| Janakievski v. Executive Director, Rochester Psychiatric Center |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-3235 Opinion Date: April 10, 2020 Judge: Leval Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed the petition based on the grounds that it became moot when petitioner was conditionally released from confinement in a state psychiatric institution as a person with a "dangerous mental disorder." The court held that the conditional release did not render the petition moot, because petitioner remains subject to an "order of conditions" that leaves him vulnerable to recommitment, and the imposition of this order was a mandatory consequence of the confinement orders that his petition challenges. |
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| United States v. Al Farekh |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-943 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Jose A. Cabranes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for using explosives, conspiring to murder U.S. nationals, conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction, conspiring to bomb a U.S. government facility, and providing material support to terrorists. The court held that a district court does not abuse its discretion where it denies a defense counsel with the appropriate security clearance access to motions filed by the Government ex parte pursuant to section 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA); a custodial interrogation that takes place overseas over a period of several weeks and involves the display of hundreds of photographs as part of a foreign country's counterterrorism investigation is not unduly suggestive, thereby rendering inadmissible an out-of-court photo identification of the defendant; and a district court does not abuse its discretion when it limits the cross-examination of a fingerprint examiner to preclude references to a fingerprint misidentification in a wholly unrelated case. Under the circumstances in this case, the court held that the district court did not err in adjudicating the Government's CIPA motions ex parte and in camera, admitting the out-of-court photo identification of defendant, and limiting the cross-examination of the Government's fingerprint examiner. |
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| United States v. Bramer |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-3782 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Peter W. Hall Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. On appeal, defendant argued that the government failed to prove that the protective order to which he was subject—the basis for the charged false statement on the Form 4473—meets the requirements of an order defined in 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8). The court held that there was insufficient evidence that defendant had been issued a protective order "after a hearing" in which he had "an opportunity to participate," as required by section 922(g)(8)(A), and thus no rational trier of fact could find that when defendant submitted an application to purchase a firearm he violated section 922(a)(6) by knowingly lying about whether he was subject to such an order. |
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| United States v. Nolan |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 16-3423 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Rakoff Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that defendant received ineffective assistance because his lawyers did almost nothing to challenge the eyewitness identification testimony that formed the core of the Government's case, even though the identifications bore glaring indicia of unreliability. Furthermore, defendant received ineffective assistance because his counsel did not seek to exclude or object to the admission of a highly prejudicial and dubiously relevant photo of defendant posing with what appears to be a handgun. Because defendant was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, the court vacated his conviction and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| United States v. Tyler |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Dockets: 17-2613, 18-1319 Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: Patty Shwartz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Doreen Proctor reported drug activity in her neighborhood and cooperated with law enforcement. She was murdered. Tyler was acquitted of her murder in state court. A federal grand jury thereafter charged Tyler with witness tampering by murder, 18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(1)(C) and witness tampering by intimidation, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(3). Because legal errors resulted in overturned verdicts, Tyler was tried and found guilty three times. The district court set aside the third guilty verdict, concluding that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that Tyler had the intent to murder or intimidate Proctor to prevent her from communicating with a qualifying officer. The Third Circuit reversed and directed the district court to reinstate the guilty verdict. The district court erred in ruling that the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision, Fowler v. United States, applies only to situations where a defendant does not know the identity of a specific law enforcement officer to whom the witness would have communicated. There was sufficient evidence upon which a rational juror could conclude that Tyler acted with intent to prevent Proctor from communicating with law enforcement, and there was a “reasonable likelihood” that she would have communicated with a qualifying law enforcement officer had she not been murdered. |
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| Walker v. Coffey |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 19-1067 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Restrepo Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Communications Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law |
| The Pennsylvania Attorney General (OAG) charged Walker with forgery and computer crimes. The prosecutor and the lead investigator requested that Penn State produce Walker’s emails from her employee account. At Penn’s request, they obtained a subpoena. The subpoena was missing information regarding the date, time or place where the testimony or evidence would be produced, or which party was requesting the evidence. The subpoena was incomplete and unenforceable. The prosecutor offered the subpoena to Penn’s Assistant General Counsel, who instructed an employee to assist. After the OAG obtained Walker’s emails, the pending criminal charges were dismissed with prejudice. Walker filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, citing qualified immunity because Walker did not have a clearly established right to privacy in her work emails. A Third Circuit panel affirmed, reasoning that Penn produced the emails voluntarily, rather than under coercion resulting from the invalid subpoena and was acting within its legal authority and through counsel. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Walker's amended complaint, alleging violations of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701 (SCA). The SCA is inapplicable because Penn does not provide electronic communication services to the public. Penn acted within its rights as Walker’s employer in voluntarily disclosing her work emails. Penn’s search of its server to produce Walker’s emails is not prohibited by the SCA, regardless of whether its counsel was induced by deceit or knowingly cooperative. It is the law of the case that Penn consented to disclose Walker’s emails. |
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| In re: Emerson Stevens |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-305 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Frank K. Richardson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit authorized, under 28 U.S.C. 2244, a motion to file a successive 28 U.S.C. 2254 application for federal habeas relief. The court held that movant has made a prima facie showing that his application satisfied section 2244(b)(2)(B)'s requirements. In this case, movant relied on a newly discovered "box of materials" from law enforcement authorities that movant had been requesting for decades and that he claimed showed his innocence, undermining his convictions. |
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| Sigmon v. Stirling |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-7 Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: James Andrew Wynn, Jr. Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner, who was sentenced to death for two murders. The court held that the postconviction court's conclusion that petitioner could not show prejudice, even if counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to prison conditions evidence, is not contrary to clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also held that petitioner's claim that the Supreme Court of South Carolina violated his due process and equal protection rights in his post-conviction proceedings is not a cognizable claim, and petitioner cannot obtain relief; the Supreme Court of South Carolina's conclusion that it was not deficient performance to refrain from objecting to the state's closing arguments is not contrary to clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of facts; trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to request a mitigating circumstance unsupported by the record; the trial court's instructions correctly explained that the jury should consider both statutory and non-statutory mitigating circumstances; and the post-conviction court's conclusion that any deficiency regarding this mitigating charge did not prejudice petitioner survives review under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Finally, the court held that petitioner failed to demonstrate that post-conviction counsel were ineffective in failing to raise any substantial claims. |
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| United States v. Spivey |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4099 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Floyd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for improper venue. At issue was, in which judicial district(s) is venue proper, when a state sex offender subject to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) relocates from one state to another and fails to update his registration in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The court joined several of its fellow circuits in holding that venue was proper in the district from which defendant departed, namely the Eastern District of North Carolina. |
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| United States v. Hinojosa |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-41134 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Jerry E. Smith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed the substance abuse testing requirement in defendant's term of supervised release. The court held that there was no conflict between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment, rejecting defendant's claims to the contrary. The court also held that the substance abuse testing condition related to, among other things, the nature and circumstances of defendant's offense, his personal history and characteristics, and the need to afford adequate deterrence. Therefore, the district court did not commit error, plain or otherwise. |
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| United States v. Holguin-Hernandez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-50386 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not reversibly err in assessing defendant's sentence. The court explained that the twelve-month revocation sentence is within the applicable advisory Guidelines policy statement ranges, and that the district court's order that the revocation sentence run consecutively to the sentence for the new marijuana offense is consistent with USSG 7B1.3(f). The court concluded that nothing inappropriate was considered and the district court's sentence was reasonable. |
