| United States v. Gonzalez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 19-1351 Opinion Date: November 17, 2020 Judge: Selya Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence for violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), holding that the life without parole sentence imposed by the district court was not unconstitutional and that Defendant's remaining claims of error were unavailing. On appeal, Defendant, who was twenty years old at the time he committed the charged crime, sought to vacate his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on Eighth Amendment grounds. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to make the case for extending the Miller ban on life-without-parole sentences to offenders like Defendant who were in the eighteen-to-twenty range when they committed the crimes of conviction; (2) the district court did not err in determining that Defendant had twice committed the predicate offense of first-degree murder even where the jury had been instructed only on second-degree murder; and (3) Defendant's sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. |
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| Gray v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 20-790 Opinion Date: November 13, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit denied the petition for appealability, holding that assaulting a federal officer, an offense under 18 U.S.C. 111(b), is a categorical crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A), using a firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence. The court held that petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. In this case, petitioner pleaded guilty in 2012 to assaulting a federal officer, in violation of section 111(a)(1) and (b), and to using a firearm during that assault, in violation of section 924(c). |
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| United States v. Houtar |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 19-3627 Opinion Date: November 13, 2020 Judge: Dennis G. Jacobs Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law, International Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for international parental kidnapping and passport fraud. After determining that defendant's vagueness challenge fails insofar as it is premised on deficient notice, the court held that the International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act (IPKCA) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. In this case, the IPKCA is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to someone who retains children abroad without first abducting them, when the children had not been in the United States for several years prior to the unlawful retention. The court also held that the district court properly applied two Sentencing Guidelines enhancements for substantial interference with the administration of justice and for fraudulent use of a United States passport. |
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| United States v. Brinkley |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4455 Opinion Date: November 13, 2020 Judge: Diana Jane Gribbon Motz Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Brinkley was subject to an arrest warrant. An ATF analyst identified possible addresses. Because a water bill for one address was in Brinkley’s name, Agent Murphy believed that address was Brinkley’s most likely residence. Another address was an apartment. Detective Stark also found multiple addresses, including the apartment. Brinkley’s Facebook page led Starck to believe that Brinkley was dating Chisholm, who was associated with the apartment. Officers went to the apartment. Chisholm opened the door, denied that Brinkley was there, grew “very nervous” and looked behind her. The officers saw another woman and heard movement from a back room. Chisholm stated that she did not want the officers to enter and asked whether they had a warrant. Murphy later testified that the sounds and the women’s reactions led him to believe that Brinkley was in the apartment. Five uniformed, armed officers entered and found Brinkley in a bedroom, then conducted a protective sweep and saw digital scales, a baggie containing cocaine base, and a bullet. They obtained a search warrant and seized firearms. Brinkley was charged with felon-in-possession counts, possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, and firearm possession in furtherance of a drug offense. The Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of a motion to suppress. Though the officers developed a well-founded suspicion that Brinkley might have stayed in the apartment at times, they failed to establish probable cause that he resided there. Because they entered the apartment pursuant solely to the authority of the arrest warrant, their entry was unlawful. When police have limited reason to believe a suspect resides in a home, generic signs of life inside and understandably nervous reactions from residents, without more, do not amount to probable cause that the suspect is present within. |
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| United States v. Moriello |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-4464 Opinion Date: November 18, 2020 Judge: Floyd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction under two administrative regulations for repeatedly refusing to comply with directions from an immigration judge and a courtroom bailiff to cease distracting conduct during an immigration proceeding. The charges stemmed from an incident where court personnel requested defendant, who works as an immigration attorney, to stop using her cell phone. When defendant refused, she received a citation from Federal Protective Service officers. Count One charged defendant with failing to comply with the lawful direction of an authorized individual while on property under the authority of the GSA in violation of the Direction Regulation. See 41 C.F.R. 102-74.385. Count Two charged defendant with impeding and disrupting the performance of official duties by government employees while on property under the authority of the GSA in violation of the Conduct Regulation. See 41 C.F.R. 02-74.390. The regulations were promulgated pursuant to 40 U.S.C. 1315. The court concluded that the district court properly rejected defendant's vagueness challenge; the district court properly concluded that section 1315 is a constitutional delegation of authority and that the regulations do not exceed the scope of that authority; the district court properly concluded that the regulations do not violate the Tenth Amendment; the district court properly interpreted the Direction Regulation; and the district court properly found that sufficient evidence supports defendant's conviction under Count Two. |
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| Sealed Appellee v. Sealed Appellant |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 20-10272 Opinion Date: November 13, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit wire fraud in connection with a scheme involving the use of phone calls, emails, and wire transfers to defraud the victim of hundreds of thousands of dollars. The court held that appellant has not shown any clear or obvious error in Count One of the indictment and, even if he had done so, he has not met his burden of demonstrating that the alleged error affected his substantial rights. The court also held that appellant has not shown any clear or obvious error under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Finally, the court declined to consider appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim without prejudice to his right to seek collateral review. |
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| United States v. Arayatanon |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-60233 Opinion Date: November 13, 2020 Judge: Stephen Andrew Higginson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excusing two case agents from sequestration under Federal Rule of Evidence 615 and, in any event, defendant failed to show prejudice. Furthermore, the district court did not err by admitting jailhouse telephone calls. The court also held that the district court did not err at sentencing in determining the quantity of methamphetamine attributable to defendant for the purpose of calculating his base offense level under USSG 2D1.1(c); the district court did not clearly err by applying a two-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2D1.1(b)(5); and the district court did not clearly err by sentencing defendant as a career offender under USSG 4B1.1. |
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| United States v. Batiste |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-30927 Opinion Date: November 13, 2020 Judge: Kurt D. Engelhardt Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for sentence reduction filed pursuant to section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. The court held that the district court did not misinterpret United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 285 (2019), as precluding consideration of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors during First Step Act sentencings and preventing any downward departure or variance from the guidelines range. However, the court held that it is not clear where the district court considered and implicitly rejected defendant's request for a reduction of his term of supervised release, or merely overlooked it. Therefore, the court remanded the issue to the district court for consideration and disposition. The court rejected defendant's argument that the district court's re-imposition of a 262-month sentence resulted in a substantively unreasonable sentence. Rather, the court held that the substantive reasonableness standard does not apply here and that defendant has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion or legal error occurred. Finally, defendant's argument that the district court failed to consider the guidelines range applicable to him if he were sentenced today is foreclosed by Hegwood. |
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| United States v. McKinney |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-50801 Opinion Date: November 16, 2020 Judge: Leslie Southwick Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. When defendant pleaded guilty to the crime, he reserved the right to challenge on appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of the discovery of the firearm by an officer patting him down prior to questioning. The court concluded that the evidence before the district court did not support the conclusion that officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to detain defendant for questioning or to subsequently frisk him. In this case, defendant was detained for questioning while standing on a sidewalk with others near a business that in recent days had been the location of multiple gang-related shootings. The court stated that the body-camera videos and police report do not sufficiently explain the events leading up to the initiation of the investigatory detention. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| United States v. Robinson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-50907 Opinion Date: November 13, 2020 Judge: Kurt D. Engelhardt Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for sentence reduction filed pursuant to section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to consider the lower, noncareer offender sentencing range that would apply if defendant were sentenced in 2019, rather than in 2010, in deciding whether to grant his First Step Act motion for sentence reduction. Furthermore, the court was not persuaded that any legal error occurred here in the district court's assessment of defendant's motion. In this case, the court was not convinced that the district court based its determination on an erroneous interpretation of the First Step Act or United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 285 (2019). |
