| White v. State, Division of Forestry |
| Citation: 135 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 67 Opinion Date: December 26, 2019 Judge: James W. Hardesty Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Real Estate & Property Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying a prisoner's petition for judicial review challenging the amount of compensation he received, upon his release, in connection with the industrial injury he suffered while incarcerated, holding that the administrative appeals officer properly affirmed the calculation of the prisoner's average monthly wage. Appellant was injured while working for Nevada Division of Forestry while he was incarcerated. Respondent accepted Appellant's workers' compensation claim. After Appellant was released he sought to have the benefits calculated at the minimum wage guaranteed under the Nevada Constitution. Under the modified workers' compensation program for prisoners, however, the amount of compensation a prisoner may receive upon release is based on the average monthly wage the prisoner actually received as of the date of the injury. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying Appellant's petition for judicial review, holding that an administrative appeals officer is not permitted to recalculate the average monthly wage at an amount the prisoner did not actually receive while incarcerated. |
| |
| Cabrera v. State |
| Citation: 135 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 65 Opinion Date: December 26, 2019 Judge: Stiglich Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of two counts of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and other crimes, holding that the district court erred in precluding Defendant from asserting duress as a defense to the charged crimes which were not punishable with death. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit murder, and burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon. At issue on appeal was whether the language in Nev. Rev. Stat. 194.010(8) stating that duress cannot be asserted as a defense to a crime that "is punishable with death" can be interpreted to include crimes that are not punishable with death but require proof of intent to commit a crime that is punishable by death. The Supreme Court held (1) section 194.010(8) cannot be interpreted to limit the duress defense with respect to crimes that are not punishable with death regardless of the relationship between those crimes and another crime that is punishable with death; and (2) the district court's error in precluding Defendant from asserting duress as a defense to the crimes not punishable by death was not harmless. |
| |
| High Desert State Prison v. Sanchez |
| Citation: 135 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 68 Opinion Date: December 26, 2019 Judge: James W. Hardesty Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision applying the pre-2007 version of Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.4465 to Defendant's criminal conduct in this case, holding that the 2007 amendment to Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.4465 applies when the charged offense is continuous in nature but that attempted lewdness with a child under fourteen is not a continuing offense. Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted lewdness with a child under fourteen and was alleged to have committed the offenses between 2006 and 2013. The district court applied the 2003 version of section 209.4465. On appeal, the State argued that section 209.4465(8)(2007) applied to Defendant's offenses because the attempted lewdness counts were charged as continuing offenses through 2013. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) attempted lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen is not a continuing offense; and (2) the district court properly relied on the 2003 version of section 209.4465 and applied Defendant's earned credits to his parole eligibility. |
| |
| In re Application of Finley |
| Citation: 135 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 63 Opinion Date: December 26, 2019 Judge: Tao Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Petitioner's petition to seal criminal records, holding that because the parties did not cite all of the proper statutes governing Petitioner's petition and the district court did not apply all of the controlling statutes the court erred in concluding that all of Petitioner's convictions were ineligible for sealing. At issue in this appeal was whether, if enough time elapses so that a petitioner's later conviction is sealed and deemed never to have occurred, that makes an earlier conviction eligible also to be sealed since it is no longer chronologically followed by another later conviction, even though it would not have been eligible prior to sealing the later conviction. The Supreme Court held (1) district courts have discretion to evaluate successive convictions in reverse chronological order, thereby potentially sealing earlier convictions that would not have been eligible had the court instead considered the convictions in forward chronological order; and (2) even if a later conviction has been sealed, the district court may still consider it in deciding whether earlier convictions should be sealed or not and in concluding whether the petitioner was truly rehabilitated. |
| |
| State v. Inzunza |
| Citation: 135 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 69 Opinion Date: December 26, 2019 Judge: James W. Hardesty Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Respondent's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, holding that Respondent properly invoked his speedy-trial right, Respondent was entitled to a presumption of prejudice, and the State failed to rebut that presumption. The district court concluded that the State violated Respondent's right to a speedy trial because the State's gross negligence caused a twenty-six-month delay between the filing of charges and Respondent's arrest, and the State failed to rebut the presumption that the delay prejudiced Respondent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that Respondent was entitled to a presumption o prejudice under the facts enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992); and (2) the State did not rebut this presumption or explain on appeal how Respondent was not prejudiced by the delay. |
| |
| Benko v. Quality Loan Service Corp. |
| Citation: 135 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 64 Opinion Date: December 26, 2019 Judge: James W. Hardesty Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellants' putative class action alleging that Respondents, current or former Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 107 trustees, engaged in unlicensed debt collection agency activities by pursuing nonjudicial foreclosures on their homes, holding that Appellants did not plead a cognizable cause of action. In dismissing the complaint the district court found that the plain language of Chapter 107 authorized the actions allegedly performed by Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the legislature did not intend that deed of trust trustees be subjected to Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 649 licensing requirements when they are engaged in nonjudicial foreclosures; and (2) because Appellants' allegations fell within the bounds of Chapter 107, Appellants did not plead a cognizable cause of action. |
| |
| Chandra v. Schulte |
| Citation: 135 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 66 Opinion Date: December 26, 2019 Judge: Stiglich Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed nine district court orders directing payment from the Nevada Real Estate Education, Research and Recovery Fund (the Fund), one to Melani Schulte individually and eight to various LLCs in her control, stemming from William Schulte's fraudulent management of properties, holding that the spousal exception to Fund recovery in Nev. Rev. Stat. 645.844(4)(a) applied at the time of the misconduct and that transactions involving one's own properties do not qualify for Chapter 645's protections. The Fund compensates victims of real estate fraud whose judgment against a fraudulent real estate licensee is uncollectible. The district court issued the nine orders stemming from the fraudulent management of properties by William, Melani's then husband. All but one of the properties were jointly owned by the Schultes. The Supreme Court reversed the orders, holding (1) because Melani and William were married at the time of the fraud, the spousal exception prohibits Melani's individual recovery; and (2) because transactions involving one's own properties do not require a real estate license, the district court erred in granting awards to the eight LLCs. |
| |
