felony conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a stand-committed sentence of two and one-half to nine years (sentence 1). The maximum of that sentence was subsequently reduced to seven years. On the other felony, the trial court imposed a three-and-one-half-to-seven year sentence that was to run consecutively to the stand-committed sentence on the first felony (sentence 2). The court suspended sentence 2 for ten years subject to conditions. At some point before November 12, 2012, defendant was paroled on sentence 1. On November 12, 2012, defendant committed second degree assault. Defendant’s parole was revoked, and, on November 18, 2012, he resumed serving sentence 1. Sentence 1 ended on March 9, 2014. On March 6, 2013, the trial court set defendant’s bail on the second degree assault charge at $10,000 cash, which he was unable to pay. In February 2014, a jury convicted the defendant of the second degree assault charge. He was sentenced on that charge on May 6, 2014 (sentence 3). Sentence 3 was to run consecutively to sentence 2. On that day, the trial court also imposed sentence 2 (which had previously been suspended for ten years). In December 2018, defendant filed a motion requesting that the trial court amend sentences 2 and 3 so that they ran concurrently, instead of consecutively. The court denied his motion, and defendant appealed. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the sentencing. |
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| State ex rel. Jefferson v. Russo |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-338 Opinion Date: February 5, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting summary judgment to Judge Joseph D. Russo and denying Sell Jefferson a writ of mandamus, holding that Jefferson's claims were barred by res judicata. In 1975, Jefferson was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction was not notified of Jefferson's aggravated murder conviction and life sentence. As a result, the Adult Parole Authority granted Jefferson final release in 1982. In 1985, Jefferson was indicted for several felony counts. Jefferson was convicted and sentenced to a prison term, to be served concurrently with his 1975 sentence. Jefferson raised numerous challenges to his arrest and reincarceration in the 1975 case, without success. Jefferson then brought this proceeding, arguing that his due process rights were violated. The court of appeals concluded that the claims in Jefferson's complaint were barred by res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was properly granted. |
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| State ex rel. Newsome v. Hack |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-336 Opinion Date: February 5, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court granted Relator's request for a writ of mandamus to compel Karla Hack, the former Marion County Court Reporter, to inform him of the fee for a copy of the transcript of his 2009 sentencing hearing, holding that Relator established all three requirements necessary to obtain a writ of mandamus. Relator, an inmate in the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, filed a motion to compel the court reporter to produce a copy of the sentencing transcript and inform Relator of the fee for a copy of it. Relator then filed a motion to add the county court reporter's office and the current county court reporter as respondents, stating that Hack had retired and that he was unable to determine who the current court reporter was. The Supreme Court granted the motion and the writ, holding that Relator established that he was entitled to the writ. |
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| State v. Davis |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-309 Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: Fischer Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In this certified-conflict case, the Supreme Court held that when an indigent defendant makes an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon counsel's failure to request a waiver of court costs, a reviewing court must apply the test in State v. Bradley, 538 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio 1989) for determining whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant was convicted of assaulting a peace officer. The trial court assessed court costs against Defendant, despite his indigent status. On appeal, the court of appeals determined that Defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to request a waiver of costs and that the basis for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to request such a waiver no longer exists. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when trial counsel fails to request that the trial court waive court costs on behalf of an indigent defendant, a determination of prejudice for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis deeds on whether there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have granted the request to waive costs had one been made; and (2) the court of appeals incorrectly analyzed the prejudice prong of the ineffective-assistance of counsel analysis set forth in Bradley. |
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| South Carolina v. McCall |
| Court: South Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 27943 Opinion Date: February 5, 2020 Judge: Kaye Gorenflo Hearn Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Terry McCall was convicted of felony DUI. On appeal, he argued the warrantless collection of his blood and urine at the direction of law enforcement pursuant to Section 56-5-2946 of the South Carolina Code (2018) violated the Fourth Amendment. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed because exigent circumstances existed to support the admission of his blood and urine test results. |
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| South Carolina v. Young |