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| United States v. Mukes |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 20-5134 Opinion Date: November 17, 2020 Judge: Gibbons Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Mukes was arrested after a dispute with his girlfriend, Davis. He pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Davis claimed that Mukes had fired the gun into the air four times. Mukes denied ever firing or threatening Davis. Officers had observed Mukes walking away, holding a handgun, and told Mukes to drop the gun. Mukes fled and was quickly caught. Officers recovered the loaded handgun. The arrest record stated that Mukes threw the weapon while fleeing. The affidavit of complaint stated that Mukes dropped the firearm before he ran. Mukes insisted that he dropped the gun in response to police commands before running. The PSR stated that Mukes dropped the firearm after he ran and recommended a four-point enhancement for using a firearm in connection with another felony offense, “Reckless Endangerment-Deadly Weapon,” and a two-point enhancement for recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person while fleeing from a law officer. Mukes argued that he should not be penalized for contesting the enhancements when he accepted responsibility for the crime. The district court applied both enhancements, declined to grant Mukes a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and sentenced Mukes to the statutory maximum, 120 months' imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The government failed to demonstrate that either enhancement was applicable; on remand, the court should consider whether Mukes may receive the two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. |
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| United States v. Tisdale |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Dockets: 19-1901, 19-1903, 19-1944 Opinion Date: November 18, 2020 Judge: Jeffrey S. Sutton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Tisdale, Davis, and Hill held prominent positions in Detroit's "Playboy Gangster Crips," which committed hundreds of home invasions. On January 31, 2017, Tisdale and other gang members approached a house on Stout Street, threw a brick through the window, and left. They met with Davis and drove back to rob the house. As they exited their Jeep, someone shot at them from the house. Tisdale returned fire. A bullet from the house hit Tisdale’s leg. The gang members left. Federal agents obtained a warrant to search Tisdale’s home and discovered incriminating evidence. Tisdale, Hill, Davis, and 11 others were indicted. Many pleaded guilty; a jury convicted Tisdale, Hill, and Davis of racketeering conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and convicted Tisdale of assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering and of using a firearm during a crime of violence, sections 1959(a)(3), 924(c). The district court sentenced Tisdale to 252 months, Hill to 246 months, and Davis to 144 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the affidavit used to support the search warrant lacked probable cause; that the court should have granted Davis’ motion to sever; that the court should have granted a mistrial after jurors inadvertently saw the defendants in the hallway escorted in handcuffs by marshals; that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense; and that the court erred by instructing the jury that firing a gun qualifies as “brandishing.” |
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| Shuhaiber v. Illinois Department of Corrections |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-3244 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Scudder Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| Shuhaiber, who is confined to a wheelchair, sued the Illinois Department of Corrections under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. He alleged that the Stateville Center failed to accommodate his disability by confining him to a cell unsuited to the use of a wheelchair and that he was transported to physical therapy in vans that were not ADA-compliant, leaving him to depend on an officer to lift him. The district court dismissed the complaint, determining that Shuhaiber failed to allege that he was deprived of access to facilities or services or that the vans caused him to miss medical appointments. Shuhaiber appealed and sought permission to proceed without prepaying the requisite filing fee. Meanwhile, Shuhaiber, a native of the United Arab Emirates, had been transferred to DHS custody for removal from the United States. Shuhaiber, as a frequent filer of federal lawsuits, had accumulated more than three strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act for filing frivolous lawsuits and would have had to prepay the filing fee to appeal the dismissal of his claims. Doubting that Shuhaiber was still a “prisoner,” the district court granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the appellate filing-fee bar does not apply where the appellant is being held by immigration authorities and no longer is a “prisoner” within the meaning of the PLRA. The district court was, nonetheless, right to dismiss his claims. |
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| United States v. Daoud |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Dockets: 19-2174, 19-2185, 19-2186 Opinion Date: November 17, 2020 Judge: St. Eve Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Daoud came to the FBI’s attention because of online activity that evinced a desire to engage in violent jihad. While communicating and meeting with undercover agents, Daoud sometimes wavered about killing people. Daoud planned a Chicago car bomb attack. Undercover agent, “Mudafar” described the bomb that he would supply and the mass carnage it would cause. Mudafar and Daoud met to implement the attack. Daoud, age 18, was arrested upon pressing the button and was charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction and attempting to destroy a building used in interstate commerce with an explosive. While Daoud was in pretrial custody, he solicited the murder of the FBI agent (Mudafar). Daoud’s cellmate was paid to record conversations and instructed Daoud to make a phone call authorizing the killing, which Daoud did. Daoud was charged with soliciting a crime of violence, murder-for-hire, and obstruction of justice. Two years later, Daoud physically attacked another for drawing a picture of the Prophet Muhammad. Daoud was, again, charged. Daoud spent over 400 days in segregated housing during his pretrial incarceration, and Daoud witnessed his cellmate commit suicide. The cases were consolidated. Daoud was diagnosed with psychiatric disorders. With medication, Daoud’s condition improved; he was found competent to stand trial. Daoud pled guilty while maintaining his innocence. The advisory Guidelines range was life imprisonment; he was sentenced to 16 years' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence as substantively unreasonable. The court downplayed the extreme seriousness of Daoud’s offenses in conflict with the undisputed facts; failed to account for the need to protect the public from Daoud’s high risk of reoffending; improperly distinguished the sentences of similar offenders by relying on Daoud’s pretrial confinement; and premised its sentence on mitigating factors that could not bear the weight assigned to them. |
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| United States v. Dawson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 20-1233 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: St. Eve Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Dawson pled guilty to conspiring to transport stolen property in interstate commerce and was sentenced to 18 months of prison followed by three years of supervised release, plus restitution. Less than a year after Dawson was released, Dawson’s probation officer asked the court to revoke his supervised release because Dawson had violated several conditions, including by possession of a firearm. Dawson was charged in state court with weapons violations. He was released to home confinement on electronic monitoring. At the federal revocation hearing, the parties disagreed about proving the firearms violation. The judge opined that state courts “do literally nothing” on firearm violations and continued the hearing. Later, officers testified and the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Dawson had possessed the firearm. Dawson did not contest the other violations. The advisory Guidelines range was six-12 months in prison. The statutory maximum was 24 months. The court revoked Dawson’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment with no supervised release to follow. The court focused first on Dawson’s electronic-monitoring violation, then on Dawson’s failure to make restitution payments. As for Dawson’s missed drug tests, the court considered them a “technical violation.” The court called the firearm violation, “an affront to the Court,” and “a danger to the community.” The court made its sentence consecutive to any forthcoming sentence in the pending state-court case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court chose its sentence to punish Dawson for possessing the firearm but should have focused on his breach of the court’s trust and left any punishment to the state court and that the court disregarded his mitigation arguments and the relevant sentencing factors. |
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| United States v. Elmer |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2890 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Scudder Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, White Collar Crime |
| Elmer owned and operated multiple healthcare-related companies including Pharmakon, a compounding pharmacy that mixes and distributes drugs—including potent opioids like morphine and fentanyl—to hospitals across the U.S.. Pharmakon conducted its own internal potency testing and contracted with a third party to perform additional testing to evaluate whether its compounded drugs had too little of the active ingredient (under-potent) or too much (over-potent). In 2014-2016, testing showed 134 instances of under- or over-potent drugs being distributed to customers. Elmer knew the drugs were dangerous. Rather than halting manufacturing or recalling past shipments, sales continued and led to the near-death of an infant. Elmer and Pharmakon lied to the FDA. Elmer was charged with conspiracy to defraud the FDA (18 U.S.C. 371); introducing adulterated drugs into interstate commerce (21 U.S.C. 331(a), 333(a)(1) & 351); and adulterating drugs being held for sale in interstate commerce (21 U.S.C. 331(k), 331(a)(1) & 351). Pharmakon employees, FDA inspectors, and Community Health Network medical staff testified that Elmer was aware of and directed the efforts to conceal out-of-specification test results from the FDA. The district court sentenced Elmer to 33 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to rulings related to the evidence admitted at trial and Elmer’s sentence. The evidence before the jury overwhelmingly proved Elmer’s guilt. The sentence was more than reasonable given the gravity of Elmer’s crimes. |
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| United States v. Johnson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2718 Opinion Date: November 17, 2020 Judge: St. Eve Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Johnson, a “sovereign citizen,” participated in a bogus mortgage-elimination scheme. Charged with mail fraud, Johnson represented himself at a month-long jury trial, presenting nonsensical defenses. Johnson was capable of basic trial tasks. The Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction, stating that Johnson was a “fool,” but not incompetent. While serving his 300-month sentence, Johnson filed false bankruptcy petitions. Charged with bankruptcy fraud, Johnson did not have counsel at his initial appearance and repeatedly insisted that he was not the defendant. The magistrate asked Johnson several questions to confirm his decision to proceed pro se. Johnson stated that his competency to represent himself had “already been established and affirmed on appeal.” The magistrate “strongly urge[d]” him to accept counsel but ultimately found that Johnson had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Johnson was again questioned and declined counsel during the final pretrial conference, Before and at trial, Johnson performed the necessary functions. Johnson’s arguments were gibberish, characterized by statements like, “the United States is a figment of our imagination.” Johnson accepted counsel for sentencing. The court applied a downward variance and sentenced Johnson, age 55, to 216 months’ imprisonment, consecutive to his current sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court’s colloquy with Johnson was lacking, but Johnson’s waiver of counsel was valid. Johnson’s history and his separate, more thorough colloquy with the magistrate indicate that Johnson’s decision to forgo counsel was not uninformed. The court also rejected Johnson’s challenge to the sentencing explanation. |
