Latest 8 Cases This Week: Zell v. Ricci (1st Cir.), M.D.C.G. v. United States (5th Cir.), Fuqua v. United States Postal Service (7th Cir.)

Rethinking Retroactivity in Light of the Supreme Court’s Jury Unanimity Requirement

MICHAEL C. DORF

In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Monday in Ramos v. Louisiana, in which it held that the federal Constitution forbids states from convicting defendants except by a unanimous jury, Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses the Court’s jurisprudence on retroactivity. Dorf highlights some costs and benefits of retroactivity and argues that the Court’s refusal to issue advisory opinions limits its ability to resolve retroactivity questions in a way that responds to all the relevant considerations.

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Zell v. Ricci

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 18-1372, 18-1608

Opinion Date: April 20, 2020

Judge: Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's case against various defendants, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's federal law claims or state law negligent training/supervision claim but erred in dismissing Plaintiff's state law negligence claim. Kelsey Zell, a high school junior, was hit by a fellow student and sustained a concussion. Zell faced a one-day suspension for her role in the altercation. Zell and her parents (together, Plaintiffs) unsuccessfully challenged the suspension decision. Plaintiffs later filed a complaint against the school district's superintendent, the dean of students, and other school officials, alleging several claims. The district court dismissed the claims and denied Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint. The court then denied Defendants' motion for sanctions. The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing Zell's federal law claims or state law negligent training/supervision claim and Zell's motion to amend as it relates to these issues; (2) did not err in denying the denial of Defendant's motion for sanctions against Zell's counsel; but (3) erred in dismissing Plaintiff's state law negligence claim.

M.D.C.G. v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-40076

Opinion Date: April 21, 2020

Judge: E. Grady Jolly

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

Plaintiff and two minors filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting claims of assault and battery, false imprisonment/false arrest, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. Plaintiff's claims arose from a Border Patrol agent's physical and sexual abuse of plaintiff and the minors, including rape, beatings, knife body-carvings, strangulations, and the attempted burial of a living victim. The Fifth Circuit held that the agent's conduct was outside the scope of his employment, and thus plaintiff could not recover damages from the United States under the FTCA. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the FTCA claims based on the agent's conduct. The court also held that the FTCA's discretionary function exception deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over the negligent supervision claims, and thus vacated in part, remanding to the district court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Fuqua v. United States Postal Service

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 18-2415

Opinion Date: April 23, 2020

Judge: Brennan

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

Fuqua, a mail handler, was forced to transfer to a new location when his Chicago center was downsized. He did not receive placement within 30 miles of his home. He refused to appear for work in Kansas City and was fired. Fuqua alleged his termination caused him emotional distress and made an administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671. The Postal Service denied his claim, ruling that his exclusive remedy was through the Department of Labor (DOL) under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. 8101. Fuqua filed suit for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress under the FTCA. During a stay in the proceedings, Fuqua corresponded with the DOL alleging he was injured because of defendants’ “extreme and outrageous conduct refusing to allow [him] to become assigned a station closer to [his] residence.” The DOL denied his FECA claim, explaining “[e]motional conditions that arise out of administrative and personnel matters, such as termination of employment are usually covered only if the weight of the evidence supports that the employer acted in an abusive manner or erred.” The district court dismissed Fuqua’s case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. FECA applied to Fuqua’s claim, its administrative scheme ran its course, and his claim was denied for lack of evidence. The district court had no subject matter jurisdiction over his FTCA claims. Fuqua’s allegation falls within the “transfer, or reassignment” definition of “personnel action.”

Williams v. Baptist Health

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 Ark. 350

Opinion Date: April 23, 2020

Judge: Kemp

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's action against Baptist Health appellees and John Hearnsberger, M.D., holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's motions to compel production of two types of disputed discovery. Appellant, a surgeon, was on the medical staff of Baptist Health from 2003 until 2011, when his appointment and clinic privileges at Baptist Health Medical Center-Little Rock were terminated, effective immediately. Baptist Health also reported the suspension of Appellant's clinical privileges to the Arkansas State Medical Board, which, in 2014, revoked Appellant's license. Appellant appealed the revocation, and his license was reinstated. In 2011, Appellant filed a lawsuit against Baptist Health and several individuals, asserting several claims. The circuit court entered a consent order dismissing the Medical Board and Dr. Hearnsberger in his official capacity. The circuit court then granted summary judgment on Appellant's remaining claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's motions to compel production of two types of discovery, and the discovery error was not harmless as to Appellant's discrimination and tortious-interference claims.

Tilkey v. Allstate Ins. Co.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D074459(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 21, 2020