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| United States v. Huntsberry |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-31269 Opinion Date: April 10, 2020 Judge: Stuart Kyle Duncan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for various drug offenses and for possessing firearms as a convicted felon. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's felon in possession conviction, because a reasonable jury could plausibly infer, based on the evidence presented, that defendant had knowledge of the weapons. Furthermore, even assuming the district court plainly erred in light of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), defendant failed to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for that error, much less that the error affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Finally, the court held that district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to sever the felon-in-possession count from the drug counts. |
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| United States v. Koutsostamatis |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-20594 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Andrew S. Oldham Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's order of restitution imposed under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act after defendant was convicted of wire fraud. Defendant's conviction stemmed from him posing as a hacker and threatening to release sensitive information unless BP paid him a fortune in cryptocurrency. Although the court rejected defendant's contention that BP's efforts did not constitute "participation" in the FBI's investigation, the court agreed with defendant that BP's expenses constitute "other expenses" within the meaning of section 3663A(b)(4) of the statute. Therefore, the court held that the statutory text, usage, and Lagos v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1684 (2018), lead it to conclude that BP's expenses fell outside the ambit of section 3663A(b)(4). Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. |
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| United States v. Martinez-Ovalle |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-10957 Opinion Date: April 10, 2020 Judge: Don R. Willett Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for illegal reentry after removal. The court held that the Ex Post Facto Clause required the sentencing court to apply the 2016 Guidelines to his 2018 offense. The court explained that, under the 2016 Guidelines, those in effect when defendant's crime concluded, his sentencing range would have been 18–24 months. However, under the 2018 Guidelines, defendant's sentencing range jumped to 30–37 months. Therefore, the court held that defendant was ultimately sentenced under the 2018 sentencing range, and the disparity between the 2016 Guidelines range means that he was sentenced in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. |
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| United States v. Prentice |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Dockets: 18-11084, 18-11273 Opinion Date: April 13, 2020 Judge: Edith Hollan Jones Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit reversed defendant's sentence for possession of a firearm as a felon. The court held that, contrary to defendant's approach, Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779 (2020), broadens the understanding of "a serious drug offense" by focusing on the underlying conduct. Therefore, defendant's conviction for that serious drug offense, as well as his two convictions for the violent felony of burglary of a habitation, triggered the Armed Career Criminal Act. The court held that defendant's prison sentence must accordingly be enhanced, and defendant failed to show a plain error regarding his supervised release. The court remanded for reinstatement of defendant's original sentence. |
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| Smith v. Cook |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 17-4118 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Larsen Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A masked gunman attempted to rob a Columbus Ohio restaurant. Employees escaped and flagged down a police officer. A man, matching the robber's description, discarded distinctive clothing items as he ran away. A pocket contained a handgun matching that used in the robbery. Police apprehended Smith nearby. DNA material matching Smith was found on the discarded items. Smith retained attorney Armengau. Detectives connected Smith to earlier restaurant robberies with “a strikingly consistent method of operation.” They requested cell phone records for a phone number that Smith had given to his probation officer; Smith’s phone had been used near and at the approximate time of most of the robberies. Smith was charged with 18 robberies. Smith’s attorney, Armengau, was indicted for sex crimes. The judge handling Smith’s case recused himself. At Smith’s request, Armengau continued to represent Smith; Armengau’s criminal charges were unknown to the jury. Smith received three continuances. During trial, the prosecutors offered a plea deal for 27 years’ imprisonment. Armengau conceded to the court that he did not share the offer because prior discussions with Smith led Armengau to believe that a 27-year sentence would not be accepted. Smith was present and did not object. The prosecutors stated that the offer would remain open. Smith never asked to discuss a plea. The jury convicted Smith for 12 robberies. With prior-offender gun charges, the judge sentenced Smith to 84 years’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief, rejecting ineffective assistance and Confrontation Clause claims, based on the Armengau’s stipulation to limit the number of trial witnesses, his failure to communicate the plea offer, and the “conflict” posed by his own criminal charges. |
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| Tackett v. Trierweiler |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-1037 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Ronald Lee Gilman Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In a 2006 Ypsilanti drive-by shooting, two teenagers, inside a mobile home, were killed. Four people, including Tackett, were charged. Tacket was found guilty on two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. After unsuccessful state-court proceedings, Tackett filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Even assuming that Tackett’s gun misfired, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Tackett was guilty of first-degree murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory. The facts supported an inference of an intent to kill and there was more than enough time for the shooters to take a “second look.” There was evidence that premeditation and deliberation took place during that time. Tackett provided assistance to the other shooters, knowing all the facts known to the shooters. The court rejected Tackett’s argument that he could have been convicted as a principal, or as an aider and abettor and that the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a special instruction that they had to unanimously agree as to which of these theories was the basis for their verdict. There was no constitutional problem in the fact that two other defendants were convicted of second-degree murder while Tackett was convicted of first-degree murder. The court also rejected ineffective assistance claims. |
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| United States v. Allen |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-3606 Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: John M. Rogers Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2007, Allen pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. The court determined that Allen was a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 and sentenced him to 210 months’ imprisonment. In 2019, Allen moved to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194, citing his age and participation in numerous prison classes and programs. The government argued that his sentencing guidelines range remained unchanged even though the statutory mandatory minimum penalty had been lowered. The district court denied Allen’s request for a reduced prison sentence, reasoning that the Act precluded it from considering Allen’s post-sentencing conduct. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The First Step Act provision regarding retroactivity of the Fair Sentencing Act does not prohibit courts from considering a defendant’s post-sentencing conduct when deciding whether to reduce his sentence. Courts may consider all relevant factors when determining whether to reduce a defendant’s sentence under section 404, which does not require courts to ignore all developments that occurred after the defendant committed the covered offense. Congress contemplated that district courts may look to 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s familiar framework when deciding whether to reduce a defendant’s sentence under the First Step Act. |
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| United States v. Caya |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2469 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Diane S. Sykes Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Police, checking on Thomas, who was unconscious in her car, called for paramedics. While waiting, they found a methamphetamine pipe in the car. At the hospital later, Thomas stated that she had used methamphetamine; that she and her live-in boyfriend obtained it together; that she kept her meth pipes at home; and that she had two children, a one-year-old and a 14-year-old. She was initially confused about where they were. The officers requested a welfare check. Caya answered the door, apparently under the influence of drugs. Sergeant Miller knew that Caya was on extended supervision for a felony conviction and subject to Wisconsin Statutes section 302.113(7r), which authorizes officers to search the person, home, or property of an offender released to extended supervision if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the offender is involved in criminal activity or is violating a condition of his supervision. Caya told the officers that he and Thomas were clean and that Thomas’s children were with their grandmother in Dubuque. The officers initiated a search and found Thomas’s one-year-old child in the living room; they later recovered drug paraphernalia, cash, several loaded rifles and handguns, and 350 grams of meth. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Caya's motion to suppress. Criminal offenders on community supervision have significantly diminished expectations of privacy because of the government’s strong interest in preventing recidivism. The Supreme Court has held that a law-enforcement officer may search a person on parole without any suspicion of criminal activity. A search under section 302.113(7r), which requires reasonable suspicion, is constitutionally permissible. |