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| Balbuena v. Sullivan |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 12-16414 Opinion Date: November 17, 2020 Judge: Bridget S. Bade Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion, denied a petition for rehearing, and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc, in appeals arising from the district court's denial of petitioner's habeas corpus petition and his motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for relief from judgment. Petitioner argues that the state court's admission of his confession violated his due process rights because it was the involuntary product of coercion, and that his Rule 60(b) motion was a proper motion to amend his habeas petition and not a disguised second or successive petition subject to 28 U.S.C. 2244. Considering the petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) framework and applying a highly deferential standard, the panel held that the state court's conclusion that petitioner's confession was voluntary was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. In this case, the state court did not unreasonably conclude that petitioner was sixteen years old and considered his age, experience, and maturity as part of the totality of the circumstances of his confession. Furthermore, the state did not unreasonably conclude that the circumstances of his interview were not coercive. The panel also held that, because petitioner asserted a new claim in his Rule 60(b) motion despite the district court's previously adjudicating his habeas petition on the merits, the district court properly denied that motion as an unauthorized second or successive petition. |
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| United States v. Clark |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-7046 Opinion Date: November 17, 2020 Judge: Mary Beck Briscoe Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law |
| Defendant Jessica Clark pleaded guilty to one count of child neglect in Indian Country. At sentencing, the district court concluded there were no sufficiently analogous Guidelines provision that applied to Clark's conviction, and consequently, it had to sentence her without reference to a specific Guidelines provision or advisory sentencing range. Clark received an 84-month term of imprisonment, to be followed by a five-year term of supervised release. Clark appealed, arguing the district court erred: (1) by not finding U.S.S.G. 2A2.3, the Sentencing Guidelines provision applicable to “Assault” offenses, was sufficiently analogous to her offense of conviction and therefore should have, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2X5.1, been applied by the district court to determine both an offense level and in turn an advisory Guidelines sentencing range; and (2) the district court plainly erred by failing to adequately explain the reasons for the sentence it imposed. The Tenth Circuit rejected Clark's first argument, but agreed with the second: there was no sufficiently analogous Guidelines provision, but an explanation of the reasons for the sentence ultimately imposed was warranted. |
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| Senter v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-11627 Opinion Date: November 13, 2020 Judge: Baker Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability and held that the district court violated Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), by failing to address petitioner's claim that he no longer qualified as an armed career criminal in light of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), because his prior 1988 Alabama conviction for attempted first-degree robbery has no state law elements. The court explained that Clisby requires a federal district court to resolve all claims for relief raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 2254, regardless of whether habeas relief is granted or denied. In this case, the district court never in the first instance resolved petitioner's claim that his attempted robbery conviction could not be a violent felony because, as an offense unrecognized by Alabama law, it has no elements at all. Accordingly, the court vacated the denial of the section 2255 petition without prejudice and remanded. |
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| Tuomi v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-14373 Opinion Date: November 13, 2020 Judge: Branch Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that petitioner was not denied his right to counsel when the state court accepted his motion to withdraw his guilty plea without first appointing him new counsel or providing him an opportunity to confer with counsel; the district court did not err in concluding that petitioner's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue he had been denied his right to counsel before withdrawing his guilty plea; and the district court did not err in concluding that petitioner's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a claim that petitioner did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel, in violation of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). |
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| United States v. Johnson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-15259 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Julie Carnes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's 151-month sentence for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding defendant responsible for more than 400 kilograms of marijuana; the district court did not clearly err in applying a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG 3C1.1; the district court did not clearly err in applying a two-level enhancement for criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood under USSG 2D1.1(b)(15)(E); the district court did not plainly err in denying defendant an additional one-level reduction for timely acceptance of responsibility under USSG 3E1.1(b); and the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence. |
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| Roane v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 20-5329 Opinion Date: November 18, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech |
| In July 2019, the Department of Justice announced a revised protocol for execution by lethal injection using a single drug, pentobarbital. Plaintiffs, federal death row inmates, sought expedited review of three of the district court's rulings, and two plaintiffs with upcoming execution dates moved for stays of execution pending appeal. The DC Circuit held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the government on plaintiffs' Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) claim. In this case, plaintiffs had pointed to several alleged discrepancies between the 2019 Protocol and state statutes dictating different methods of execution or aspects of the execution process. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that there was no conflict, either because the government had committed to complying with the state statutes at issue or because no plaintiff had requested to be executed in accordance with them. However, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment challenge for failure to state a claim. The court held that, by pleading that the federal government's execution protocol involves a "virtual medical certainty" of severe and torturous pain that is unnecessary to the death process and could readily be avoided by administering a widely available analgesic first, plaintiffs' complaint properly and plausibly states an Eighth Amendment claim. The court denied Plaintiffs Hall and Bernard's request for a stay of execution based on the Eighth Amendment claim. The court also held that the district court should have ordered the 2019 Protocol to be set aside to the extent that it permits the use of unprescribed pentobarbital in a manner that violates the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Finally, the court affirmed the district court's denial of a permanent injunction to remedy the FDCA violation. |
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| Combs v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 379 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Wynne Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of capital murder, holding that the trial court did not err when it did not bring jurors into open court after they posed a question during deliberations. Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. For his sole point on appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it did not bring the jurors into open court after they posed a question during deliberations. The State conceded that the court violated Ark. Code Ann. 16-89-125(e) by not bringing the jury into open court when it asked a question. The Supreme Court held that because there was no risk of misinformation being communicated to the jury the State met its burden of overcoming the presumption of prejudice. |
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| Rabion v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 375 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Karen R. Baker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that there were no grounds stated on which a writ of habeas corpus could be issued. Defendant was convicted of two counts of negligent homicide, leaving the scene of an accident involving injury or death, driving on a suspended license, and driving while intoxicated. Defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising several allegations. The Supreme Court found that Defendant's allegations did not establish probable cause for issuance of the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to issuance of the writ. |
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| Russell v. Payne |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 377 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Rhonda K. Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Petitioner's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that the chief justice had the constitutional authority to appoint a special judge, who had the jurisdiction and authority to preside over Petitioner's case. Two days before Petitioner's scheduled trial, Chief Justice Hannah appointed Honorable Ted Capeheart to preside in the place of an elected circuit court judge who had suddenly fallen ill. Twice, Petitioner filed habeas petitions alleging that Judge Capeheart lacked authority to preside over his case. The circuit court denied both petitions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Chief Justice had the constitutional authority to appoint Judge Capeheart, who consequently had the jurisdiction and authority to preside over Petitioner's case. |
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| Waller v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 381 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Womack Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner's claim for habeas relief but remanded the matter for resentencing, holding that Petitioner's sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for his offenses. In his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus Petitioner alleged that his convictions for arson and first-degree battery are void because he did not plead guilty to either offense and that his sentence for first-degree murder exceeded the length provided in the sentencing guidelines. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part, holding (1) Petitioner's claims failed to demonstrate that he was illegally detained; but (2) the suspended imposition of sentences in connection with Petitioner's convictions for first-degree murder and battery exceeded the statutory maximum for the offenses, and therefore, resentencing was necessary. |
