Latest 6 Cases: Williams v. U.S. Bancorp Investments, Inc. (Civil Procedure), Stanley v. Superior Court (Civil Rights), California v. Tran ...

Would Eliminating Qualified Immunity Substantially Deter Police Misconduct?

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses the proposal that eliminating or substantially reducing the qualified immunity currently enjoyed by police officers would address racism and police brutality. Although the idea has lately garnered some bipartisan support and could potentially have some benefit, Dorf describes two reasons to be skeptical of the suggestion. He concludes that for all of its flaws, qualified immunity may actually facilitate the progressive development of constitutional rights.

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Williams v. U.S. Bancorp Investments, Inc.

Docket: A156226(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 9, 2020

Judge: Tucher

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Class Action

In the 2005 Burakoff class action, the court (in 2008) certified two subclasses of California Bancorp financial consultants for a period running through the date of the order. Subclass A “worked more than 40 hours in a week or 8 hours in a day, but did not receive overtime pay.” Subclass B were illegally required to pay their business expenses. Williams joined Bancorp in 2007, becoming a member of the Burakoff putative class. In 2010, he filed another class action, alleging similar causes of action for a class period beginning the day after the Burakoff class period ended, with consistent subclasses. The trial court stayed the Williams case pending Burakoff's resolution. In 2011, the court decertified the Burakoff overtime subclass, for lack of sufficient commonality. In 2012, the parties settled Burakoff. Williams participated in that settlement as a member of Subclass B. He did not, nor did any absent members of Subclass A, release his wage and hour claims. Bancorp then demanded arbitration under an agreement Williams had signed. Bancorp argued the Burakoff decertification order collaterally estopped Williams from relitigating the appropriateness of class certification. Williams agreed to the dismissal of his claim for unpaid business expenses. Following a remand, the trial court granted a motion to compel arbitration of Williams’s individual claims, concluding that a class decertification order may have collateral estoppel effect. The court of appeal reversed. An order denying certification to a proposed class does not preclude an absent member of the putative class from later seeking to certify an identical class in a second action; collateral estoppel does not bar an absent member in a putative class that was initially certified, but later decertified, from subsequently pursuing an identical class action.

Stanley v. Superior Court

Docket: A160151(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 9, 2020

Judge: Stuart R. Pollak

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Stanley was charged with sexual intercourse with a child 10 years old or younger with enhancements for prior serious felony convictions. Following an August 2019 mistrial, the court set a new trial for April 2020. Stanley waived his statutory right to a speedy trial until that date. On March 4, 2020, Governor Newsom declared a state of emergency in response to the COVID-19 outbreak,. On March 16, the Contra Costa County Health Officer issued a “shelter in place” order. Days later, the Governor ordered all Californians to stay at home except for limited activities. On March 23, Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye issued an emergency order suspending all jury trials and extending by 60 days the Penal Code 1382 time period for holding a criminal trial, stating that courts cannot comply with health restrictions and that potential jurors would be unavailable. On May 4, Stanley filed an unsuccessful "speedy trial" motion to dismiss. The court determined there was good cause under Penal Code 1382(a) to extend the trial date and set a jury trial for July 13, 2020, and stated the last day for the start of trial under Penal Code 1382 is July 29, 2020. The court of appeal affirmed. While it is unlikely that the orders are unlawful, the court did not address that issue. The severity of the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact it has had within the state independently support the trial court’s finding of good cause.

California v. Tran

Docket: D075280(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 9, 2020

Judge: Richard D. Huffman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Hung Tran was convicted by jury of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (count 1) and mayhem (count 2). With regard to count 1, the jury found true Tran personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim. Tran was sentenced to prison for four years; the court struck the great bodily injury allegation and stayed the sentence under count 2. Tran appealed, contending the court erroneously admitted into evidence "doctored" videos used by the prosecution's expert witness during his testimony; substantial evidence did not support his conviction under counts 1 and 2; the court erroneously admitted lay opinion testimony from a prosecution witness; and Tran's trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective. After review, the Court of Appeal determined that none of Tran's claims had merit and affirmed.

Spikener v. Ally Financial, Inc.

Docket: A157301(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 9, 2020

Judge: Mark B. Simons

Areas of Law: Consumer Law, Legal Ethics

Spikener purchased a car under a credit sales contract; the seller did not inform Spikener that the car had been in a major collision. Before Spikener learned about the collision, the contract was assigned to Ally. The Contract complied with the Holder Rule, 16 CFR 433.2, which requires consumer credit contracts to include a notice: “ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.” Plaintiff sued Ally under the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). Ally agreed to rescind the contract and refund the amount Spikener had paid: $3,500. Spikener unsuccessfully sought $13,000 in attorney fees under CLRA’s fee-shifting provision. The court cited “Lafferty,” which held a debtor cannot recover damages and attorney fees for a Holder Rule claim that exceed the amount the debtor paid under the contract. The FTC construes the Holder Rule in the same manner. In response to Lafferty, Civil Code 1459.5, was enacted, providing that the Holder Rule’s limitation on recovery does not apply to attorney fees. The court of appeal affirmed. The FTC’s construction of the Rule is entitled to deference; to the extent section 1459.5 authorizes recovery of attorney fees on a Holder Rule claim even if that results in a total recovery greater than the amount the plaintiff paid under the contract, it conflicts with, and is preempted by, the Holder Rule.

Trejo v. County of Los Angeles

Docket: B293564(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 9, 2020

Judge: White

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

When the Los Angeles County Civil Service Rules 2.01 and 12.02(B) are read together, their plain meaning is that so long as the probationer is engaged in the duties of "a position or positions" she is not "absent from duty." Plaintiff, a deputy sheriff, challenges his employer's practice of extending probation while investigating the deputy's claimed misconduct as violating the rules. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's issuance of a writ of mandate directing the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department to reinstate the deputy as a permanent civil service employee. The court held that the plain language of the rules does not authorize the department's practice of extending probation by re-assigning deputies under investigation to administrative duty. In this case, plaintiff became a permanent civil service employee 12 months after his probation began. Furthermore, the County's arguments premised upon avoiding absurd and impractical interpretations are unpersuasive. The court also agreed that plaintiff did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies.

Fadeeff v. State Farm General Insurance Co.

Docket: A155691(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 9, 2020

Judge: Miller

Areas of Law: Insurance Law

The 2015 Valley Fire caused smoke damage to the Fadeeffs’ home, insured under a State Farm homeowners’ policy. Linen wall covering inside the home had started to buckle and the Fadeeffs had health concerns. With State Farm’s approval, the Fadeeffs retained ServPro to assist with smoke and soot mitigation and cleaning. State Farm’s independent adjuster (Gannaway) reported that the home was “well maintained” and that “[a]ll damage is related to smoke and soot.” State Farm made payments totaling $50,000. The Fadeeffs hired a public adjuster and submitted supplemental claims, totaling $75,000. State Farm’s independent adjuster (Carpenter), who is not a licensed adjuster in California and not licensed in any building trade reported he could not find smoke damage. State Farm retained FACS, which took only surface samples from the home and determined that no additional cleaning was required. State Farm denied the supplemental claims. The Fadeeffs filed suit, alleging insurance bad faith. The court granted State Farm summary judgment. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that multiple disputed facts made summary judgment inappropriate. It is not possible to conclude that it is indisputable that the basis for denial was reasonable. There are triable issues regarding whether State Farm could have reasonably relied on its experts. A jury should determine the issue of punitive damages.