Joe, Joey, Joe-Baby, Sexist: Where’s Your Imposter Syndrome?

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman responds to a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed criticizing soon-to-be First Lady Jill Biden for using the academic title she earned. Professor Grossman dissects the op-ed, penned by a retired lecturer at Northwestern University, and explains the deep and pervasive sexism behind it.

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M & M Realty Partners at Hagen Ranch, LLC v. Mazzoni

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 18-13536

Opinion Date: December 11, 2020

Judge: Douglas Howard Ginsburg

Areas of Law: Contracts, Trusts & Estates

M&M Realty entered into a contract with the William Mazzoni Trust in 2011 for the purchase of a plot of land in Boynton Beach, Florida. M&M subsequently filed suit seeking specific performance of the land sale contract and damages from the Mazzoni Trust, as well as damages from William Mazzoni, as co-trustee and agent of the Trust, for tortious interference with the land sale contract. The Eleventh Circuit held that M&M failed to make out a prima facie claim for specific performance or for damages for breach of contract because M&M did not provide evidence that it was ready, willing, and able to perform under the contract -- specifically, that it had the necessary funds to make the purchase. The court also held that William Mazzoni, as a co-trustee of the Defendant trust and signatory as its agent on the contract, is not liable for tortious interference. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment granting summary judgment in favor of William Mazzoni and the Mazzoni Trust.

In re Estate of Lentz

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 118307

Opinion Date: December 11, 2020

Judge: Wall

Areas of Law: Trusts & Estates

In this matter arising from the district court's distribution of Lanny Lentz's estate among his three daughters the Supreme Court remanded the judgment of the court of appeals holding that it lacked jurisdiction over this appeal because Appellant's posttrial motions did not toll the time for her to appeal, holding that the court of appeals did in fact have jurisdiction over the appeal. Appellant, one of Lentz's daughters, filed a petition to set aside and/or reconsider the final settlement and, simultaneously, an objection to discharge of executrix and petition to disgorge fees for administration paid to the fiduciary. The district court denied the motions. Appellant appealed, claiming that the property values for properties in the final settlement were not supported by substantial competent evidence. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration of the appeal on the merits, holding that Appellant's notice of appeal was timely and that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal.

Zelman v. Zelman

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2020 ME 138

Opinion Date: December 15, 2020

Judge: Joseph Jabar

Areas of Law: Business Law, Trusts & Estates

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the business and consumer docket's entry of final judgment reaffirming a partial summary judgment on the complaint filed by Michael Zelman and a counterclaim filed by Andrew and Zelman Family Business Holdings, LLC (ZFBH), holding that the business and consumer court had subject matter jurisdiction. Michael brought this action both individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Estelle Betty Zelman asking the superior court to dissolve and liquidate ZFBH. Andrew and ZFBH filed an answer and counterclaim. The court entered a final judgment concluding that Andrew was not a manager of ZFBH and that the sole remaining manager of ZFBH had died and declining to dissolve ZFBH. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the business and consumer court had subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction; and (2) the court correctly concluded that William did not have the authority to appoint Andrew as a manager of ZFBH.

In re Estate of Marsh

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 307 Neb. 893

Opinion Date: December 4, 2020

Judge: William B. Cassel

Areas of Law: Trusts & Estates

In this proceeding brought by the daughters of Gale Marsh to determine the amount of inheritance tax due, the Supreme Court affirmed the county court's determination of the ownership interest of Marsh's revocable trust in a limited liability company valued at more than $12 million, holding that the court did not err in determining that assignments signed by Marsh rather than the trustees were valid. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) published notice of the evidentiary hearing was not a prerequisite of the County court's subject matter jurisdiction, and even if notice was not published, the County did not suffer prejudice; (2) the county court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the County's motion for a continuance; and (3) the court's determination that ownership interests were validly transferred from the trust conformed to the law, was supported by competent evidence, and was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.

In re Estate of Shaffer

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-6672

Opinion Date: December 16, 2020

Judge: Donnelly

Areas of Law: Trusts & Estates

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Ohio Rev. Code 2107.24 eliminates the requirement of witness competency and that, therefore, the voiding provision of Ohio Rev. Code 2107.15 does not apply to essential witnesses to a remediated will, holding that the voiding provision of section 2107.15 applies equally to essential witnesses to both formally compliant and remediated wills. Zachary Norman, the son of Juley Norman, filed an application to probate a 2006 document claiming to be a will that was handwritten and signed by Joseph Shaffer. The will had no witness signatures. The probate court denied the application. On appeal, Zachary argued that Ohio Rev. Code 2107.24 does not require the witnesses to a noncompliant will to be "competent witnesses," and therefore, the voiding provision of section 2107.15 did not apply to a purported will that may be remediated pursuant to section 2107.24. The court of appeals agreed and reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 2107.15 applies both to wills executed in compliance with section 2107.03 and those submitted pursuant to section 2107.24; and (2) the probate court correctly applied section 2107.15 and determined that Juley could not be included in the list of beneficiaries of Shaffer's estate.

Wilburn v. Mangano

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 191443

Opinion Date: December 10, 2020

Judge: S. Bernard Goodwyn

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law, Trusts & Estates

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining Defendant's demurrer to Plaintiffs' suit, holding that "fair market value" on a specified date, without more specificity, was not a sufficiently certain price term to allow a court to compel specific performance of a contract regarding the purchase of real estate. The decedent executed a will wherein she devised property to Plaintiffs, her three daughters. In the same will, the decedent granted her son, Defendant, an option to purchase the property from his sisters. The decedent then executed a codicil to her will revising the purchase price for the option to "an amount equal to the fair market value at the time of my death." In their complaint, Plaintiffs sought specific performance of a contract for the purchase of real estate. The circuit court dismissed the case with prejudice, holding that there was no enforceable contract because the will and codicil did not determine the purchase price and did not provide a method of determining the purchase price. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the term "fair market value," as set forth in the codicil, did not provide a price for the property, nor did it provide a mode for ascertaining the price with sufficient certainty.