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| California v. Gallo |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E074674(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Menetrez Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant-appellant Gerard Gallo was charged by information with elder abuse under Penal Code section 368(b)(1) (count 1) and murder under section 187(a) (count 2). He was convicted by jury as charged, for which the trial court sentenced him to a total indeterminate term of 15 years to life on count 2. The court also imposed a determinate term of three years on count 1, but stayed the sentence pursuant to section 654. After defendant appealed, in an unpublished opinion the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. Almost seven years later, defendant petitioned for resentencing under section 1170.95 in pro. per. The State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing defendant was the actual killer, thus, not entitle do relief. The State stated that defendant punched his father in the face and his father died. When the trial court asked if this was a “single-defendant murder case,” the prosecutor responded, “Yes.” Thereafter, the trial court denied defendant’s petition for resentencing. Defendant was appointed counsel for appealing that denial. Counsel filed a "Wende" brief; defendant did not file a supplemental brief. The Court of Appeal determined "Wende's constitutional underpinnings do not apply to appeals from the denial of postconviction relief," and it had no independent duty to review the record for reasonably arguable issues, but could undertake review "in the interests of justice." Because defendant was the sole killer, and a jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder under section 187 (a), section 1170.95 did not apply to defendant. Thus, the Court independently reviewed the record for potential error, and was satisfied appointed counsel fully complied with their responsibilities as counsel, and no arguable issue was presented. |
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| California v. Roseberry |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C092118(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 17, 2020 Judge: Harry E. Hull, Jr. Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In June 2015, defendant William Roseberry began serving a five-year term in state prison for willfully inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant. While serving that time, defendant brought a controlled substance into prison. In December 2015, for defendant’s in-prison offense and pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.1(c), a trial court imposed a three-year prison term consecutive to the five-year term defendant was already serving for the corporal injury offense. Appealing that second sentence, defendant contended the trial court: (1) contravened Penal Code section 1170.1 (c) because only one-third of the base term should have been imposed; and (2) erred by failing to pronounce a single determinate term of imprisonment, “treat[ing] this case as a stand-alone case, which it was not.” Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's sentence. |
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| In re Williams |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B303744(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 16, 2020 Judge: Laurence D. Rubin Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that the denial of a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051 violates his right to equal protection of the laws and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Petitioner, who was 21 years old at the time of the offense, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and the jury found true the allegation that he personally used a firearm in the commission of the robbery. The jury also found true the special circumstance allegations that he committed multiple murders and murder during the commission of robbery. Petitioner was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). The Court of Appeal held that the amendment to section 3051 did not provide any relief to petitioner who had committed an LWOP offense after he had attained 18 years of age. The court rejected petitioner's equal protection argument, disagreeing that youth offenders sentenced to LWOP and those youth offenders sentenced to parole-eligible life terms are similarly situated with respect to the Legislature's first goal, which is to calibrate sentences in accordance with youthful offenders' diminished culpability. Furthermore, even if the court assumed petitioner is similarly situated to non-LWOP indeterminately-sentenced youth offenders aged 18 to 25, the court still would find no equal protection violation. Finally, the court held that petitioner's LWOP sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. |
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| Menifee v. Superior Court |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: H047473(Sixth Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 13, 2020 Judge: Eugene M. Premo Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Menifee and his codefendants were charged, based on a 2013 home invasion robbery, with first-degree robbery within an inhabited place acting in concert; attempted first-degree robbery within an inhabited place acting in concert; first-degree burglary; first-degree robbery within an inhabited place; attempted robbery of an inhabited building; and active participation in a criminal street gang (Penal Code 186.22(a)). The information alleged firearm and gang enhancements. Based on Menifee’s criminal record, Menifee's tattoos and the facts of the instant offense, a gang expert (Jackson) opined that Menifee was “an active associate of Double Rock criminal street gang.” Jackson agreed that, absent the current offense, Menifee would be an associate, rather than a Double Rock member. Taking the current offense into account, however, Jackson considered Menifee to be a member. Jackson admitted that, to his knowledge, there was no record that Menifee admitted to gang membership when he was arrested in 2013 or at any other time. Menifee moved to dismiss the gang participation count and the gang enhancement allegations pursuant to section 995. The court of appeal upheld the denial of the motion. While certain components of the gang expert’s testimony were inadmissible, the remaining admissible evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was sufficient to hold Menifee to answer on the gang enhancement allegations and substantive gang participation charge. |
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| People v. Bankers Insurance Co. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A157152(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 16, 2020 Judge: Pollak Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Bankers posted a bond for the release of Al-Zetawi, who was in custody on felony animal-cruelty charges. Al-Zetawi did not execute a waiver of his right to personally attend all proceedings. He appeared at nine proceedings before the court scheduled trial for June 4, 2018. On March 8, Al-Zetawi sought a continuance; he appeared at the March 13 hearing, stating he planned to travel to Jordan for surgery. The court denied the motion. Al-Zetawi appeared at a March 20 pretrial conference; the court ordered him to return on June 4th. On May 31, Al-Zetawi moved to continue the trial date. Al-Zetawi did not appear at the June 1 hearing. His attorney stated that he was supposed to return the day before but was detained in Jordan because of medical issues. The court denied the request. On June 4, Al-Zetawi did not appear. The court forfeited his bail, issued a warrant, denied Bankers’ motions to toll the six-month bail-forfeiture period to secure Al-Zetawi’s appearance, and entered summary judgment on the bond. Bankers argued that the court lost jurisdiction of the bond when Al-Zetawi failed to appear on May 29 and June 1 and the court neither declared a forfeiture of the bail nor found sufficient excuse for his absences. The court of appeal affirmed. While the judge did not state explicitly that she considered Al-Zetawi’s non-attendance at the hearings to be sufficiently excused, she clearly considered the failure to have ordered him to be present to provide an excuse. |
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| People v. Lopez |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: H046618(Sixth Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 16, 2020 Judge: Grover Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Lopez pleaded guilty in 2011 to transporting a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11352(a)), a felony. Lopez was granted probation, which he violated in 2014; the court terminated probation and imposed an eight-month sentence, suspended execution of that sentence, and placed Lopez on mandatory supervision. Lopez violated the terms of mandatory supervision in February 2016. The court increased the sentence to two years but again suspended execution to reinstate supervision. Lopez again violated supervision in October 2016. He failed to appear at the violation hearing, and a bench warrant issued. Lopez was brought to court in 2018 and moved to vacate his conviction. In 2013—two years after his guilty plea—Health and Safety Code section 11352 had been amended to make transportation of a controlled substance a felony only where the transportation was for the purpose of sale, not for personal use. Lopez claims his offense involved personal use. The court found the statutory amendment inapplicable because Lopez’s judgment was final. The court of appeal reversed. Where execution of sentence is suspended to place a defendant on mandatory supervision, there is no final judgment for purposes of retroactively applying an ameliorative statutory amendment. Sentencing was not actually complete; Lopez is entitled to retroactive application of the amendment that made transporting a controlled substance for personal use a misdemeanor. |
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| People v. Swanson |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B299638(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Victoria Gerrard Chaney Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After defendant was convicted of first degree murder under the provocative act doctrine, he filed a petition in the superior court under Penal Code section 1170.95, which permits a defendant convicted of murder under the felony-murder rule or natural and probable consequences doctrine to be resentenced. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition, holding that provocative act murder is not a natural and probable consequence theory. The court also held that first degree provocative act murder does not fall within the felony murder rule. Because the right to counsel under section 1170.95 does not attach until the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of eligibility under the statute, defendant failed to demonstrate eligibility under the statute. Therefore, remand is not appropriate in this case. |
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| Craft v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC19-953 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's first-degree murder conviction and sentence of death, holding that any error in the proceedings below was not prejudicial. Defendant pleaded guilty to the first-degree murder of his cellmate. The trial court accepted the plea, finding that it was freely, voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently given. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred in one aspect of how it handled mitigation, but the error did not prejudice Defendant; (2) the trial court did not fundamentally error by failing to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors were sufficient to justify the death penalty; (3) the trial court’s failure to enter a written order finding Defendant competent to proceed after orally announcing its competency finding did not constitute fundamental error; and (4) Defendant's guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. |