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| United States v. Chaparro |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-2513 Opinion Date: April 13, 2020 Judge: HAMILTON Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Chaparro was convicted based on viewing child pornography in 2013, transmitting child pornography in August 2014, and viewing child pornography on a smartphone in November 2014. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The court rejected challenges, which were not raised in the district court, to the sufficiency of the evidence that he was the person using the electronic devices and to allegedly improper remarks made by the prosecutor. The court acknowledged that “the government’s case could have been stronger as to the identity of the devices’ user.” The computer forensics led investigators to a home, not to an individual, and little evidence showed that Chaparro resided at the address before December 2014. Any improper rebuttal comments did not affect Chaparro’s substantial rights. The admission of Chaparro’s statement to pretrial services that he lived at the address was an error; pretrial services information is “confidential” and its admission is specifically prohibited “on the issue of guilt,” 18 U.S.C. 3153(c)(1), (3). Chaparro’s lone witness, his uncle, testified that Chaparro did not live at the address where the crimes were committed until just before his arrest. The court allowed the testimony of the pretrial services officer for impeachment. Assuming an exception exists under section 3153(c)(3) for other forms of impeachment, applying that exception to include specific contradiction by a statement from someone other than the witness is contrary to the protections Congress enacted. |
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| Winfield v. Dorethy |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Dockets: 19-1441, 19-1547 Opinion Date: April 13, 2020 Judge: St. Eve Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Winfield confessed to shooting Garrett. Winfield was convicted of attempted murder. Winfield was also accused of killing Stovall in the same shooting but was acquitted on that charge because no credible witness had placed Winfield at the scene of the crime and his confession did not mention Stovall. The judge rejected Winfield’s argument that his confession was coerced and his “half-hearted” alibi defense. On appeal, Winfield raised one unsuccessful sentencing argument. Illinois state courts, on post-conviction review, concluded that trial counsel’s presentation of Winfield’s alibi was not so deficient that it violated the Constitution; they did not meaningfully address the performance of appellate counsel. On federal habeas review, the district court concluded that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), did not apply because the ineffective assistance claim had not been adjudicated on the merits in state court. It considered the claim without any deference to the state courts and found appellate counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by omitting an argument that Winfield’s confession was uncorroborated. The Seventh Circuit held that Winfield is not entitled to relief. Winfield cannot overcome the deference applied to the state court’s finding that trial counsel performed reasonably because Winfield never told counsel that he was at home at the time of the shooting. The Constitution did not obligate Winfield’s appellate counsel to discover and present a complex and novel corpus delicti argument that may not have succeeded. |
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| United States v. Brown |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1919 Opinion Date: April 13, 2020 Judge: Raymond W. Gruender Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm. The court held that defendant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during a critical stage of the proceedings, because he clearly and unequivocally asserted his right to self-representation. Furthermore, the district court did not err in allowing defendant to proceed pro se with his public defender as stand-by counsel. Even assuming that defendant was denied his right to counsel, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, defendant was without counsel during the direct examination of one witness at the motion to suppress hearing. The court concluded that defendant failed to point to any deficiencies in counsel's cross-examination of the first witness or her examination of the subsequent witnesses, nor does he argue that his motion to suppress would have been granted had counsel performed the initial cross-examination of the Government's witness. |
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| United States v. Castellanos Muratella |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1219 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Grasz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for participating in a methamphetamine-distribution conspiracy. The court held that the district court correctly designated defendant as a career offender based on his prior conviction for two felony drug crimes under Iowa Code section 124.401. The court held that section 124.401 is no broader than USSG 4B1.2. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant where there was no indication that the district court counted his methamphetamine addiction against him. Rather, the generous variance suggests just the opposite. Therefore, defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable. |
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| United States v. Espinal |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1341 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Bobby E. Shepherd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for illegal reentry into the United States. The court declined to reach the issue of whether there is a "ruse exception" to the Speedy Trial Act because, even assuming that the exception exists, the facts in this case do not show that any such ruse occurred. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold a hearing on the motion to dismiss the indictment before denying it. The court also held that, even assuming without deciding, that there were fundamental procedural errors in the underlying removal proceedings, defendant has not met his burden in demonstrating actual prejudice—that but for those errors, there was a reasonable likelihood he would not have been deported. Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in disposing of this issue without a hearing |
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| United States v. Fortier |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3517 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Stras Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for two counts of child pornography. The court held that the government met its specific-intent requirement by providing sufficient proof that one of defendant's "dominant purposes" was to create a visual depiction of his sexual acts with the victims. The court also held that there was no error in allowing defendant's ex-girlfriend to testify that he recorded them having sex too, and that she was 17 years old and in high school when they started dating. Furthermore, there was no error in allowing an FBI task force officer to describe some of the videos and photos from defendant's collection. Finally, defendant's argument -- that his conduct was beyond the reach of Congress to regulate under the Commerce Clause because every action he took was in Minnesota and neither he nor the images crossed state lines -- was foreclosed by precedent. |
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| United States v. Johnson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Dockets: 17-3776, 18-2455, 19-1449 Opinion Date: April 10, 2020 Judge: Roger Leland Wollman Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for nine counts of wire fraud and one count of money laundering. The court held that the district court did not plainly err by finding that defendant's consent to search the vehicle was voluntary. In this case, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's finding that although defendant was being watched by deputies while on the property, did not have access to a phone, and was told that a warrant would be sought whether or not he consented to a search of his truck, his consent was not mere acquiescence to government authority. The court rejected defendant's contention that the government failed to prove venue was proper in the District of Minnesota where a reasonable jury could find that it was more likely than not that the emails at issue were sent from or received in Minnesota. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant, and his sentence was not substantively unreasonable. The court also held that the $2.1 million personal money judgment forfeiture did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines. Finally, the court rejected defendant's arguments in two pro se appeals as without merit. |
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| United States v. Sanders |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1497 Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: Erickson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence of a firearm. The court held that the officers acted in their community caretaking function when they entered the home of defendant's girlfriend without a warrant in response to a domestic disturbance phone call from the girlfriend's daughter. Once the officers arrived at the scene, they learned further details that indicated a serious concern for the safety of the girlfriend and the children who were inside the house. The court also held that the scope of the encounter was carefully tailored to satisfy the officers' purpose for entry. Furthermore, a warrant was not needed to search areas that may conceal the gun, because the daughter told officers that defendant had a gun. Therefore, the officer had an objectively reasonable belief that a gun was inside the house. Finally, the court held that the district court did not err by applying a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG 3C1.1, and the district court did not err in refusing to reduce defendant's applicable Guidelines range to account for acceptance of responsibility. |
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| United States v. Saucedo |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1693 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Bobby E. Shepherd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for illegal reentry into the United States. The court rejected defendant's challenge to the indictment on Speedy Trial Act grounds, holding that the indictment was returned within the 30-day statutory period and thus there was no violation of the Act. Furthermore, even assuming without deciding, that there is a "ruse exception," to the Act, the court held that it would not apply in this case because the facts show that no ruse occurred. In this case, immigration authorities undeniably had a lawful basis for their civil detention of defendant, and defendant failed to show that his detention by ICE was for the primary or exclusive purpose of furthering his ultimate prosecution. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion; defendant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and is therefore barred from collaterally attacking the underlying removal order; and the district court's finding that defendant's waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent is not clearly erroneous. |
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| United States v. Splettstoeszer |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1321 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Grasz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for distribution, possession, and receipt of child pornography. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant's prior sexual abuse convictions as probative of his interest, intent, and motive for distributing, receiving, and possessing child pornography. The court also held that defendant's 210 month sentence is substantively reasonable, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant after relying on the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. |
