What Trump’s Pardons Reveal about Him and His Misunderstanding of Executive Clemency

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—describes how President Trump’s pardons reveal his “superficial and distorted” understanding of American values. Professor Sarat points out that for someone who claims to value the clemency power, President Trump has granted clemency fewer times than any President since William McKinley, who served from 1897 to 1901, and when Trump has granted clemency, he has used it to reward people whose crimes show their contempt for the rule of law.

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Sandoval-Ryan v. Oleander Holdings

Docket: C089486(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 7, 2020

Judge: Elena J. Duarte

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Civil Procedure, Contracts, Health Law

Plaintiff Anna Sandoval-Ryan signed admission documents on behalf of her brother, Jesus Sandoval, following his admission to Sacramento Post-Acute (Post- Acute), a skilled nursing facility owned by Oleander Holdings, LLC (Oleander) and Plum Healthcare Group, LLC (Plum Healthcare). Among the documents plaintiff signed were two agreements to arbitrate claims arising out of the facility’s care for Sandoval. Sandoval’s condition deteriorated while being cared for at the facility, and he was transferred to a hospital where he later died. Plaintiff sued defendants Post-Acute, Oleander, and Plum Healthcare in superior court; she brought claims on her own behalf and on behalf of Sandoval. Defendants moved to compel arbitration of plaintiff’s claims. The trial court denied the motion on the basis the agreements were invalid because they were secured by fraud, undue influence, and duress. Defendants appealed the trial court’s ruling, contending the parties agreed to allow the arbitrator to decide threshold questions of arbitrability, and the trial court erred by deciding the issue instead. Absent clear and unmistakable language delegating threshold arbitrability issues to the arbitrator, the Court of Appeal concluded defendants’ claim lacked merit.

347 Group, Inc. v. Philip Hawkins Architect, Inc.

Docket: C091273(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 7, 2020

Judge: Ronald B. Robie

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts

Plaintiff 347 Group, Inc. (347 Group) sued and obtained a default judgment against defendant Philip Hawkins Architect, Inc. (Architect, Inc.) for breach of contract. Defendants Philip Hawkins, as an individual, and Design-Build, Inc. (Design Build) were also named in the lawsuit, although were not defaulting parties. Instead, 347 Group dismissed its breach of contract cause of action against Hawkins and Design Build but maintained causes of action for fraudulent conveyance and conspiracy, seeking to establish Hawkins and Design Build were alter egos of Architect, Inc. and liable under the contract with Architect, Inc. After Design Build and Hawkins prevailed on those causes of action, they moved for attorney fees. The trial court denied the motion finding an attorney fees award improper because 347 Group dismissed its contract cause of action and the remaining tort causes of action did not allow for an attorney fees award. On appeal, Hawkins argued the trial court erred and he was entitled to attorney fees because he was sued as an alter ego. The Court of Appeal determined Hawkins was indeed entitled to a prevailing party determination and whatever attorney fees the contract allowed him to recover. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for consideration of fees.

Gulf Offshore Logistics, LLC v. Superior Court

Docket: B298318A(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 7, 2020

Judge: Kenneth R. Yegan

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law

The Supreme Court remanded to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration of its opinion in light of Ward v. United Airlines, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 732, and Oman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 762. In the prior opinion, the court held that Louisiana law governed the employment relationships at issue here. However, after considering the Supreme Court's recent guidance on the matter, the court concluded that California law applies and that the trial court correctly denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment. Ward and Oman establish that California's wage and hour laws apply to workers who perform all or most of their work in California. For workers who perform work in multiple jurisdictions, this test is satisfied if the worker performs some work in California and is based in California. In this case, the crew members of the Adele Elise performed the majority of their work within the boundaries of California. Furthermore, the port of Port Hueneme, where the Adele Elise was docked, and the entire Santa Barbara Channel are inside the state. Therefore, under Ward and Oman, the crew members are entitled to the protection of California law because they performed all or most of their work in California. Finally, the court concluded that there is no preemption. The court denied the petition for writ of mandate.