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| Allen v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Dockets: S20A1081, S20A1082 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Dylon Allen and Zaykives McCray appealed their convictions for malice murder and other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Chiragkumar Patel. Allen argued on appeal that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a prior robbery and by allowing McCray’s out-of-court statements to be used against Allen, and that these errors cumulatively prejudiced him. McCray argued the trial court erred by failing to ensure that McCray understood his right to be present at bench conferences and failing to instruct the court reporter to transcribe the entirety of voir dire. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed: (1) Allen’s convictions, because any errors in admitting evidence of a prior robbery and McCray’s out-of-court statements were harmless, even considered cumulatively; and (2) McCray’s convictions, because the record showed McCray elected not to attend bench conferences despite being told that he could, and the trial court was not required to order the court reporter to transcribe voir dire. |
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| Bonner v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1146 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Ronnie Bonner entered a non-negotiated guilty plea to malice murder and other charges in connection with a March 2012 home invasion in Richmond County, Georgia. Bonner later filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and, following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the motion. Bonner appealed, challenging the voluntariness of his plea and claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Bonner’s motion to withdraw, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the appealed order and remanded this case to the trial court for dismissal of Bonner’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. |
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| Casey v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1105 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Clarence Casey was convicted by jury of felony murder predicated on an aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Alfred Bradley. Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Casey appealed, alleging: (1) the State presented insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict; (2) the trial court did not apply the proper standard in evaluating Casey’s claim for relief on the “general grounds” set forth in OCGA sections 5-5-20 and 5-5-21; and (3) the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence. While the Georgia Supreme Court found was sufficient evidence to support the verdict as a matter of due process, it concluded the trial court failed to exercise its discretion as the “thirteenth juror” under OCGA sections 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 in ruling on Casey's motion for a new trial. The Court therefore vacated the trial court's order in part and remanded the case to the trial court. Necessarily, the Court did not reach Casey's final enumeration of error. |
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| Hughes v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1309 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Lawrence Hughes was convicted by jury of the felony murder of Jamon Epps, and related crimes. On appeal, he contended: (1) the evidence was insufficient; (2) the trial court made certain evidentiary and charging errors; and (3) trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Hughes' convictions. |
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| Merritt v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1190 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Jerry Merritt appealed his convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony for the 2014 shooting death of Anthony Taylor, following an argument between the two. Merritt contended his trial counsel was ineffective, and that the trial court erred by failing to give jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter and duty to retreat, and by allowing the prosecutor to ask leading questions. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded any deficient performance by counsel did not prejudice Merritt’s case; any error by the trial court in allowing leading questions was harmless; and that the trial court did not plainly err in refusing to give the requested instructions. |
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| Morris v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1218 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Tommy Lee Morris was convicted by jury of felony murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in connection with the shooting death of Tony Foster. Morris contended on appeal only that the evidence presented against him at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Morris' convictions. |
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| Smallwood v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1274 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Carla Wong McMillian Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Derek Smallwood was convicted after a bench trial for entering an automobile under OCGA 16*8*18. He argued the statute was void for vagueness, or alternatively, under the rule of lenity, he should have been sentenced for misdemeanor criminal trespass of a vehicle. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded OCGA 16-8-18 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of Smallwood’s case, and because that statute prevailed as the more specific statute over criminal trespass of a vehicle, the rule of lenity did not apply. |
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| Thornton v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20G0613 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In the parking lot of a gas station, a Department of Natural Resources (DNR) game warden told Christopher Thornton to turn down the volume of his car stereo. Thornton refused to comply, and he eventually drove away, dragging the game warden for a short distance. He later was arrested and charged with several crimes, including two counts of obstructing a game warden in the lawful discharge of his official duties. Thornton was convicted by jury. On appeal, he argued the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions for obstruction because it failed to establish that the game warden was in the lawful discharge of his official duties at the time of the incident. In particular, Thornton argued that a game warden had no authority to enforce the Uniform Rules of the Road, which limited the volume of sound that can be emitted from a stereo in a motor vehicle - in the parking lot of a gas station. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the judgment of conviction. Although its analysis differed somewhat from that of the Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the obstruction convictions could stand. |
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| Wilcox v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1173 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Namon Wilcox challenged his 2016 convictions for rape, malice murder, and other crimes in connection with the rape and subsequent stabbing death of Suzanne Stilwell. Wilcox contended the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and asked the Georgia Supreme Court to grant him a new trial on general grounds. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Wilcox's convictions. |
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| People v. Brown |
| Court: Supreme Court of Illinois Citation: 2020 IL 125203 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Michael Burke Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Brown was charged with armed robbery and aggravated robbery. At a pretrial conference, defense counsel stated that Brown had told counsel that “a mental problem that he has had in the past has resurfaced. He’s under medication.... He tells me that he is again starting to hear the voices and said that he was having some difficulty in communicating with me … and that it may have factored into the events ... it may be necessary to do an evaluation to determine whether or not he’s fit to stand trial.” Judge Kouri ordered an evaluation, continuing the case for 30 days. The attorneys indicated the “evaluation would just be for fitness.” The fitness report indicated that Brown met the DSM-5 criteria for schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type; PTSD; and mild intellectual disability but had the ability to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings and to assist in his defense. At the next court date, a written order set the matter for trial and included handwritten notations, “fitness report received, parties stipulate to contents” and “by agreement—Brown is fit to stand trial.” Brown was convicted. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court failed to affirmatively exercise its judicial discretion to determine Brown’s fitness for trial. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the verdict and sentence. Neither the parties nor the trial court indicated a bona fide doubt of Brown’s fitness, either when Judge Kouri ordered the examination or 30 days later. No party ever requested a fitness hearing. Absent a bona fide doubt concerning his fitness to stand trial, Brown was not entitled to a fitness hearing. |
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| People v. Reveles-Cordova |
| Court: Supreme Court of Illinois Citation: 2020 IL 124797 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Anne M. Burke Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| J.B. and Cordova had purchased a Romeoville home together and had three children. In January 2010, Cordova moved from the home. J.B. was granted an order of protection, prohibiting Cordova from having any contact with J.B. or the children and from entering the home. J.B. testified that, on November 20, 2010, as she was getting ready for a date, Cordova kicked in her locked bedroom door and entered the room, “going crazy.” He made threats, damaged property, and raped J.B. He then began choking her. Cordova only let go when J.B.'s cell phone rang; he stated he was going to return and then left. J.B. went to her neighbor’s house and called the police. J.B. was taken to the hospital for a sexual assault examination. Cordova testified that he and J.B. had arranged to meet that day so he could retrieve some of his mother’s items. He denied any violence and testified they had consensual sexual relations. Cordova was convicted of criminal sexual assault, 720 ILCS 5/12- 13(a)(1), and home invasion predicated upon criminal sexual assault, section 12-11(a)(6). The trial and appellate courts rejected Cordova’s argument that under the one-act, one-crime doctrine he could be sentenced only on the home invasion conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Proof of criminal sexual assault is a necessary element of proof of home invasion predicated on criminal sexual assault. All the elements of criminal sexual assault are included in the offense of home invasion predicated on criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault contains no element not included in home invasion. |
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| State v. Stidham |
