Taking Stock: A Review of Justice Stevens’s Last Book and an Appreciation of His Extraordinary Service on the Supreme Court

RODGER CITRON

Rodger D. Citron, the Associate Dean for Research and Scholarship and a Professor of Law at Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, comments on the late Justice John Paul Stevens’s last book, The Making of a Justice: Reflections on My First 94 Years. Citron laments that, in his view, the memoir is too long yet does not say enough, but he lauds the justice for his outstanding service on the Supreme Court.

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Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 19-1067

Opinion Date: December 16, 2019

Judge: Kimberly Ann Moore

Areas of Law: Drugs & Biotech, Intellectual Property, Patents

Amgen’s patents relate to erythropoietin (EPO) isoforms and aspects of their production. EPO is a glycoprotein hormone that regulates red blood cell maturation and production. Recombinant human EPO is an important therapeutic protein for the treatment of anemia. Amgen manufactures and markets recombinant human EPO as Epogen. Hospira submitted its Biologics License Application (BLA) to the FDA, seeking approval for a biosimilar to Amgen’s Epogen product. Amgen sued Hospira for infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(a) and 271(e)(2)(C). A jury found the asserted claims not invalid and infringed. Of the 21 accused drug substance batches, the jury found seven batches entitled to the Safe Harbor defense. The jury awarded Amgen $70 million in damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s claim construction and finding substantial evidence of infringement. Section 271(e)(1) carves out a "Safe Harbor” exception to patent infringement liability when otherwise-infringing activities are solely for uses reasonably related to obtaining FDA approval. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that the 14 batches at issue were not manufactured “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information” to the FDA.

Blackbird Tech LLC v. Health in Motion, LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 18-2393

Opinion Date: December 16, 2019

Judge: Wallach

Areas of Law: Intellectual Property, Legal Ethics, Patents

Blackbird sued HIM for infringement of a patent relating to exercise equipment. Blackbird is owned and controlled entirely by attorneys, whose business model consists of purchasing patents and monetizing them “through litigation.” Nineteen months later, after a transfer of venue, Blackbird offered to settle for $80,000. HIM declined, asserting that the infringement allegations lacked merit and that HIM believed there was a strong likelihood that Blackbird would be ordered to pay attorney fees. Blackbird made another t offer, for $50,000. Again, HIM declined. Months later, Blackbird offered to settle for $15,000. HIM declined, again requesting that Blackbird pay some of its expenses. Blackbird then offered a “walk-away” settlement whereby HIM would receive a license to Blackbird’s patent for zero dollars, and the case would be dismissed. HIM declined. During discovery, HIM moved for summary judgment. After the motion was briefed and without notifying HIM in advance, Blackbird filed a notice of voluntary dismissal with prejudice, executed a covenant not to sue, and moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court dismissed Blackbird’s claims with prejudice, denied Blackbird’s motion to dismiss, and authorized HIM to seek costs, expenses, and attorney fees. The Federal Circuit affirmed an award to HIM of fees and expenses in the requested amount ($363,243.80), upholding findings that Blackbird’s litigation position was “meritless” and “frivolous.” Blackbird litigated in an unreasonable manner and the court properly considered the need to deter future abusive litigation.

Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. One World Technologies, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 18-2112

Opinion Date: December 17, 2019

Judge: Todd Michael Hughes

Areas of Law: Intellectual Property, Patents

Chamberlain’s 611 patent, entitled “Barrier Movement Operator Human Interface Method and Apparatus,” is directed to improved methods of human interaction with “barrier movement operators,” such as garage door operator systems. Claims 18–25 of the patent are directed to an “interactive learn mode” that “guide[s] a user through installation and learn mode actions.” On inter partes review, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found those claims anticipated, 35 U.S.C. 102(b) and 103(a). The Federal Circuit affirmed the findings as supported by substantial evidence. The disclosure, in prior art, of transmitting the signals in sequence, one after the other in response to the previously-completed steps of identifying the garage door operator’s present status and activities to be completed teaches the “responsive to” step in the challenged claim.