| Court: South Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 27942 Opinion Date: February 5, 2020 Judge: John W. Kittredge Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In the course of a gun battle between mutual combatants, a bullet fired at Petitioner Aaron Young Jr. (Young Jr.) missed its intended mark and killed an unintended victim. Young Jr. and his father Aaron Young Sr. (Young Sr.) willingly engaged a rival, Tyrone Robinson, in a residential neighborhood. The battle ended when Robinson shot and killed an unintended victim, an eight-year-old child who was playing in the area. The State charged all three combatants with the murder of the victim. Robinson's murder charge stemmed from a straightforward application of the doctrine of transferred intent. The Youngs' murder charges stemmed from an application of the doctrine of mutual combat. The South Carolina Supreme Court held mutual combat could properly serve as the basis for a murder charge for the death of a non-combatant under the "hand of one is the hand of all" theory of accomplice liability. The Court therefore found the law sanctioned holding Young Jr. responsible for the actions of Robinson in causing the victim's death, and affirmed Young Jr.'s murder conviction and sentence. |
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| Jordan v. Texas |
| Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Docket: PD-0899-18 Opinion Date: February 5, 2020 Judge: Keel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A jury convicted Appellant Patrick Jordan of deadly conduct and sentenced him to four years in prison. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred in denying him a jury instruction on self-defense against multiple assailants. The court of appeals concluded that Appellant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction at all, and the failure to include multiple assailants language was not error. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed, finding Appellant was entitled to a jury instruction on multiple assailants, and the failure to include it was indeed harmful. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. |
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| State v. Badikyan |
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2020 UT 3 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Matthew B. Durrant Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that it acted jurisdiction to hear Defendant's unpreserved claim on appeal, holding that Utah's Plea Withdrawal Statute, Utah Code 77-13-6, bars review of unpreserved claims raised as part of an appeal from the denial of a timely plea-withdrawal motion. Defendant pled guilty to attempted murder. Before he was sentenced Defendant moved to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed this denial and raised a new challenge under the plain error exception to the preservation rule. The court of appeals concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Defendant's unpreserved claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that that the Plea Withdrawal Statute bars appellate review of unpreserved claims raised as part of an appeal of a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea. |
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| State v. Flora |
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2020 UT 2 Opinion Date: January 30, 2020 Judge: Matthew B. Durrant Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, in which Appellant raised two new arguments, from the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his plea under Utah Code 77-13-6, the Plea Withdrawal Statute, holding that the Plea Withdrawal Statute prohibited this Court from considering Appellant's unpreserved arguments. Appellant pled guilty to felony driving under the influence. Before sentencing, Appellant moved to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion. Appellant appealed and raised two new arguments under the plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel exceptions to the preservation rule. The court of appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court for original appellate review. The Supreme Court held (1) the Plea Withdrawal Statute prevents this Court from considering Appellant's unpreserved arguments; and (2) defendants may not rely on preservation exceptions when appealing the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. |
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| In re Jones |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2020 VT 9 Opinion Date: January 31, 2020 Judge: Beth Robinson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Petitioner Reco Jones appealed the civil division’s denial of his postconviction relief (PCR) petition alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary. Due to his immigration status, federal deportation policies, and Department of Corrections (DOC) policies, the sentence petitioner agreed to, nominally twelve years to life, likely amounted to a life sentence without the possibility of parole with only a minimal chance of deportation. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the voluntariness of his plea was compromised by misinformation given to him. The Court therefore reversed and vacated petitioner’s conviction, and remanded to the civil division with instructions to refer the case to the criminal division for further proceedings. |
