| McCloud v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 19-4184 Opinion Date: February 9, 2021 Judge: William J. Nardini Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying as untimely petitioner's motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner contends that this circuit's recent decision in United States v. Townsend, 897 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2018), created a newly discovered fact that extended his filing deadline under section 2255(f)(4). The court concluded that an intervening development in case law does not constitute a newly discovered "fact" within the meaning of section 2255(f)(4). In this case, a decision issued after a conviction but before the filing of a motion under section 2255 is not a newly discovered "fact" pursuant to section 2255(f)(4). Therefore, Townsend, in pronouncing a new rule of law, gave rise to no new facts and thus did not extend the limitations period for petitioner's section 2255 motion. |
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| United States v. Pulley |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-4273 Opinion Date: February 10, 2021 Judge: Richard E. Myers Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| A district court's finding of whether a particular false statement or omission in a warrant affidavit was made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth is a factual one, subject to reversal only upon an appellate finding of clear error. The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction, pursuant to a plea agreement, for intent to distribute a quantity of hydrocodone. The court upheld the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence that was seized pursuant to warrants authorizing searches of his residence, automobile, and mobile device in connection with a robbery. Because the court found no clear error in the district court's factual findings regarding the Franks intentionality prong, the court rejected defendant's challenges and need not reach the materiality prong. Likewise, the court need not reach defendant's Lull-premised contention that all of the co-suspect's statements should be removed from the affidavit and that the affidavit, so altered, is insufficient to establish probable cause. The court also concluded that the district court did not commit clear error in its remaining findings of fact. In this case, the district court expressly credited the detective's testimony that the robbery co-suspect provided information that was found to be credible based on it having been corroborated. |
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| United States v. Velasquez-Canales |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-4753 Opinion Date: February 9, 2021 Judge: Traxler Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's 36-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after commission of an aggravated felony. The court held that there was no error in the district court's application of a six-level sentencing enhancement for a prior felony conviction with a sentence exceeding one year and one month under USSG 2L1.2(b)(2)(C). In this case, defendant was sentenced to 6-17 months in prison for his 2018 North Carolina offenses and, under North Carolina's Justice Reinvestment Act of 2011, the last nine months of that sentence was to be served in post-release supervision. The court concluded that defendant's argument, that a post-release supervision term is the functional equivalent of a suspended sentence and should not be included in the determination of the maximum term of imprisonment imposed, is foreclosed by United States v. Barlow, 811 F.3d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 2015). |
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| United States v. White |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-4886 Opinion Date: February 5, 2021 Judge: Barbara Milano Keenan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this court order, the Fourth Circuit certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Virginia: Under Virginia common law, can an individual be convicted of robbery by means of threatening to accuse the victim of having committed sodomy? |
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| Broadnax v. Lumpkin |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-70014 Opinion Date: February 8, 2021 Judge: Edith Hollan Jones Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Petitioner, convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. After the district court rejected the petition and denied a certificate of appealability (COA), petitioner sought a COA under 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2) to appeal numerous issues. The Fifth Circuit granted a COA and received additional briefing on a single issue pertinent to his Batson challenges to the jury's makeup. The court affirmed the district court's refusal to consider newly discovered evidence relevant to petitioner's Batson claim, because Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011), bars its consideration. Furthermore, the court found no error in the district court's conclusions where petitioner failed to meet the standards embodied in section 2254(d); he has no basis to offer evidence outside the state record; and a certain spreadsheet was correctly barred from consideration in federal court. The court rejected petitioner's five other claims for relief and denied a COA on each of these claims. |
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| Lucio v. Lumpkin |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 16-70027 Opinion Date: February 9, 2021 Judge: Andrew S. Oldham Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner, who was convicted of capital murder for beating to death her two-year-old daughter. Petitioner argues that the state trial court denied her constitutional right to present a complete defense by excluding two expert witnesses from testifying at the guilt phase of her trial. The now-vacated panel decision concluded that petitioner fairly presented a complete-defense claim to the state courts; the state courts simply overlooked it; and petitioner therefore got the benefit of de novo review of her complete-defense claim in federal court. The court concluded that this was error. The court concluded that the state courts adjudicated petitioner's claims on the merits and thus the relitigation bar in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies. Evaluating the relevant state court decisions under the relitigation bar, the court rejected petitioner's contention that she satisfied the relitigation exceptions. In this case, the court rejected petitioner's claim that the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986); the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); and the state court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. The court noted that various dissenting opinions contradict AEDPA, Supreme Court precedent, and the record in this case. |
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| United States v. Martinez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 20-20148 Opinion Date: February 8, 2021 Judge: Jennifer Walker Elrod Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit withdrew its prior opinion and substituted the following opinion. The court vacated defendant's condition of supervised release requiring defendant to "participate in an inpatient or outpatient substance-abuse treatment program" supervised by defendant's probation officer. The court concluded that the option to require inpatient rehabilitation delegates to the probation officer the judicial decision to significantly restrict defendant's liberty during treatment. In this case, because of defendant's short ten-month sentence, the district court should not have delegated the decision to further restrict defendant's liberty during the course of treatment while on supervised release. Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings. |
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| United States v. Medel-Guadalupe |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Dockets: 19-40901, 19-40902 Opinion Date: February 8, 2021 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit withdrew its prior opinion and substituted the following opinion. The court affirmed defendant's 120-month sentence for harboring an illegal alien. The court held that defendant waived his duplicity argument by pleading guilty; even if the district court erroneously applied the reckless endangerment and bodily injury sentencing enhancements, the errors were harmless; defendant's contention that the district court impermissibly delegated judicial authority through the wording of two special conditions of supervised release, the required alcohol and drug treatment, fails under either plain error or de novo review; and defendant's sentence was within the Guidelines and he fails to demonstrate that an explanation of the revocation sentence would have changed his sentence. |
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| In re Hanna |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-3881 Opinion Date: February 11, 2021 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Hanna was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. He exhausted state remedies, then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which the district court denied in 2009. The Sixth Circuit rejected Hanna’s claim that he was deprived of effective assistance in mitigation because his counsel failed to present a psychologist to testify about organic neurological defects and his troubled childhood. In 2019, Hanna sought leave to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition and moved to remand his pending petition, arguing that his second-in-time petition is not successive under section 2244(b). The Sixth Circuit denied both requests, rejecting Hanna’s argument that his new claims could not have been raised in his first petition because his previous habeas counsel suffered a conflict of interest. Hanna’s underlying claims of ineffective assistance in mitigation were raised in the previous petition. Hanna seeks to add new evidence. Hanna has also not shown that he meets the requirements of section 2244(b)(2). Hanna does not claim that his new petition relies on a new rule of constitutional law; he seeks an evidentiary hearing to prove certain facts and all of his claims relate to trial counsel’s representation in mitigation. Mitigation evidence categorically does not meet section 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)’s requirement that the new facts establish actual innocence. In addition, Hanna’s claims were procedurally defaulted or have been adjudicated in unchallenged state court decisions. |
