| Kahler v. Kansas |
| Court: US Supreme Court Docket: 18-6135 Opinion Date: March 23, 2020 Judge: Elena Kagan Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Kansas adopted the “cognitive incapacity” test for the insanity defense, which examines whether a defendant was able to understand what he was doing when he committed a crime. A defendant may raise mental illness to show that he “lacked the culpable mental state required as an element of the offense charged,” Kan. Stat. 21–5209. Otherwise, a defendant may use evidence of mental illness to argue for a lesser punishment. Kansas does not recognize a moral-incapacity defense, which asks whether illness left the defendant unable to distinguish right from wrong with respect to his criminal conduct. Kahler, charged with capital murder after he killed four family members, unsuccessfully argued that Kansas’s insanity defense violated due process because it permits the conviction of a defendant whose mental illness prevented him from distinguishing right from wrong. Convicted, Kahler was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. Due process does not require Kansas to adopt an insanity test that turns on a defendant’s ability to recognize that his crime was morally wrong. A state rule about criminal liability violates due process only if it “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Early common law reveals no consensus favoring Kahler’s approach. The tapestry of approaches adopted by the states indicates that no version of the insanity defense has become so ingrained in American law as to be “fundamental.” The defense sits at the juncture of medical views of mental illness and moral and legal theories of criminal culpability—areas of conflict and change--and is a matter for state governance, not constitutional law. |
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| Federal Defenders of New York, Inc. v. Federal Bureau of Prisons |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 19-1778 Opinion Date: March 20, 2020 Judges: John M. Walker, B.D. Parker, Susan Laura Carney Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against the BOP and Warden Quay in an action alleging that defendants' curtailment of inmate-attorney visits at the MDC in early 2019 violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and the constitutional right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's APA claim by failing to consider applicable BOP regulations in its zone-of-interests analysis. Furthermore, the district court misconstrued plaintiff's Sixth Amendment claim. Plaintiff brought this claim under the federal courts' inherent equitable powers, but the district court treated the claim as purporting to arise directly under the Sixth Amendment. The court thought it was prudent to defer ruling on the merits of the Sixth Amendment claim because plaintiff raised novel questions of constitutional law. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings and directed the district court to consider appointing a master to mediate the parties' differences at the earliest possible time to ensure that plaintiff has meaningful, continuous access to clients. |
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| Persad v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 17-661 Opinion Date: March 24, 2020 Judge: Susan Laura Carney Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law, Military Law |
| Petitioner, a legal permanent resident, sought review of an agency order of removal based on a finding that he committed an "aggravated felony" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G). Under section 1101(a)(43)(G), to establish an aggravated felony, the government must show by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen committed a "theft offense" that resulted in a term of imprisonment of "at least one year." Petitioner was a member of the U.S. Army when he pleaded guilty to four violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), one of which was larceny of military property. Under the military's customary practice of unitary sentencing at the time, the military judge issued a general sentence that imposed a punishment for all four of petitioner's convictions for 30 months' confinement. The Second Circuit held that, under the military's traditional unitary sentencing scheme, a military judgment in which a single sentence of confinement is imposed in connection with multiple counts of conviction may not be presumed to be equivalent to equal, full‐term, concurrent sentences as to each count of conviction. Because the government has not carried its burden, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| In re: Sampson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 20-1224 Opinion Date: March 25, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2014, Sampson pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court denied his motion to withdraw his plea and sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court denied his subsequent 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, finding his claims waived or meritless. Sampson filed a 28 U.S.C. 2244 and 2255(h) motion seeking permission to file a second or successive 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The Third Circuit denied the application, concluding that there was no new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. Sampson cited the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Rehaif” holding that the government must prove that a defendant charged with violating section 922(g) knew both that he possessed a firearm and that he belonged to the relevant class of persons barred from possessing a firearm. Rehaif did not state a rule of constitutional law but only addressed what the statutes require for a conviction and the rule has not been made retroactive. Sampson was informed that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sampson knowingly possessed a firearm and pled guilty. |
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| United States v. Gary |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4578 Opinion Date: March 25, 2020 Judge: Roger L. Gregory Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a person previously convicted of a felony. The Fourth Circuit held that defendant's guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently made because he did not understand the essential elements of the offense to which he pled guilty. In this case, the district court accepted defendant's plea without giving him notice of an element of the offense and the error was structural. Therefore, the court vacated the guilty plea and convictions, remanding for further proceedings. |
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| United States v. Gravatt |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-6852 Opinion Date: March 23, 2020 Judge: Quattlebaum Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| A conspiracy that involves the distribution of 50 or more grams of crack cocaine, which is a "covered offense" under the First Step Act of 2018 because the penalties for it were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, remains a covered offense if the conspiracy also charges distribution of powder cocaine, the penalties for which were not modified. In this case, defendant pleaded guilty to knowingly and willfully conspiring with others to unlawfully possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine and 5 kilograms or more of powder cocaine. Because defendant's sentence involved a covered offense under Section 404(a) and Section 404(c)'s limitations do not apply, the district court should have reviewed defendant's motion on the merits, applying its discretion under Sections 404(b) and (c). Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| United States v. Johnson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Dockets: 18-4312, 18-4333 Opinion Date: March 25, 2020 Judge: Barbara Milano Keenan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendants were convicted by a jury of several charges related to their participation in the Black Guerilla Family's (BGF) Greenmount Regime, a violent street and prison gang in Baltimore. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in failing to hold a Remmer hearing to determine whether the reported incident by a juror -- that family members or friends of defendants had used cell phones to take photographs of the jurors in a public area of the courthouse -- prejudiced the jurors and affected their ability to impartially consider the evidence. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to conduct a Remmer hearing. |
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| United States v. Wass |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4547 Opinion Date: March 25, 2020 Judge: James Andrew Wynn, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an indictment alleging that defendant violated the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The court held that binding precedent establishes that application of SORNA to defendant does not violate the nondelegation doctrine or the ex post facto clause. In this case, the district court correctly found that the application of SORNA to sex offenders, like defendant, whose offenses predate Congress's enactment of SORNA, does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Furthermore, the court rejected defendant's ex post facto theories, challenging the application of the criminal sanctions of 18 U.S.C. 2250(a) to pre-SORNA offenders, and alleging that SORNA's registration requirement is itself so punitive that it constitutes punishment that cannot constitutionally be applied to pre-SORNA offenders. Finally, the court held that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance was inapplicable here. |
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| United States v. Williamson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4837 Opinion Date: March 23, 2020 Judge: James Harvie Wilkinson, III Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Drugs distributed for the "personal use" of an accomplice may be included as relevant conduct for the crime of aiding-and-abetting the distribution of a controlled substance. The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of aiding-and-abetting the distribution of methamphetamine. The court held that the district court did not err in including quantities that the accomplice used recreationally in defendant's sentence. The court also held that the district court did not commit clear error in its sentencing analysis, rejecting defendant's claims to the contrary. |
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| United States v. Barnes |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-60497 Opinion Date: March 23, 2020 Judge: Jerry E. Smith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and waived his right to challenge his conviction and sentence. After defendant was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), the Supreme Court held in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), that the ACCA's residual clause was unconstitutional. Defendant filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence, which the district court dismissed. The Fifth Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal and held that defendant's section 2255 motion was barred by his collateral-review waiver in his plea agreement. The court held that precedent foreclosed defendant's contention that a defendant cannot waive a right that is unknown at the time that the waiver provision is executed, and that he cannot waive his right to challenge an illegal or unconstitutional sentence. |
