Latest 7 Cases: Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. v. SMG Holdings, Inc. (Arbitration & Mediation), Pacific Pioneer Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Civil ...

Should Animals Be Allowed to Sue?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on case in which Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) brought a civil damages suit on behalf of an abused horse, now named Justice, against the horse’s former owner. Colb dismantles three arguments critics raise in opposition to recognizing abused animals as plaintiffs in lawsuits such as this one.

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Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. v. SMG Holdings, Inc.

Docket: C082841(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 30, 2020

Judge: William J. Murray, Jr.

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Contracts, Insurance Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether a binding arbitration clause in an insurance policy issued by plaintiff Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co., applied to a third party, defendant SMG Holdings, Inc. The policy had been issued to Future Farmers of America, which was holding an event inside the Fresno Convention Center. Future Farmers had licensed the use of the convention center from its property manager, SMG. As part of the license, Future Farmers agreed to obtain coverage for itself and to name SMG as an additional insured. Thereafter, Future Farmers obtained a policy from Philadelphia Indemnity, which provided coverage for “managers, landlords, or lessors of premises” as well as for any organization “as required by contract.” The policy also contained an arbitration clause for coverage disputes. During the Future Farmers event, an attendee was injured in the convention center parking lot. When the injured man sued SMG, which also managed the parking lot, SMG tendered its defense to Philadelphia under the policy. Philadelphia refused, believing SMG was not covered under the policy for an injury occurring in the parking lot. After two years, Philadelphia petitioned the trial court to compel arbitration against SMG. The trial court denied the petition, concluding no evidence was presented that the parties to the policy intended to benefit SMG, and Philadelphia was equitably estopped from claiming SMG was required to arbitrate the dispute. Philadelphia contended: (1) the trial court erred in determining SMG was neither a third party beneficiary of the policy, nor equitably estopped from avoiding the policy’s arbitration clause; (2) alternatively, the court erred in finding Philadelphia estopped from compelling SMG to arbitrate; and (3) the coverage dispute was encompassed by the arbitration clause and arbitration should be ordered. The Court of Appeal agreed SMG could be compelled to arbitrate. Judgment was reversed, the trial court's order vacated, and the trial court directed to order arbitration of the coverage dispute.

Pacific Pioneer Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.

Docket: G057326(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 30, 2020

Judge: William W. Bedsworth

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law

In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeal was asked to determine whether insurers have the right to appeal a small claims default judgment entered against their insureds. Vanessa Gonzalez sued Jonathan Johnson in small claims court after an auto accident in Orange, California. Johnson did not show up for the small claims hearing, and the small claims court entered a default judgment against him for $10,000, plus $140 in costs. Johnson’s auto insurer was Pacific Pioneer Insurance Company. Pacific Pioneer filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court struck the notice of appeal, and Pacific Pioneer sought to set aside that order. This prompted the trial court to compose a minute order explaining why it had struck the notice: Code of Civil Procedure 116.710(d) precluded a non-appearing “defendant” - which the court equated with Pacific Pioneer - from appealing a small claims judgment. Pacific Pioneer then filed this writ petition, challenging the trial court’s reading of the relevant statutes. The Court of Appeal concluded the insured’s failure to appear in small claims court did not annul the appeal right conferred upon the insurer by Code of Civil Procedure section 116.710(c). The trial court thus erred in striking Pacific Pioneer’s notice of appeal. The Court issued a writ to direct the trial court to vacate its order striking Pacific Pioneer’s notice of appeal, and to reinstate its appeal of the small claims judgment in favor of Gonzalez.

Jeppson v. Ley

Docket: B292166(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 30, 2020

Judge: Wiley

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

After defendant's dog killed plaintiff's cat, the parties settled for $2,000 and a written agreement with a non-disparagement clause. However, defendant then posted a hostile message on a neighborhood blog about plaintiff, who responded by suing defendant and his wife for breach of contract, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant and his wife filed an anti-SLAPP motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's anti-SLAPP motion and held that there was no public interest in defendant's internet post about plaintiff. In this case, neither party was in the public eye; none of their acts directly affected a large number of people beyond the three households; and there was no issue of public interest when the speaker's words were merely an effort to gather ammunition for another round in the speaker's neighborhood wrangle.