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| United States v. Brooks |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-2283 Opinion Date: February 9, 2021 Judge: Murphy Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Police officers pulled over the vehicle in which Brooks was riding for a seatbelt violation. The officers approached, smelled marijuana, and saw Brooks making a “stuffing motion” under his seat. The police found a gun partially hidden there. After a jury convicted Brooks of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the lone African-American juror emailed the court that the other jurors had pressured her into a guilty verdict. On appeal, Brooks claimed that the stop and search of the vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment, that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence that he “possessed” a gun, and that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, to investigate the racial biases of the other jurors. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Brooks’s conviction and 66-month sentence. The number of officers who conducted the traffic stop did not affect whether it was “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. The felon-in-possession statute does not require a defendant to control a gun for any significant period of time. Peña-Rodriguez does not permit an evidentiary hearing to impeach a jury verdict even when no jurors made race-based statements. |
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| United States v. Lanier |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Dockets: 16-6655, 16-6657 Opinion Date: February 11, 2021 Judge: Karen Nelson Moore Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics |
| The Laniers were charged with a scheme to fraudulently obtain government contracts. During deliberations, a juror contacted assistant district attorney Nelson—a social acquaintance, not involved with the Laniers's case. Nelson informed the district judge that Juror 11 called her and said that there was a “problem” with the deliberations. No juror alerted court personnel to any problems. Convicted, the Laniers unsuccessfully requested to interview the jurors and moved for a mistrial. No one interviewed the jurors nor questioned Nelson in open court. The Sixth Circuit remanded for a Remmer hearing in 2017. On remand, the district court summoned the jurors and Nelson, ordering them not to discuss or research the case. Juror 11 nonetheless texted Nelson, suggesting that the juror had researched the case online. Nelson reported the texts to the district judge, who failed to notify the Laniers but ordered Juror 11 to preserve her texts and web-browsing history. Weeks later, the court ordered Juror 11 to turn over her phone and laptop and asked his IT staffer and law clerk to examine the devices. They discovered that the web-browsing data had been deleted. The Laniers unsuccessfully sought a full forensic exam. After Sixth Circuit intervention, the court allowed the Laniers’ expert to forensically examine the devices. Juror 11 revealed that she had discarded her phone months earlier; any potentially deleted texts and web-browsing data are unrecoverable. The district court denied the Laniers’ motions for a new trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Laniers were deprived of a “meaningful opportunity” to demonstrate juror bias and are entitled to a new trial to be held before another district judge. |
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| United States v. Small |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Dockets: 20-5117, 20-5120 Opinion Date: February 10, 2021 Judge: Siler Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Small and Johnson were indicted for aiding and abetting and conspiracy to commit kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1), (c). Spoon, age 73, testified that she was alone when she noticed a black Chevrolet Malibu pull into her driveway. Small and Johnson ran into her Tennessee home, held Spoon at gunpoint, bound her feet and hands together, and took Spoon’s valuables. Spoon was captive for 20-25 minutes before they left. Spoon freed herself and called the authorities. Mercer County, West Virginia Deputy Addair, having received reports regarding similar home invasions and an anonymous tip that the defendants were driving a black sedan with an out-of-state registration, obtained surveillance footage of Small at a pawnshop. Small had an active Tennessee arrest warrant. Police located the Chevrolet in West Virginia and arrested Small. Johnson fled in a truck, which Small had purchased in Tennessee. Days later, police arrested Johnson. During deliberations, the jury asked the court for definitions of the terms “confined,” “seized,” and “abducted.” The court provided the dictionary definitions. Convicted, Small was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment and Johnson to 300 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, to the court’s advice to the jury, and to the sentences. Although the defendants did not transport the victim across state lines, sufficient evidence proves that they used a rental car to cross state lines, travel to Spoon’s home, and escape. A reasonable jury could conclude that the interstate commerce element is met. |
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| Eagan v. Dempsey |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 17-3184 Opinion Date: February 9, 2021 Judge: Kenneth Francis Ripple Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Eagan, an Illinois Department of Corrections inmate, suffers from mental illnesses including depression, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder. On November 30, 2014, Eagan engaged in self-harming behaviors while under suicide watch. Eagan brought a 42 U.S.C 1983, claiming violations of the Eighth Amendment by medical and custodial staff at Pontiac Correctional Center. The district court denied his motions to recruit and appoint counsel for him, then granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part. In evaluating the motion to recruit counsel, the district court departed significantly from circuit precedent. Eagan has established that, but for the court's error, there is a reasonable likelihood that the assistance of counsel would have altered the outcome of the summary judgment motion with respect to Eagan’s claims based on the physician's decisions. The alleged "decision" to leave Eagan with significant, prolonged pain in order to teach him a lesson about the consequences of self-destructive behavior does not involve a mere choice of medical remedies; the court noted the lack of evidence with respect to the allegation. Eagan has not established, however, that there is a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome with respect to the officer defendants. The record clearly supports summary judgment in their favor. |
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| Estate of Christopher J. Davis v. Ortiz |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-3355 Opinion Date: February 5, 2021 Judge: Diane Pamela Wood Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| East Troy police, conducting a “sting” operation, used a confidential informant to lure Juarez-Nieves into delivering cocaine at Roma’s restaurant. Nieves showed up with Davis and Lara, who parked their car in the restaurant lot, next to an empty vehicle. The police arrived in their marked squad car and started to park behind the empty car, Lara began slowly to pull out of his parking spot. Officer Knox had to step aside to avoid the car. As Lara headed for the exit, Deputy Ortiz, standing 50 feet away, fired shots into the car. A shot hit Davis. Lara kept driving for a brief time but crashed the car. The police apprehend Lara and Nieves as they fled on foot. Medical personnel pronounced Davis dead. Davis’s Estate argued that Ortiz’s use of deadly force was unreasonable. The district court found that Ortiz’s testimony was not enough to establish as a matter of law that Ortiz was aiming exclusively for the driver. Instead, Ortiz said that his “intent was to stop the threat that was coming at [him].” The district court found that a jury could conclude that Ortiz was shooting at the car generally and that deadly force was excessive in those circumstances. The court denied Ortiz’s motion for qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Disputes of material fact on which immunity depend must be resolved by the trier of fact. |
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| Gacho v. Wills |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-3343 Opinion Date: February 8, 2021 Judge: Diane S. Sykes Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Gacho is serving a life sentence for two 1982 kidnapping-murders. Cook County Judge Maloney presided in his case. For years, Maloney had solicited cash for acquittals. He came down hard on defendants who did not pay. Gacho was tried jointly with Titone. Titone opted for a bench decision, having paid Maloney $10,000 for an acquittal. As federal investigators began closing in, Maloney reneged and found Titone guilty. The jury returned a guilty verdict against Gacho. After Maloney was indicted, Titone won a new trial based on judicial bias, but Gacho’s post-conviction proceedings dragged on for decades. In 2016 the Illinois Appellate Court rejected his due-process claim, reasoning that Gacho needed to prove that the judge was actually biased against him and had not done so. The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Evidence that the presiding judge was actually biased is sufficient to establish a due-process violation but is not necessary. Constitutional claims of judicial bias also have an objective component: the reviewing court must determine whether the judge’s conflict of interest created a constitutionally unacceptable likelihood of bias. Ignoring that objective test was contrary to Supreme Court precedent. The acute conflict between Maloney’s duty of impartiality and his personal interest in avoiding criminal liability created a constitutionally unacceptable likelihood of compensatory bias in Gacho’s case. |