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| Allen v. Mitchell |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 2-4145 Opinion Date: March 24, 2020 Judge: Bush Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Allen was convicted of aggravated robbery and murder for the death of 84-year-old English, whom he knew through a prison ministry. Allen’s thumbprint was found on England’s glasses. Cigarette butts consistent with Allen’s brand and saliva were found in English’s trash. The coroner put English’s time of death between before six a.m. on January 25, 1991. A bus driver remembered picking up Allen near English’s home around six a.m. that day. Allen was sentenced to death. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. State courts denied post-conviction relief. Allen claimed he was denied due process because a juror, Worthington, initially indicated that she was not sure that she could be impartial. Worthington stated her brother had been killed two years earlier, that the man charged with the murder was acquitted, and she did not feel justice was done. The judge asked whether she could reach a verdict based solely on the evidence; Worthington said she could. Allen’s counsel stated that witnesses from the coroner’s office who testified at her brother’s trial would testify at Allen’s trial. Worthington stated that she was a bit anxious but denied that her reaction might substantially impact her ability to concentrate on Allen’s case. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the finding that Worthington was unbiased was supported by her testimony and that the judge could legitimately validate her statements because he saw and heard her. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The determination of whether to seat a juror is an exercise of discretion by the trial court. The Ohio Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply established Supreme Court precedent. |
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| United States v. Armes |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5539 Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Thapar Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Armes pled guilty to five counts of producing, two counts of distributing, and one count of possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2252A(a)(2), 2252A(a)(5)(B). The images showed him molesting two members of his family--an infant and a toddler. The presentence report related that in 2005 Armes pled guilty to two counts of Kentucky third-degree rape: “According to the Indictment, the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with a victim that was less than 16 years old . . . while the defendant was over 21 years old.” Armes did not object to those statements. Normally, the minimum prison terms for producing, distributing, and possessing child pornography are 15, five, and zero years (respectively). Those numbers rise to 25, 15, and 10 years for repeat sex offenders, including those with a past conviction under state law “relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, [or] abusive sexual contact involving a minor or ward.” The district court applied the enhancement, making Armes’s minimum sentence 25 years. The Sentencing Guidelines recommended the maximum possible sentence—350 years. The government asked for 75 years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Armes’s 50-year sentence as reasonable. His Kentucky rape convictions triggered the sentencing enhancement; the district court had enough information to determine the particular crime of conviction; that crime categorically qualifies for the enhancement. |
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| United States v. Hobbs |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-3343 Opinion Date: March 20, 2020 Judge: Larsen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Hobbs pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which forbids felons to possess firearms. The indictment listed three predicate felonies: Assault on a Peace Officer, Attempted Felonious Assault, and Aggravated Robbery with Firearm Specification. Hobbs had served a six-year sentence for the aggravated robbery conviction. The district court determined that Hobbs was an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) and sentenced him to the statutory minimum, 15 years’ imprisonment. After Hobbs filed his appeal, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif (2019), which held that to obtain a conviction under section 922(g), “the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Hobbs’s indictment did not expressly allege the knowledge element and the district court did not advise him of it when taking his guilty plea. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting arguments that the indictment was deficient and that the plea was not knowing and voluntary. Hobbs was unable to show a reasonable probability that he would not have entered his plea if he had been told of section 922(g)’s knowledge-of-status requirement. |
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| United States v. Jones |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5633 Opinion Date: March 23, 2020 Judge: Jeffrey S. Sutton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| McKinney reported that she had returned home to find her ex-boyfriend, Jones, inside her house, refusing to leave. Jones chased her outside, throwing items. McKinney was hit by a bottle of dish soap. McKinney saw Snipes drive Jones away in a white “Tahoelike vehicle.” Paducah Officer Parrish took steps to corroborate McKinney’s story. McKinney stated that Jones had threatened to kill her and could easily obtain a gun. She repeatedly stated that she planned to get an emergency protective order and that she feared Jones would return once the officers left. Parrish stayed in his car near the house and saw two black males in a white Chevy Suburban at the nearby intersection. Parrish stopped the vehicle. A pat-down of Jones revealed nothing. Parrish arrested him for assault (a fourth-degree misdemeanor) and placed him in the back of his squad car. Jones yelled that the cuffs were too tight. When Parrish checked the cuffs, he spotted a firearm in the back of his cruiser that he had not seen before. Jones, a convicted felon, was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm. The district court suppressed the firearm, reasoning that the Fourth Amendment bars investigatory stops prompted by a completed misdemeanor. The Sixth Circuit reversed: the Fourth Amendment contains no such rule. The court noted the problems inherent in requiring officers to make the bright-line distinction. The proper inquiry looks at the nature of the crime, how long ago it was committed, and the ongoing risk to public safety. |
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| United States v. Marshall |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-2267 Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Jeffrey S. Sutton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Marshall pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute oxycodone and was sentenced to 118 months of prison plus six years of supervised release. Although required to serve his supervised release in Kentucky, Marshall moved to Illinois, violating a release condition. The district court briefly revoked Marshall’s release. Marshall moved, with permission, to Michigan. For the next year, Marshall made progress. The probation office recommended an early end to his supervised release. Marshall filed an unopposed motion to end the supervision. The court denied his request, reasoning that Marshall had completed little of the release term and had violated the conditions before. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Marshall never appealed his original or his new sentence; the district court did not issue a new sentence or an amended sentence before this appeal. On rehearing, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, which provides a general grant of appellate jurisdiction to review “final” judgments. The court affirmed the denial of the motion on the merits. |
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| Orr v. Shicker |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Dockets: 19-1380, 19-1387, 19-1732 Opinion Date: March 23, 2020 Judge: Diane Pamela Wood Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Class Action, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The plaintiffs, current and former inmates of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), have been diagnosed with hepatitis C. They filed suit against IDOC, Wexford (which provides inmate health services) and doctors more than 10 years ago after fruitless efforts to receive treatment for their disease while incarcerated. Their 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint alleges that the diagnostic and treatment protocols for IDOC inmates with hepatitis C violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Seventh Circuit reversed the grant of class certification and vacated a preliminary injunction. After discussing numerosity and commonality of facts and issues, the court noted that the district court failed to name a class representative or explain its omission, leaving no way to assess the adequacy of representation. On the assumption that the court would have accepted the proposed representatives, the record does not reveal whether they would be adequate. The lack of a named representative also makes it impossible to find typicality--that the “claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” The individual plaintiffs have not shown that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent the preliminary injunction, so it was error to grant injunctive relief. |
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| United States v. Davis |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Dockets: 18-2634, 18-3129 Opinion Date: March 20, 2020 Judge: Diane Pamela Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Davis's girlfriend, Orkman, a Walmart assistant manager, shared her knowledge of Walmart’s cash handling procedures. Davis robbed the Indianapolis Walmart with Greer. Greer entered the customer service area, pointed a gun, used duct tape to restrain employees, including Orkman, then returned, with bags of cash, to the car where Davis was waiting. Davis photographed the cash and gave Orkman $1,500. Davis planned a second robbery. Orkman wanted out. Davis threatened her. Davis and Williams executed a second robbery. Later that day, Davis paid $8,000 in low-denomination bills for a Land Rover. Indianapolis Police began watching Orkman, who had worked during both robberies although they occurred during different shifts. An officer noticed Davis’s Land Rover near Orkman's home, learned about its purchase, and obtained a court order to place a GPS tracking device. Davis planned his third robbery with Townsell, who later testified. The GPS tracking device allowed the police to locate the Land Rover after an alert about the Kokomo robbery. Officers arrested Davis, Greer, and Townsell. Inside the vehicle, they found a gun and stashes of cash ($23,862, $9,088, $17,020, $8,205, and $1,958). In Davis’s apartment, they found a bag of quarters stamped “Walmart,” ammunition, cash, and a suitcase taken from the Kokomo Walmart. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Davis's and Greer's convictions, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. A rational jury could have found each guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. |
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| United States v. Groce |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1170 Opinion Date: March 20, 2020 Judge: Diane Pamela Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Groce was convicted of sex trafficking, conspiracy to engage in interstate transportation for prostitution, interstate transportation for prostitution, maintaining a drug house, using or carrying a firearm in maintaining the drug house, and witness retaliation. He was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment plus 20 years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit vacated the retaliation count. His PSR recommended 11 standard conditions of supervised release and seven special conditions. Condition 11 states: As directed by the probation officer, defendant shall notify employers and third parties providing volunteer opportunities and educational opportunities; organizations to which defendant belongs; and neighbors and family members with minor children, of defendant’s criminal record based on risk associated with his offense, his obligations to register as a sexual offender, and the legal requirements under the Sex Offender Notification Act. The probation officer may also take steps to confirm defendant’s compliance ... or provide such notifications directly. Condition 18 states: Have no contact with the victim in person, through written or electronic communication, or through a third party, unless authorized by the supervising U.S. probation officer. Defendant shall not enter the premises or loiter within 1,000 feet of the victim’s residence or place of employment. At his resentencing, Groce objected to conditions 4, 8, 15, and 17. His counsel stated, “I’m aware of no grounds for objecting ... we’re willing to waive the reading.” Groce subsequently challenged Conditions 11 and 18 as vague and overbroad. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, finding that Groce had waived his objections. |