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| In re: Courtney Wild |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-13843 Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: Newsom Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Petitioner, one of more than 30 woman who were victimized by notorious sex trafficker and child abuser Jeffrey Epstein, sought mandamus relief, alleging that when federal prosecutors secretly negotiated and entered into a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein in 2007, they violated her rights under the Crime Victims' Rights Act of 2004. Specifically, petitioner alleged that federal prosecutors violated her rights to confer with the government's lawyers and to be treated fairly by them. In this case, Epstein entered into a non-prosecution agreement with federal prosecutors, and the prosecutors never conferred with the victims about the agreement or told them that such agreement was under consideration. The Eleventh Circuit denied mandamus relief and held that rights under the CVRA do not attach until criminal proceedings have been initiated against a defendant, either by complaint, information, or indictment. Because the government never filed charges or otherwise commenced criminal proceedings against Epstein, the court held that the CVRA was never triggered. |
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| United States v. Gomez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-10609 Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's 46 month sentence for illegally reentering the United States and 21 month sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that defendant's 67 month sentence, ordered to run consecutively to his undischarged state sentence, represented a significant period of time for defendant to spend in prison but that his actions warrant it in this instance. In this case, the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, including defendant's history of violence, including his sexual battery conviction, as well as his arrest for violating a domestic violence protective injunction. Furthermore, defendant's sentences were within their respective Guidelines ranges, and his sentence for illegally reentering the United States was at the low end of that range. |
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| In re: Mustafa Al Hawsawi |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 19-1100 Opinion Date: April 10, 2020 Judge: Henderson Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Military Law |
| The DC Circuit denied petitions for writs of mandamus seeking vacatur of all orders issued by the former presiding military judge because of the appearance of partiality. Petitioners are being tried before a military tribunal for their alleged roles in the September 11th terrorist attacks. The court held that it was neither clear nor indisputable that the military judge should have recused himself. The court explained that the military judge's career and relationships do not constitute reasonable bases for the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. |
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| United States v. Butler |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 17-3080 Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: Srikanth Srinivasan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The DC Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to grant defendant's motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Defendant was convicted of murder almost 50 years ago. The government recently acknowledged that hair evidence introduced against defendant was false and exceeded the limits of science, and that the prosecution knew or should have known as much at the time of his trial. The court held that the false hair evidence presented by the government was material, because there is a reasonable likelihood that the false hair evidence could have affected the jury's verdict. In this case, the hair evidence provided powerful corroborating evidence. In the absence of the potentially confirming role played by the false hair evidence, the court held that a reasonable juror could have found that the government fell short of meeting its heavy burden, even without the defense advancing a compelling alternative theory. |
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| Barnebey v. Alaska Department of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles |
| Court: Alaska Supreme Court Docket: S-16844 Opinion Date: April 10, 2020 Judge: Peter J. Maassen Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| Jason Barnebey was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. At the police station he was administered a breath test by a DataMaster testing instrument, which showed a result of .081 percent alcohol, above the .08 legal limit. Barnebey elected to obtain an independent chemical test, which showed a result of .073. Following an administrative hearing, a hearing officer relied on the DataMaster breath-test result to sustain the Department of Motor Vehicles’s revocation of the Barnebey's license pursuant to AS 28.15.165(c). Barnebey appealed, arguing, as he had at the administrative hearing, that it was error not to consider the DataMaster’s inherent margin of error in determining whether his test result was over the legal limit. The superior court affirmed the hearing officer’s decision and awarded attorney’s fees to the State; Barnebey appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court determined the hearing officer properly interpreted the governing law and did not violate due process in her consideration of the DataMaster’s margin of error. The Court affirmed the decision revoking the man’s license. However, the Court concluded it was error for the superior court to award attorney’s fees to the State without considering whether the man was entitled to protection as a constitutional litigant under AS 09.60.010(c)(2). The fee award was therefore vacated, and the matter remanded for further consideration of only that issue. |
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| State v. Allen |
| Court: Arizona Supreme Court Docket: CR-17-0556-AP Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: Ann Timmer Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first degree murder and his death sentence but vacated the sentences imposed for counts two, four, and five and remanded for resentencing on those counts, holding that the trial court committed fundamental error by imposing greater than presumptive sentences on those counts. Defendant was found guilty of first degree felony murder (count one), conspiracy to commit child abuse (count two), and three counts of child abuse (counts three through five). The court sentenced Defendant to death for the murder conviction. On the non-capital counts, the court sentenced Defendant to aggravated (counts two through four) and maximum (count five) prison sentences. Count four ran concurrently with the death sentences, with the remaining sentences running consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but reversed three of the sentences imposed, holding (1) there was no error in the guilt phase of the trial; (2) the jury did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to death; (3) Defendant was incorrectly sentenced on count two as a dangerous crime against children in the first degree under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-705(D); and (4) insufficient aggravating factors supported the sentences on counts two, four and five. |
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| Finney v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 145 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Baker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant stated no ground in the petition on which the writ could issue. Appellant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. Appellant later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the Arkansas Department of Correction miscalculated his parole-eligibility status and that, therefore, the judgment of conviction was void. Appellant further alleged that he was unaware when he entered his guilty plea that his prior conviction for aggravated robbery would result in him not being eligible for parole. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's parole eligibility claims were not cognizable in this habeas proceeding; and (2) Appellant's challenge to his guilty plea was not within the purview of a writ of habeas corpus. |
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| Garcia-Chicol v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 148 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Womack Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion for mistrial, holding that the circuit court's decision to admit into evidence a translation of a letter Defendant wrote in Spanish did not violate Ark. R. Evid. 1009 or Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Defendant was convicted of rape. On appeal, the Supreme Court held (1) there was no reversible error as a result of the bailiff's response to the jury foreman's question regarding the verdict forms, which resulted in the foreman mistakenly signing the forms for both rape and attempted rape, as shown by polling the members of the jury individually; and (2) Defendant did not have a constitutional right to confrontation because the translated statements were attributable to Defendant and, therefore, nontestimonial, and the accompanying affidavit to the letter substantially complied with Rule 1009. |
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| Gardner v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 147 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Rhonda K. Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of capital murder and sentence of death, holding that the circuit court did not err. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court did not err in refusing to allow Defendant to represent himself where Defendant's request to self-representation was not unequivocal; (2) the circuit court did not err in refusing to give Defendant's non-model instruction stating that the jury had the option of extending mercy in assessing his punishment; and (3) the circuit court did not err in including two aggravated circumstances jury instructions offered by the State. |
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| Proctor v. Payne |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 142 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Karen R. Baker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying and dismissing Appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that because Appellant did not establish either that the sentencing orders implicated the jurisdiction of the circuit court or that they were facially invalid, the circuit court did not err in denying the petition. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition on the basis that Appellant had previously raised the same arguments in a prior habeas petition. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the circuit court clearly erred in determining that Appellant's Fair Sentencing of Minors Act claims were previously considered, but because Appellant's challenge was to his parole eligibility, he failed to establish that the writ should issue; and (2) Appellant's argument that his sentence was a grossly disproportionate punishment was not cognizable in a writ of habeas corpus. |