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| Larry Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-3210 Opinion Date: February 5, 2021 Judge: HAMILTON Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| While incarcerated, Howell tore his medial meniscus cartilage and his anterior cruciate ligament (ACL). Five months later, he had surgery to repair the meniscus. It was another 20 months before Howell had surgery to reconstruct his ACL, despite Howell’s continuing pain and efforts to have the surgery sooner. While his requests for the ACL surgery were still being rejected, Howell filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging Eighth Amendment violations. A jury ruled in favor of the physician but against Wexford, a private company that provides medical services at the prison. The court entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of Wexford. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence about Wexford’s treatment of other incarcerated people. Howell did not show that their situations were fairly comparable to his. The court also did not err in granting Wexford’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law. Howell blamed his pain and delayed surgery on Wexford’s “collegial review process,” which requires an off-site Wexford physician to review and approve an on‐site Wexford physician’s recommendation that an incarcerated person be referred to an off‐site healthcare provider. The collegial review process is not unconstitutional on its face, and Howell did not offer evidence that would let a reasonable jury find that the collegial review process caused any violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. |
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| McIntosh v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1095 Opinion Date: February 5, 2021 Judge: Scudder Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| McIntosh sued Wexford, a private company that provides prison health care, and jail officials for acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, 42 U.S.C. 1983. McIntosh alleged that a nurse funneled him unprescribed medication and that staff members failed to prevent him from attempting suicide after he became addicted to the painkillers and suffered from acute mental illness. McIntosh was then a pretrial detainee; his claim arose not under the Eighth Amendment,, but under the Due Process Clause. McIntosh was required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act to exhaust all available administrative remedies. McIntosh claims he timely filed grievances as prescribed by the jail’s procedures but that Sergeant Strubberg told him that the internal administrative process was on hold pending the outcome of a criminal investigation into how he had obtained large quantities of unprescribed pain medication. Wexford and the jail officials claim that McIntosh submitted no grievances. The district court referred the case to a magistrate, who heard testimony from McIntosh and Sergeant Strubberg of the St. Clair County Jail. McIntosh supported his testimony with two affidavits from fellow inmates. The magistrate accepted McIntosh’s version of events. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court erred in rejecting the magistrate’s recommended finding without holding a new hearing upon which to base its own credibility determinations, given that witness credibility weighed heavily in the exhaustion-of-remedies inquiry. |
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| United States v. Nebinger |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1504 Opinion Date: February 11, 2021 Judge: Diane Pamela Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2016, Nebinger pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Probation Office determined that he qualified as an armed career criminal, based on prior convictions for Illinois residential burglary, drug possession with intent to deliver, and aggravated battery, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), which changed his sentencing exposure from a 10-year maximum sentence to a 15-year minimum sentence. The court held that his burglary conviction was an improper ACCA predicate and imposed a 10-year sentence. On remand, in light of a Seventh Circuit holding that the Illinois residential burglary statute corresponds to ACCA generic burglary, the court increased his sentence to 15 years. The Seventh Circuit remanded. While this litigation was pending, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that Illinois residential burglary is not an ACCA predicate. The Supreme Court’s 2019 "Rehaif" holding that the government must prove that the defendant knew that he fell within one of the categories of people who are not entitled to possess guns does not invalidate Nebinger's guilty plea. The knowledge element requires only that the defendant knew, at the time he possessed the firearm, that he was a felon; he did not also need to know that his status prohibited him from possessing a firearm. Neither Neblinger's indictment nor the government’s proffered factual basis for the conviction mentioned Nebinger’s knowledge of his status but Nebinger cannot establish prejudice. He admitted to six prior felony convictions at his plea colloquy. |
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| United States v. Saunders |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 20-2486 Opinion Date: February 8, 2021 Judge: St. Eve Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Saunders pleaded guilty to dealing in firearms without a license and possessing a firearm as a felon. Saunders, sentenced to five years’ imprisonment in January 2020, asked the court for compassionate release or, alternatively, to transfer him to home confinement in June 2020. Saunders cited “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” based on his serious risk from the novel coronavirus, given his history of chronic bronchitis, type 2 diabetes, blood clots, a heart attack, other heart problems, diabetic neuropathy, and hypertension, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court denied the motion, finding that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors weighed against release because firearms trafficking is a serious crime that fuels Chicago's ongoing gun violence and Saunders had served only 19 months (including time served before sentencing) of his 60-month sentence. Saunders had not demonstrated that the Bureau of Prisons was unable to control the spread of COVID-19. The court recommended that the Bureau of Prisons place him in a medical facility, and it did so. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court did not abuse its broad discretion in finding that the section 3553(a) factors weighed against release despite the health threat that Saunders faces. Courts are not compelled to release every prisoner with extraordinary and compelling health concerns. The court lacked authority to change Saunders’s place of imprisonment and did not err by declining to review his request for home confinement. |
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| United States v. Williams |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 20-2404 Opinion Date: February 10, 2021 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Williams has been seeking release since he began serving his 2013 18‐year sentence for robbery and brandishing a firearm, contending that his guilty plea was involuntary. In 2020, Williams asked the warden to move for his compassionate release, arguing that the judge’s role in his plea negotiations was an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for relief, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The warden never responded. Weeks later, Williams moved the district court for compassionate release on the same ground. Court-appointed counsel filed an amended motion, advancing a different ground: the COVID‐19 pandemic and Williams’s risk of exposure stemming from his role as a prison chapel usher. The government opposed the motion on the merits and argued that Williams had not met the statute’s exhaustion requirement. The district court denied the motion on the merits, noting that Williams admitted that he did not suffer from any significant medical conditions that might increase his COVID-19 risk. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, also concluding that Williams failed to exhaust his Bureau of Prisons remedies. Exhaustion is a mandatory, claim‐processing rule and must be enforced when properly invoked. An inmate is required to present the same or similar ground for compassionate release in a request to the Bureau as in a motion to the court; any contrary approach would undermine the purpose of exhaustion—to provide the Bureau with information necessary to move for release on a defendant’s behalf. |
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| Young v. City of Chicago |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-3534 Opinion Date: February 5, 2021 Judge: KANNE Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Young drove Hughes to get a haircut. Hughes stated that he had a gun that he was returning to its owner at the barbershop. Young came back hours later. Young did not ask about the gun but believed that Hughes had left it. Chicago police received an anonymous tip that the two were driving around with a gun. Officers spotted the vehicle and saw that Hughes was not wearing a seatbelt. They lawfully stopped the car and approached with guns drawn. Hughes told Young, “take this.” Young replied, “hell no.” Hughes wiped the gun and placed it on the center console. The officers saw this, arrested both men, and learned both were convicted felons. The officers' reports listed Hughes as the gun's possessor and owner. Young was charged as an armed habitual criminal. A judge found probable cause to detain him. Young could not pay the $100,000 bond. Young stayed in pretrial detention for a year before being acquitted. Young sued Chicago and several officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for holding him in pretrial detention without probable cause and ignoring and fabricating evidence to detain him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of all of his claims. “It does not matter that Young said the gun wasn’t his—protesting innocence is not a get-out-of-pretrial-detention-free card." Nor does it matter that the police allegedly later falsified evidence. They had all the probable cause they needed from the arrest scene. |