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| United States v. Manriquez-Alvarado |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2521 Opinion Date: March 24, 2020 Judge: Frank Hoover Easterbrook Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| Manriquez-Alvarado, a citizen of Mexico, has repeatedly entered the U.S. illegally. He was ordered removed in 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2017, each time following a criminal conviction. He was found in the U.S. again in 2018 and was sentenced to 39 months' imprisonment for illegal reentry. 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), (b)(2). All of the convictions for reentry rest on the 2008 removal order. Manriquez-Alvarado argued that this order was invalid because immigration officials never had “jurisdiction” to remove him. His “Notice to Appear” did not include a hearing date. In 2018, the Supreme Court held (Pereira) that a document missing that information does not satisfy the statutory requirements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to dismiss. Pereira identifies a claims-processing doctrine, not a rule limiting immigration officials' jurisdiction. Older removal orders are pen to collateral attack if the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available; the deportation proceedings improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial review; and the order was fundamentally unfair, 8 U.S.C.1326(d). In 2008, Manriquez-Alvarado stipulated to his removal, waiving his rights to a hearing, administrative review, and judicial review. The statute does not ask whether administrative and judicial remedies would have been futile. It asks whether they were available. Manriquez-Alvarado’s removal was the result of his criminal conduct; he lacked permission to enter the U.S. at all. It is not unfair to order such an alien's deportation. |
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| Worman v. Entzel |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2048 Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Scudder Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Worman mailed his supervisor a pipe bomb, which the Postal Service intercepted. Worman was convicted of mailing an explosive device (18 U.S.C. 1716), possessing an unregistered destructive device (26 U.S.C. 5861(d), 5845(f)), transporting an explosive device (18 U.S.C. 844(d)), and possessing and using a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). Worman’s mailing of a bomb constituted the predicate crime of violence for the section 924(c) charge, which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment consecutive to any sentence imposed on another count. Worman was sentenced to 360 months for the 924(c) offense and one month for the other offenses. The judge explained that Worman would not be released until he was 84 and lacked any criminal history. The Eighth Circuit vacated; its precedent prohibited judges from considering a mandatory consecutive sentence when granting a downward variance. The court resentenced Worman to 168 months for the pipe‐bomb offenses and 360 mandatory, consecutive months for the 924(c) offense. In 2016, Worman filed an unsuccessful pro se motion for a new sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, based on the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” decision. In 2017, the Supreme Court held, in “Dean,” that a sentencing court may use its discretion when calculating an appropriate sentence for a felony serving as the basis for a section 924(c) conviction. Worman sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, despite recognizing that Dean provided Worman a basis for a sentencing reduction. Worman does not meet either exception authorizing a second habeas motion. Dean was a decision of statutory law, not an interpretation of the Constitution, and does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. |
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| United States v. Suellentrop |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1002 Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress images and videos retrieved from his cell phone. The court held that the district court correctly determined that investigators and prosecutors were permitted to use the images and video from defendant's phone that an acquaintance viewed on his own initiative. In this case, the Fourth Amendment does not extend to private searches that are neither instigated nor performed on behalf of a government entity; defendant's acquaintance acted entirely on his own when he searched defendant's cell phone; and the agents examining the phone went no further than the private search when they examined the phone. As to the remainder of the materials found on the phone, the court held that the state investigators reasonably understood the state warrant to authorize a search of the phone. |
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| United States v. Turner |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1191 Opinion Date: March 23, 2020 Judge: Erickson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized at his residence, as well as statements he made to officers at his residence and at the police station. The court held that the search warrant was supported by probable cause where defendant had prior drug convictions for possession and manufacturing/delivery of controlled substances; a search of the trash at his residence yielded evidence of illegal drug activity; and a rental car was located in the driveway along with defendant's own vehicle. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a Franks hearing where defendant failed to make either the requisite showing of intentional or reckless falsehood or omission, or that the probable cause analysis would change if the affidavit was modified as suggested. |
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| Milam v. Harrington |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-55213 Opinion Date: March 25, 2020 Judge: Andrew David Hurwitz Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus as time-barred. The panel held that the district court erred in its refusal to consider whether petitioner's claimed impairment was the cause of the untimeliness of the federal filing, despite his representation by state habeas counsel, and that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating whether state habeas counsel's misconduct supported equitable tolling. In this case, because the district court thought abandonment was required, it did not consider whether petitioner's state habeas counsel's misconduct qualified as an "extraordinary circumstance" under all the facts of this case. Accordingly, the panel remanded for the appropriate analysis. |
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| Smith v. Davis |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 17-15874 Opinion Date: March 20, 2020 Judge: Carlos T. Bea Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The en banc court affirmed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition as untimely. Petitioner argued that he was entitled to extend the one-year limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1) by equitable tolling for the 66 days between the date his conviction became final in the state appellate court and the date when his attorney informed him of that unsuccessful appeal and provided him with the state appellate record. The en banc court held that petitioner failed to exercise reasonable diligence during the 10 months available after he received his record from his attorney and before the time allowed by the statute of limitations expired. In view of the historic practice of courts of equity and modern Supreme Court precedent governing equitable tolling, the en banc court made two related holdings. First, for a litigant to demonstrate "he has been pursuing his rights diligently," and thus satisfies the first element required for equitable tolling, he must show that he has been reasonably diligent in pursuing his rights not only while an impediment to filing caused by an extraordinary circumstance existed, but before and after as well, up to the time of filing his claim in federal court. Second, and relatedly, it is only when an extraordinary circumstance prevented a petitioner acting with reasonable diligence from making a timely filing that equitable tolling may be the proper remedy. In this case, the en banc court held that petitioner was not entitled to relief. |
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| United States v. Miller |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 17-50338 Opinion Date: March 20, 2020 Judge: Rakoff Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, White Collar Crime |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of wire fraud and filing false tax returns. The jury found that defendant embezzled over $300,000 from the company for which he served as managing member and president. The panel overruled its prior decisions in light of the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Shaw v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 462 (2016), and held that wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1343 requires the intent to deceive and cheat, and that the jury charge instructing that wire fraud requires the intent to "deceive or cheat" was therefore erroneous. However, in this case, the panel held that the erroneous instruction was harmless. The panel noted that it was deeply troubled by an Assistant U.S. Attorney's disregard for elementary prosecutorial ethics, but that the misconduct did not entitle defendant to any relief. The attorney here had a personal and financial interest in the outcome of the case. The panel wrote that as soon as the Department of Justice became aware of the impropriety, it took every necessary step to cure any resulting taint, including turning over the entire prosecution of the case to disinterested prosecutors from the Southern District of California. Finally, the panel found defendant's remaining arguments to be without merit. |
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| United States v. Walker |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-10211 Opinion Date: March 20, 2020 Judge: Jay S. Bybee Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's application of a fifteen-year-minimum sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) to defendant's sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The panel held that defendant's predicate domestic violence convictions under California Penal Code 273.5 qualified as categorical violent felonies, and that defendant's arguments to the contrary were foreclosed by United States v. Laurico-Yeno, 590 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 2010), and its progeny. The panel rejected defendant's claim that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a sentencing judge, to find that a defendant's prior convictions were for crimes on different occasions. Rather, the panel held that defendant's argument was foreclosed by United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), which held that a sentencing judge may find the dates of prior offenses in deciding if a defendant has committed three or more violent felonies. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding that defendant committed three separate offenses. |
