“Might as Well Carry a Purse with That Mask, Joe”: COVID-19, Toxic Masculinity, and the Sad State of National Politics

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN, LINDA C. MCCLAIN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman and Boston University law professor Linda C. McClain comment on COVID-19, toxic masculinity, and the state of national politics today. Grossman and McClain contrast President Trump’s reckless bravado that endangers the lives of Americans with the empathy of Democratic presidential nominee former Vice President Joe Biden’s in asking people to be patriotic by doing their part by wearing masks to protect other Americans.

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Should Department of Justice Lawyers Defy William Barr?

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost, Associate Dean of the Faculty, and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at Amherst College—comments on an open letter addressed to the 100,000 professionals working in the U.S. Department of Justice and published by Lawyers Defending Democracy. In the letter, more than 600 members of the bar from across the United States call on their DOJ colleagues to refrain from “participating in political misuse of the DOJ in the elction period ahead.” Sarat argues that the letter rightly recognizes that Attorney General Barr’s blatant partisanship endangers the integrity of the DOJ itself and its role in preserving the rule of law.

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Signs for Jesus v. Pembroke, New Hampshire

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 17-1192

Opinion Date: October 7, 2020

Judge: Jeffrey R. Howard

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the Town of Pembroke, New Hampshire and dismissing the complaint filed by Signs for Jesus and Hillside Baptist Church (collectively, the Church) challenging the Town's denial of the Church's application for a permit to install an electronic sign on its property, holding that the Town met its summary judgment burden on all counts. Hillside Baptist Church applied for a permit to install an electronic sign on its property to transmit messages provided by the nonprofit corporation Signs for Jesus. The Pembroke Zoning Board of Adjustment denied the permit, citing a provision in the Pembroke Sign Ordinance that bans the use of electronic signs in the zoning district where the Church was located. The Church later brought this complaint, alleging violations of the state and federal Constitutions, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and certain New Hampshire zoning laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the Town and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Church's state statutory claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err.

County of Sonoma v. U.S. Bank N.A.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A155837(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 8, 2020

Judge: Sanchez

Areas of Law: Banking, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Quail's 47,480-square-foot unincorporated Sonoma County property contained two houses, garages, and several outbuildings. In 2013, a building with hazardous and unpermitted electrical wiring, hazardous decking and stairs, unpermitted kitchens and plumbing, broken windows, and lacking power, was destroyed in a fire. Two outbuildings, unlawfully being used as dwellings, were also damaged. One report stated: “The [p]roperty . . . exists as a makeshift, illegal mobile home park and junkyard.” After many unsuccessful attempts to compel Quail to abate the conditions, the county obtained the appointment of a receiver under Health and Safety Code section 17980.7 and Code of Civil Procedure section 564 to oversee abatement work. The banks challenged a superior court order authorizing the receiver to finance its rehabilitation efforts through a loan secured by a “super-priority” lien on the property and a subsequent order authorizing the sale of the property free and clear of U.S. Bank’s lien. The court of appeal affirmed in part. Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in matters subject to a receivership, including the power to issue a receiver’s certificate with priority over pre-existing liens when warranted. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in subordinating U.S. Bank’s lien and confirming the sale of the property free and clear of liens so that the receiver could remediate the nuisance conditions promptly and effectively, but prioritizing the county’s enforcement fees and costs on equal footing with the receiver had no basis in the statutes.

Premier Health Care Investments, LLC v. UHS of Anchor, LP

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S19G1491

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Warren

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

In 2005, the Georgia Department of Community Health (Department) promulgated a rule, commonly known as the “Psychiatric Rule” (“the Rule”), that required hospitals to obtain a Certificate of Need (“CON”) “prior to the establishment of a new or the expansion of an existing acute care adult psychiatric and/or substance abuse inpatient program,” and defined “expansion” as “the addition of beds to an existing CON-authorized or grandfathered psychiatric and/or substance abuse inpatient program.” The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Department could, through the Rule, require a licensed hospital with a psychiatric/substance-abuse program authorized by a CON, to obtain an additional CON to redistribute inpatient beds in excess of those identified in its CON to operate a psychiatric/substance-abuse program, but within its total licensed bed capacity. In UHS of Anchor, L.P. v. Department of Community Health, 830 SE2d 413 (2019), the Court of Appeals held that the Department could. The Supreme Court determined the appellate court erred in that conclusion, and reversed. "The General Assembly’s delegation of legislative authority to the Department to promulgate rules as part of its administration of the CON program does not include the authority to define additional new institutional health services requiring a CON, beyond those listed in OCGA 31-6-40 (a)."

Purcell v. Parker

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 OK 83

Opinion Date: October 6, 2020

Judge: Yvonne Kauger

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Petitioners and respondents owned real property in McClain County, Oklahoma, containing and abutting Colbert Lake (the Lake). Petitioners also owned real property containing Colbert Creek, which was the sole source of water that fed the Lake. Respondents sought a permit from the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB), to sell water from the Lake to oil companies for use in fracking operations. The only notice that the OWRB provided to petitioners of the respondents' permit application was by publication in newspapers. The permits were issued, and petitioners subsequently filed suit at the district court, arguing that they were not given proper and sufficient notice of the permit proceedings. The district court dismissed the lawsuit in a certified interlocutory order, and petitioners appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper, constitutionally required notice to landowners in such proceedings. The Court held that the notice given was inadequate, therefore judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for for further proceedings.

In re ACTD LLC, d/b/a The Green Mountain Surgery Center

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 VT 89

Opinion Date: October 2, 2020

Judge: Eaton

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

During the certificate of need (CON) application process, applicant ACTD, LLC (operator of the Green Mountain Surgery Center (GMSC), a for-profit multi-specialty ambulatory surgery center), indicated that it initially planned to offer surgical services in five identified specialties. After the CON was issued, applicant notified the Board that in addition to these five specialties, it planned to offer plastic surgery and ophthalmology procedures. The Board chose to review these changes and, after hearing, issued a decision clarifying that the original CON was limited in scope to the five specialties applicant had identified in its application, and that the proposed addition of plastic surgery and ophthalmology procedures was a nonmaterial change to the project. The Board concluded that applicant had demonstrated a need for greater access to plastic surgery and ophthalmology procedures currently performed in a hospital setting and approved the addition of these services. However, it rejected applicant’s proposal to offer ophthalmology procedures already available at another ambulatory surgery center nearby. The Board also extended applicant’s implementation reporting period for two additional years. Applicant argued on appeal of the Board's decision that the Board improperly restricted the scope of the CON and lacked the power to extend the reporting requirement. Finding that the Board acted within its authority, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed its decision.

431 East Palisade Avenue Real Estate LLC v. City of Englewood

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 19-3621

Opinion Date: October 8, 2020

Judge: Julio M. Fuentes

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Palisade sought to build a 150-bed for-profit assisted living facility, which would provide supportive services to memory care patients 0n a 4.96-acre parcel located partially in the city and partially in the borough. The city opposes its construction because the property is in a “one-family residence” zoning district. Palisade argued that the zoning ordinance discriminated on its face against individuals with disabilities by not permitting assisted living facilities as of right in the single-family district and by explicitly allowing them in only one zoning district. The district court granted Palisade a preliminary injunction. The Third Circuit vacated. The zoning ordinance, by failing to include “assisted living facilities” among its permitted uses in the single-family district, but explicitly allowing them in a different district, does not facially discriminate against the disabled in violation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604. Failure to permit a land use as of right is not tantamount to an express prohibition. There is no indication that disabled status, rather than the building size or the commercial character of the development, is the dispositive trait, singled out for different treatment. The court noted that Palisade did not seek a variance.