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| Rickman v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 138 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Kemp Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of two counts of rape, one count of kidnapping, and other offenses, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress, denying Defendant's proffered jury instructions, or allowing Defendant to plead guilty over the State's objection. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress his custodial statement; (2) under the circumstances, the circuit court did not err in rejecting Defendant's proffered jury instructions on Class B felony kidnapping and on concurrent or consecutive sentencing; and (3) the circuit court did not err in refusing to accept Defendant's guilty plea when the prosecutor objected. |
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| California v. Broadbent |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C086848(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Renner Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| After a court trial, defendant Jason Broadbent was convicted of five counts of selling an assault weapon (counts 1, 5, 15-17), six counts of selling a large-capacity magazine (counts 2, 6, 13, 18-20), nine counts of possession of a firearm by a felon (counts 3, 7, 11-12, 23- 27), three counts of selling heroin (counts 4, 8, 28), four counts of unlicensed sale of a firearm (counts 9- 10, 21-22), and one count of selling methamphetamine (count 14). The court also found true that defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction and three prior prison terms. After denying defendant’s "Romero" motion, the court sentenced defendant to a total term of 53 years eight months in prison. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) his 2001 conviction could not be used as a prior strike or to enhance his sentence under Penal Code section 667.5(b); (2) the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Romero motion to strike his prior strike conviction; (3) all of his sentences for selling a large-capacity magazine and all but one of his sentences for possession of a firearm should have been stayed pursuant to section Penal Code 654; and (4) the court imposed unlawful terms for counts 9, 10, 14, 21, and 22. In supplemental briefing, defendant argued: (1) his convictions for selling large-capacity magazines under section 32310 must be reversed because the statute violated the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) his prior prison term enhancements should have been stricken based on recent amendments to section 667.5; and (3) he was entitled to a hearing on his present ability to pay various fines and fees pursuant to California v. Duenas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (2019). The Court of Appeal agreed the trial court miscalculated the sentence it imposed with respect to counts 9, 10, 14, 21, and 22; defendant’s sentences on counts 2, 3, 6, 7, 11-13, and 18-20, and all but one of his sentences on counts 23-27 should have been stayed pursuant to section 654; and defendant's prior prison terms enhancements had to be stricken. The case was remanded for resentencing, but affirmed in all other respects. |
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| California v. Dennis |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: G055930(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: Raymond J. Ikola Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| After being convicted of three counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder, three counts of second degree robbery, three counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm and a couple of gang-related offenses, with various enhancements attached to each, the trial court sentenced defendant Corbin Dennis to a total of 23 years 8 months, plus 45 years to life in state prison.The attempted premeditated murder convictions were based on a theory that defendant aided and abetted the actual shooter’s attempted premeditated murders by committing the target crime of unlawfully challenging another person in a public place to fight, the natural and probable consequence of which was attempted murder (not attempted premeditated murder). On appeal defendant contended he was entitled to the ameliorative benefits of California Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), which he claimed required reduction of the attempted murder convictions to misdemeanors for disturbing the peace and resentencing to give him credit for time served. He also argued there was insufficient evidence to support his attempted murder convictions. Alternatively, defendant contended the special finding under Penal Code section 664(a), that the attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated, should have been stricken, because the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that in order to make the special finding of premeditation based on a natural and probable consequences theory, it was required to find attempted premeditated murder was a natural and probable consequence of the target crime. The Court of Appeal concluded Senate Bill 1437 was not a bar to defendant's convictions for attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences theory. Furthermore, the Court found the evidence presented at trial sufficient to support the attempted murder convictions and the jury instruction concerning the target offense. The Court found merit in defendant's claim of instructional error regarding attempted premeditated murder on a natural and probable consequences theory: the trial court’s instruction constituted a Sixth Amendment violation because it allowed the jury to find the attempted murders were premeditated without requiring the jury to find that attempted premeditated murder was the natural and probable consequence of the target offense. |
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| In re Shelton |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A154983(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: J. Anthony Kline Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 1993, Shelton was sentenced to a prison term of 19 years to life after pleading no contest to the second-degree murder of his mother-in-law and assault with a firearm on her sister-in-law. Shelton had no prior criminal history. Parole hearings in 2016 and 2018, were his fifth and sixth. Shelton’s “Comprehensive Risk Assessment,” from 2016, concluded he presented a low risk of violence. The psychologist who evaluated Shelton noted “confusion and memory loss secondary to multiple traumatic brain injuries” Shelton had suffered in the military. Shelton, 64 years old in 2019, was permanently mobility impaired and blind/vision impaired. Shelton filed a habeas corpus petition. TIn November 2019, Shelton was again denied parole. The court of appeal ordered a new hearing for consideration of all of the relevant factors. The record suggests Shelton’s cognitive condition will never allow him to demonstrate the kind of insight into his crimes that the panels have been demanding. According to the doctor, Shelton’s neurocognitive disorder was a significant contributing factor in his commission of the offense and “it is unlikely that his disorder will ever allow him to give a coherent narrative about his motivations at the time of the crime.” That lack of insight had not led to violent outcomes in prison. The panel also failed to adequately consider Shelton’s elderly status and the magnitude of his disabilities. |
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| People v. Matthews |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A157723(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Stewart Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Matthews was charged in three cases, with allegations of a prior strike conviction and five prior prison terms for felony convictions that subjected him to sentence enhancements under Penal Code 667.5(b). He entered into a plea agreement with specific sentences and completed a change of plea form for each case in which he wrote the sentence for that case. The form also was executed by his attorney, the prosecutor and the court. For Case 1 he pled guilty to felony grand theft, with a three-year prison term that would be doubled to six years because of the prior strike. He admitted four of the prior prison term allegations, with four one-year terms; his total sentence would be 10 years, concurrent with the sentences in the other cases. For Case 2, Matthews pled guilty to resisting arrest, with a three-year term. In Case 3, Matthews pled guilty to unlawfully taking a motor vehicle, with a three-year term. The court imposed the stipulated sentences. The court of appeal, after determining that it had jurisdiction although Matthews had not sought a certificate of probable cause, held that the four one-year terms must be stricken based on a revision to Penal Code section 667.5(b) that eliminates such terms for all but certain prior sexual offenses. The other stipulated sentences imposed should remain intact, thereby reducing his total prison term to six years. |
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| People v. Perlas |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A152806(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 13, 2020 Judge: Peter J. Siggins Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Perlas, age 17, and his friends shoplifted alcohol and drank in the park; Perlas assaulted the victim, who was found dead the next day. In 1996, Perlas was convicted of second-degree murder. In 2015, Perlas was released to life-term parole, with an agreed-upon condition that he would not consume alcohol. Perlas had been on parole for more than two years without incident when San Francisco police officers responded to reports of a woman in distress and, outside Perlas’s apartment building, met Perlas’s wife, holding their 10-week-old daughter. She stated that Perlas, who was drunk, threw her cell phone out of their window, then attempted to leave on his motorcycle. Perlas’s wife blocked his exit. He “became enraged.” When she tried to take away his keys, Perlas shoved her and gave her a bloody nose, then left. The next day, officers arrested Perlas for spousal battery, child endangerment, and vandalism. Perlas met with his parole officer and signed a form admitting he had been drinking. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation petitioned to revoke Perlas’s parole, stating: “Intermediate sanctions have been considered. However, they have been deemed not appropriate.” The trial court ultimately dismissed the petition “for failure to appropriately consider intermediate sanctions.” The court of appeal reversed. The petition sufficiently alleged that the Department considered and rejected intermediate sanctions before seeking revocation and why intermediate sanctions were not appropriate. |
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| Colorado v. Donald |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 24 Opinion Date: April 13, 2020 Judge: Gabriel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| After Laron Donald was arrested and charged with a felony, the district court set bond and announced the next court date. Donald subsequently posted bond and was released from jail. The one-page bond provided that as a condition of his release, Donald was prohibited from leaving the state of Colorado without approval of the court and the surety. Donald failed to appear at his next scheduled court date, and the court issued a warrant for his arrest. Five weeks later, Donald was pulled over for a traffic violation in Mississippi; the officer discovered Donald had outstanding Colorado warrants and arrested him. Donald was subsequently extradited to Colorado and charged with several counts of violation of bail bond conditions under section 18-8-212(1), C.R.S. (2019). The issue his case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on: (1) what role, if any, the prohibition on inference stacking set out in Tate v. Colorado, 247 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1952), should play in sufficiency of the evidence challenges in criminal cases; and (2) whether sufficient evidence supported Donald’s conviction for violation of bail bond conditions. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the presence of stacked inferences was not alone dispositive of a sufficiency of the evidence claim (it is one factor that a court may consider in determining whether the evidence presented satisfied the prevailing substantial evidence test for evidence sufficiency); and (2) the prosecution here presented sufficient evidence to support Donald’s conviction for violating the bail bond condition prohibiting him from leaving the state without permission. Accordingly, judgment of the division below was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