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| United States v. Hansmeier |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2386 Opinion Date: February 10, 2021 Judge: Jane Louise Kelly Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, he was sentenced to 168 months in prison and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $1,541,527.37. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment where the indictment sufficiently described a fraudulent scheme to violate the federal statutes regarding mail and wire fraud. In this case, the indictment lays out a sufficient basis for the government's charge that defendant committed fraud, and it informs the court and the parties involved of the facts underlying that charge. The court also held that the government met its burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the $1,541,527.37 loss total was attributable solely to settlement payments from the fraud scheme. Therefore, the district court did not err in adopting that figure as fairly representative of the actual loss caused by the scheme. |
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| United States v. Oliver |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2209 Opinion Date: February 11, 2021 Judge: Jane Louise Kelly Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for five counts of drug-trafficking, but reversed his 25 month sentence, remanding for resentencing. The court held that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial was not violated and rejected his claims of error related to the admission of map exhibits, submission of an unadmitted exhibit to the jury, the prosecutor's leading questions to a government witness, and the admission of firearm evidence. The court also held that the government's notice complied with 21 U.S.C. 851. However, because the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's 2006 Illinois conviction qualified as a "serious drug felony," the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence does not apply in his case. Therefore, defendant is entitled to resentencing. |
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| United States v. Urbina-Rodriguez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-3022 Opinion Date: February 5, 2021 Judge: Melloy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. In this case, the jury permissibly found the required nexus without the guidance of expert testimony and rejected the claim that defendant's express reference to "protection" related solely to protecting chickens against wildlife. |
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| United States v. Weber |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 20-1391 Opinion Date: February 10, 2021 Judge: Erickson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and life sentence for five counts of aggravated sexual abuse and three counts of sexual abuse of a minor. While the court doubted that a search warrant that neither identifies the items to be seized nor incorporates an affidavit that might arguably cure the deficiencies meets the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement, the court need not reach that question because any error in admitting the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court held that there was no error in admitting testimony from victims of defendant's sexual abuse because the evidence was substantially probative, rebutted defendant's defense, and was not unduly prejudicial. Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a missing abuse victim's testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1). |
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| United States v. Woodberry |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Dockets: 19-30225, 19-30284 Opinion Date: February 11, 2021 Judge: Ronald Murray Gould Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment finding Defendants Woodberry and Johnson guilty of Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) and (b)(1); separately finding Johnson guilty of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence and a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); convicting Woodberry of aiding and abetting Johnson's firearm possession offense; and finding that Johnson used a short-barreled rifle during the robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(B)(i), which resulted in both defendants having their mandatory minimum sentences increased. The panel held that the district court did not err in instructing the jury that the "market for marijuana, including its intrastate aspects, is commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction," or that the "commerce" element of Hobbs Act robbery could be established if the robbery "could" affect commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction. The panel also held that the short-barreled element in section 924(c)(1)(B)(i) does not contain a separate mens rea requirement. |
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| United States v. Torres |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-2161 Opinion Date: February 8, 2021 Judge: Robert Edwin Bacharach Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In a pat-down search of Ronald Torres following a traffic stop, police officers found a handgun, which lead to his arrest for possessing a firearm after a felony conviction. Torres moved to suppress evidence of the gun, arguing police did not have a reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. Though the district court erroneously viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the Tenth Circuit determined this error was ultimately harmless, because undisputed evidence had justified the traffic stop and pat-down search. The traffic stop was permissible because the police had probable cause from observing a parking violation. When the police approached the vehicle, the smell of burnt marijuana created reasonable suspicion for further questioning. That questioning led to reasonable suspicion that Torres was armed and dangerous, justifying the pat-down search. Given the reasonableness of the suspicion for the pat-down search, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in denying Torres’s motion to suppress. |
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| Armstrong v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-13041 Opinion Date: February 5, 2021 Judge: Lagoa Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2255 habeas petition as second or successive, holding that a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) does not constitute a new, intervening judgment for purposes of the bar on second or successive section 2255 motions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). In this case, petitioner failed to obtain the required certification from this court before filing a second section 2255 petition, and the district court dismissed it as unauthorized. Without such authorization, the court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition. |
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| Lee v. GDCP Warden |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-11466 Opinion Date: February 11, 2021 Judge: Grant Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 motion for habeas relief. Petitioner argued that his attorneys violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase of his capital murder trial. The court concluded that the Georgia Supreme Court's determination that petitioner failed to show that the allegedly deficient performance prejudiced him, as required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), was not an unreasonable application of federal law. In this case, it was not unreasonable for the Georgia Supreme Court to conclude that there is no reasonable probability of a different result if petitioner's trial attorneys had collected and presented the mitigating evidence proffered to the state habeas court. |
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| United States v. Antonio Morales |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-11934 Opinion Date: February 5, 2021 Judge: Marcus Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court held that, even if the affidavit supporting the search warrant did not establish probable cause to justify the search, suppression of the fruits of the search would be inappropriate under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The court explained that the police here did exactly what the Fourth Amendment required of them: they obtained a warrant in good faith from a neutral magistrate and reasonably relied on it; they had no reason to believe that probable cause was absent despite the magistrate's authorization; there is no evidence in this record that the affidavit supporting the warrant misled the magistrate or that it contained false information; the affidavit was not lacking in indicia of probable cause so as to render the executing officers' belief in its existence unreasonable; and the warrant was not facially deficient because it failed to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized. Finally, the court rejected defendant's claim that the district court lacked lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition charge, because such an omission is not a jurisdictional defect. |
