Latest 7 Cases: MSY Trading Inc. v. Saleen Automotive, Inc. (Business Law), Barriga v. 99 Cents Only Stores LLC (Civil Procedure), California v. ...

The “When” of Chevron: The Missed Opportunity of County of Maui

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, DANIEL FOLSOM

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and rising 3L Daniel Folsom comment on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, in which the Court interpreted a provision of the Clean Water. Estreicher and Folsom argue that the case presented an opportunity to clarify the murky question of when the Chevron doctrine applies, yet the Court avoided answering that question.

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The Unnecessary Protection of Qualified Immunity

JOANNA C. SCHWARTZ, SETH STOUGHTON

UCLA law professor Joanna C. Schwartz and South Carolina law professor Seth W. Stoughton address some of the arguments commonly asserted to support qualified immunity, the doctrine that shields police officers from civil liability for constitutional violations. Schwartz and Stoughton argue that eliminating qualified immunity should not affect police decision-making and that existing Supreme Court doctrine gives police officers plenty of leeway to make mistakes without violating the Constitution. Because qualified immunity applies only to unreasonable actions by police officers, eliminating or substantially restricting it should not a chilling effect on police officers’ ability or willingness to respond to critical incidents.

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MSY Trading Inc. v. Saleen Automotive, Inc.

Docket: G057093(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Raymond J. Ikola

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Contracts

A "subtle" question concerning entitlement to attorney fees raised by this appeal was one of first impression for the Court of Appeal. In a separate lawsuit filed at Superior Court, plaintiffs obtained a judgment for breach of contract, including an award of attorney fees, against certain entities not parties to the present suit. Plaintiffs filed the present enforcement action against defendants, seeking to hold them liable on the judgment as alter egos of the judgment debtors. Plaintiffs lost against one of the defendants, Steve Saleen (Steve). Steve moved for attorney fees under the contract; the court granted the motion and plaintiffs appeals. Plaintiffs contended this was not an action on the contract and, therefore, fees were unavailable under Civil Code section 1717. Instead, it was an enforcement action. They cited caselaw for the proposition that a judgment on the contract subsumes and extinguishes contractual rights. On the other hand, had plaintiffs included Steve as a defendant in the Superior Court suit, making the exact same alter ego allegations they made to the Court of Appeal, undoubtedly Steve would have been entitled to contractual attorney fees under the doctrine of reciprocity established by Civil Code section 1717 and Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 25 Cal.3d 124 (1979), even though he was not a signatory on the contract. The Court of Appeal concluded the timing of an alter ego claim (either pre- or postjudgment) was too arbitrary a consideration on which to base the right to attorney fees. "When a judgment creditor attempts to add a party to a breach of contract judgment that includes a contractual fee award, the suit is essentially 'on the contract' for purposes of Civil Code section 1717." The Court therefore agreed with Steve and affirmed judgment.

Barriga v. 99 Cents Only Stores LLC

Docket: E069288(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Art W. McKinster

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Class Action, Labor & Employment Law

Plaintiff Sofia Barriga filed this lawsuit against 99 Cents Only Stores LLC, (99 Cents) individually, and on behalf of similarly situated current and former nonexempt employees of 99 Cents hired before October 1, 1999, pleading various Labor Code violations and violation of the unfair competition law. Plaintiff alleged 99 Cents had a zero-tolerance policy that required its stores to lock their doors at closing time, therefore, forcing nonexempt, nonmanagerial employees, who worked the graveyard shift and clock out for their meal break or at the end of their shift, to wait for as long as 15 minutes for a manager with a key to let them out of the store. According to plaintiff, 99 Cents did not pay its employees for the time they had to wait be let out, and the policy denied employees their full half-hour meal break. Plaintiff moved the trial court to certify two classes: (1) “Off the Clock Class,” and (2) “Meal Period Class.” 99 Cents opposed the certification motion, contending there was no community of interests among putative class members, and the lack of common issues among putative class members would render a class action unmanageable. Plaintiff moved to strike 174 declarations of employee declarants who were members of the proposed classes on the grounds the process by which they had been obtained was improper, and because they were substantively inconsistent with the subsequent deposition testimony of 12 of declarants. Concluding it lacked the statutory authority to strike the declarations, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to strike. And, based on all 174 declarations, the court concluded plaintiff had not demonstrated a community of interests or a commonality of issues among putative class members. Plaintiff appealed those orders. The Court of Appeal found the record demonstrated the trial court in this case was unaware of the need to scrutinize 99 Cents’ declarations carefully, and was either unaware of or misunderstood the scope of its discretion to either strike or discount the weight to be given the 174 declarations, including the declarations of employees who were not members of the putative classes, if it concluded they were obtained under coercive or abusive circumstances. The orders denying plaintiff’s motion to strike 99 Cents’ declarations and class certification motion were reversed, and the matter remanded for reconsideration.

