Latest 6 Cases: Piranha Partners v. Neuhoff (Energy, Oil & Gas Law), Glenn v. Leal (Health Law), Coming Attractions Bridal v. Texas Health ...

How to Spot a Nation in Freefall

JOSEPH MARGULIES

Cornell law professor Joseph Margulies points out that when a nation doesn’t have the money to fix its roads but does give money away to help the rich get richer, that is a sign of a nation in collapse. Margulies describes the shift to neoliberal thinking under Nixon that has produced record levels of economic inequality and explains why the Trump administration’s proposed economic policies would benefit only the rich.

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Piranha Partners v. Neuhoff

Docket: 18-0581

Opinion Date: February 21, 2020

Judge: Jeffrey S. Boyd

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Real Estate & Property Law

In this case involving a written assignment of an overriding royalty interest in minerals produced from land in Wheeler County the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's judgment declaring that the assignment conveyed an overriding royalty interest in all production under the lease, holding that the assignment unambiguously conveyed the assignor's overriding royalty interest in all production under the lease. The assignment in this case identified the single well that was producing at the time of the assignment, the land on which the well was located, and the lease under which the overriding royalty interest existed. At issue was whether the assignment conveyed the assignor's interest in all production under the identified lease or only in production from the identified well or from any well drilled on the identified land. The court of appeals held that the assignment conveyed only the 3.75 percent overriding royalty interest in production from the tract of land on which the well was located. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the assignment unambiguously conveyed all of the interest that the assignor owned at the time of the conveyance.

Glenn v. Leal

Docket: 18-0344

Opinion Date: February 21, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Health Law, Medical Malpractice

In this healthcare liability action, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion for directed verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), holding that the trial court gave an erroneous charge that instructed the jury on the incorrect law applicable in the case. Plaintiffs filed this action against their obstretician, claiming that Defendant failed to exercise ordinary care when delivering Plaintiffs' baby and that Defendant's negligence proximately caused the baby's brachial plexus injury. At the close of the evidence Defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that there was legally insufficient evidence of willful and wanton negligence as required under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 74.153. The trial court denied the motion. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs, finding that Defendant was negligent under an ordinary, and not a willful and wanton, negligence standard. The trial court denied Defendant's motion for JNOV. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court erred in charging the jury because the jury should have considered whether section 74.153's standard of willful and wanton negligence applied in this case where it was contested whether Defendant provided emergency medical care to the mother and the baby.

Coming Attractions Bridal v. Texas Health Resources

Docket: 18-0591

Opinion Date: February 21, 2020

Judge: Bland

Areas of Law: Health Law

The Supreme Court held that the corporation alleging a healthcare liability claim against a hospital in this case fell within the Texas Medical Liability Act's definition of "claimant" under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 74.351(a) and that the allegations stated a health care claim against the hospital, and therefore, the corporation was required to submit an expert report supporting the claim. A bridal shop in Ohio was required to close when health authorities learned that a nurse at the Dallas Presbyterian Hospital who had visited the bridal shop was diagnosed as having the Ebola virus. The shop's owner sued the hospital, alleging that the hospital's negligence in failing to prevent transmission of the Ebola virus to the nurse caused the shop to close permanently due to health concerns and adverse publicity. Invoking the Act, the hospital moved to dismiss the claims because the owner failed to submit an expert report detailing a factual basis for its healthcare liability claim. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the business's claims that the hospital's departure from accepted safety standards caused its injury stated a healthcare liability claim under the Act and that the business was a claimant under the Act.

Shinogle v. Whitlock

Docket: 18-0703

Opinion Date: February 21, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

In this negligence action, the Supreme Court held that an agreed scheduling order setting expert report deadlines, with no reference to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 128.053(a), did not extend the statutory deadline to serve an expert report and that Plaintiffs' failure timely to serve an expert report entitled the shooting range's employee to seek dismissal. Plaintiffs sued a shooting range and its employee alleging negligence. The parties submitted to an agreed scheduling order, but the order did not specifically reference section 128.053. More than ninety days after Plaintiffs filed suit Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied dismiss, ruling that the agreed scheduling order extended Plaintiffs' section 128.053 deadline. The court of appeals dismissed all claims against the shooting range but allowed the claims against the employee to proceed on the basis that section 128.053(b)(2) does not apply to a shooting range employees. The Supreme Court held (1) the shooting range was correctly dismissed from the suit because the agreed scheduling order did not extend Plaintiffs' deadline to serve the expert report section 128.053 requires; and (2) the employee was entitled to dismissal with prejudice under section 128.053(b)(2) as an implicated defendant whose conduct was required to be addressed in an expert report.

Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C.

Docket: 18-0595

Opinion Date: February 21, 2020

Judge: John P. Devine

Areas of Law: Professional Malpractice & Ethics, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a permits dismissal based on an affirmative defense and that the alleged destruction of evidence is an action "taken in connection with representing a client in litigation," thus entitling the defendant attorneys to attorney immunity. Plaintiff hired Defendants to represent her in a lawsuit. Plaintiff later sued Defendants for, inter alia, fraud, trespass to chattel, and conversion, alleging that Defendants intentionally destroyed key evidence in the case. Defendants moved to dismiss the case under Rule 91a, claiming that it was entitled to attorney immunity on all of Plaintiff's claims. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that affirmative defenses such as attorney immunity cannot be the basis of a Rule 91a dismissal and that Defendants were not entitled to attorney immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 91a permits motions to dismiss based on affirmative defenses "if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought"; and (2) because Defendants' allegedly wrongful conduct involved the provision of legal services that conduct was protected by attorney immunity.

Gray v. Skelton

Docket: 18-0386

Opinion Date: February 21, 2020

Judge: John P. Devine

Areas of Law: Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff's legal malpractice claim as baseless under Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1995), holding that Peeler did not bar Plaintiff's malpractice claim. Plaintiff, a former client, sued her criminal defense attorney for malpractice after her conviction was vacated based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court dismissed the claim as baseless under Peeler. In Peeler, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that "plaintiffs who have been convicted of a criminal offense may negate the sole proximate cause bar to their claim for legal malpractice in connection with that conviction only if they have been exonerated on direct appeal, through post-conviction relief, or otherwise." The trial court concluded that, because Plaintiff had failed to prove her exoneration, the Peeler doctrine barred her malpractice claim. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) exoneration under Peeler requires both that the underlying criminal conviction be vacated and also proof of innocence; and (2) therefore, the Peeler doctrine did not bar Plaintiff's malpractice claim, and Plaintiff must now obtain a finding of her innocence in the malpractice action to maintain her claim.