| Court: Supreme Court of Indiana Docket: 20S-PC-634 Opinion Date: November 17, 2020 Judge: Goff Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's maximum 138-year sentence imposed for crimes Defendant committed as a juvenile and revised the sentence to a total sentence of eighty-eight years, holding that the 138-year sentence was inappropriate. Defendant was seventeen years old when he and two others committed murder in 1991. Defendant received an aggregate sentence of 138 years, which was the maximum possible term-of-years sentence. In 2016, Defendant filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief challenging the propriety of his sentence in light of the fact that he was a juvenile when he committed the crimes. The post-conviction court granted the petition and imposed an aggregate sixty-eight-year sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the order granting relief and revisited its prior decision regarding the appropriateness of his sentence but revised the sentence to an aggregate term of eighty-eight years, holding (1) the doctrine of res judicata does not bar consideration of Defendant's appropriateness argument due to two major shifts in the law; and (2) Defendant's maximum term-of-years sentence imposed for crimes he committed as a juvenile was inappropriate. |
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| Wilson v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Indiana Docket: 19S-PC-548 Opinion Date: November 17, 2020 Judge: Mark S. Massa Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reduced Defendant's aggregate sentence to 100 years, holding that Defendant's appellate counsel was ineffective on appeal by failing to bring an Appellate Rule 7(B) challenge to the appropriateness of Defendant's sentence. Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder, felony armed robbery, and felony conspiracy to commit criminal gang activity. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an aggregate sentence of 181 years. Defendant later sought post-conviction relief, arguing that, because he was a juvenile when he committed the crimes at issue, the criminal gang enhancement was unconstitutional as applied and that both his trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective. The post-conviction court denied Defendant's petition for relief. The Supreme Court revised Defendant's sentence downward to an aggregate 100 years, holding (1) Defendant's original sentence was not unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because the sentence was not subject to the requirements of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); but (2) Defendant's appellate counsel performed inadequately by failing to request appellate review of the sentence's appropriateness under Appellate Rule 7(B). |
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| State v. Davis |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 19-0214 Opinion Date: November 13, 2020 Judge: Thomas D. Waterman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of first-degree murder, holding that a new trial was required because the marshaling instruction for that charge failed to cross-reference Defendant's insanity defense. On appeal, Defendant argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective representation by failing to object to the instruction at issue. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the jury instructions were materially misleading without the cross-reference to the insanity defense in the marshaling instruction for first-degree murder and that trial counsel breached an essential duty by failing to object; and (2) this significant error in that marshaling instruction for the main offense undermines this Court's confidence in the verdict, requiring a new trial. |
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| State v. Daino |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 120824 Opinion Date: November 13, 2020 Judge: Wall Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress all evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search of his apartment, holding that Kansas law does not foreclose consent through nonverbal conduct. Defendant was charged with several drug-related offenses. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that he did not validly consent to the warrantless search of his apartment because he did not verbally agree to let the officers enter. The district court granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Defendant had affirmatively communicated to the officers that they could enter his apartment. At issue on appeal was whether nonverbal conduct can establish valid consent. The Supreme Court held that it can, holding (1) an individual may express valid consent through words, acts, or conduct, and an individual's nonverbal conduct can be relevant in determining whether this standard has been met; and (2) the matter must be remanded for a new hearing under the appropriate legal standards. |
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| Commonwealth v. Bohigian |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12858 Opinion Date: November 13, 2020 Judge: Budd Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's convictions for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OUI) causing serious bodily injury and misleading an investigator, holding that errors at trial required that Defendant's convictions be vacated and the matter remanded for a retrial. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the plain language of the relevant statutes makes clear that blood alcohol level testing shall not be done absent consent, and any nonconsensual testing done at the police's direction is inadmissible; (2) because Defendant's blood draw was performed without Defendant's actual consent, the blood draw was impermissible and the blood alcohol content test results were improperly admitted at trial, and the tainted evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the trial judge erred by failing to make an independent determination regarding the voluntariness of Defendant's statements and by failing to give a humane practice instruction to the jury, and the error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. |
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| Commonwealth v. Lester |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-10129 Opinion Date: November 18, 2020 Judge: Lowy Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of two counts of murder and other crimes, holding that any error committed during the proceedings below was not prejudicial. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial judge's admission of a DNA expert's testimony regarding a "nonexclusion" result; (2) the trial judge did not err in admitting into evidence charts depicting DNA test results; (3) the prosecutor erred in misstating certain evidence, but the error was not prejudicial; (4) the judge's jury instruction that prior inconsistent statements may not be considered substantively was erroneous, but the error did not prejudice Defendant as to require a new trial; (5) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial on the grounds that a purported courtroom closure during voir dire was unconstitutional; and (6) following plenary review of the record pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 33E, there was no basis for reducing Defendant's sentence on the murder conviction or ordering a new trial. |
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| Commonwealth v. Moffat |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-08733 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Lowy Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below nor reason to exercise the Court's authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the Commonwealth did not violate Defendant's due process rights by omitting evidence that helped Defendant and that countered the prosecutor's theory of the case; (2) error occurred when a lay witness testified that he had previously referred to Defendant as the "guy...who killed my cousin" but the inadmissible evidence did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (3) the prosecutor improperly urged the jury to draw an inference of guilt against Defendant due to his courtroom behavior, but the error did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (4) there was no error in the jury instructions regarding circumstantial evidence; (5) Defendant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; and (6) the motion judges did not err in denying the defendant's motions for posttrial discovery. |
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| Steward v. State |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A19-1401 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: G. Barry Anderson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to correct his sentence of life imprisonment for first-degree premeditated murder, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to correct his sentence. The district court convicted Defendant of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of release after thirty years. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant later filed his motion to correct his sentence, arguing that his conviction violated Minn. Stat. 611.02, under which when "there exists a reasonable doubt as to which of two or more degrees the defendant is guilty" a defendant shall be convicted only of the lowest degree offense. The district court denied the motion without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Defendant's conviction did not violate section 611.02. |
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| Kelly v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2019-KA-01044-SCT Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: James W. Kitchens Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Kasey Boomer Kelly was convicted of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. Kelly appealed his conviction, claiming that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After review of the trial court record, the Mississippi Supreme Court found Kelly's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated because he failed to assert that right and because he failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the delay. The Court also found the State presented sufficient evidence to show constructive possession of the weapon. Therefore, the Court affirmed Kelly's conviction and sentence. |
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| Williams v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2019-KA-01476-SCT Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Maxwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Timothy Williams challenged the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting his felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm conviction. Though he argued his conviction should have been reversed, Williams stipulated he was indeed a felon and was prohibited from possessing firearms. And he admitted to a detective, in a recorded interview and then in a signed statement, that he purchased a Colt .45 semi-automatic pistol “off the street.” Williams also described how he loaned the pistol to a woman - a woman who later testified Williams indeed left a gun with her. Williams also insisted the State violated his constitutional and statutory speedy trial rights due to an eighteen-month delay between his arrest and trial. The Mississippi Supreme Court found no merit to Williams' first contention, and determined that even if the delay between arrest and trial was presumptively prejudicial, Williams failed to show any actual prejudice from the delay. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Williams' conviction and the ten-year sentence he received as a habitual offender. |
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| State v. Cox |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 307 Neb. 762 Opinion Date: November 13, 2020 Judge: Michael G. Heavican Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person, holding that the district court did not err in admitting cell phone records for Defendant's phone and statements Defendant made to law enforcement. Prior to trial, Defendant filed motions to suppress his cell phone records and statements he made to law enforcement, arguing that the warrant authorizing the search of Defendant's cell phone records was obtained without probable cause and that his Miranda rights were violated when he invoked his right to remain silent and officers continued to question him. The district court denied the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting cell site location information evidence at trial; and (2) Defendant waived any right to assert error in the denial of his motion to suppress his statements made to law enforcement. |