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| In re Colorado v. DeGreat |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 25 Opinion Date: April 13, 2020 Judge: Hart Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| For nearly a year and a half, Edward DeGreat sat in prison awaiting a new trial after his earlier convictions were reversed. Colorado’s speedy trial statute, required that retrial after reversal take place within six months of the trial court’s receipt of the mandate after appeal. This six-month period could be tolled when the delay is attributable to the defendant; here, respondents argued the delay was attributable to DeGreat because defense counsel did not reach out to schedule a status conference. The Colorado Supreme Court found Colorado law reflected the long-standing principle that a defendant had no duty to bring himself to trial. The Court granted DeGreat’s petition and held the charges against DeGreat had to be dismissed with prejudice. |
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| Cooper v. Delaware |
| Court: Delaware Supreme Court Docket: 261, 2019 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Vaughn Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Maurice Cooper was convicted of: Drug Dealing (Heroin), Aggravated Possession of Heroin, four counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, four counts of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, and two counts of Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered when the police searched a business because there was no nexus between the evidence sought and the business; (2) denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered when the police searched a residential unit for the same reason as the business (no nexus); and (3) denying his motion to suppress evidence retrieved from his Instagram account pursuant because evidence from searches of the business and residence lead police to the account. In addition. Cooper argued his sentence violated his constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment. After review of the trial court record, the Delaware Supreme Court found no merit to Cooper’s claims and affirmed the convictions and sentence. |
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| Ponticelli v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC19-607 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's successive postconviction motion filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that Appellant was not entitled to postconviction relief. In 1993, Appellant's two death sentences became final. In his postconviction motion Appellant raised claims predicated on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and the Supreme Court's decision on remand in Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that this Court's precedent and the United States Supreme Court's precedent foreclosed relief as to Appellant's claims. |
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| Idaho v. Ish |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 45345 Opinion Date: April 13, 2020 Judge: Roger S. Burdick Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Martin Edmo Ish appealed his conviction and sentence for one count of voluntary manslaughter. The State charged Ish with second-degree murder in November 2015 for the June 2009 killing of Eugene Lorne Red Elk in Pocatello, Idaho. Ish and friends were barhopping when at some point, Ish had a confrontation with staff at the Bourbon Barrel. Ish and his friends went a few blocks away to Duffy's Tavern. The friends returned to the Bourbon Barrel, but Ish did not; Barrel staff called Duffy's to alert them of Ish's earlier confrontation. Red Elk was working at Duffy's as a bouncer. He asked Ish to leave, and Ish complied. Later that night, however, Red Elk was discovered in Duffy's parking lot "gurgling blood." He had suffered a brain injury from blunt force trauma to the head; despite being life-flighted to a medical center in Idaho Falls, Red Elk died three days later. TO police, Ish admitted that he “blasted” Red Elk and he “was pretty sure he killed him because he was laying [sic] there gurgling.” A trial was held in April 2017 after which the jury found Ish guilty of the lesser-included charge of voluntary manslaughter. Ish appealed, claiming the trial order erred in seating and instructing the jury, and in making certain evidentiary rulings. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial. The Supreme Court determined the district court’s finding that the prosecution did not strike Juror 3 with discriminatory intent was clearly erroneous. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. |
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| Idaho v. Lodge |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 46378 Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: Stegner Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Riley Lodge appealed a no contact order entered against him as a result of his being convicted of two counts of sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age. After Lodge pleaded guilty to these two counts, the district court entered a no contact order which prohibited Lodge from having contact with the named victims and “[a]ll minor children.” On appeal, Lodge contended the district court abused its discretion by failing to provide an exception to the no contact order for two minor children who were also his biological children, and who were conceived as a result of the underlying sexual batteries. Lodge argued the district court failed to exercise reason because there was no evidence that he posed a threat to his own children. The Idaho Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court and the no contact order. |
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| Dew-Becker v. Wu |
| Court: Supreme Court of Illinois Citation: 2020 IL 124472 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Anne M. Burke Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Gaming Law |
| Dew-Becker sued Wu, alleging that the two had engaged in a daily fantasy sports (DFS) contest on the FanDuel website; that Dew-Becker had lost $100 to Wu; and that the contest constituted illegal gambling so that Dew-Becker was entitled to recover the lost money under 720 ILCS 5/28-8(a). The circuit court rendered judgment in favor of Wu, finding that section 28-8(a) does not allow recovery when the gambling is not conducted between one person and another person. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed that recovery is unavailable. The DFS contest was not gambling under section 28-8(a). A person commits gambling if he “knowingly plays a game of chance or skill for money or other thing of value, unless excepted in subsection (b).” Subsection (b)(2) provides an exception to gambling for a participant in any contest that offers “prizes, award[s] or compensation to the actual contestants in any bona fide contest for the determination of skill, speed, strength or endurance or to the owners of animals or vehicles entered in such contest.” That “DFS contests are predominately skill-based is not only widely recognized” but has created a potential revenue problem for the DFS websites. New and unskilled players are often hesitant to participate. |
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| People v. Lindsey |
| Court: Supreme Court of Illinois Citation: 2020 IL 124289 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Mary Jane Theis Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Rock Island officer Muehler received information that the defendant was selling narcotics from a motel room. The defendant had an extensive criminal record, including two 2012 arrests for the manufacture and delivery of controlled substances. Another officer contacted the defendant, who stated that he had narcotics for sale and agreed to meet. Muehler surveilled the motel and observed the defendant drive away. Muehler knew that the defendant had a suspended driver’s license. Another officer stopped the defendant, who was arrested and signed a waiver of rights form. The motel’s staff stated that the defendant was staying in Room 130. Deputy Pena and his K-9 partner, Rio, went to the motel. Rio conducted a “free air sniff” in the alcove outside Room 130 and alerted to the odor of narcotics “within inches of the door.” Muehler obtained a search warrant. Inside the room, police found heroin and related items. The defendant admitted that the heroin was his. After the denial of his motion to suppress, the defendant was convicted. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. The government can violate the Fourth Amendment either by a warrantless intrusion onto a person’s property or by a warrantless infringement of a person’s societally recognized privacy. Even if the defendant’s motel room was his home, the alcove outside it was not curtilage; it was not put to personal use by the defendant. He had no ownership or possession of the alcove, only a license to use it. The defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcove. |
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| State v. Wilson |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 18-0564 Opinion Date: April 10, 2020 Judge: Edward M. Mansfield Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter and assault with intent to cause serious injury, holding that Defendant was not entitled to a pretrial evidentiary hearing and that Defendants remaining challenges were without merit. Defendant was charged with one count of murder and two counts of attempted murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offenses of one count of voluntary manslaughter and two counts of assault with intent to cause serious injury. On appeal Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court should have held a pretrial hearing pursuant to section 704.13 to determine his immunity from prosecution before trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in refusing to conduct a pretrial hearing on Defendant's justification defense; (2) the trial evidence was sufficient to prove lack of justification; and (3) Defendant's remaining allegations of error were without merit. |
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| State v. Coleman |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 118673 Opinion Date: April 10, 2020 Judge: Green Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court revoking Defendant's probation without first imposing intermediate sanctions, holding that Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3716(c)(9)(B) does not apply to probationers such as Defendant, whose offenses were committed before that statute's effective date. Effective July 1, 2017, the Legislature amended section 22-3716(c)(9)(B) to permit a trial court to revoke a probationer's probation without first imposing graduated sanctions if the probation was granted as the result of a dispositional departure. Defendant's probation in the instant case was granted as a dispositional departure and was revoked on November 1, 2017. The trial court ruled that because Defendant's probation had been granted as the result of dispositional departures, the court had the authority to revoke Defendant's probation and impose the underlying sentences without first imposing intermediate sanctions. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the trial court erred in applying section 22-3716(c)(9)(B) retrospectively. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err by holding that section 22-3716(c)(9)(B) does not operate retrospectively. |