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| United States v. Ardon Chinchilla |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-10987 Opinion Date: February 11, 2021 Judge: Lagoa Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| Defendant was charged in a two-count superseding indictment with violating 18 U.S.C 1546(a) by allegedly using a fraudulent order of supervision to obtain a driver's license from the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Florida DHSMV). Defendant moved to dismiss the superseding indictment for failing to state an offense under section 1546(a), arguing that the term "authorized stay" means "lawful presence" in the United States and that no federal statute or regulation expressly identifies an order of supervision as "evidence of authorized stay in the United States." The district court dismissed the superseding indictment after concluding that an order of supervision does not qualify as a document "prescribed by statute or regulation . . . as evidence of authorized stay . . . in the United States" as required by section 1546(a). Based on a review of the statutes and regulations, the Eleventh Circuit held that an order of supervision falls within the plain and ordinary meaning of section 1546(a)'s "other document" clause. The court explained that the Form I-220B, Order of Supervision, itself is a document prescribed by the federal immigration statutes and regulations as showing that an alien has legal permission to stay in the United States. Furthermore, separate and apart from the immigration statutes and regulations, an order of supervision is a document prescribed by certain federal entitlement regulations as evidence of legal permission to stay in the United States. The court also held that defendant's proposed statutory interpretations are not supported by section 1546's language and structure. The court explained that "authorize stay" as used in section 1546(a) is not defined by terms of art for immigration laws governing alien admissibility. Furthermore, section 1546(a)'s "other document" provision does not require an order of supervision to be expressly listed or otherwise identified as evidencing authorized stay in the United States. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order dismissing the superseding indictment and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| United States v. Isaac |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-11239 Opinion Date: February 5, 2021 Judge: Edward Earl Carnes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for two counts of producing child pornography and one count of possessing child pornography. The court held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence found on defendant's cell phone. The court also held that defendant's sentence was not procedurally unreasonable where the district court did not err in applying three sentencing enhancements under USSG 2G2.1(b)(5), 2G2.2(b)(5), and 4B1.5(b)(1). Furthermore, defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors. |
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| Gentry v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2021 Ark. 26 Opinion Date: February 11, 2021 Judge: Wynne Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for second-degree murder and sentence of life imprisonment but reversed the additional ten years added to the sentence for a firearm enhancement, holding that Defendant's ten-year sentence under Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-121 was illegal. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction because the State met its burden of negating Defendant's justification defense; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the State to introduce evidence about Defendant's gang affiliation; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain hearsay statements attributed to the decedent as dying declarations; and (4) the trial court illegally added ten years to Gentry’s life sentence under section 16-90-121. |
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| Manuel v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2021 Ark. 24 Opinion Date: February 11, 2021 Judge: Wynne Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from the denial of Appellant's pro se motion to enforce his plea agreement, holding that Appellant's motion to enforce the plea agreement represented an untimely postconviction motion, and therefore, Appellant's notice of appeal was untimely. Appellant pled guilty to two counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to forty-five years' imprisonment. In his motion to enforce the plea agreement, Appellant argued that the sentence he received was not the sentence included in the plea agreement. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that both Appellant's motion to enforce the plea agreement and his notice of appeal were untimely, and therefore, neither the circuit court nor the Supreme Court had authority to grant the relief sought. |
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| State v. Torres |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2021 Ark. 22 Opinion Date: February 11, 2021 Judge: Hudson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to the circuit court's order granting a mistrial as to both the guilt and penalty phases of Defendant's capital murder trial when the event precipitating the mistrial occurred after the jury found Defendant guilty, holding that the circuit court correctly determined that the unique circumstances in this case required a mistrial as to both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. After a retrial, a jury convicted Defendant of capital murder and first-degree battery. During the penalty phase of trial, the State's witness lunged toward Defendant in an apparent effort to assault him. After the jury left the courtroom, Defendant's counsel moved for a mistrial of the sentencing proceeding. The circuit court declared a mistrial as to both the guilt and the penalty phases of the trial. The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking an order directing the circuit court to preserve the guilty verdict and conduct a new sentencing hearing only. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the circuit court did not err or exceed its jurisdiction in declaring a mistrial with respect to the guilt phase of the trial. |
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| People v. Chhoun |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S084996 Opinion Date: February 11, 2021 Judge: Carol Corrigan Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for five counts of murder, one count of residential burglary, and three counts of residential robbery with enhancements for personal use of a firearm and Defendant's death sentence, holding that there was no reasonable possibility that any assumed error could have affected the verdict. Specifically, the Supreme Court assumed potential errors in the trial court's failure to admonish support persons each time they accompanied a witness and in admitting hearsay during the penalty phase of trial. The Court, however, found no reasonable possibility that either assumed error could have affected the verdict. The Court further concluded that no cumulative prejudice rendered Defendant's trial unfair and therefore affirmed Defendant's convictions and his sentence of death. |
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| California v. Acosta |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: G057136(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 9, 2021 Judge: Goethals Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| At 21 years old, appellant Joshua Acosta, who was diagnosed with a form of high-functioning autism spectrum disorder, plotted with his codefendant, to kill their friend Katlynn’s parents, whom Acosta believed was physically and sexually abusing her. Acosta shot and killed Katlynn’s parents and a family friend who was at their house. A jury convicted Acosta of three counts of first degree murder and found true the multiple murder special circumstance and firearm enhancements. The trial court sentenced him to three consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), plus an additional 75 years to life in prison. On appeal, Acosta claimed his LWOP sentences were unconstitutional and had to be modified to allow for future parole consideration. Much of his challenge related to California Penal Code section 3051, which granted the right to a youth offender parole hearing to juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP, and to juvenile and young adult offenders sentenced to indeterminate or life terms, no matter how lengthy. According to Acosta, section 3051 violated equal protection because it denied young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP the right to a youth offender parole hearing. Acosta further contended his LWOP sentences violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court of Appeal rejected these contentions and affirmed the judgment. |
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| California v. Burgess |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D076287(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 11, 2021 Judge: Terry B. O'Rourke Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Months after a Pennsylvania court ordered Reginald Burgess be put on supervised probation, a jury in California convicted him of violating Penal Code section 29815, possession of a firearm in violation of an express condition of probation. The superior court suspended imposition of sentence and granted Burgess three years’ probation with various conditions, ordering that he could move to reduce the felony conviction to a misdemeanor upon 18 months of successful probation. Burgess appealed, contending insufficient evidence supported his conviction. Specifically, pointing to a Judicial Council jury instruction, CALCRIM No. 2512, he argued an essential element of the section 29815 offense was not met: his violation of a court order that he not own or possess a firearm. Burgess contended that because the Pennsylvania probation department directly set the conditions of his probation, there was no court order for purposes of the offense. The California Court of Appeal rejected these contentions. "Interpretation of section 29815 is not guided by form jury instructions, which are not the law. ... the statutory language merely requires the probationer be bound by the condition." The Court found the State proved Burgess had agreed to a condition of probation specifically restricting his possession of firearms, and substantial evidence supported his possession of such firearms in California while subject to the probation condition. Therefore, judgment was affirmed. |
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| California v. Marrero |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D076712(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 11, 2021 Judge: Guerrero Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Armando Marrero pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury to another person, with sentencing enhancements for great bodily injury, multiple victims, and a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15 percent or more. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence for five years and granted formal probation, on the condition (among others) that Marrero spend 180 days in local custody. At a subsequent hearing, the court ordered restitution in the amount of $358,047.79, covering $350,000 in attorney fees and approximately $8,000 in travel expenses. Marrero appealed, contending: (1) the attorney fees order was excessive; (2) the trial court violated his right to due process by admitting illegible handwritten attorney time records into evidence; and (3) the court violated due process by awarding travel expenses without adequate notice. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Marrero’s first two contentions but agreed with the third. The Court therefore reversed the award of travel expenses with directions to rehear the matter on proper notice. Otherwise, the Court affirmed. |
