Dead Letter Office: What’s Left of the Impeachment Power After Trump’s Acquittal

DEAN FALVY

Dean Falvy, a lecturer at the University of Washington School of Law in Seattle, discusses what happens now, after Senate Republicans voted to acquit President Trump. Falvy predicts that (1) President Trump will be emboldened to commit further abuses of power, (2) future presidents will be less constrained by fear of impeachment, and (3) impeachment may become more routine as political practice and significantly less effective as a constitutional remedy.

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Watson v. City of Blytheville

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 Ark. 51

Opinion Date: February 6, 2020

Judge: Kemp

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Tax Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff's illegal exaction suit against the City of Blytheville and its Sewer Department (collectively, the City), holding that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment. In her complaint, Plaintiff claimed that a $5 fee for sewer system repairs and upgrades, imposed pursuant to a city ordinance, was a tax and constituted an illegal exaction in violation of article 16, section 13 of the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly found that the fee was not a tax and, therefore, not an illegal exaction.

Citrix Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12741

Opinion Date: February 5, 2020

Judge: Cypher

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Appellate Tax Board (the Board) upholding sales tax assessments for fees charged for subscriptions to use online software products, holding that the subscription fees were subject to sales tax. Appellant sold subscriptions for three online software products. The Commissioner of Revenue determined that Appellant's subscription fees constituted sales of software subject to sales tax and assessed sales tax against Appellant for the taxable periods April 2007 through June 2009 and October 2009 through December 2011. The Board upheld the sales tax assessments. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that receipts from sales of subscriptions for the online software products were subject to Massachusetts sales tax.

G4, LLC v. Pearl River County Board of Supervisors

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2018-CA-01227-SCT

Opinion Date: February 6, 2020

Judge: James W. Kitchens

Areas of Law: Business Law, Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law, Tax Law

G4, LLC, entered into a lease in 2009 with the City of Picayune, Mississippi, for land on the grounds of the Picayune Municipal Airport. After the Pearl River County Board of Supervisors assessed ad valorem taxes on the leased land, G4 paid the taxes under protest and petitioned the Board for a refund and for a refund of taxes it had paid on lots in the Tin Hill subdivision. The Board denied G4’s petition, and G4 appealed to the Circuit Court of Pearl River County, which affirmed. G4 appealed, asserting that, according to the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in Rankin County Board of Supervisors v. Lakeland Income Properties, LLC, 241 So. 3d 1279 (Miss. 2018), it was automatically exempt from paying ad valorem taxes on the airport property. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded the circuit court’s decision that affirmed the Board’s refusal to refund the airport property taxes. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision that G4 was not entitled to a refund of taxes paid on the Tin Hill subdivision lots.

Estate of Mary Van Riper v. Director, Division of Taxation

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: a-51-18

Opinion Date: February 5, 2020

Judge: Solomon

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law, Trusts & Estates

Walter and Mary Van Riper transferred ownership of their marital home to a single irrevocable trust. Walter passed away shortly after transfer of the property to the trust. Six years later, after Mary passed away, the trustee distributed the property to the couple’s niece. In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether the New Jersey Division of Taxation (Division) properly taxed the full value of the home at the time of Mary’s death. Walter and Mary directed that, if sold, all proceeds from the sale of their residence would be held in trust for their benefit and would be utilized to provide housing and shelter during their lives. Walter died nineteen days after the creation of the Trust. Mary died six years later, still living in the marital residence. Mary’s inheritance tax return reported one-half of the date-of-death value of the marital residence as taxable. However, the Division conducted an audit and imposed a transfer inheritance tax assessment based upon the entire value of the residence at the time of Mary’s death. Mary’s estate paid the tax assessed but filed an administrative protest challenging the transfer inheritance tax assessment. The Division issued its final determination that the full fair market value of the marital residence held by the Trust should be included in Mary’s taxable estate for transfer inheritance tax purposes. The Appellate Division affirmed the Tax Court’s conclusion, rejecting the estate’s argument that transfer inheritance tax should only be assessed on Mary’s undivided one-half interest in the residence. The Supreme Court agreed with both the Tax Court and the Appellate Division that the Division properly taxed the entirety of the residence when both life interests were extinguished, and the remainder was transferred to Marita. The property’s transfer, in its entirety, took place “at or after” Mary’s death, and was appropriately taxed at its full value at that time. “In light of the estate-planning mechanism used here, any other holding would introduce an intolerable measure of speculation and uncertainty in an area of law in which clarity, simplicity, and ease of implementation are paramount.”

Columbus City Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-353

Opinion Date: February 6, 2020

Judge: Donnelly

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Tax Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the board of tax appeals (BTA) of the 2015 tax year value of an apartment complex located in Franklin County, holding that the BTA's decision was reasonable and lawful. At issue was whether the BTA erred in deciding that the sale price paid for the transfer of ownership of a corporate entity, Palmer House Borrower, LLC (Palmer) should be presumed to constitute the value of the real estate owned by that entity. Palmer further asserted that the BTA improperly admitted and relied upon the submitted evidence of the transfer and sale. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA reasonably considered the sale and conveyance documentation; (2) the BTA reasonably determined that the transaction was, in substance, a sale of the real estate; (3) the appraisal offered by Palmer was not the only evidence of value; and (4) Palmer did not show that the BTA's decision violated Ohio Const. art. XII, 2.

Willacy v. Cleveland Board of Income Tax Review

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-314

Opinion Date: February 4, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the board of tax appeals (BTA), holding that Cleveland's taxation of Appellant's employment compensation in 2014 and 2015 was required under municipal law and did not violate Appellant's due process rights, despite the fact that Appellant did not work or live in the city of Cleveland during the tax years at issue. Appellant was employed by the Sherwin-Williams Company from 1980 until she retired in 2009 and moved to Florida. Sherwin-Williams compensated Appellant, in part, with stock options during her employment. Appellant exercised some of those options in 2014 and 2015, and Cleveland collected income tax on their value. Appellant sought refunds from the city based on the fact that she resided in Florida during the tax years at issue. Cleveland Board of Income Tax Review denied the refunds, and the BTA affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's arguments challenging the taxation failed.