California v. Martin

Docket: E074315(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 7, 2020

Judge: Raphael

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Court of Appeal held in California v. Schaffer, 53 Cal.App.5th 500 (2020) that a parolee exposed to a 180-day jail term for a parole violation resulting from non-criminal conduct was not entitled, under United States v. Haymond, 139 S.Ct. 2369 (2019), to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether he had violated his parole. Defendant and appellant Tyrel Martin was convicted in 2014 of committing a lewd and lascivious act with a child by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear, for which he was sentenced to a 5-year prison term. He was released on parole in 2018. In August 2019, the Division of Adult Parole Operations of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DAPO) petitioned to revoke Martin’s parole, alleging that he failed to report to his parole agent upon release from custody, that he failed to register as a sex offender, and that he did not participate in electronic monitoring. As part of a compromise with the DAPO, Martin admitted the allegations regarding failure to report and failure to participate in electronic monitoring, and he was ordered to serve a 180-day jail term with credit for time served. A month later, the trial court set aside Martin’s admissions, vacated the sentence, and set a formal revocation hearing, having been notified that the case should have been governed by Penal Code section 3000.08 (h), providing that, for certain parolees, a parole violation meant that the parolee will be sent back to prison, with the Board of Parole Hearings responsible for determining future parole consideration. Following a contested revocation hearing, the trial court found that Martin violated parole by failing to report to his parole agent upon release from custody. Martin was ordered to return to prison. Martin contends on appeal, as he did in trial court, that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Haymond entitled him to have a jury determine whether he violated parole beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeal concluded Martin was not entitled to have a jury make findings using the beyond a reasonable doubt standard under Haymond, despite the possibility he faced a lengthy prison sentence for his parole violation.

People v. Rodriguez

Docket: B303099(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 7, 2020

Judge: Dennis M. Perluss

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Penal Code section 1170.95 requires the prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of first or second degree murder under current law to establish a petitioner's ineligibility for relief under that statute. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that the superior court here used an improper standard, concluding he was ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 because the record could support a finding of express malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than based on its own finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant would be guilty of murder within the meaning of sections 188 and 189, as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437. Accordingly, the court reversed the order denying defendant's petition to vacate his murder conviction and for resentencing, remanding for a new evidentiary hearing on defendant's eligibility for relief.

Kao v. Joy Holiday

Docket: A157886(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 7, 2020

Judge: Petrou

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law

The appellants owned Joy Holiday, a travel company operating bus tours for Chinese-speaking travelers. In 2009, Kao, a Taiwanese national, came to the U.S. after accepting a job offer from Joy. Joy filed an H-1B visa application stating it wished to employ Kao at an hourly salary of $29.30. Before receipt of the visa, Kao moved into the appellants’ home and began working for Joy. Kao was paid monthly: $2,500 less $800 for rent. The appellants characterized the payments as an allowance or stipend. Joy’s accountant characterized the payments as salary despite Kao not being on the payroll. Kao received no itemized statements. After receipt of the visa, Kao was put on Joy’s payroll with a $2,500 monthly salary. Kao normally worked 10-12 hours daily. His rent was reduced to $600. In January 2011, Kao was demoted and his salary was reduced to $2,000. Kao moved into an apartment but the payroll records reflect the $600 rent deduction through April 2011. Kao’s employment was terminated in May 2011. Kao filed suit, alleging violations of federal and state law regulating minimum wage and overtime pay, 29 U.S.C. 201; Lab. Code 1194, 1194.2. The court of appeal found that Kao was a non-exempt employee, entitled to recover unpaid wages under his statutory claims and remanded with instructions to calculate the wage and overtime payments for Kao’s entire employment. The court subsequently affirmed the award on remand: $481,088.94 for unpaid wages, attorney fees, and costs, with prejudgment interest. Kao was employed by Joy and it was appropriate to invoke the alter ego doctrine to hold the appellants personally liable.

Prang v. Amen

Docket: B298794(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 7, 2020

Judge: Laurence D. Rubin

Areas of Law: Tax Law, Trusts & Estates

The trustees of the Amen Family 1990 Revocable Trust challenge the Assessor's reassessment of property the Trust received from a corporation that the Trust had partially owned. Although there were at least five owners of the stock of the transferor corporation (including the Trust) and the transferee was solely the Trust, the Trust contends that the proportional ownership interest exception applied because it had owned all the voting stock in the corporation. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the Assessor and upholding the reassessment. The Assessor argues that "stock" in Revenue & Taxation Code section 62(a)(2) means exactly what it says—stock—and applies to all classes of stock, including for present purposes both voting and non-voting stock. Under this interpretation, the Assessor was right to reassess the property after the transfer because the proportional ownership interests, as measured by all the stock of the transferor corporation, had changed. Finally, the "Primary Economic Value" test in section 60 also supports that all stock is considered in applying section 62(a)(2).