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| Hernandez v. State Personnel Board |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E072444(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 10, 2021 Judge: Raphael Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law |
| Petitioner-appellant Anthony Hernandez was convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence after choking his girlfriend. The California Department of Correction and Rehabilitation (Department) terminated him from his position as a correctional officer, stating that because of his domestic violence conviction, federal law prohibited him from carrying a firearm, which he needed for the job. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether the Department acted reasonably in terminating Hernandez. It was undisputed that federal law makes it a felony to possess a firearm after being convicted in any court of misdemeanor domestic violence, which was defined in part as the use of physical force by “a person similarly situated to a spouse” of a victim. Disputed here was whether Hernandez was “similarly situated to a spouse” of his girlfriend, given that he had been dating her five or six months and did not share a permanent residence with her. In line with the federal case law, the Court found the evidence was sufficient to support the Department’s determination that Hernandez was “similarly situated to a spouse” of his victim under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Department acted reasonably in terminating him. |
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| In re D.C. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E073980(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 11, 2021 Judge: Manuel A. Ramirez Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| Defendant-appellant D.C. (minor) appealed a court order sustaining the State's petition made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The petition alleged minor carried a concealed dirk or dagger on his person in violation of Penal Code section 21310. Minor argued, and the State conceded, reversal was called for because the juvenile court erred when it found the human trafficking affirmative defense set forth in Penal Code section 236.23 did not apply in his case. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed the juvenile court erred, but declined the parties’ invitation to find the requirements of the defense were met. The Court reversed and ordered a new hearing on the applicability of Penal Code section 236.23. |
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| People v. Duchine |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A157980(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 9, 2021 Judge: Stewart Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Duchine was convicted of first-degree murder in 1987. His conviction was affirmed. In 2019, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 (Senate Bill 1437), with a declaration asserting he was charged and convicted of first-degree murder under a felony-murder theory, but that he did not, with intent to kill, aid, abet or assist the actual killer in the commission of murder, and that he could not be convicted of first-degree murder under the newly reformed murder statutes (amended Penal Code sections 188 or 189). After appointing counsel for Duchine and reviewing briefs, the trial court denied the petition. On appeal, the Attorney General agreed with Duchine that the trial court erred by denying relief at the prima facie stage on the ground that there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could reach a guilty verdict of first-degree murder and by engaging in judicial fact-finding at the prima facie stage rather than holding an evidentiary hearing. The court of appeal reversed and remanded with instructions to the trial court to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing on Duchine’s petition. |
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| People v. Kidane |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B303213(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 10, 2021 Judge: Elizabeth A. Grimes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeal held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's vehicular manslaughter conviction and the true finding on the special allegation. In this case, the jury had ample evidence before it upon which to rest its determination that defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, he had struck and injured someone before fleeing the scene. The court also held that defendant forfeited his argument that the trial court erred by imposing an upper term sentence. Finally, defendant's contention that trial counsel was ineffective lacked merit because he failed to demonstrate either element of an ineffective assistance claim. |
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| In re Colorado v. Subjack |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2021 CO 10 Opinion Date: February 8, 2021 Judge: Monica M. Márquez Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In two cases consolidated for review, the common issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether a a criminal defendant who was unable to post bond on a class 4 felony charge was “in custody” and therefore entitled to a preliminary hearing on that charge under section 16-5-301(1)(b)(II), C.R.S. (2020), and Crim. P. 7(h)(1), even if that defendant was also in custody for separate, unrelated offenses. While serving sentences in the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) for unrelated offenses, David Subjack and Darryl Lynch were each arrested and charged with possession of contraband in the first degree, which is a class 4 felony. In both cases, the court set cash-only bonds, which neither defendant posted. Subjack and Lynch each requested a preliminary hearing pursuant to section 16-5-301(1)(b)(II) and Crim. P. 7(h)(1). The district court denied their requests, reasoning that the current charges did not form the “primary basis” of their custody. The Supreme Court concluded defendants were “in custody for the offense for which the preliminary hearing is requested” and therefore entitled to a preliminary hearing on their current charges. |
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| Perez v. Colorado |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2021 CO 5M Opinion Date: February 8, 2021 Judge: Brian D. Boatright Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| After Marcus Perez led police on a "lengthy foot pursuit," officers found two live shotgun shells in Perez's pocket. Without giving Perez Miranda warnings, the officer asked him, “Where’s the gun?” Perez answered that he had thrown the gun away. At a suppression hearing, Perez argued that his answer should have been suppressed because he was not Mirandized before the officer questioned him. The trial court disagreed, finding that the public safety exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), applied. A jury convicted Perez of second-degree assault on a peace officer and four counts of possession of a dangerous weapon by a previous offender (“POWPO”). Perez appealed, contending that the public safety exception did not apply. The court of appeals agreed but deemed the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the convictions. Under the facts of this case, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the public safety exception applied, and the arresting officer was not required to give Miranda warnings before inquiring about the gun's location. |
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| Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction |
| Court: Connecticut Supreme Court Docket: SC20089 Opinion Date: February 16, 2021 Judge: Christine S. Vertefeuille Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the habeas court denying Petitioner's second petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Petitioner's federal due process rights were violated when the State knowingly failed to correct the false testimony of two prosecution witnesses when defense counsel was aware of the falsity of the testimony. A jury found Petitioner and his codefendants guilty of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. In his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus Petitioner alleged that his prior habeas counsel provided ineffective assistance in that he failed to raise the claim that the State had violated Petitioner's right to due process by failing to correct the allegedly false testimony of two witnesses at trial. The habeas court denied the petition, and the Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in light of the facts of this case, the fact that counsel was aware of the falsity of the testimony was insufficient to protect Petitioner's due process rights. |
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| State v. Lee |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-16-0000797 Opinion Date: February 9, 2021 Judge: Paula A. Nakayama Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacating the circuit court's order granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained in a search of Defendant's bedroom, holding that the circuit court erred in suppressing all evidence obtained by the State. In granting Defendant's motion to suppress, the circuit court determined that Defendant possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bedroom and that the police officer coerced Defendant into opening his bedroom door. The court then suppressed all statements, evidence, observations and actions that were obtained after entry into the bedroom. The ICA vacated the circuit court's order, holding that an emergency aid exception justified the warrantless search. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that, even if the officers unlawfully searched Defendant's bedroom, the evidence obtained did not constitute suppressible "fruit of the poisonous tree." |
