American Law’s Worst Moment—2020

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—explains why the police murder of George Floyd was the worst moment of 2020 in American law. Professor Sarat proposes that we remember the event and that date—May 25—as “infamous,” a word reserved for rare and atrocious events like the bombing of Pearl Harbor, in an attempt to capture the brutality and inhumanity of the act.

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Reinard v. Crown Equipment Corporation

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 18-3440

Opinion Date: December 30, 2020

Judge: Raymond W. Gruender

Areas of Law: Personal Injury, Products Liability

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's admission of evidence over plaintiffs' objection and denial of plaintiffs' motion for a new trial in a products liability action brought against Crown, a forklift manufacturer. The court applied Huff v. Heckendorn Manufacturing Co., 991 F.2d 464, 467 (8th Cir. 1993), and concluded that plaintiffs waived their challenge to the admission of the video simulations where they preemptively introduced the simulations into evidence. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.

Hooks v. Atoki

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-6093

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Carolyn Baldwin McHugh

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Personal Injury

Plaintiff-appellant Antonio Hooks alleged Officers Chris Harding and James Irby of the Bethany, Oklahoma, Police Department, used excessive force against him in the course of an arrest, and, separately, that Officer Kayode Atoki exhibited deliberate indifference by failing to intervene during a vicious, gang-related jailhouse assault. The district court screened and dismissed Hooks’s excessive force claim prior to discovery. And after limited discovery, the district court granted Officer Atoki’s motion for summary judgment on the deliberate indifference claim. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, in part and reversed, in part. Specifically, the Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Hooks’s excessive force claim because some of his allegations were not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Officer Atoki on Hooks’s deliberate indifference claim. The Court also took the opportunity to clarify that its recent discussion of the deliberate indifference standard in Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984 (10th Cir. 2020), applied outside the medical context.

Akhmetshin v. Browder

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 19-7129

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Harry Thomas Edwards

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Personal Injury

Appellant, a resident of the District of Columbia and a dual citizen of the United States and the Russian Federation, filed a defamation action in district court against appellee, a nonresident alien and citizen of the United Kingdom. Because appellee made his allegedly defamatory statements outside of the District of Columbia, appellant sought to establish personal jurisdiction over appellee under the District's long-arm jurisdiction statute, D.C. CODE 13-423(a)(4). The district court granted appellee's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The DC Circuit vacated, concluding that it cannot determine whether appellee's non-government contacts with the District satisfy any of the three "plus factors" required under the long-arm statute. In this case, the district court relied on an overly broad construction of the government contacts exception in granting judgment for appellee and denying jurisdictional discovery. Accordingly, the court has no sound basis upon which to credit the district court's judgment. The court remanded for jurisdictional discovery.

Dziubla v. Piazza

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D076183(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Dato

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Internet Law, Personal Injury

Plaintiffs-appellants Robert Dziubla and Linda Stanwood claimed defendant Ignatius Piazza II, owner of a Nevada firearms training facility, harassed and threatened them by publishing defamatory statements along with their personal identifying information, and sending associates to invade their home. Piazza retorted that plaintiffs conned him out of thousands of dollars and are now attempting to steal his property and "chill his constitutional rights." The trial court granted in part and denied in part Piazza’s special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. With one important clarification as to the scope of protected activity, the Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion. That clarification involved so-called “doxing” allegations in the complaint: plaintiffs’ claim that Piazza published private personal identifying information about them to thousands of gun enthusiasts as a thinly-veiled threat about what could happen if they continued to litigate the business dispute. Although it was included in an otherwise-protected litigation “alert” that discussed the pending lawsuit, the doxing information was entirely extraneous to the court proceedings that were the ostensible subject of the communication. The Court of Appeal thus rejected Piazza’s assertion that plaintiffs could not meet the “minimal merit” standard on the anti-SLAPP motion because the doxing allegations would necessarily be barred by the litigation privilege in Civil Code section 47(b). The order granting the special motion to strike was reversed in part as to two of plaintiffs’ cause of action ‒ the tenth, seeking an injunction, and the twelfth, alleging a civil rights violation ‒ but only as to the claims included in these causes of action that alleged injury from the publication of their personal information, i.e., the doxing allegations. In all other respects, the order was affirmed. The matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

N.G. v. County of San Diego

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D076539(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 28, 2020

Judge: Joan Irion

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

In 2018, N.G. submitted a proposed claim for damages to the County, alleging that San Diego County Deputy Sheriff Richard Fischer sexually assaulted her in 2017. N.G. acknowledged the claim was submitted 81 days after the six-month period for filing a claim expired. N.G.’s petition for relief alleged that due to the emotional trauma and psychological difficulties faced by victims of sexual assaults committed by law enforcement officers, which could cause those victims to delay in coming forward, her failure to file a timely claim should have been excused due to mistake or excusable neglect. Accordingly, N.G. also filed an application for leave to file a late claim. The County denied leave to file a late claim; N.G. appealed when the district court denied her petition under Government Code section 946.6 seeking relief from the requirement in the Government Claims Act that she timely file a claim with the County of San Diego prior to bringing a suit for damages. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court was within its discretion to conclude that N.G. did not establish mistake or excusable neglect to support her petition for relief from the claim filing requirement. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed.

Skahan v. Stutts Construction Co.

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Dockets: SCWC-16-0000664, SCWC-16-0000663, SCWC-19-0000077

Opinion Date: December 24, 2020

Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

In these consolidated appeals arising from Kenneth Skahan's claims for workers' compensation benefits against his former employer and its insurance carrier (collectively, Employer), the Supreme Court vacated in part the judgments of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board's (LIRAB) decisions, holding that the ICA erred in part. Skahan injured his back while working for Employer, and Employer accepted workers' compensation liability. After Skahan's employment with Employer ended, he experienced mid and low back pain and was diagnosed with diffuse idiopathic skeletal hyperostosis (DISH) and filed multiple claims for additional workers' compensation benefits. LIRAB determined that Skahan's DISH injury was compensable because it was causally related to his work injury but that his low back injury was not compensable. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated in part, holding (1) the ICA erred in holding that Employer rebutted the Haw. Rev. Stat. 386-85 presumption that Skahan's low back claim was for a covered work injury; (2) LIRAB's finding that Skahan's injury was permanent and stationary and at maximum medical improvement by April 19, 2013 was clearly erroneous; and (3) LIRAB's conclusion of law ending Skahan's temporary total disability benefits on April 19, 2013 was clearly erroneous.

Potter v. Great Falls Insurance Co.

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2020 ME 144

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Connors

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the opinion of the Workers' Compensation Board Appellate Division agreeing with the conclusion of the administrative law judge (ALJ) that Darla Potter, an aquaculture worker, was not a "seaman" within the meaning of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. 30104, holding that the Appellate Division did not err. The Appellate Division affirmed the decree of the ALJ granting Potter's petitions for award of compensation for injuries sustained in the course of her employment with Cooke Aquaculture USA, Inc. At issue on appeal was whether Potter's claims fell within the jurisdiction of federal admiralty law or state workers' compensation law. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Potter was not a seaman within the purview of the Jones Act.