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| State v. Lindell |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 49 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Joseph Jabar Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of theft by unauthorized taking, theft by deception, securities violations, tax evasion, and failure to pay state income tax, holding that the trial court did not commit prejudicial error or abuse its discretion. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence employee procedure manuals or certain checks with their memo lines unredacted without a limiting instruction; (2) the court did not err by declining to instruct the jury on the definition of the word “conduct,” by declining to instruct the jury on methods for calculating income taxes, and by failing to provide the jury with relevant statutes; and (3) the court did not err in concluding that Defendant's conduct satisfied the territorial applicability requirement of Maine law. |
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| State v. Anderson |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A18-1491 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: McKeig Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of second-degree driving while impaired, holding that the State properly used Defendant's license revocation as an aggravating factor to enhance his charge of driving while impaired. Defendant was charged with second-degree driving while impaired for refusal to submit to chemical testing in violation of Minn. Stat. 169A.25, subd. 1(b), which requires that the defendant both refuse to submit to chemical testing and the presence of one aggravating factor. Defendant's prior license revocation was the aggravating factor, but the State waited until the license revocation was sustained to charge Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding (1) a license revocation is "present" as an aggravating factor as of its effective date, and it may be used to enhance a charge of driving while impaired once review has occurred or the right to review has been waived; and (2) therefore, the State properly used Defendant's license revocation as an aggravating factor. |
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| State v. Vangrevenhof |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A18-1530 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: G. Barry Anderson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions for first-degree sale of a controlled substance and second-degree possession of a controlled substance, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a witness's statements under Minn. R. Evid. 807, the residual hearsay exception. Defendant's convictions were based on a transaction in which Defendant sold methamphetamine to L.P. After she was arrested, L.P. was interviewed by law enforcement and made statements regarding her meeting with Defendant and the drug transaction. During trial, the district court admitted into evidence L.P.'s statements under Rule 807. At issue on appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting the statements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting L.P.'s statements because admission of the statements satisfied the enumerated requirements of Rule 807. |
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| In re Care & Treatment of D.N. |
| Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC98077 Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: Powell Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court committing Appellant to the department of mental health (DMH) as a sexually violent predator (SVP), holding that the circuit court did not err. In 2005, Appellant pleaded guilty to felony sex abuse. Before his release in 2016, the State filed a petition seeking to civilly commit him as an SVP. A jury found Appellant to be an SVP and the circuit court committed him to DMH. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it prohibited Appellant from questioning the jury panel about the specific ages of child victims; (2) the circuit court did not err when it excluded a portion of the testimony regarding Appellant's risk of future dangerousness; (3) the circuit court did not plainly err in submitting Instruction No. 6, the verdict director; (4) Appellant received effective assistance of counsel at his probable cause hearing; (5) the circuit court did not plainly err in overruling Appellant's motion for new trial based on juror nondisclosure of bias; (6) Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for change of venue was without merit; and (7) omissions in the trial transcript did not prejudice Appellant's appellate review. |
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| McFadden v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC97737 Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: Mary R. Russell Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court judgment overruling Defendant's Mo. Rev. Stat. 29.15 motion for postconviction relief from his death sentence for first degree murder, holding that the circuit court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were not clearly erroneous. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court committed multiple errors affecting the guilt phase, penalty phase, and postconviction relief phases of his criminal case. Among other things, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in failing to find that his counsel provided ineffective assistance in several respects. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were not clearly erroneous and that the circuit court did not err in denying postconviction relief. |
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| State v. Barnett |
| Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC98268 Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: George W. Draper, III Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sentencing Defendant to two terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, holding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 565.020 is constitutional as applied to Defendant. Defendant was nineteen years old when he killed his grandparents. Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for each murder count. Later, a federal district court ordered the state of Missouri either to sentence Defendant to life without the possibility of probation or parole or grant him a new penalty phase trial. On remand, Defendant argued that section 565.020, which then provided that first-degree murder shall be punishable either by death or imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or parole, was unconstitutional as applied to him because offenders who commit crimes at nineteen years old also display the transient, hallmark features of adolescence affecting risk and impulse control. The circuit court rejected Defendant's claims and sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole on both murder counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where Supreme Court precedent clearly defines a juvenile as an individual younger that eighteen years of age for purposes of the considerations Defendant sought, section 565.020 was constitutional as applied to Defendant. |
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| State v. Galvan |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 513 Opinion Date: April 10, 2020 Judge: Funke Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part as modified and vacated in part the order of the district court imposing consecutive five-month terms of imprisonment following Defendant's revocation from post-release supervision in two cases, holding that Defendant's second five-month term of imprisonment must be vacated and that Defendant was entitled to jail time credit. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in imposing consecutive sentences and failing to award credit for time served after revocation, prior to sentencing. The Supreme Court vacated the five-month term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation in one case, directing that Defendant not commerce serving the post-release supervision term in that case until he had completed serving his post-release supervision term in his other case. The Court affirmed the five-month term of imprisonment imposed in the other case, as modified by crediting Defendant with sixty-four days of time served. |
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| Valdez-Jimenez v. Eighth Judicial District Court |
| Court: Supreme Court of Nevada Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 20 Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: James W. Hardesty Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied Defendants' petitions for writ of mandamus challenging the district court's bail process and decisions, holding that, to safeguard against pretrial detainees sitting in jail simply because they cannot afford to post bail, certain due process protections are constitutionally required, and there was no relief to provide to Defendants in this case. Each defendant filed a motion to vacate or reduce their bail amount, contending that the bail amounts were excessive and that the bail process violated their right to due process and equal protection. The district court denied the motions. Both defendants filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court elected to entertain the writ petitions but denied the petitions because there was no relief it could provide to Defendants, holding (1) bail may be imposed only where it is necessary to reasonably ensure the defendant's appearance at court proceedings or to protect the community, and a defendant who remains in custody after arrest is entitled to an individualized hearing; and (2) because Defendants were no longer subject to pretrial detention, their petitions for writs of mandamus are denied. |
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| New Jersey v. Bell |
| Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey Docket: a-58-18 Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: Solomon Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Isaiah Bell was arrested after James Kargbo died from stab wounds apparently inflicted during an altercation that occurred when defendant and his partner arrived at Kargbo’s house to pick up her son. A Somerset County prosecutor asked a grand jury to consider two charges against defendant: murder, a crime of the first degree, and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. The prosecutor explained the counts and elements of the offenses. A grand juror twice asked whether murder had different degrees, and the prosecutor explained that grand jurors do not determine degrees, only whether the facts presented “fit the elements of the crime.” After several witnesses testified and answered questions, the same grand juror asked, “is there such a thing as second-degree murder?” The prosecutor responded by discussing the grand jury’s responsibilities regarding “lesser included lower offenses,” and the elements of murder. The grand juror asked, “[T]here’s no part of the . . . statute that speaks to premeditation?” The prosecutor confirmed that there was not and read the model jury charge for murder. The grand jury indicted defendant on both counts. The issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether the prosecutor's failure to instruct the grand jury on lesser-included offense for murder in response to questions posed by the grand juror constituted an abuse of prosecutorial discretion that warranted dismissal of defendant's indictment for first-degree murder and weapons charges. The Supreme Court determined the prosecutor did not impermissibly interfere with the grand jury's investigative function. |