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| Idaho v. Campbell |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 47037 Opinion Date: February 10, 2021 Judge: Moeller Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The State charged Carli Campbell as an accessory to a felony under Idaho Code section 18-205(1) for withholding or concealing information from police officers about an aggravated battery and burglary that occurred in her home in December 2017. After the evidentiary phase of the trial was completed, Campbell requested the district court instruct the jury that the State was required to prove that the alleged assailant, Michael Cross, committed the aggravated battery or burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. The State opposed this request and the district court agreed, concluding that while the State was required to prove Campbell had knowledge of the conduct that constituted an aggravated battery or a burglary, it was not was required to prove Cross committed the aggravated battery or burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Campbell guilty. Campbell now appeals her conviction to this Court. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| State v. Thompson |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 19-1259 Opinion Date: February 5, 2021 Judge: McDonald Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for attempting to obtain a prescription drug by deceit, as a habitual offender, and conspiracy to commit a nonforcible felony, holding that Defendant's constitutional challenge to Iowa Code 814.6A was unavailing. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in admitting, over Defendant's objections, evidence regarding Defendant's residential address, which was offered to prove Defendant's knowledge, motive, and intent; and (2) section 814.6A, a newly-enacted law that prohibits a represented defendant from filing pro se documents, does not violate the constitutional separation-of-powers doctrine. The Court then denied Defendant's motion to accept his pro se supplemental brief. |
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| State v. Colson |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 120946 Opinion Date: February 5, 2021 Judge: Wilson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for felony murder, intentional second-degree murder, felony theft of a firearm, felony theft of a vehicle, and burglary, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. On appeal, Defendant raised three arguments attacking the sufficiency of the State's evidence supporting his convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the State was sufficient to support the convictions, and the jury was not required to stack inferences in convicting Defendant; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's request for a lesser included offense instruction on voluntary manslaughter. |
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| State v. Farmer |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 121534 Opinion Date: February 5, 2021 Judge: Wall Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence for first-degree felony murder and several other offenses, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's departure motion and that Defendant abandoned his claim regarding proper notice under the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA), Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-4901 et seq. After Defendant was originally sentenced, he filed two motions to correct an illegal sentence. The district court eventually resentenced Defendant but denied his motion for a departure sentence. Defendant appealed from his resentencing, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred in failing to notify him of his duty to register under KORA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by denying Defendant's motion for a departure sentence; and (2) Defendant failed to preserve his claim of defective notice under KORA. |
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| State v. Stoll |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 117081 Opinion Date: February 5, 2021 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for failure to register under the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA), holding that the court of appeals panel erred when it declined to review Defendant's claim challenging her duty to register under the invited error doctrine, but the argument failed on the merits. During trial, Defendant filed a motion arguing that the State would need to prove she had a culpable mental state when she failed to register. The district court denied the motion, concluding that failure to register was a strict liability crime. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting Defendant's defense of substantial compliance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial compliance is not an available defense to a charge of failure to register under KORA; (2) the unavailability of a substantial compliance defense did not violate Defendant's due process rights; (3) Defendant had standing to challenge KORA on its face as unconstitutional; and (4) while the court of appeals erred when it held that Defendant could not challenge the sufficiency of the State's evidence because she invited any error, Defendant's claim still failed on the merits. |
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| Commonwealth v. Jackson |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-11341 Opinion Date: February 4, 2021 Judge: Kafker Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for murder in the first degree with deliberate premeditation, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below and no reason for this Court to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce or set aside the verdict. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the trial judge did not commit prejudicial error in (1) allowing the Commonwealth's peremptory challenges of two prospective jurors over Defendant's objections pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461 (1979); (2) admitting a graphic autopsy photograph; and (3) allowing rebuttal testimony about overheard telephone statements of a Commonwealth witness imparting that she altered her testimony upon receipt of death threats and denying Defendant's request to conduct consequent voir dire of that witness. |
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| Quinones v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-13042 Opinion Date: February 4, 2021 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief. Petitioner was charged with solicitation to commit a crime stemming from an incident involving an informant that occurred while Petitioner was incarcerated. During the trial court proceedings, Petitioner filed two motions seeking discovery related to the informant and an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Department of Correction was a third party. The trial court judge denied both motions. Petitioner then filed his Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition asking the single justice to vacate the trial court's orders denying his discovery-related motions. The single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because Petitioner could seek review of any error in the normal appellate process the single justice properly denied relief. |
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| State v. Wilkes |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2021 MT 27 Opinion Date: February 9, 2021 Judge: Sandefur Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to a net five-year suspended term of commitment to the Montana Department of Corrections and a $15,000 fine for her convictions for felony possession of methamphetamine and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, holding that the district court erred in imposing the fine. The fine at issue included the maximum $5,000 fine on criminal possession of dangerous drugs (CPDD) and an additional $10,000 for the thirty-five percent market value fine mandated by Mont. Code Ann. 45-9-130(1). The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in deviating from the statutory presumption that a defendant is entitled to a deferred imposition of sentence on a first-offense CPDD; but (2) erred in imposing the fine required by section 45-9-130(1) without a qualifying basis on the trial evidence and without consideration of the factors specified in Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-213(3). |
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| State v. Johnson |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 308 Neb. 331 Opinion Date: February 5, 2021 Judge: Lindsey Miller-Lerman Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences for five counts of robbery, five counts of use of a weapon to commit a felony, one count of second-degree assault, and one count of attempted escape, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his assignments of error. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err when it overruled Defendant's motion to suppress statements he made while in custody; (2) the district court did not err in overruling Defendant's motion to suppress evidence of witness identifications from photographic lineups; (3) there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's finding that Defendant failed to prove the insanity defense; and (4) Defendant's sentences were not excessive. |
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| State v. Reames |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 308 Neb. 361 Opinion Date: February 5, 2021 Judge: Funke Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal of her sentence of probation stemming from her conviction of one count of possession of a controlled substance, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear this matter. A jury found Defendant guilty of one count of possession of a controlled substance. On March 17, 2020, the district court sentenced Defendant to one year of probation. On March 20, 2020, the court entered an amended order of probation allowing Defendant to reside in Kansas instead of Nebraska. The rest of the March 17 sentencing order remained in effect. On appeal, Defendant argued that she received ineffective assistance of counsel when her trial counsel failed to timely appeal from the March 17 sentencing order. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that there was no proper, timely appeal in this case. |