In re Howerton

Docket: F076546(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 30, 2020

Judge: Brad R. Hill

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order granting habeas relief to respondent under Penal Code section 3051. The People argued that the trial court wrongly found section 3051 applicable because respondent had already been granted parole on his indeterminate-term youth offense. The court held that, by the plain language of the statute, respondent was not entitled to a youth offender parole hearing at the time the statute became effective and thus was not entitled to the additional benefits afforded by the case law requiring immediate release upon parole under that statutory scheme.

People v. Cervantes

Docket: B298077(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 30, 2020

Judge: Arthur Gilbert

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Penal Code section 1170.95 applies only to murder convictions. Defendant argued that the failure to include voluntary manslaughter convictions in section 1170.95 violates his constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the section 1170.95 petition, holding that defendant's exclusion from section 1170.95 does not violate his right to equal protection. The court held that the decision not to include manslaughter in section 1170.95 falls within the Legislature's "line-drawing" authority as a rational choice that is not constitutionally prohibited. The court also rejected defendant's claim that he was denied substantive due process where there was a rational relationship between the objectives of the legislative enactment and the methods chosen to achieve those objectives. In this case, the legislative goal was to eliminate the sentencing disparity caused by the felony murder rule, and that goal was properly achieved by the section 1170.95 petition procedure to vacate those murder convictions.

People v. Winn

Docket: H045157A(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 30, 2020

Judge: Greenwood

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Winn was convicted of first-degree murder for the stabbing death of Derrington after Derrington had Winn and his wife evicted from their home. The jury found true a deadly weapon enhancement. Winn admitted he had previously served five prior prison terms. The court imposed a total term of 31 years to life in prison, including five one-year terms for the prior prison term enhancements. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred by admitting a photograph of the victim taken before the offense; that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the photograph; and that the court erred during a post-verdict Marsden hearing by failing to inquire into Winn’s claim that his counsel deprived him of the opportunity to testify in his defense. The Supreme Court transferred the matter back for reconsideration in light of Senate Bill No. 136, amending Penal Code section 667.5(b) to allow the imposition of a one-year enhancement for a prison prior term only if the prior conviction is for a sexually violent offense. The Attorney General conceded that because Winn’s conviction is not yet final, he is entitled to the retroactive benefit of the amendment. The court of appeal struck the prior prison term enhancements and modified the sentence. Admission of the photograph was harmless error; there was no reasonable likelihood the jury would have reached a more favorable outcome had it been excluded.

Becerra v. Superior Court

Docket: A157998(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 30, 2020

Judge: Fujisaki

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

Plaintiffs requested from the Department of Justice all records within its possession subject to disclosure under newly-amended California Public Records Act (CPRA) (Gov. Code 6250) section 832.7, which recognizes the right of the public to know about incidents involving shootings or the use of force by an officer that results in death or great bodily injury and findings of sexual assault or dishonesty by an officer. The Department denied the records in part, stating: “To the extent that the Attorney General has obtained records from other state and local law enforcement agencies, the Attorney General is not the agency that 'maintains’ those documents. [T]he employing agency … will be best situated to assess any applicable exceptions…. [T]o the extent that the Attorney General has obtained such records in relation to investigations or proceedings that the Attorney General is conducting, the disclosure provisions ... do not apply" under section 832.7(a). The court of appeal denied the Department's mandamus petition. Section 832.7 generally requires disclosure of all responsive records in the possession of the Department, regardless of whether the records pertain to officers employed by the Department or whether the Department created the records. While a “catchall" CPRA exemption, section 6255, may apply to records that are subject to disclosure under section 832.7, the Department did not adequately demonstrate that the public interest served by nondisclosure of the records clearly outweighs the public interest in their disclosure.