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| United States v. Finnesy |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 18-3045 Opinion Date: March 20, 2020 Judge: Jerome A. Holmes Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Brandon Finnesy appealed his conviction and sentence for escape from custody. As to his conviction, which was entered upon his guilty plea, Finnesy contended he should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because the magistrate judge who conducted his plea colloquy lacked “jurisdiction” to accept his plea. As to his sentence, he contended the district court erred in applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines relevant to his case. Finding no reversible errors, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Finnesy's conviction and sentence. |
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| George v. U.S. Attorney General |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-14000 Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's ruling that petitioner's conviction for sexual misconduct, N.Y. Penal Law 130.20, qualifies, under the modified categorical approach, as the aggravated felony of rape, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), and a crime involving moral turpitude. Because the record of conviction does not make clear whether petitioner pleaded guilty to forcible or statutory rape, the court need not decide whether the New York statute is divisible as between those two different kinds of rape or whether the criminal complaint is a valid Shepard document. The court explained that, even if it were to resolve both issues in the department's favor, the criminal complaint would still fail to establish that petitioner pleaded guilty to forcible rape. Furthermore, the board failed to address whether statutory rape is a crime involving moral turpitude, so the court does not address that issue. Nor does the court need to address petitioner's alternative argument that he is eligible for a discretionary waiver of deportation even if he is removable. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| United States v. Eason |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Dockets: 16-15413, 16-17796, 18-12848 Opinion Date: March 24, 2020 Judge: Jill Pryor Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In consolidated criminal appeals, the Eleventh Circuit held that a conviction for Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a). The court agreed with its sister circuits and defendants, holding that because the offense can be committed by a threat to person or property, the statute is too broad to qualify as a crime of violence either under the elements clause or as an enumerated robbery or extortion offense. Therefore, Hobbs Act robbery cannot serve as a predicate for a career offender sentencing enhancement. Accordingly, the court vacated each defendant's sentence and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| United States v. Goldman |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-13282 Opinion Date: March 25, 2020 Judge: Rosenbaum Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Where, as here, the loss is a unique artifact for which market value cannot fully compensate, courts must use replacement costs in determining restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA). The Eleventh Circuit wrote that, while absolute precision is not required under the MVRA, the district court must base its restitution order on evidence. Furthermore, that evidence must show that the restitution will make the victim whole—nothing more and nothing less. The court affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he was convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States and theft of major artwork. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his role in stealing Gold Bar 27, a gold ingot recovered from an undersea wreckage site. The court remanded for the district court to ascertain the amount of restitution. In this case, the district court did not ascertain replacement value when it determined market value was insufficient and then imposed restitution. |
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| Israel v. Alaska, Department of Corrections |
| Court: Alaska Supreme Court Docket: S-16990 Opinion Date: March 20, 2020 Judge: Craig F. Stowers Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Medical Malpractice |
| Psychiatrists employed by the Alaska Department of Corrections (DOC) diagnosed inmate Adam Israel with paranoid schizophrenia. The inmate disputed his diagnosis, contending that his claimed rare genetic ability to see the electro-magnetic radiation of poltergeists was misunderstood as a delusion. The inmate brought a medical malpractice action against the psychiatrists and DOC seeking rescission of his diagnosis and damages. DOC filed a motion for summary judgment supported by an affidavit from DOC’s chief medical officer. The affidavit confirmed the inmate’s diagnosis and asserted that the inmate received treatment consistent with his diagnosis. After notifying the inmate that he needed expert testimony to oppose the motion for summary judgment, the superior court granted DOC’s summary judgment motion because the inmate failed to provide expert testimony to rebut DOC’s evidence. Israel appealed, arguing that DOC’s medical director was not qualified to testify about the standard of care under AS 09.20.185. The Alaska Supreme Court determined Israel failed to create a genuine issue of material fact about the correctness of his diagnosis. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment. The Supreme Court also rejected Israel's other arguments raised on appeal. |
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| People v. Bullard |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S239488 Opinion Date: March 23, 2020 Judge: Kruger Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this case involving whether Proposition 47 requires a court to draw a distinction under Cal. Veh. Code 10851 between permanent and temporary vehicle takings, the Supreme Court held that a person who has unlawfully taken a vehicle in violation of section 10851 is not disqualified from Proposition 47 relief because the person cannot prove he or she intended to keep the vehicle away from the owner indefinitely. Proposition 47 reduced felony offenses consisting of theft of property worth $950 or less to misdemeanors. While liability for theft generally requires that the defendant have an intent permanently to deprive the owner of possession, section 10581 does not distinguish between temporary takings and permanent ones. At issue in this case was whether Proposition 47 grant sentencing relief to people who take vehicles permanently but denies relief to people who take vehicles temporarily. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative and reversed the superior court's denial of resentencing for Defendant's 10851 conviction, holding that Proposition is neither categorically inapplicable to section 10851 convictions nor is a defendant not entitled to resentencing because he lacked the intent permanently to deprive the vehicle's owner of its possession. |
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| People v. Orozco |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S249495 Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Goodwin Liu Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal ruling that Proposition 47's revision to Cal. Penal Code 496, making the offense of receiving stolen property a misdemeanor when the value of the property is $950 or less, does not extend to convictions for receiving a stolen vehicle under section 496d, holding that Proposition 47's amendment to section 496(a) did not affect convictions for receiving stolen property under section 496d. Proposition 47 amended section 496, the general statute criminalizing receipt of stolen property, by making the offense a misdemeanor if the value of the property does not exceed $950. Proposition 47, however, did not amend 496d. Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawfully buying, receiving, concealing, selling or withholding a stolen vehicle in violation of section 496d. Defendant filed a motion under Proposition 47 to reduce his convictions to misdemeanors. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Proposition 47's revision to section 496 does not extend to convictions under section 496d. |
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| California v. Mitchell |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E071660(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: March 23, 2020 Judge: Fields Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant-appellant Gloria Mitchell was convicted by a jury of several offenses involving three minor victims, John Doe 1, John Doe 2 and Jane Doe. With respect to John Doe 1, defendant was convicted of torture (count 1) and mayhem (count 2). With respect to John Doe 2 and Jane Doe, defendant was convicted of misdemeanor child abuse. She was sentenced to prison for: seven years to life on count 1; the middle term of four years on count 2; 180 days in county jail on count 4; and another 180 days in county jail on count 5. However, the trial court stayed the sentence on count 2 pursuant to Penal Code section 654 and deemed the sentence on counts 4 and 5 satisfied based on credit for time already in custody. The trial court also imposed a restitution fine in the amount of $300; a court operation assessment in the amount of $160; and a criminal conviction assessment of $120. Defendant appealed her convictions and sentences, and argued the fines should have been stricken as unconstitutional under California v. Duenas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (2019). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences. |
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| People v. Medeiros |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A155648(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Margulies Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Medeiros was convicted of embezzlement and grand theft of property valued in excess of $1.3 million. The court sentenced Medeiros to a seven-year prison term: the middle term of two years for grand theft, three years for Penal Code section 12022.6(a)(3) amount of loss enhancement, and two years for the section 186.11(a)(2) aggravated white-collar enhancement. It stayed his two-year, middle-term sentence for embezzlement and for all enhancements attached to that charge. The court of appeal affirmed in part, rejecting Medeiros’s claim that it should strike a Penal Code former section 12022.6 enhancement because the statute was repealed before he was sentenced. Vacating and remanding in part, the court agreed that either his conviction for embezzlement or his grand theft conviction should be stricken as they are two statements of the same offense under Penal Code section 954. The court also agreed that the true finding on his section 186.11 enhancement should be stricken because he did not commit two related felonies. The judgment should be amended to correct the total amount of the court security fee and criminal conviction assessment. The court declined to remand for a further hearing to determine the amount of and his ability to pay victim restitution. |
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| People v. Torres |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B296179(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Moor Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder (counts 11 and 12) under a felony murder theory of liability, the jury found true the special circumstance that the murders were committed during the commission of a robbery and found true multiple murder special circumstance allegations. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 and newly enacted Senate Bill No. 1437. The court disagreed with defendant's broad assertion that a trial court may not summarily deny a petition on the basis of the record of conviction prior to appointment of counsel and briefing, but nevertheless reversed the trial court's order. In this case, the trial court relied exclusively on the jury's 2001 special circumstances findings, which findings alone are not sufficient to preclude relief in the wake of People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522. The court remanded to allow the trial court to determine whether defendant has made a prima facie showing that he falls within the provisions of section 1170.95. |