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| State v. Thomas |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 308 Neb. 312 Opinion Date: February 5, 2021 Judge: Freudenberg Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of marijuana, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress. In his suppression motion, Defendant sought to suppress evidence found in his vehicle during a felony traffic stop. The stop was initiated based on law enforcement's belief that Defendant's vehicle matched the description in a police bulletin of a vehicle used in a shooting committed three days prior. In his motion to suppress, Defendant argued that the police bulletin was insufficient to justify the traffic stop. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of the suppression motion, holding (1) the felony traffic stop was a tier-two police-citizen encounter; and (2) the law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of Defendant's vehicle based on the police bulletin alone. |
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| New Jersey v. Desir |
| Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey Docket: a-43-19 Opinion Date: February 9, 2021 Judge: Solomon Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether defendant Herby Desir was entitled to discovery regarding the controlled purchase of narcotics by a confidential informant (CI). Defendant was not charged in connection with that controlled purchase; however, the purchase formed the probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for defendant’s home, and execution of the search warrant led to charges against defendant for multiple drug and weapons offenses. The Appellate Division reversed the denial of defendant’s motion to compel discovery and remanded for further proceedings, thus permitting defendant, after receiving discovery, “either to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial . . . or to accept his earlier conviction and sentence.” The Appellate Division found that, under provisions of Rule 3:13-3(b)(1), the State should have automatically given defendant the laboratory report -- along with any police reports and video and sound recordings -- once the indictment was filed. The Supreme Court held a defendant seeking discovery in connection with a "Franks" hearing may -- in the trial court’s discretion and on showing a plausible justification that casts reasonable doubt on the veracity of the affidavit -- be entitled to limited discovery described with particularity that is material to the determination of probable cause. The Court affirmed and modified the Appellate Division’s judgment and remanded to the trial court for consideration under the standard adopted in this decision. |
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| People v. Badji |
| Court: New York Court of Appeals Citation: 2021 NY Slip Op 00897 Opinion Date: February 11, 2021 Judge: DiFiore Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals held that the definition of credit card in N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 511(1), as supplemented by N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 511-a, is the controlling definition as designated by N.Y. Penal Law 155.00(7) and, as a result, the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction of grand larceny for stealing an intangible credit card account number. Defendant's conviction of grand larceny in the fourth degree was based on Defendant's theft of the victim's credit card account number to purchase goods. During trial, there was no evidence that Defendant possessed the physical card itself. At issue was whether the People needed to prove that Defendant physically possessed the tangible credit card in order to support his conviction of grand larceny based upon credit card theft. The issue turned on the definition of credit card for purposes of N.Y. Penal Law 155.00(7) and whether that definition includes the credit card account number. The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that, under the Penal Law, theft of a tangible card is not a necessary element of fourth-degree grand larceny. |
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| People v. Duval |
| Court: New York Court of Appeals Citation: 2021 NY Slip Op 00896 Opinion Date: February 11, 2021 Judge: Wilson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division upholding the denial of Defendant's suppression motion, holding that the search warrant in this case was facially valid and that Defendant's challenge to the execution of the search warrant was unpreserved for appellate review. Police officers searched Defendant's residence pursuant to a search warrant and recovered, among other things, a handgun and ammunition. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the warrant was invalid because it did not meet the constitutional requirements of particularity. The motion court denied Defendant's suppression motion. Defendant then pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the motion court did not abuse its discretion in denying suppression without holding an evidentiary hearing. |
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| Ex parte Stephen Dale Barbee |
| Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Docket: WR-71,070-03 Opinion Date: February 10, 2021 Judge: Keel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In a subsequent application for writ of habeas corpus, Applicant Stephen Barbee sought relief under McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), which he claimed was a previously unavailable legal basis for his claim. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals filed and set his application to address whether he was entitled to relief under McCoy. After review, the Court concluded that the legal basis for the current claim was previously available, and even if it were not, Applicant failed to allege facts that would have entitled him to relief under McCoy. Consequently, the Court dismissed this subsequent application as an abuse of the writ. |
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| Wheeler v. Texas |
| Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Docket: PD-0388-19 Opinion Date: February 10, 2021 Judge: Slaughter Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In applying for a blood-alcohol search warrant, a police officer submitted an unsworn probable-cause affidavit. Finding that the affidavit articulated probable cause but not realizing that it was unsworn, a magistrate signed and returned the search warrant. The same police officer then executed that search warrant. It was undisputed the officer’s failure to take the oath and swear to his probable-cause affidavit was improper. The question before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether despite this defect, and assuming a valid warrant issued, the good-faith exception to the Texas exclusionary rule applied such that the blood-alcohol evidence was admissible. The Court held that, under the facts of this case, the good-faith exception was inapplicable and the evidence was subject to suppression. The Court agreed with the court of appeals that the officer in this case was objectively unreasonable in executing a search warrant he knew was unsupported by a sworn probable-cause affidavit, such that he could not be said to have acted in objective good-faith reliance upon the warrant. |
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| In re Pers. Restraint of Brooks |
| Court: Washington Supreme Court Docket: 97689-9 Opinion Date: February 11, 2021 Judge: Steven González Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| In 1978, 17-year-old Carl Brooks pleaded guilty to eight counts of first degree robbery, first degree rape, first degree kidnapping, first degree assault, second degree murder, and first degree burglary, all while armed with a deadly weapon. Over the span of three days, Brooks carjacked, robbed, and raped a woman while her son was present; attempted to rob a couple where gunfire between Brooks and the male victim led to the shooting death of the victim’s wife; carjacked and robbed a third woman; and threatened a fourth woman in her home, demanded financial information, and assaulted her. Brooks had prior convictions in both juvenile and adult court. At the time, sentencing in Washington was “indeterminate:” trial courts sentenced offenders to the maximum amount of time that could be served. But the amount of time the offender would actually serve was largely controlled by the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles (parole board) who would set the minimum term, taking into account recommendations by the trial court and prosecutor. The judge ordered five of the life sentences to run concurrently, and the remaining three to run consecutively, effectively sentencing Brooks to four consecutive “blocks” (or groupings) of life sentences. Both the prosecutor and the court recommended that the parole board give Brooks minimum terms of life. Departing from the recommendations slightly, the parole board set minimum terms of 20, 25, 25, and 20 years for the four blocks, for a minimum total of 90 years. Not long after Brooks was sentenced, the Washington legislature replaced the indeterminate sentencing system with a determinate system. For those sentenced under the former indeterminate sentencing system who were still incarcerated, the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB) (the successor to the parole board) was directed to “attempt to make [parole] decisions reasonably consistent” with the Sentencing Reform Act. While Brooks has been serving his time, the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The Washington Supreme Court determined that by its plain language, RCW 9.94A.730 applies to Brooks’ sentence. The ISRB was ordered to provide Brooks with a hearing under RCW 9.94A.730 that presumed release. Accordingly, the Court granted the Personal Restraint Petitioned, reversed the Court of Appeals, and remanded to the ISRB for further proceedings. |
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| State v. Loayza |
| Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Docket: 2018AP002066-CR Opinion Date: February 11, 2021 Judge: Ann Walsh Bradley Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's judgment of conviction for eighth offense operating while intoxicated (OWI), holding that it was more likely than not that Defendant had a 1990 California OWI conviction, and therefore, the State met its burden of proof. The court of appeals remanded Defendant's conviction for resentencing as a seventh offense, determining that the State did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of Defendant's 1990 California OWI conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the documentary evidence in the record was sufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, Defendant's 1990 California OWI conviction. |
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