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| State v. Jones |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 307 Neb. 809 Opinion Date: November 13, 2020 Judge: Lindsey Miller-Lerman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court summarily denying Defendant's motion to vacate or modify seeking reinstatement of his appeal a postconviction ruling, holding that the district court erred when it denied Defendant's motion without a hearing. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. After Defendant brought an unsuccessful appeal he filed a petition for postconviction relief. The district court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, but his request to proceed in forma pauperis and the accompanying poverty affidavit were not timely filed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Defendant subsequently filed in the district court a motion to vacate or modify, seeking reinstatement of his appeal on the grounds that the negligent acts of prison officials in the mailroom at the penitentiary delayed the filing of his poverty affidavit. The district court denied the motion without a hearing. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a hearing on the motion, holding that Defendant's claim of official negligence was sufficient to obtain a hearing at which to submit proof to the court of his allegation of official negligence. |
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| State v. Stack |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 307 Neb. 773 Opinion Date: November 13, 2020 Judge: Papik Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences for second degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, holding that there was no merit to the errors assigned and argued by Defendant. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err in declining to direct a verdict and finding the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's convictions; (2) the district court did not err in determining that the evidence supported a conviction of second degree murder rather than sudden quarrel manslaughter; (3) the district court did not err in overruling Defendant's insanity defense; and (4) the district court did not impose excessive sentences. |
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| New Hampshire v. Shaw |
| Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court Docket: 2019-0072 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Anna Barbara Hantz Marconi Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Joshua Shaw was convicted by jury of driving after his license had been suspended, and on misdemeanor counts of enhanced simple assault, attempted enhanced simple assault, resisting arrest, and disobeying an officer. In 2018, while Salem Police Officer Feole was on patrol, he saw a pickup truck pass by with its rear plate area completely covered in snow. Because of the snow, the truck’s registration sticker was not visible, but the truck was pulling a utility trailer with a visible Michigan registration. Feole ran the Michigan registration number and discovered that the trailer was registered to the defendant whose New Hampshire operating privileges had been suspended in 2015 for failing to pay child support. Feole asked defendant if he was the registered owner of the trailer, and defendant confirmed that he was, but still refused to give Feole his license. Defendant was placed under arrest, but he refused, kicking and screaming at Feole and another three officers who arrived to provide backup. Defendant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion for in camera review of any disciplinary actions involving the police officers in his case and any prior “use of force” reports they filed; and (2) instructing the jury that the crime of disobeying an officer required the State to prove the defendant “refused to produce his driver’s license on demand of a law enforcement officer for the purposes of examination by the officer.” Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. |
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| People v. Balkman |
| Court: New York Court of Appeals Citation: 2020 NY Slip Op 06838 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Feinman Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division affirming County Court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a stop of the vehicle in which Defendant was a front seat passenger, holding that the People failed to meet their burden of coming forward with evidence sufficient to establish that the stop was lawful. A police officer stopped a vehicle when his patrol car's mobile data terminal notified him that something was similar about the registered owner of the vehicle and a person with an outstanding warrant, known as a "similarity hit." The officer arrested Defendant after observing a handgun on the floor of the front passenger seat where Defendant was sitting. Defendant was neither the registered owner of the vehicle nor the person with the warrant. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop. County Court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that where the People presented no evidence about the content of the similarity hit, the suppression court could not independently evaluate whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the stop. |
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| Christianson v. NDDOT |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 245 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Jerod E. Tufte Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| Kyle Christianson appealed a district court’s judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation’s suspension of his driving privileges based on his conviction in Canada for a driving under the influence offense. Christianson argued the Department lacked jurisdiction because the Canadian statute did not define an equivalent offense, and that the hearing officer failed to provide a fair and impartial hearing. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the Department’s suspension and disqualification of Christianson’s noncommercial and commercial driving privileges. |
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| Jundt v. NDDOT |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 232 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Daniel J. Crothers Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| Corey Jundt appealed a district court judgment affirming an administrative hearing officer’s decision to suspend Jundt’s driving privileges for 180 days for driving under the influence. Jundt argued the hearing officer erred in suspending his driving privileges because the arresting officer failed to read him the implied consent advisory. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the implied consent requirements of N.D.C.C. 39-20-01 did not apply when an individual consented to a chemical test. |
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| North Dakota v. Conry |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 247 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Daniel J. Crothers Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Levi Conry was charged with leaving the scene of an accident involving damage to a motor vehicle. Conry entered into a plea agreement with the State and pleaded guilty. As part of the agreement Conry received a deferred imposition of sentence on the charge of leaving the scene of an accident involving damage to a motor vehicle. The district court accepted the plea agreement and imposed conditions on Conry according to the terms of the plea agreement. The order deferring imposition of sentence stated: “The Court reserves jurisdiction to determine restitution within 90 days.” The State subsequently submitted a statement seeking $11,352.93 in restitution. Conry requested a hearing after which the district court entered an order denying the restitution claim in its entirety. The court found the terms of the plea agreement allowed the court to order no restitution. The State appealed that order. Finding that the State had no statutory right to appeal a restitution order in a criminal case, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined it lacked jurisdiction over the State's appeal and dismissed it. |
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| North Dakota v. Gates |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 237 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Joan Gates appealed a district court order denying her motion for summary judgment filed in her criminal case. In 2013, a jury found Gates guilty of misapplication of entrusted property, a class B felony, for her actions while she was personal representative of the Estate of Lela Gates. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Gates’ appellate brief failed to provide the Court with a reasonable opportunity to address any alleged errors made by the district court. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. |
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| North Dakota v. Hajicek |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 231 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Daniel J. Crothers Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Timothy Hajicek appealed after he conditionally pled guilty to driving under the influence. Hajicek claimed the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because a University of North Dakota police officer acting outside his jurisdiction was without official capacity and without the official power to seize. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the UND police officer was lawfully responding to a request for assistance under N.D.C.C. 44-08-20(3). |
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| North Dakota v. Polk |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 248 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Marcus Polk was convicted by jury of aggravated assault. He appealed. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded sufficient evidence of serious bodily injury supported Polk’s conviction for aggravated assault. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded testimony from three Fargo police officers. |
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| North Dakota v. Vaagen |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 241 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Daniel J. Crothers Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Amy Vaagen appealed an order revoking her unsupervised probation and imposing a period of confinement. In 2018, Vaagen pleaded guilty to preventing arrest, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The district court deferred imposition of Vaagen’s sentence. The court also ordered Vaagen to submit to random drug urinalysis testing once a week for the duration of her probation. The urinalysis testing condition was orally announced during sentencing but was not included in the original order. In 2019, the district court sua sponte issued an amended order deferring imposition of sentence. The amended order contained the urinalysis condition. Months later, the State petitioned to revoke Vaagen's probation based on alleged violations of the urinalysis testing condition. After a third petition, the court revoked Vaagen’s unsupervised probation. On December 18, 2019, the court sentenced Vaagen to a period of confinement. She appealed, arguing the district court improperly amended the order under which her probation was revoked. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the revocation. |
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| Wisham v. North Dakota |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 250 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Jon J. Jensen Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Derek Wisham appeals from an order denying his application for post-conviction relief. In 2014, Wisham was charged with gross sexual imposition and assault. On December 21, 2015, Wisham pled guilty to a charge of sexual imposition, a class B felony, and assault, a class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to ten years of incarceration with all but four years suspended for two years on the sexual imposition charge and one year straight time on the assault charge, with credit for time served on both counts. The State moved for summary judgment on Wisham's application for relief; Wisham failed to timely respond to the State's request. The North Dakota Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed dismissal of his application. |