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| People v. Wang |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B294888(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: March 24, 2020 Judge: Elwood G.H. Lui Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment entered after a jury trial in which defendant was convicted of the first degree murders of his mother-in-law and father-in-law. The court held that the erroneous omission of a heat of passion instruction as to the count 2 killing was harmless; the trial court properly denied defendant's request for heat of passion and imperfect self-defense instructions as to the count 1 killing; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the 2013 domestic violence incident; the improper admission of the double hearsay evidence of defendant's threat was harmless; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing defendant's wife to testify that she believed defendant was going to get a gun during one of their arguments; the prosecutor did not improperly question defendant about the invocation of his right to remain silent; the prosecutor did not misstate the law or lower the People's burden of proving the element of premeditation and deliberation for first degree murder; defense counsel's failure to call defendant's middle child to testify at trial was a rational tactical choice and did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel; and there was no cumulative error. Finally, the court held that remand for resentencing was unwarranted. |
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| People v. Wilkes |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A155624(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Mark B. Simons Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| Wilkes was convicted for the attempted murder of Christopher and related crimes. The court of appeal affirmed the conviction but modified the judgment to strike an enhancement for a prior one-year prison term for a grand theft conviction and award presentence conduct credits. The court upheld other enhancements and rejected Wilkes’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that he intended to kill Christopher and that the attempted murder was premeditated and deliberate. There was evidence that Wilkes purposefully fired a gun into the front passenger window of a car, knowing Christopher was in the driver’s seat, and that he fired a subsequent shot at Christopher after Christopher exited the car. The court also rejected Wilkes’s equal protection challenge to a statutory provision rendering youth offenders sentenced pursuant to the Three Strikes Law (Pen. Code 667(b)–(j), 1170.12), such as Wilkes, ineligible for youth offender parole hearings. (section 3051(h).) |
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| State v. Sawyer |
| Court: Connecticut Supreme Court Docket: SC20132 Opinion Date: March 24, 2020 Judge: Andrew J. McDonald Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to suppress photographs and videos of suspected child pornography that the police recovered from computer equipment and other media storage seized from Defendant's residence pursuant to a search warrant, holding that the search warrant affidavit supported a finding of probable cause. On appeal, Defendant argued that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause because the issuing judge could not reasonably have inferred from descriptions in the affidavit of two photographs of nude children that the photographs were lascivious. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the totality of the circumstances described in the affidavit and the reasonable inferences drawn therefore supported a finding of probable cause to believe that a there was a substantial chance that a search of Defendant's residence would uncover evidence of possession of child pornography. The Court further declined Defendant's invitation to adopt a more demanding standard for assessing whether there is probable cause to issue a search warrant. |
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| Idaho v. Hayes |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 47324 Opinion Date: March 20, 2020 Judge: Brody Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Michael Hayes was convicted by jury of felony battery on a correctional officer. Hayes appealed his judgment of conviction on three grounds: (1) the district court erred by failing to issue subpoenas for two medical professionals; (2) the district court abused its discretion by allowing the State to inquire into prior instances of Hayes’ conduct towards correctional officers; and (3) the district court abused its discretion by denying Hayes’ motion for a new trial. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order denying Hayes’ requests for subpoenas, and held that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the State to inquire into prior instances of Hayes’ conduct. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The Idaho Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for review, and finding the district court did not err in issuing its judgment, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction. |
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| Commonwealth v. Bredhold |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Dockets: 2017-SC-000436-TG, 2017-SC-000536-TG, 2017-SC-000537-TG Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Hughes Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated the interlocutory orders of the trial court concluding that Defendants' individual psychological assessments provided further support for the exclusion of the death penalty as to Defendants individually, holding that the constitutional issue in this case was not a "justiciable cause" before the circuit court and was not properly before the Supreme Court. At issue in these consolidated cases was whether evolving standards of decency require that the Eighth Amendment prohibit imposition of the death penalty as to a defendant under twenty-one years old at the time of his offense. Defendants argued before the circuit court that the current national consensus and scientific research supported raising the age for death-penalty eligible from age eighteen to twenty-one. At this stage in the proceedings, none of the defendants had been convicted or sentenced. The circuit court declared Kentucky's death penalty statute unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment insofar as it permits capital punishment for offenders under twenty-one years old at the time of their offense and that two of the defendants should not receive the death penalty. The Supreme Court vacated the interlocutory orders, holding that none of the defendants had standing to raise an Eighth Amendment challenge to the death penalty. |
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| Roberts v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2018-SC-000249-MR Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Wright Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of murder and vacated her twenty-year sentence, holding that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to grant Defendant's motions for a mistrial and in ruling that Defendant did not qualify for the domestic violence exemption for parole ineligibility. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial after the Commonwealth played inadequately redacted recordings of police interviews with Defendant; and (2) the trial court erred in ruling that Defendant did not qualify for the domestic violence exemption for parole eligibility pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.720. |
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| White v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2014-SC-000725-MR Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Vanmeter Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After the United States Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded Defendant's case to the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017), the Supreme Court remanded this case to the circuit court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Defendant's intellectual disability claim, holding that Defendant produced enough evidence to form a reasonable doubt as to his intellectual capacities so as to warrant a hearing on the issue. In 2014, Defendant was convicted of murder and rape in the first degree. The jury recommended a sentence of death for the murder. The Supreme Court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment for further consideration in light of the Court's analysis in Moore regarding the execution of intellectually disabled defendants. Since the remand, Defendant pro se asked the Supreme Court to waive his intellectual disability claim so he could move forward with post-conviction proceedings. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) due to his death sentence, Defendant may not pro se waive his pending intellectual disability claim; and (2) Defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the matter of his potential intellectual disability. |
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| Evans v. State |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 36 Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Ellen A. Gorman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial court vacated the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's petition for post-conviction review, holding that Defendant must receive a new hearing on his petition. Defendant pleaded guilty of trafficking in prison contraband. Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction review alleging ineffective assistance by his plea counsel. The court held a hearing and announced that it would grant Defendant's petition. The court began to issue that decision from the bench, but an interruption led the court to resume the hearing. The court then proceeded to deny the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the process at Defendant's hearing irredeemably tarnished the appearance of fairness in the proceeding. |
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| State v. Alexander |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 1/19 Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Robert N. McDonald Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this case concerning the discretion of a court to dismiss a probation violation petition and to terminate probation the Court of Appeals held that the circuit court had discretion to terminate Defendant's probation before it would otherwise expire and remanded the case to the circuit court for any necessary proceedings in which the court may either exercise its discretion, indicate that it had already done so, or take any other appropriate action. Defendant pled guilty to theft and was sentenced to three years supervised probation. Defendant was later charged with violating the conditions of his probation. After noting that Defendant had already been incarcerated for longer than the presumptive sanction of fifteen days' imprisonment the court dismissed the probation violation petition without determining whether Defendant had committed the alleged probation violations. The court never declared that Defendant's probation had "expired" and was "over." Because the record did not indicate that the circuit court in fact exercised its discretion to terminate Defendant's probation before it would otherwise expire, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the circuit court for any necessary proceedings in which the court may either exercise its discretion, indicate that it had already done so, or take any other appropriate action. |