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| State ex rel. Bonner v. Serrott |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-1450 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for writs of mandamus and procedendo to compel the court of common pleas judge to issue a judgment of conviction that constitutes a final, appealable order, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy at law. In 1993, Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder with a firearm specification and other offenses. The court of appeals reduced the aggravated murder conviction to a murder conviction. In 1995, on remand, the trial court entered a modified judgment. Appellant later filed a motion arguing that the modified judgment entry was not a final, appealable order because it did not comply with Crim.R. 32(C). The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal. In 2015, the trial court issued a new judgment of conviction sua sponte. Appellant did not appeal from the new entry. In 2018, Appellant filed an action seeking writs of mandamus and procedendo, arguing that the 2015 judgment of conviction was not a final, appealable order. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, concluding that Appellant had an adequate remedy at law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the petition. |
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| State ex rel. Davis v. Janas |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-1462 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus against former Lorain County Court of Common Pleas Judge Thomas W. Janas, holding that Appellant's complaint sufficiently alleged that the judge patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to change Appellant's sentence after the sentence had been affirmed on appeal. In 1994, following Appellant's conviction for aggravated murder, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison with parole eligibility after twenty years. In 2018, the Adult Parole Authority informed Appellant that the trial court had issued a nunc pro tunc entry in 1999 stating that Appellant's sentence for aggravated murder was twenty full years to life. In 2019, Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus arguing that the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to issue the nunc pro tunc entry after the court of appeals had affirmed his sentence. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant's complaint stated a meritorious claim that the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to change his sentence after his sentence had been affirmed on appeal. |
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| State ex rel. Parker Bey v. Loomis |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-1463 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus against the Trumbull Correctional Institution and Julie Loomis, the assistant to the warden (collectively, TCI), holding that the appellate court erred in dismissing Appellant's public-records mandamus complaint. While incarcerated at the Trumbull Correction Institution, Appellant submitted a handwritten public-records request to TCI seeking legal-mailroom logs and the dates and times that the institutional inspector made rounds in the housing units for certain periods. Loomis provided copies of the portions of the requested legal-mailroom logs in which Appellant's name appeared but none of the remaining records. Appellant filed a complaint seeking to compel TCI to provide him with the rest of his requested records. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint, determining that the complaint was moot because Appellant had already received all the requested records to which he was entitled. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where TCI provided no evidence demonstrating that it complied with the second part of Appellant's records request, the court of appeals erred when it concluded that Appellant's claim was moot. |
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| State v. Fips |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-1449 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Fischer Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals finding that Defendant's conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence and reducing her conviction to a lesser included offense rather than ordering a new trial, holding that a new trial is the appropriate remedy when a reviewing court determines that a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of assaulting a peace officer. On appeal, the court of appeals determined that Defendant's conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence, but rather than ordering a new trial, the court of appeals modified the judgment to reduce the conviction to the lesser included offense of disorderly conduct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred by not adhering precedent dictating that a new trial is the appropriate remedy when a reviewing court determines that a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. |
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| State v. Miller |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-1420 Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: Fischer Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated Defendant's guilty pleas and convictions, reaffirming that trial courts in felony cases must strictly comply with the plea colloquy required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and holding that a trial court strictly complies with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) when it orally advises the defendant in a manner reasonably intelligible to the defendant that the plea waives the rights enumerated in the rule. At issue in this case was whether strict compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) requires that the plea colloquy include particular words. Defendant pleaded guilty to certain crimes. On appeal, Defendant argued that the pleas should be vacated because the trial court failed to ensure that he understood that by pleading guilty he was waiving the constitutional rights enumerated in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). The court of appeals vacated Defendant's guilty pleas and reversed his convictions, concluding that the trial court failed to strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) by failing to advise Defendant that he would waive his constitutional trial rights by pleading guilty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court strictly complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) by using easily understood words conveying to Defendant that he would be waiving certain constitutional rights if he were to plead guilty. |
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| Stever v. Wainwright |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-1452 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief on any of his three propositions of law. Appellant was convicted of an aggravated murder that he committed when he was a juvenile. In his habeas petition, Appellant argued that he was entitled to immediate release because the court of common pleas had lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his case for several reasons. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint, determining that the premise of Appellant's claim was false. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals properly found that the judgment of conviction and sentence were not void ab initio for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
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| Washington v. Cyr |
| Court: Washington Supreme Court Docket: 97323-7 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Yu Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2017, petitioner Johnny Ray Cyr pleaded guilty to three counts of sale of a controlled substance (heroin) for profit. Cyr stipulated to his prior convictions and to his offender score of 5. Based on his convictions and offender score, the standard sentence range provided by the SRA is 68+ to 100 months. The issue his case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on the statutory maximum sentence Cyr could receive for those three convictions. The Court held that if Cyr had a prior conviction for violating the Uniform Controlled Substances At, " “or under any statute of the United States or of any state relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic drugs,” then his statutory maximum sentence is 120 months. In that case, he must be sentenced within the standard range provided by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A RCW. However, the Court could not determine from the record whether Cyr had such a prior qualifying conviction. The matter was therefore remanded to the trial court to address that question and, depending on the answer, to conduct further proceedings. |
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| Winnebago County v. C.S. |
| Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Docket: 2016AP001982 Opinion Date: April 10, 2020 Judge: Annette Kingsland Ziegler Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Health Law |
| The Supreme Court held that Wis. Stat. 51.61(1)(g), which permits the involuntary medication of an incompetent but non-dangerous inmate, is facially unconstitutional for any inmate who is involuntarily committed based on determinations that he was mentally ill and in need of treatment when the inmate is involuntarily medicated based merely on a determination that the inmate is incompetent to refuse medication. At issue before the Supreme Court was the circuit court's order of extension of commitment, order for involuntary medication and treatment, and order denying C.S.'s postcommitment motion. C.S., who suffered from schizophrenia, was committed while he was an inmate. Because he was determined incompetent to refuse medication pursuant to section 51.61(1)(g) he was the subject of multiple involuntary medication court orders. C.S. was committed not based upon a determination of dangerousness but, rather, on determinations that he was mentally ill and in need of treatment. C.S. argued that section 51.61(1)(g)(3 is unconstitutional when it permits the involuntary medication of any inmate committed under Wis. Stat. 51.20(1)(ar) without a determination that the inmate is dangerous. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that incompetence to refuse medication alone is not an essential or overriding State interest and cannot justify involuntary medication. |
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| Wiley v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 49 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Gray Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the 1992 sentence imposed on Defendant for crimes Defendant committed when he was fifteen years old, holding that Defendant's sentence was not a de facto life sentence entitling him to an individualized sentencing hearing under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). In 1992, Defendant was sentenced to three life sentences and one twenty-year to life sentence, all running concurrently, and one eighteen- to twenty-year sentence running consecutively to the other sentences. Here, Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming it was illegal in violation of Miller, Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132 (Wyo. 2014), and their progeny. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's 1992 sentence was not the functional equivalent of life in prison and that Defendant was not entitled to an individualized sentencing hearing under Miller. |
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