Hard Cases

JOSEPH MARGULIES

Cornell law professor Joseph Margulies uses the killing of Rayshard Brooks in Atlanta by police to explain some lessons for reform we might learn. Margulies calls upon us to use this case to reexamine the circumstances that should result in a custodial arrest and to shrink the function of police so as to use them only in the very few situations that truly require them.

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Olabi v. Neutron Holdings, Inc.

Docket: A156990(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 19, 2020

Judge: Burns

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Civil Procedure, Contracts, Labor & Employment Law

The Private Attorney General Act (Labor Code 2698) allows an employee, as a proxy for state enforcement agencies, to sue an employer on behalf of herself and other aggrieved employees for Labor Code violations. When the parties have an arbitration agreement, California law blocks the employer from enforcing that agreement with respect to representative PAGA claims for civil penalties; the agreement may be enforceable with respect to other claims, including claims for victim-specific relief (like unpaid wages). Lime rents electric scooters. Olabi entered into an agreement to locate, recharge, and redeploy Lime's scooters. The agreement required the parties to arbitrate “any and all disputes,” including Olabi’s classification as an independent contractor but contained an exception for PAGA representative actions. Olabi sued, alleging Lime intentionally misclassified him and others as independent contractors, resulting in Labor Code violations; he included claims under the Unfair Competition Law and PAGA. Lime petitioned to compel arbitration, arguing Olabi was required to arbitrate independent contractor classification disputes and that the PAGA exception did not cover the unfair competition claim or the PAGA claim to the extent that Olabi sought victim-specific relief. Olabi voluntarily dismissed his unfair competition claim and disavowed any claim for victim-specific relief. The trial court denied Lime’s petition and granted Olabi leave to amend. The court of appeal affirmed. The language of the arbitration agreement broadly excludes PAGA actions

Martinez v. San Diego County Credit Union

Docket: D075360(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 19, 2020

Judge: Judith L. Haller

Areas of Law: Banking, Civil Procedure, Civil Rights

Abelardo Martinez, who was blind, brought an action against San Diego County Credit Union (Credit Union) claiming its website was incompatible with software permitting him to read website content. He alleged this defect denied him equal access to, and full enjoyment of, the Credit Union's website and its physical locations. Martinez asserted a single cause of action under the Unruh Civil Rights Act based on two alternate theories: (1) Credit Union's website violated the American Disabilities Act (ADA); and (2) Credit Union's actions constituted intentional discrimination prohibited by the Unruh Civil Rights Act. On the day scheduled for jury selection, the court dismissed the action on its own motion based on its understanding Martinez was intending to pursue only the ADA theory, and the court's finding Martinez had not sufficiently alleged Credit Union's website constitutes a "public accommodation" within the meaning of the ADA (although the court characterized its ruling as a nonsuit, the parties agree it was a conclusion based solely on Martinez's pleadings). Martinez appealed. The Court of Appeal found the trial court erred in dismissing the action at the pleadings stage based on the ADA's public-accommodation element: a disabled plaintiff can state a viable ADA claim for alleged unequal access to a private entity's website if there is a sufficient nexus between the claimed barriers and the plaintiff's ability to use or enjoy the goods and services offered at the defendant's physical facilities. Under this standard, the Court found Martinez alleged a sufficient nexus to state an ADA violation. The Court rejected the Credit Union's alternate argument that the dismissal was proper because the United States Congress has not enacted specific website accessibility standards.

Airs Aromatics, LLC v. CBL Data Recovery Tech. Inc.

Docket: D075798(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 19, 2020

Judge: Dato

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts

In a prior appeal, the Court of Appeal vacated a default judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Airs Aromatics, LLC (Airs), concluding the trial court was without jurisdiction to award damages in excess of that demanded in Airs's complaint for breach of contract. The Court gave Airs the option on remand to proceed with a new default prove-up hearing seeking up to $25,000 in damages, or amend the complaint to state the full amount of damages sought. Selecting the first option, Airs received a default judgment awarding it $25,000 in damages, $33,849 in prejudgment interest, and $614 in costs. After the trial court denied its set-aside motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 663a, defendant CBL Data Recovery Technologies, Inc. (CBL) appealed the second default judgment, contending that Airs's failure to serve it with the default prove-up papers or a substitution of counsel form invalidated the judgment. In addition, CBL challenged the amount of damages awarded and the prejudgment interest award. Rejecting each of these contentions, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment.