FOX Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 18-2024

Opinion Date: December 18, 2019

Judge: Sharon Prost

Areas of Law: Intellectual Property, Patents

SRAM’s patent generally covers an improved bicycle chainring structure that better maintains the chain, obviating the need for extraneous structures. On inter partes review, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found that the prior art references disclose all the limitations of the SRAM patent’s independent claims and that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the asserted prior art. The Board nevertheless concluded, based on its analysis of secondary considerations, that the challenged claims would not have been obvious. The Federal Circuit vacated. In order to accord substantial weight to secondary considerations in an obviousness analysis, the evidence of secondary considerations must have a nexus to the claims; there must be a legally and factually sufficient connection between the evidence and the patented invention. The Board erred in presuming nexus between the independent claims and secondary considerations evidence pertaining to SRAM’s chainrings. On remand, SRAM will have the opportunity to prove a nexus between the challenged independent claims and the evidence of secondary considerations--that the evidence of secondary considerations is attributable to the claimed combination of wide and narrow teeth with inboard or outboard offset teeth, as opposed to, for example, prior art features in isolation or unclaimed features.

Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Trend Micro Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 19-1122

Opinion Date: December 19, 2019

Judge: Stoll

Areas of Law: Intellectual Property, Legal Ethics, Patents

IV alleged infringement of patents directed to filtering data files (such as email messages) based on content. The court severed the defendants. During claim construction in the Symantec action, IV’s expert consistently opined that a “characteristic” as used in asserted claims is “an attribute of the document such as whether it contains a virus or is SPAM or bulk email or includes copyrighted content.” The court adopted that construction. At the Symantec trial, IV’s expert changed his opinion, testifying that bulk email was not a characteristic. During a clarification hearing, IV’s counsel maintained that the expert had not changed his opinion and that bulk email “never was” within the scope of claim 9. The court clarified its claim constructions, stating that it “learn[ed] only at the last minute” that IV understood the construction to mean “that bulk email was excluded from claim 9 when it was clearly in the other claims ... a surprise inconsistent with the representations from” IV, and not what was intended. The court granted Micro judgment in part, holding the asserted claims invalid, canceled the Micro trial, and concluded that IV’s conduct was exceptional “solely with respect to” the changed testimony but that the case overall was not exceptional under 35 U.S.C. 285 and awarded Micro $444,051.14 in attorney fees. The Federal Circuit vacated. The district court should have determined whether the circumstances surrounding the expert’s changed opinion were such that, when considered as part of the totality of circumstances, the case stands out as exceptional, i.e., the case stands out among others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.

Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC v. Willowood, LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 18-1614

Opinion Date: December 18, 2019

Judge: Jimmie V. Reyna

Areas of Law: Copyright, Drugs & Biotech, Environmental Law, Intellectual Property, Patents

Syngenta sued Willowood, a Hong Kong company that sells fungicide to its Oregon-based affiliate, for infringement of patents directed to a fungicide compound and its manufacturing processes and infringement of copyrights for detailed product labels that provide directions for use, storage, and disposal, plus first-aid instructions and environmental, physical, and chemical hazard warnings. The district court dismissed the copyright claims as precluded by the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. 135 and granted-in-part Syngenta’s summary judgment motion with respect to patent infringement. After a jury trial, the court entered a defense judgment on the patent claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part, reversed-in-part, and vacated in part. The district court did not provide an adequate analysis of the potential conflict between FIFRA and the Copyright Act. Because FIFRA does not, on its face, require a “me-too” registrant to copy the label of a registered product, FIFRA only conflicts with the Copyright Act to the extent that some particular element of Syngenta’s label is both protected under copyright doctrines and necessary for the expedited approval of Willowood’s generic pesticide. The court erred by imposing a single-entity requirement on the performance of a patented process under 35 U.S.C. 271(g); practicing a patented process abroad does not trigger liability under section 271(g) in the same manner that practicing a patented process domestically does under section 271(a).