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| Oregon v. Morales |
| Court: Oregon Supreme Court Docket: S067225 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Thomas A. Balmer Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant Gerardo Morales was indicted on various sex crime charges and, after the trial court set bail, defendant’s mother paid $20,000 as security for defendant’s release prior to trial. The notice defendant’s mother signed when depositing the security funds on defendant’s behalf stated that “[t]he Court may order that the security deposit be applied to any fines, costs, assessments, restitution, contribution, recoupment, or other monetary obligations that are imposed on the defendant.” Defendant was represented by court-appointed counsel at trial, after which the jury found defendant guilty of several sex offenses. Following those convictions, the State requested that defendant be required to pay attorney fees for his court-appointed counsel. Defendant objected on the ground that the court could not find that he had the ability to pay attorney fees. The State argued that when a third party makes a security deposit on behalf of a criminal defendant, that third party was informed that fees or fines might be paid out of that deposit. For that reason, the State argued, those funds were available to pay court-ordered fees and the defendant therefore had the “ability to pay” such fees out of the security amount. The court found defendant did not have the ability to pay, but nevertheless imposed $5,000 in attorney fees and ordered it to be paid out of the money deposited by defendant’s mother as security for his pretrial release. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court held that because the trial court determined defendant did not have the ability to pay, it erred in imposing the fees on the basis of the third party's security payment alone. |
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| Pennsylvania v. Knight |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 775 CAP Opinion Date: November 18, 2020 Judge: Debra McCloskey Todd Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Melvin Knight appealed the death sentence he received for his role in the 2010 torture and murder of Jennifer Daugherty (“the Victim”), a 30–year-old intellectually disabled woman. On direct appeal, Appellant raised fourteen issues for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review, including a challenge to the jury’s failure to find as a mitigating circumstance Appellant’s lack of a significant history of prior criminal convictions. In addressing this claim, the Court observed that it was undisputed that Appellant had no prior felony or misdemeanor convictions, a fact to which the prosecutor conceded during closing argument. The Supreme Court largely rejected Appellant's contentions of error, finding that Appellant’s sentence of death was not the product of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, but, rather, was fully supported by the evidence that Appellant and his co-defendants held the intellectually-disabled victim against her will for several days, during which time they continuously subjected her to myriad forms of physical and emotional torture, eventually stabbing her in the chest, slicing her throat, strangling her, and stuffing her body into a trash can which they left outside under a truck. As the jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, the Court found Appellant’s sentence complied with the statutory mandate for the imposition of a sentence of death. |
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| In re Honorable Velia Meza, 226th Jud. Dist. Ct., Bexar Cty, Texas |
| Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Docket: WR-90,325-01 Opinion Date: November 18, 2020 Judge: Sharon Keller Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A district attorney called a subordinate into his office to discuss a case and review the case file. Within a few weeks, the district attorney’s official status ended, he became part of a private law firm, and a member of that private law firm substituted in as defense counsel in the case. The State moved to disqualify the entire firm. The trial court denied the motion, but the court of appeals granted mandamus relief, ordering the trial court to disqualify the entire firm. The trial court sought mandamus relief from the court of appeals’s order. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that under "unequivocal, well-settled law," the former district attorney was disqualified from acting as defense counsel. But the Court also concluded that the same cannot be said for the other members of the law firm. Consequently, the Court denied mandamus in part and granted mandamus in part. |
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| Ukwuachu v. Texas |
| Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Docket: PD-0776-19 Opinion Date: November 18, 2020 Judge: Slaughter Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The court of appeals reversed Appellant Samuel Ukwuachu’s conviction for sexual assault by concluding that the State improperly used cell-phone call and location records to impeach two defense witnesses, thereby resulting in the introduction of false evidence in violation of his due process rights. Yet, the phone records at issue were never admitted into evidence nor made part of the record. Further, no expert testimony was introduced to establish that the State misled the jury regarding any particular information shown in the records. Without these phone records or such expert testimony, Appellant could not prove that the State actually elicited witness testimony that conflicted with the substance of those records. Accordingly, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined Appellant failed to make the requisite showing of falsity that must underlie any false-evidence due process claim. The Court, therefore, reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting Appellant a new trial, and remanded this case for consideration of Appellant’s remaining issues on appeal. |
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| Wells v. Texas |
| Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Docket: AP-77,070 Opinion Date: November 18, 2020 Judge: Walker Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In November 2016, a jury convicted Appellant Amos Wells, III of capital murder for the 2013 murders of Chanice and Annette Reed committed during the same criminal transaction. Pursuant to the jury’s answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.071, sections 2(b) and 2(e), the trial judge sentenced Appellant to death. Upon automatic appeal to the Texas Court of Appeals, Appellant raised thirteen points of error. After review, the Court found no merit to any contention and affirmed the trial court's judgment and sentence. |
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| Washington v. Martinez |
| Court: Washington Supreme Court Docket: 97496-9 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Steven González Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Simon Martinez sexually abused his daughter, Y.M., for nearly a decade, starting when she was about 5 years old. Martinez raped and sexually abused Y.M. regularly until she moved out of the family home in 2014, when she was about 14. Around that time, she told several people about the sexual abuse, including authorities. The State charged Martinez with one count of first degree rape of a child, which required it to prove Martinez raped Y.M. when she was no more than 12 years old. The State limited the charging period to three years: July 2009 to July 2012, even though there was considerable evidence the abuse continued until Y.M. was 14. The State elected not to add a charge of second degree rape. During trial, over Martinez’s objection, Y.M.’s two friends, her mother, and a friend’s mother were all permitted to testify that in 2014, Y.M. told them she had been sexually abused; this was long after the charging period, but contemporaneous with the ongoing abuse. Martinez moved to exclude Y.M.’s complaints to these witnesses as untimely since they happened so long after the charging period. The trial judge denied the motion, concluding that complaints were no longer required to be timely to be admissible. Based on those complaints, Y.M.’s testimony, and other evidence, the jury found Martinez guilty. Martinez received an indeterminate sentence of 123 months to life. Martinez largely argued on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the four witnesses to testify. Finding no such abuse of discretion, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. |
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| In re I.S.A. |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 19-0939 Opinion Date: November 18, 2020 Judge: Jenkins Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court denying a petition to expunge a criminal record based upon its finding that Petitioner was barred from seeking expungement pursuant to W. Va. Code 61-11-25(a), holding that the circuit court erred in ruling, without holding a hearing, that Petitioner was barred from seeking expungement. Without holding a hearing, the circuit court found that Petitioner was statutorily barred from seeking expungement due to a purported plea of guilty entered by Petitioner in exchange for the dismissal of another charge. The Supreme Court vacated the order, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in (1) finding that Petitioner entered a plea of guilty and was therefore barred from seeking expungement; (2) finding, without evidentiary support, that granting Petitioner's request for expungement was contrary to the public interest and public safety; and (3) failing to hold a hearing under the particular circumstances presented by this case. |
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| State v. Walker |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 19-0777 Opinion Date: November 17, 2020 Judge: Walker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion to correct illegal sentence, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining that defendants are not entitled to credit for time served on home incarceration where the home incarceration is a condition of probation. Defendant was convicted of one count of grand larceny by false pretenses. Defendant was sentenced to a term of one to ten years in prison, suspended in favor of three years' probation. After Defendant's probation was revoked, he was sentenced to the underlying term of incarceration. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, asserting that he should be credited for time served on home incarceration as part of his probation. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to credit for time served while on home incarceration where that home incarceration was imposed as a condition of probation rather than as an alternative sentence to another form of incarceration. |
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| State v. Nash |
| Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Docket: 2018AP000731-CR Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Annette Kingsland Ziegler Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's judgment and order denying Defendant's postconviction motion to withdraw his Alford plea, holding that Defendant did not meet his burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that manifest injustice would result if he were not permitted to withdraw his plea. Defendant entered an Alford plea to second-degree sexual assault of a child. After he was sentenced, Defendant filed a postconviction motion seeking to withdraw his Alford plea, arguing that the circuit court failed to establish strong proof of guilt as to each element of the offense. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record demonstrated that there was a sufficient factual basis to support strong proof of Defendant's guilty for each of the two elements of the offense. |
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