Click here to remove Verdict from subsequent Justia newsletter(s). | New on Verdict Legal Analysis and Commentary | A Modest Proposal: A Heartbeat Bill for Those Who Don’t Wear Masks | MARCI A. HAMILTON | | University of Pennsylvania professor Marci A. Hamilton draws upon a strategy used by anti-abortion advocates in suggesting a way to encourage (or coerce) more people into wearing masks to avoid the spread of COVID-19. Hamilton proposes requiring persons who opt not to wear a mask in public (1) to watch, on a large screen, an adult's beating heart for 30 seconds, and (2) to be read a statement about how their decision unreasonably endangers others. | Read More |
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Family Law Opinions | IDHW & John Doe v. GAL & 4th Judicial District Casa | Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Docket: 47789 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: Stegner Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law | A guardian ad litem (GAL) for two minor children appealed after a magistrate court determined the children should have been placed with their biological father in Mexico. Jane Doe I (Daughter) and John Doe II (Son) were removed from the care of their mother (Mother) along with another half-sibling on after a preliminary investigation revealed the children were homeless and living in a car. At the time Daughter and Son were taken into foster care, the specific whereabouts of their biological father, John Doe (Father), were unknown, other than that he had been deported to Mexico in December 2014. Father had last seen the children at that time. In addition, his paternity had not yet been established and he had not had any contact with his children since his deportation. A little more than a year after the proceedings had begun, Father’s paternity was established. Shortly after the Department filed an amended petition, it sought a case plan for Father. The Department also attempted to obtain a home study for Father but faced difficulty accomplishing this task because he lived in Mexico. The children’s GAL opposed placing the children with Father without more information about him and his living situation. Ultimately, the magistrate court ordered that the children be placed with Father as soon as possible without a home study being conducted, apparently relying on In re Doe, 281 P.3d 95 (2012). On motions to reconsider filed by the Department and the GAL, newly-discovered evidence was presented that Father was a registered sex offender who had previously pleaded guilty to failing to register as such. Nevertheless, the magistrate court denied the motions to reconsider. The GAL appealed. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the magistrate court, holding that while it continued "to recognize that the biological parent’s presumption of fitness is and should be very strong. However, it is not irrefutable. . . . Where the legislature has unequivocally placed a duty on the court and the Department to consider its primary concern 'the health and safety of the child,' it is incumbent on a court to ensure that diligent investigation occurs regarding questions pertaining to children’s safety." | | Greene v. Boyd | Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2019-SC-000379-DG Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: John D. Minton, Jr. Areas of Law: Family Law | In this dispute over a modification of the parenting schedule for two minor children the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision finding that the family court's admission and reliance upon certain statements by the court-appointed Friend-of-Court investigator (FOC) was harmless error, holding that the family court did not commit prejudicial error in admitting and considering the FOC's statements. Father filed a motion for modification of the parenting schedule requesting that he become the primary residential custodian of the parties' two children. At a bench trial, the FOC testified as to her observations and findings from her previous investigation and report. The family court ordered that the children remain living with Mother. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) hearsay statements contained within an FOC's investigative report that do not fall within a recognized hearsay exception are nonetheless admissible as evidence in a domestic custody proceeding where the notice and procedural requirements comply with Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.300(3); and (2) a family court's appointment of an FOC to investigate and generate a report under section 403.300 amounts to a determination that the FOC is sufficiently qualified to offer opinion evidence concerning the fitness of a parent and child's custody arrangements. | | Lawson v. Woeste | Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2019-SC-000670-MR Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: Hughes Areas of Law: Family Law | The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the family court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition to stay a child custody order entered by the circuit court pending her appeal, holding that the court of appeals correctly held that the extraordinary relief of a writ of prohibition was not warranted. The trial court ordered that Appellant's two minor children relocate from their residence with Appellant in Mississippi to live with their father in Kentucky. In her petition for writ of prohibition, Appellant argued, among other things, that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the relocation order. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to a first-class writ because the trial court acted within its jurisdiction; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to a second-class writ because Appellant had an opportunity for recourse through her direct appeal. | | T. G. G. v. H. E. S. | Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A18-1616 Opinion Date: June 17, 2020 Judge: Lorie Skjerven Gildea Areas of Law: Family Law | The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Father's paternity action on the grounds that Minn. Stat. 259.25, subd. 8 barred the action, holding that the statute did not bar Father's action. Father failed to register with the Minnesota Fathers' Adoption Registry within thirty days of the birth of his child. Father subsequently filed this paternity action seeking to be adjudicated as his child's father. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that because Father had failed timely to register with the Fathers' Adoption Registry he was barred under Minn. Stat. 259.52, subd. 8 from bringing or maintaining a paternity action. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Minn. Stat. 259.52, subd. 8 did not apply to Father under the circumstances of this case. | | Kuptz-Blinkinsop v. Blinkinsop | Court: Supreme Court of Nevada Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 40 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: Stiglich Areas of Law: Family Law, Real Estate & Property Law | In this real property dispute, the Supreme Court clarified that its holding in Davidson v. Davidson, 382 P.3d 880 (Nev. 2016), does not apply to claims for enforcement of real property distribution in divorce decrees. The Supreme Court held in Davidson that the six-year statute of limitations in Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.190(1)(a) applies to claims for enforcement of a property distribution provision in a divorce decree. In the instant case, Appellant sought to partition real property that a divorce decree from nine years earlier awarded to Respondent as separate property. Appellant argued that the decree expired pursuant to Davidson, which precluded Respondent from enforcing his distribution rights under the decree and rendered the property still held in joint tenancy subject to partition. The district court granted summary judgment and quieted title in favor of Respondent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 11.190(1)(a) unambiguously excludes from its purview actions for recovery of real property, and therefore, Davidson did not apply; (2) Respondent was not required to renew the divorce decree pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.214 to enforce his real property rights; and (3) Appellant's partition claim was barred by claim preclusion. | | Nelson v. Nelson | Court: Supreme Court of Nevada Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 36 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: Stiglich Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law | The Supreme Court held that it does not have jurisdiction to review a district court order denying a request for a joint preliminary injunction pursuant to EDCR 5.517 in a family law matter because no court rule or statute permits an appeal of a district court order denying a request for a joint preliminary injunction. After Husband filed for divorce, the clerk of court issued a joint preliminary injunction pursuant to EDCR 5.85 prohibiting the parties from disposing of any property subject to any community interest claim. After the district court issued a divorce decree the Supreme Court remanded the case to conduct proper tracing to determine community interests. On remand, Wife moved for the district court to reaffirm its prior joint preliminary injunction pursuant to EDCR 5.517. The district court issued a preliminary injunction for two assets subject to community property claims but declined to extend the injunction to other assets in a spendthrift trust. Wife appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that joint preliminary injunctions under EDCR 5.517 are not subject to Nev. R. Civ. P. 65, and therefore, orders denying or granting injunctions under EDCR 5.517 are not appealable under Nev. R. App. P. 3A(b)(3). | |
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