California v. Duffy

Docket: C089670(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Ronald B. Robie

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Sean Duffy was convicted by jury of numerous counts related to his possession of a stolen firearm. The trial court found true three prior prison term enhancement allegations. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of five years, which included three consecutive one-year terms for each of the prior prison term enhancements. On appeal, defendant contended the Court of Appeal should have stricken the one-year prior prison term enhancements in light of newly enacted Senate Bill No. 136, which amended Penal Code section 667.5 (b) by limiting the offenses that qualify for the enhancement. Defendant also contended three of the counts described alternate ways of committing the same offense -- possession of a concealed firearm in a vehicle -- and, thus, were not separate offenses. Therefore two of those three convictions should have been stricken. The State conceded the three prior prison term enhancements should have been stricken. The Court of Appeal agreed the three counts were duplicative. Accordingly, the Court struck the prior prison term enhancements and convictions on counts 4 and 6. As modified, judgment was affirmed, and the matter was remanded for resentencing.

People v. Castellanos

Docket: H045792(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Danner

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Castellanos was charged with transporting a controlled substance from one county to another noncontiguous county and possession of a controlled substance for sale. Castellanos pleaded no contest to count 1 in exchange for a three-year term of probation and the dismissal of count 2. Castellanos signed a plea form including preprinted waiver language, covering “the right to appeal [his] conviction, the judgment, or any other orders previously issued by this court.” In the plea colloquy, Castellanos stated that he gave up his rights to appeal and to collateral attack. The court found that Castellanos knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights, granted a three-year term of probation, and imposed an electronic search probation condition requiring Castellanos to provide law enforcement with access to any electronic device, including all passwords to any social media accounts and applications. The California Supreme Court subsequently struck down a similar electronic search condition as overbroad. The court of appeal rejected Castellanos’ challenge to the condition. Castellanos’s claim relied on a post-waiver change in the law, so Castellanos did not enter a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal from the challenged probation condition but the search condition is not overbroad, as it was related to the offense for which Castellanos was convicted.

People v. Ruiz

Docket: A153135(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ruiz was convicted of three counts of sex crimes he committed against his minor daughter and was sentenced to 44 years to life. The court of appeal affirmed the convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14, Penal Code 288.5, and forcible rape of a child under 14, section 261(a)(1)). The trial court did not violate Ruiz’s confrontation clause rights by admitting the minor’s statements to a social worker, whose primary purpose in interviewing the minor was to assess the child’s safety; the minor’s primary purpose in responding was to stop the abuse she was experiencing. The court reversed the conviction for oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child 10 or younger, section 288.7; the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to satisfy the corpus delicti rule, which requires, when a defendant makes extrajudicial incriminating statements, there must also be independent evidence of the corpus delicti, the body of the crime itself, in order to convict. Neither the minor’s testimony nor any other evidence independent of Ruiz’s confession indicates that Ruiz engaged in any sex act with the minor before her 11th birthday

McCord v. Smith

Docket: G057614(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Richard D. Fybel

Areas of Law: Family Law

After the end of their relationship, former domestic partners Keith McCord and Celeste Smith each asked the trial court for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against the other. The court granted Smith’s request and denied McCord’s request. The court also dismissed with prejudice McCord’s request for an order to show cause (OSC) why Smith should not be held in contempt. McCord appealed from the court’s order. The Court of Appeal found substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings underlying the issuance of the DVRO in favor of Smith and against McCord. There was no evidence supporting the issuance of a DVRO in favor of McCord and against Smith, and McCord made no specific argument on appeal regarding that portion of the trial court’s order.

County of Fresno v. Fresno Deputy Sheriff's Assoc.

Docket: F076417(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Brad R. Hill

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law

The county petitioned for a writ of mandate to reverse an administrative hearing decision in favor of plaintiffs, two sheriff's deputies, who alleged that their reassignments violated both the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the county and the employee organization, and an established past practice that deputies would not be involuntarily reassigned in the absence of disciplinary issues, documented performance issues, layoffs, or pending disability retirement. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision granting the petition, holding that the arbitrator who heard the matter abused his discretion because his findings were not supported by substantial evidence. In this case, plaintiffs failed to establish a violation by the county of the express terms of the MOU; the association failed to establish that the MOU was ambiguous or silent regarding reassignment of employees, and therefore there was no need to consider the past practices of the parties to determine whether the county violated its obligation to negotiate a change in practice; substantial evidence did not establish an unequivocal and clearly enunciated past practice that the department would not make involuntary transfers in the absence of a disciplinary action, documented performance issue, layoff, or pending disability retirement; the arbitrators finding that a binding past practice existed is unsupported by the record; and substantial evidence does not support a finding that the department made a unilateral change in its own established past practice when it reassigned plaintiffs out of their specialty assignments and back to patrol against their wishes.