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| Commonwealth v. Marrero |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12782 Opinion Date: March 20, 2020 Judge: Gaziano Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court convicting Defendant of possession of a firearm, unlawful possession of a loaded firearm, and discharging a firearm within 500 feet of a building, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions. Specifically, Defendant argued (1) there was insufficient evidence that he had knowledge of the physical characteristics of the firearm that subjected it to regulation; (2) there was insufficient evidence that the weapon met the statutory definition of a firearm; and (3) two out-of-court identifications were not impermissibly suggestive. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) in order to establish unlawful possession of a firearm, the Commonwealth must only prove that the defendant knew the weapon was a firearm in the conventional sense of the word, and the defendant need not have had knowledge of the specific physical characteristics that made the weapon a firearm according to statute; (2) the evidence was sufficient to establish that the weapon met the statutory definition of a firearm; and (3) the identification procedures were not impermissibly suggestive. |
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| Commonwealth v. Thomas |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12789 Opinion Date: March 23, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm while in the commission of a felony under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 18B, holding that the judgment of conviction was not erroneous. On appeal, Defendant argued that his section 18B conviction must be vacated because the Commonwealth failed to indict him for and convict him of an appropriate root felony. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding that Defendant's two convictions of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon may serve as the root felony for Defendant's section 18B conviction. |
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| State v. Townsend |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A18-0792 Opinion Date: March 25, 2020 Judge: McKeig Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of simple robbery, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction. On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to establish that her temporary use of force overcame another person's resistance, as required by Minn. Stat. 609.24. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the force element of simple robbery is satisfied the moment an actor uses force for the purpose of overcoming another's resistance to the taking or carrying away of property; and (2) the State provided sufficient evidence of Defendant's use of force to sustain a conviction for simple robbery. |
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| Nickson v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-IA-01030-SCT Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Griffis Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Johnathan Nickson was charged with two counts of first-degree murder and one count of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. The jury acquitted him on the two counts of first-degree murder but deadlocked as to second-degree murder and the felon-in-possession charge. The trial court declared a mistrial. Because the jury’s verdict acquitted Nickson of first-degree murder, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by declaring a mistrial on those charges. As a result, the trial court’s order declaring a mistrial as to the two counts of first-degree murder was reversed, and a judgment of acquittal was rendered on those charges. The trial court’s order was affirmed as to the remaining offense of second-degree murder and the charge of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon because no final resolution was reached by the jury. |
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| Smith v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-CP-01235-SCT Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Griffis Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Donald Keith Smith appealed the circuit court’s decision to summarily affirm his Petition Seeking Judicial Review of an Adverse Administrative Remedy Decision. In 2009, Smith pled guilty to one count of kidnapping, armed carjacking, and felony fleeing. Approximately two years later, Smith filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief, attacking his armed-carjacking conviction. The Mississippi Supreme Court remanded his case for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. After that hearing, the trial court determined that Smith had not received the competency evaluation the trial court had ordered. So the trial court reversed Smith's conviction. Smith was later evaluated and found to be competent. In late 2016, Smith pled guilty to attempted kidnapping, armed carjacking, and felony fleeing. The trial court sentenced Smith to thirty years, with eighteen years to serve, for attempted kidnapping, thirty years, with eighteen years to serve, for armed carjacking, and five years for felony fleeing. In July 2017, the trial court amended Smith’s sentencing order to reflect that he should be sentenced to serve ten years for attempted kidnapping. The remainder of Smith’s sentencing order stayed the same. Smith filed an initial grievance through the Administrative Remedy Program (ARP) at the MDOC. In his grievance, Smith asserted that his time computation was incorrect. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the Mississippi Department of Corrections, and therefore vacated and remanded. |
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| Ramon v. Short |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 69 Opinion Date: March 25, 2020 Judge: Mike McGrath Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court denying Appellant's application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, ruling that holding individuals pursuant to a federal civil immigration detainer request is an arrest under Montana law and that a detainer request is not an arrest warrant and does not compel the re-arrest of a person otherwise entitled to release. Plaintiff was arrested and booked into county jail. When Plaintiff attempted to post his bond, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Border Patrol) sent the jail a civil immigration detainer request under the Immigration and Nationality Act and informed the bond company that the sheriff would continue to detain Plaintiff. Consequently, Plaintiff's bondsman declined to post his bond, and Plaintiff was not released. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the sheriff violated Montana law in honoring the Border Patrol's request. The district court ruled against Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Plaintiff's continued detention for a new purpose when he was otherwise entitled to release was an arrest under Montana law, and the sheriff lacked state arrest authority to detain Plaintiff on the basis of his potential removal under federal immigration law. |
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| State v. Lierman |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 289 Opinion Date: March 20, 2020 Judge: Michael G. Heavican Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of multiple counts of sexual assault of a child and child abuse, holding that the district court did not err in admitting prior sexual assault evidence. Defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting and abusing his adopted daughter. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court erred in admitting evidence of a prior sexual assault allegedly committed by Defendant against another adopted daughter because Defendant was acquitted in that case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in allowing the State to present the evidence of prior sexual assault where at least some of those assaults were alleged to have been committed by Defendant in other jurisdictions; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error. |
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| State v. Thelen |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 334 Opinion Date: March 20, 2020 Judge: Freudenberg Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Real Estate & Property Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court affirming Defendant's criminal misdemeanor convictions for violating Neb. Rev. Stat. 39-301 by repeatedly erecting an electric fence approximately three feet from the edge of a county gravel roadway and within the county's right-of-way extending into a ditch, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's convictions. On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence presented to prove that he was the individual who placed the electric fence in the ditch and that the placement of the fence did not violate section 39-301. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the area of the ditch at issue in this case, which was within the county's right-of-way, was part of a "public road" for purposes of section 39-301; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Defendant was responsible for erecting the fences. |
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| Guzman v. Second Judicial District Court |
| Court: Supreme Court of Nevada Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 12 Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Cadish Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court granted in part Petitioner's writ petition requesting that the Supreme Court order the district court to grant his motion to dismiss four counts for which he was indicted based on the grand jury's lack of authority to inquire into those criminal offenses, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.105 empowers a grand jury to inquire into an offense so long as the district court that empaneled the grand jury may appropriately adjudicate the defendant's guilt for that offense. A Washoe County grand jury indicted Petitioner on ten counts, four of which concerned offenses committed in Douglas County. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Douglas County counts. The district court denied the motion, concluding that a grand jury's authority to return an indictment under section 172.105 extended statewide to all felony offenses. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order so it may reconsider Petitioner's motion to dismiss, holding that the district court incorrectly interpreted section 172.105. In reconsidering Defendant's motion, the Supreme Court directed the district court to determine, based on the evidence presented to the Washoe County grand jury, if venue was proper in the Second Judicial District Court for the Douglas County charges under the applicable statutes. |
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| People v. Perez |
| Court: New York Court of Appeals Citation: 2020 NY Slip Op 02096 Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Feinman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division, holding that Defendant's prior New Jersey conviction was within the scope endangering the welfare of a child under New York law, and therefore, the courts below did not err in assessing Defendant thirty points under risk factor nine of the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) risk assessment when determining Defendant's presumptive risk level. In 1999, Defendant was convicted in New Jersey for lewdness in the fourth degree. At issue in this appeal was whether Defendant was properly assessed thirty points under risk factor nine for the New Jersey conviction. The Court of Appeals held that the assessment was warranted and that Defendant's adjudication as a level two Sex Offender was correct because Defendant's prior New Jersey conviction was tantamount to endangering the welfare of a child under New York law. |
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| North Dakota v. Awad |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 66 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Jerod E. Tufte Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Election Law, Immigration Law |
| Mohamed Awad appealed a district court order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to a charge of knowingly voting when not qualified to do so. On appeal, Awad argued the district court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea because he was not adequately advised under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(b) of the possible immigration consequences of pleading guilty, and because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court order. |