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| Vermont v. Bouchard |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2020 VT 10 Opinion Date: January 31, 2020 Judge: Beth Robinson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Donald Bouchard pled guilty to two sex offenses, and challenged several of the special sex-offender probation conditions imposed on him. The two offenses related to lewd and lascivious conduct, and one count of unlawful restraint in the second degree. The offending conduct involved his niece and nephew. At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed the agreed-upon sentence. The State presented no evidence in support of any of the contested probation conditions. The trial court expressed its concern about defendant’s ability to complete the sex-offender treatment program, and told defendant that “if you don’t complete the program and a violation of probation is filed and your probation is revoked, there is no room in the sentence that you’ve negotiated with your attorney for any other programming. It really is as close to a flat ten-year sentence as I’ve ever seen.” The court imposed various probation conditions, including the “sex [-] offender special conditions of probation” at issue on appeal. The Vermont Supreme Court remanded the two conditions limiting contact with minors for clarification as to the age restrictions and the rationale behind them. The Court upheld the conditions prohibiting defendant from accessing or loitering in places where children congregate, and requiring defendant to give his probation officer notice within 48 hours of a change in contact information. |
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| Taylor v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Supreme Court of Virginia Docket: 181684 Opinion Date: February 6, 2020 Judge: LeRoy F. Millette, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the trial court's conviction of Defendant of attempted identity theft, holding that one can commit attempted identity theft under Va. Code 18.2-186.3 when using his or her own identifying information to obtain money. Defendant stole a check, made it payable to herself, and forged the account owner's signature. Using her own driver's license as identification, Defendant presented the check to a bank teller for cash but left the bank before completing the transaction. Defendant was subsequently convicted of attempted identity theft. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for attempted identity theft under section 18.2-186.3. |
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| Washington v. Yishmael |
| Court: Washington Supreme Court Docket: 96775-0 Opinion Date: February 6, 2020 Judge: Steven González Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics |
| Naziyr Yishmael, who was not an attorney, advised clients that they could "homestead" in apparently abandoned properties and, after a period of time, acquire title through adverse possession. After some of his clients were arrested for taking up residence in other people's houses, he was charged with and convicted of misdemeanor unlawful practice of law. On appeal, he contended: (1) the jury was improperly instructed that the unlawful practice of law was a strict liability offense; (2) the trial court's use of GR 24 to define the practice of law violated separation of powers was an inappropriate comment on the evidence; (3) the Statute was unconstitutionally vague; and (4) the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed Yishmael’s conviction. |
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| Mills v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 14 Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: Michael K. Davis Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of two counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and one count of interference with a peace officer, holding that Defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the extension of Defendant's traffic stop. The traffic stop in this case led to the discovery of drugs and drug paraphernalia in Defendant's vehicle. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the initial stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the duration of the traffic stop in his motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) Wyo. R. Crim. P. 12(b) precluded plain error review of the issues not raised in Defendant's motion to suppress evidence; and (2) Defendant showed a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's failure to challenge the duration of the stop and the actions of law enforcement officers during the stop, the outcome of the trial would have been different. |
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| Pyles v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 13 Opinion Date: February 3, 2020 Judge: Kautz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of possession with intent to deliver marijuana, holding that the State's evidence at trial was sufficient to prove Defendant constructively possessed the marijuana. A jury found Defendant guilty of possession with intent to deliver marijuana in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 35-7-1031(a)(ii). The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of incarceration of four to nine years, sentence suspended. On appeal, Defendant argued that the State failed to prove he possessed the marijuana. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State's evidence was clearly sufficient to establish that Defendant had constructive possession of the marijuana. |
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| Wyant v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 15 Opinion Date: February 4, 2020 Judge: Kautz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of three counts of second-degree sexual assault, holding that the district court did not plainly err in failing to instruct the jury that it had to fine beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant acted voluntarily. On appeal, Defendant argued that because second-degree sexual assault is a general intent crime, it required a voluntary act, and therefore, the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the mens rea element of second-degree sexual assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no instruction on voluntariness was required where Defendant did not show she was prejudiced by any alleged failure to provide a voluntariness instruction to the jury and Defendant did not present any evidence suggesting her actions were not voluntary. |
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