Simmons v. Bauer Media Group USA, LLC

Docket: B296220(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 19, 2020

Judge: Currey

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Bauer, an entertainment magazine publisher, appealed the denial of its special motion to strike the amended complaint of plaintiffs, Richard Simmons and Teresa Reveles. Simmons is a self-described health and fitness guru and Reveles is Simmons's live-in caretaker. Plaintiffs filed suit against Bauer after discovering that a private detective hired by Bauer unlawfully attached an electronic tracking device in Reveles' car. Plaintiffs also filed suit against the detective and the detective's sole proprietorship, LA Intelligence. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the special motion and held that Bauer failed to demonstrate the conduct at the heart of the lawsuit — the unlawful use of the tracking device — is, as Bauer contends, conduct in furtherance of its exercise of the right of free speech in connection with issues of public interest under the anti-SLAPP statute.

California v. Cotsirilos

Docket: D076870(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 19, 2020

Judge: Dato

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

While walking one evening in San Diego's College Area, Defendants Lula Sophia Gong Cotsirilos and Tess Elisabet Edman were stopped and cited for underage possession of alcohol in a public place. Although the State filed no written opposition and made no appearance at the suppression hearing, they did subpoena the two investigating officers. Rather than take evidence, the superior court granted the suppression motions based solely on the State's failure to respond or appear. The appellate division of the superior court agreed, concluding that while no written opposition was required, the State's failure to respond or appear compelled suppression. The Court of Appeal concluded that in the ordinary infraction case, the prosecution was not required to oppose a motion to suppress by filing an opposition brief or appearing at the suppression hearing. Instead, it could meet its burden to provide justification for a warrantless search by subpoenaing relevant law enforcement witnesses, who could in turn provide narrative testimony to the court in the same manner as would be permitted in the prosecution's absence at an infraction trial. Because the superior court concluded the prosecution's nonappearance in and of itself compelled suppression, the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new hearing on the motions to suppress.

Stanford Vina Ranch Irrigation Co. v. State of Cal.

Docket: C085762(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 19, 2020

Judge: Andrea Lynn Hoch

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

Stanford Vina Ranch Irrigation Company (Stanford Vina) sued the California Water Resources Control Board (the Board), among other defendants, challenging the Board’s issuance of certain temporary emergency regulations in 2014 and 2015, during the height of one of the most severe droughts in California’s history. The challenged regulations established minimum flow requirements on three tributaries of the Sacramento River, including Deer Creek in Tehama County, in order to protect two threatened species of anadromous fish, Chinook salmon and steelhead trout, during their respective migratory cycles. Furthermore, Stanford Vina challenged the Board’s implementation of those regulations by issuing temporary curtailment orders limiting the company’s diversion of water from Deer Creek for certain periods of time during those years in order to maintain the required minimum flow of water. Judgment was entered in favor of the Board and other defendants. Stanford Vina appealed. Finding the Board possessed broad authority to regulate the unreasonable use of water in California by various means, including the adoption of regulations establishing minimum flow requirements protecting the migration of threatened fish species during drought conditions and declaring diversions of water unreasonable where such diversions would threaten to cause the flow of water in the creeks in question to drop below required levels, the Court of Appeal affirmed. The Board’s adoption of the challenged regulations was not arbitrary, capricious, or lacking in evidentiary support, nor did the Board fail to follow required procedures, and the Court declined to override the Board’s determination as to reasonableness set forth in the regulations.

Masellis v. Law Office of Leslie F. Jensen

Docket: F075772(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 19, 2020

Judge: Donald R. Franson, Jr.

Areas of Law: Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The applicable standard of proof for the elements of causation and damages in a "settle and sue" legal malpractice action is the preponderance of the evidence standard. In this case, defendant, the attorney, contends that the element of causation and damages in a "settle and sue" legal malpractice case must be proven to a legal certainty, and that the legal certainty standard imposes a burden of proof higher than a mere preponderance of the evidence. The Court of Appeal explained that no published legal malpractice case using the term "legal certainty" expressly states the default burden of proof is replaced by a standard higher than preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, the court held that the term "legal certainty" is ambiguous and the court resolved the ambiguity by interpreting the statement that a plaintiff must present "evidence showing to a legal certainty that" the alleged breach of duty caused an injury as simply referring to the degree of certainty inherent in the applicable burden of proof.