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| State ex rel. Dobson v. Handwork |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-1069 Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court granted Wood County Prosecuting Attorney Paul Dobson's request seeking a peremptory writ of prohibition against Judge Peter Handwork, who presided in two criminal cases finding Andrew Schuman guilty of seven felony counts and who later modified the judgment of sentence, holding that Judge Handwork patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to issue the postjudgment orders. After entry of the judgment of sentence and Schuman's appeal was filed, Judge Handwork considered two motions filed by Schuman and issued two orders modifying the judgment of sentence. Dobson sought a writ of prohibition to vacate the post judgment orders and to prohibit any further exercise of jurisdiction by Judge Handwork. Because Judge Handwork did not file an answer, Dobson also filed a motion for default judgment. The Supreme Court granted the motion for default judgment and issued a peremptory writ of prohibition, holding that Handwork's absence of jurisdiction was patent and unambiguous. |
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| State ex rel. Hibbler v. O'Neill |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-1070 Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing as moot Appellant's complaint for writs of mandamus and procedendo against Clark County Court of Common Pleas Judge Richard J. O'Neill, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that Appellant's claims were moot. Appellant was found guilty in consolidated cases of murder with a firearm specification and attempted aggravated burglary. Appellant later filed under both case numbers a motion to vacate his postrelease control and a motion for a final, appealable order. The trial court denied the motion for a final, appealable order and granted in part the motion to vacate postrelease control, but the judgment entry did not refer to the motions that Appellant had filed in one of the two cases. Appellant filed a complaint for writs of mandamus and procedendo, arguing that Judge O'Neill had not yet ruled on his motions. Judge O'Neill filed a motion to dismiss, attaching a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry in which the judge effectively denied Defendant's motion to vacate his postrelease-control sentence in the second case. The court of appeals dismissed the claims as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claims were moot. |
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| State ex rel. Peoples v. Schneider |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-1071 Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus, holding that Appellant's claim was barred by res judicata. Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder with two firearm specifications. The indictment had contained a count of having a weapon while under disability (WUD), but the court's sentencing entry did not refer to the WUD charge. Appellant later filed a motion for a final, appealable order, arguing that the sentencing entry was void because it failed to dispose of the WUD charge. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus arguing that the sentencing entry did not dispose of the WUD charge and was not a final, appealable order. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint because Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and because Appellant's claim was barred by res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that res judicata barred Appellant's mandamus claim because he had raised the same claim multiple times previously. |
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| State v. Boaston |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-1061 Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Donnelly Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals convicting Defendant of one count of murder in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2903.02(A) and one count of murder in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2903.02(B), holding that the trial court's admission of expert opinion testimony that was not set forth in a written report was harmless error. On appeal, Defendant argued that the state's failure to supply a written report providing the expert's opinions and scientific reasoning violated Crim.R. 16(K) and that the admission entitled him to a new trial. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) it is error to admit expert opinion testimony when the expert's opinion was not submitted in compliance with Crim.R. 16(K); but (2) in the instant case, the trial court's admission of testimony that went beyond the scope of the expert's written report was harmless error. |
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| State v. Bryant |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-1041 Opinion Date: March 24, 2020 Judge: Judith L. French Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for violation of Ohio Rev. Code 4549.02(A)(1) and vacated the conviction, holding that the "registered number" of a vehicle, as used in the statute, is the license plate number associated with the vehicle. The trial court convicted Defendant with the charge of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident, concluding that Defendant failed to provide the registered number of his vehicle as required by section 4549.02(A)(1). The court of appeals affirmed on alternative grounds, holding that Defendant violated the statute by not providing the statutorily required identifying information to the police officer at the scene of the accident. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when a driver subject to section 4549.02(A)(1) gives the information specified in that statute to the required recipients under section 4549.02(A)(1)(a) and (b), the driver does not violate section 4549.02(A)(1) by not providing that information to a police officer if the driver leaves the scene without knowledge that the police have been alerted of the accident; and (2) the registered number of a motor vehicle is the license plate number associated with the vehicle. |
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| Taylor v. Harris |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-1046 Opinion Date: March 24, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed the petition because it did not comply with the statutory requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A). Appellant, who was seventeen years old at the time of the alleged offense, was convicted of three counts of murder and other crimes. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of forty-one years to life. Appellant later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the court of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the juvenile court failed to make the required findings under Ohio Rev. Code 2152.12(A)(1)(a) before the transfer and challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory transfer procedures. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant's constitutional claims on procedural grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's petition was fatally defective because he did not comply with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A). |
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| Pennsylvania v. Butler |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 25 WAP 2018 Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Dougherty Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to determine whether the procedure used to designate certain individuals convicted of sexual offenses as sexually violent predators (SVPs), codified at 42 Pa.C.S. section 9799.24(e)(3), was constitutionally permissible in light of the Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017). The Superior Court extrapolated from our decision in Muniz to hold the lifetime registration, notification, and counseling requirements (RNC requirements) applicable to SVPs pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. sections 9799.15, 9799.16, 9799.26, 9799.27, and 9799.36 were increased criminal punishment such that the procedure for conducting SVP determinations violated the requirements of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held RNC requirements did not constitute criminal punishment and therefore the procedure for designating individuals as SVPs under 9799.24(e)(3) was not subject the requirements of Apprendi and Alleyne, and remained constitutional. |
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| Pennsylvania v. Diaz |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 74 MAP 2018 Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Donohue Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania challenged a superior court's application of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.s. 648 (1984) to find that trial counsel's failure to secure a Spanish language interpreter for appellee Miguel Diaz on the first day of his trial for charges relating to rape, rape of a child, endangering the welfare of children, statutory sexual assault, indecent assault, corruption of minors, and conspiracy. The argument was that failure in not securing a translator was prejudice per se because Diaz was not a native English speaker, and could not fully understand the proceedings. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that where the absence of a needed interpreter at a critical stage of trial obstructs his ability to communicate with counsel, Cronic applies such that the defendant need not prove he or she was prejudiced by a Sixth Amendment violation. Based on the record, the Supreme Court found the Superior Court correctly concluded that Cronic was applicable and that no specific showing of prejudice was required because of the absence of an interpreter on the first day of trial during critical stages of the proceeding. |
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| Pennsylvania v. Housman |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 766 CAP Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Debra McCloskey Todd Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellee William Housman petitioned for post-conviction relief, and appealed when that relief was denied. Housman was accused of murdering Leslie White in 2000. He was convicted by jury of first-degree murder, kidnapping, theft by unlawful taking or disposition, unlawful restraint, abuse of a corpse, and criminal conspiracy. The Commonwealth sought the death penalty for Housman and his co-defendant, his former girlfriend, Beth Ann Markman. The Commonwealth appealed the PCRA court’s grant of a new penalty-phase trial, and Housman cross-appealed the court’s denial of guilt-phase relief. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the record supported the PCRA court’s determination that Housman’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence at his penalty phase had arguable merit; that trial counsel’s performance lacked a reasonable basis; and that Housman suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Accordingly, with respect to the Commonwealth’s appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court’s grant of a new penalty trial. In light of the Court's affirmance of the PCRA court’s grant of a new penalty trial, the Court did not address Housman’s remaining penalty-phase claims. |
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| Rohland v Business Office, Dept. of Corrections |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 58 MAP 2019 Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: Thomas G. Saylor Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| Appellant William Rohland was an inmate confined at SCI-Huntingdon. In 2005, he was charged in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania, with various offenses. He was ultimately sentenced on those charges in November 2006 to one-to-five years’ imprisonment, and was required as part of his sentence to pay restitution, fines, and costs. Thereafter, in 2007, Appellant was convicted in Luzerne County on two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment. As of December 2016, the Department of Corrections' records reflected Appellant still owed approximately $2,300 in connection with his Lackawanna County sentence, although the incarceration aspect of that sentenced had expired. Thus, the prison’s business office sent Appellant a memorandum notifying him of the amount owed and indicating that the prison would begin making periodic Act 84 deductions from his inmate account to satisfy that obligation. The memo also gave instructions on how Appellant could challenge the deductions. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether the deductions from an inmate account could continue after Appellant finished serving the prison-term portion of the sentence while still incarcerated on a separate sentence. The Supreme Court determined the Department had clear legal authorization under Act 84 to effectuate such deductions. That being the case, the Supreme Court determined the Commonwealth Court acted properly in granting the Department's motion for summary judgment. |