Judge: Richard D. Huffman

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

While Michael Tilkey and his girlfriend Jacqueline Mann were visiting at her home in Arizona, they got into an argument. Tilkey decided to leave the apartment. When he stepped out onto the enclosed patio to collect his belongings, Mann locked the door behind him. Tilkey banged on the door to regain entry, and Mann called police. Police arrested Tilkey and charged him under Arizona law with criminal damage deface, possession or use of drug paraphernalia, and disorderly conduct, disruptive behavior. Domestic violence charges were attached to the criminal damage and disorderly conduct charges. Tilkey pled guilty to the disorderly conduct charge only; the other two charges were dropped. After Tilkey completed a domestic nonviolence diversion program, the disorderly conduct charge was dismissed. Before the disorderly conduct charge was dismissed, Tilkey's company of 30 years, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), terminated his employment based on his arrest for a domestic violence offense and his participation in the diversion program. Allstate informed Tilkey it was discharging him for threatening behavior and/or acts of physical harm or violence to another person. Following the termination, Allstate reported its reason for the termination to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA); that information was accessible to any firm that hired licensed broker-dealers like Tilkey. Tilkey sued Allstate for wrongful termination in violation of Labor Code section 432.7 and compelled, self-published defamation. At trial, Allstate presented evidence that it would have terminated his employment based on after-acquired evidence that Tilkey had circulated obscene and inappropriate e-mails using company resources. The jury returned a verdict in Tilkey's favor on all causes of action, advising the court that it did not find Allstate's after-acquired evidence defense credible. Allstate appealed, contending: (1) it did not violate section 432.7, so there was no wrongful termination; (2) compelled self-published defamation per se was not a viable tort theory; (3) it did not defame Tilkey because there was not substantial evidence its statement was not substantially true; (4) punitive damages were unavailable in compelled self-publication defamation causes of action; (5) the defamatory statement was not made with malice; and (6) the punitive damages awarded here were unconstitutionally excessive. The Court of Appeal agreed Allstate did not violate section 432.7 when it terminated Tilkey's employment based on his plea and his participation in an Arizona domestic nonviolence program, and reversed that judgment. The Court also agreed that compelled self-published defamation was a viable theory, and affirmed that judgment. The Court determined the pubitive damages awarded here were not proportionate to the compensatory damages for defamation, and remanded for recalculation of those damages.

Erie Ins. v. Moore, et al

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 20 WAP 2018

Opinion Date: April 22, 2020

Judge: Dougherty

Areas of Law: Insurance Law, Personal Injury

At issue in this appeal was whether the alleged conduct of an insured, Harold McCutcheon, Jr. (McCutcheon), as described in a personal injury lawsuit filed against his estate by Richard Carly, obligated McCutcheon’s insurer, appellant Erie Insurance Exchange (Erie) to defend the estate against Carly’s complaint. In 2013, McCutcheon broke into the home of his ex-wife, Terry McCutcheon, in order to shoot and kill her, and then kill himself. He communicated these intentions in a note he left for his adult children. McCutcheon succeeded in executing this plan, first shooting and killing Terry and, eventually, shooting and killing himself. However, after McCutcheon killed Terry but before he killed himself, Carly arrived on the scene. Carly, who had been dating Terry, approached the front door of her home, rang the doorbell and received no answer. Carly became concerned, placed his hand on the doorknob “in order to enter and the door was suddenly pulled inward by [McCutcheon] who grabbed [Carly] by his shirt and pulled him into the home.” McCutcheon was “screaming, swearing, incoherent, and acting 'crazy.’” Then, “a fight ensued between the two and at the time, [McCutcheon] continued to have the gun in his hand” which he apparently had used to kill Terry. During this “struggle” between the two men, McCutcheon was “knocking things around, and in the process [he] negligently, carelessly, and recklessly caused the weapon to be fired which struck [Carly] in the face,” causing severe injuries. In addition, “other shots were carelessly, negligently and recklessly fired” by McCutcheon, “striking various parts of the interior of the residence and exiting therefrom.” Carly filed suit against McCutcheon’s estate, and the estate — administered by McCutcheon’s adult children — sought coverage of the lawsuit under two insurance policies issued by Erie to McCutcheon: the Erie Insurance Home Protector Policy (homeowner’s policy) and the Erie Insurance Personal Catastrophe Liability Policy (personal catastrophe policy). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held Carly’s allegations were sufficient to trigger Erie’s duty to defend, and accordingly, affirmed the superior court's order.

Trigg v. Children's Hospital of Pgh.

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 3 WAP 2019

Opinion Date: April 22, 2020

Judge: Debra McCloskey Todd

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

Appellee Mendy Trigg was the parent of J.T., who, in 2011, was age 4 and afflicted with craniosynostosis. In 2011, J.T. underwent surgery at the Hospital to correct this condition. Afterward, J.T. was transferred for post- operative care to one of Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh's (“Hospital”) intensive care units. While recovering there, J.T. fell out of the hospital bed, and, as a result, suffered damage to the surgically repaired cranial area, necessitating immediate ameliorative surgery. Subsequently, Appellees filed suit against the Hospital alleging, inter alia, that the Hospital was negligent in placing J.T. in a regular adult size hospital bed, due to the large spaces between the vertical side rails, which they alleged, enabled J.T.'s fall. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted review of this case to consider whether Appellees' argument that the trial court erred by not personally observing the demeanor of prospective jurors they challenged for-cause during voir dire. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded Appellees waived their argument for appellate review, and, thus, that the Superior Court erred in considering it. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Superior Court judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Reyes v. Jefferson County

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 18-1221

Opinion Date: April 17, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

In this interlocutory appeal involving application of the Texas Tort Claims Act's (TTCA) notice requirement the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying Jefferson County's jurisdictional plea, holding that the County had actual notice of the plaintiff's claim as a matter of law. Plaintiff sued Jefferson County under the Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex. Civ. Proc. & Rem. Code 101.101. The County asserted noncompliance with section 101.101, but the County's plea to the jurisdiction sought dismissal only on non-TTCA grounds, including noncompliance with a presentment requirement in Tex. Local Gov't Code 89.004(a). The trial court denied the County's plea on the basis that section 89.004's presentment requirement was not jurisdictional. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed the suit with prejudice for lack of statutory notice without considering the merits of the section 89.004 presentment issue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in ruling that Plaintiff failed to provide the notice section 101.101 requires to invoke the TTCA's sovereign immunity waiver.