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| South Carolina v. Simmons |
| Court: South Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 27959 Opinion Date: March 25, 2020 Judge: Kaye Gorenflo Hearn Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Michael Simmons was convicted of six counts of sexual exploitation of a minor in the second degree pursuant to section 16-15-405 of the South Carolina Code of Laws. Simmons contended this provision was unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalized conduct that was not limited to visual representations of actual minors or obscenity, and thus violated the First Amendment. Additionally, Simmons contended the trial court erred in refusing to suppress information gathered pursuant to a search warrant supported by allegedly stale information and in finding defense counsel opened the door to evidence of suspected child pornography. While the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 16- 15-405 and the validity of the search warrant, it reversed Simmons' convictions because the trial court erred in finding defense counsel opened the door. The matter was remanded for a new trial. |
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| Vermont v. Burnett |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2020 VT 28 Opinion Date: March 20, 2020 Judge: Beth Robinson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Austin Burnett appealed a trial court’s decision that he violated a condition of his probation. Defendant’s relevant underlying convictions were for sexual assault of a victim under the age of sixteen and sexual assault, no consent. The court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of four to six years, suspended except for thirty-eight months, and five years, deferred, respectively. The court apparently generated one probation order in each docket, and the orders were filed separately in the court’s corresponding files. Both orders imposed eight standard conditions on defendant. Neither was signed by defendant. One of those conditions provided, “You shall participate fully in the Vermont Treatment Program for Sexual Abusers [VTPSA] during the course of your unsuspended sentence. Failure to complete said program while incarcerated may result in a violation of your probation.” This appeal arose in the context of the latter probation condition; the State filed substantially identical complaints for violation of probation in both dockets. The court noted that the VOP complaint filed by the State also listed “other non-compliant behavior,” and asked whether the defendant was planning to admit to any other behavior. The State said that no other admission was required, and defendant’s attorney stated that the other behavior was “older” and “I think the lock picking covers it.” Defendant argued the State both failed to prove the conditions of his probation and failed to prove that his conduct amounted to a violation. The Vermont Supreme Court concurred that the State failed to prove that defendant’s conduct amounted to a violation of the probation condition (VOP) and accordingly reversed on that ground. |
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| Vermont v. Clinton-Aimable |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2020 VT 30 Opinion Date: March 20, 2020 Judge: John A. Dooley Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Henry Clinton-Aimable appealed his conviction of knowing and unlawful possession of more than one ounce of cocaine. Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine following a traffic stop. On appeal, he argued that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the seizure of defendant’s car was not supported by probable cause and that therefore the evidence seized from defendant’s car was not admissible. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and defendant's conviction was vacated. |
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| Vermont v. Galloway |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2020 VT 29 Opinion Date: March 20, 2020 Judge: Cohen Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Darryl Galloway appealed a trial court’s conclusion that he violated a condition of probation when he failed to complete a sex-offender treatment program while incarcerated. He argued that the Department of Corrections (DOC) impermissibly modified the condition in requiring him to complete an in-house program. In January 2009, defendant pled guilty to four counts of lewd and lascivious conduct - charges stemming from incidents in which defendant exposed his genitals to clothing store clerks in 2006. He received an aggregate sentence of four to twenty years suspended, except four years to serve. At the change-of-plea hearing, the court imposed several conditions of probation and placed defendant on probation. Relevant here, condition 31 mandated completion of the in-house program. In March 2010, DOC filed a violation-of-probation (VOP) complaint against defendant for violating condition 31, which defendant conceded. The court revoked probation on counts one and two and continued probation under the original conditions in counts three and four. In January 2019, DOC released defendant after he served the ten-year sentence on counts one and two. DOC put him on a bus bound for Seattle before realizing he was still on probation on counts three and four. DOC then retrieved defendant, placed him back in custody, and filed a second VOP complaint for violating condition 31 on counts three and four. DOC alleged that defendant refused to participate in VTPSA during his ten years of incarceration. In March 2019, the trial court held another VOP hearing. Noting a lack of evidence to prove that defendant was waiting to complete sex-offender treatment in the community, and his willingness to leave for Seattle without completing the treatment, the court found that defendant did not intend to complete sex-offender treatment. The court then found that defendant had been on probation since his guilty plea in 2009 and that given his ten-year failure to complete the treatment, he did not complete the programming within a reasonable amount of time. The court found defendant in violation of probation, revoked probation on counts three and four, and imposed the underlying two-to-ten-year sentence on those counts. The Vermont Supreme Court determined defendant did not have the opportunity to participate in a treatment program of his choosing in the community with respect to the remaining counts, so it could not find defendant actively refused to participate or that his conduct evinced an intent not to comply with condition 31. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Vermont v. Nagel |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2020 VT 31 Opinion Date: March 20, 2020 Judge: Paul L. Reiber Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Eric Nagel appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress and dismiss. A deputy sheriff driving along Route 2 recognized the vehicle in front of him from previous law enforcement encounters. He ran a registration check on the vehicle and learned the car was registered to Courtney Nagel. The officer knew from prior law enforcement experience that Courtney Nagel was married to defendant and that defendant’s license was criminally suspended. He also was aware that defendant had been known to visit residences suspected of drug dealing. When the deputy initiated a traffic stop of defendant's car, a subsequent search resulted in the deputy finding drugs and drug-related paraphernalia in the vehicle. Defendant argued in support of his suppression motion that police officers violated Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution by expanding the scope of a valid traffic stop into a drug investigation without reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity. To this, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed and reversed. |
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| Akers v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Supreme Court of Virginia Docket: 190094 Opinion Date: March 26, 2020 Judge: McCullough Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Defendant's appeal from the decision of the trial court refusing to entertain Defendant's motion to reduce his sentence under Va. Code 19.2-303, holding that the lower courts did not err in concluding that the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction to hear Defendant's motion following his transfer to the Department of Corrections (DOC). Defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine by a prisoner. After Defendant incurred new convictions the circuit court revoked Defendant's suspended sentence. Defendant later filed a motion for modification of sentence asking the court to reconsider its order revoking his entire suspended sentence. Five days before a scheduled hearing on the motion, the court learned that Defendant had been taken into the custody of the DOC. At a later hearing, the trial court concluded that it was barred from considering Defendant's motion. The court of appeals denied Defendant's appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lower courts correctly held that once Defendant had been transferred to the DOC the trial court could no longer modify his sentence; and (2) no violation of Defendant's constitutional rights occurred in this case. |
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| Harrison v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 43 Opinion Date: March 25, 2020 Judge: Michael K. Davis Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the order of the district court denying Defendant's motion to enforce his claimed plea agreement, which the court treated as a Wyo. R. Crim. P. 35(a) motion, holding that Defendant's brief on appeal failed to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure and contained no cogent argument or citation to pertinent authority. In exchange for Defendant's guilty plea, the State agreed that it would not seek the death penalty. The district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment. In his motion to enforce his claimed plea agreement, Defendant did no more than state his belief that he should have been required to serve no more than seven to eight years in prison for the first degree murder and reference a previously submitted commutation request. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the district court order denying Defendant's motion, holding that Defendant's brief failed in all respects to comply with the rules of appellate procedure. |
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| Hartley v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 40 Opinion Date: March 23, 2020 Judge: Kate M. Fox Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse but remanded to correct a sentencing error, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's request for two lesser-included offense instructions and that prosecutorial misconduct did not require a new trial. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his lesser-included offense instructions and that the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's request for the lesser-included offense instructions and that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct. The Court, however, remanded the case to correct a sentencing error brought to its attention by the State. |
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