Latest 6 Cases: In Re: Appeal of Coatesville Area Sch Dist (Civil Procedure), Lamar Advantage v. City of Pgh ZBA, et al. (Civil Procedure), ...

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NEIL H. BUCHANAN

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan points out that although Trump’s coup failed, Republicans now have in front of them all of the building blocks necessary to impose one-party rule in the United States within the next four years. In this first of a series of columns, Professor Buchanan describes but a few of the available options Republicans have to rig elections in their favor.

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In Re: Appeal of Coatesville Area Sch Dist

Docket: 7 MAP 2020

Opinion Date: January 20, 2021

Judge: Thomas G. Saylor

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Non-Profit Corporations, Real Estate & Property Law, Tax Law

Two taxing districts undertook parallel challenges to a property’s partial tax exemption. Appellee Huston Properties, Inc. (“Taxpayer”), owned the subject property (the “Property”). In 2013, Taxpayer, claiming to be a charitable institution, sought tax-exempt status for the Property for the 2014 tax year. After a hearing, the Chester County Board of Assessment Appeals granted a partial exemption, reasoning that that portion of the Property was used for charitable purposes. The City of Coatesville appealed that decision to the Court of Common Pleas. Six days later, the Coatesville Area School District, another taxing authority encompassing the Property, lodged its own appeal, also challenging the Property’s partially-tax-exempt status. The School District also intervened in the City's case. Ultimately, the trial court affirmed the Board's grant of a partial exemption. Both the City and the School District appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and Taxpayer cross-appealed as to each, seeking fully-exempt status for the Property. In a memorandum decision, the Commonwealth Court vacated and remanded to the trial court for more specific findings to support the partial tax exemption. On remand, the trial court set forth particularized findings and conclusions, and re-affirmed its earlier decision assessing the Property. At this juncture, the City elected not to appeal to the Commonwealth Court. The School District appealed the ruling in its own case, but it did not appeal the identical, simultaneous ruling which contained the City’s docket number. Taxpayer moved to quash the School District’s appeal. The Commonwealth Court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal observing that the common pleas court’s ruling in the City’s case became final after no party appealed it. Because the School District had intervened in that matter, it was a party to those proceedings. With that premise, the court found that res judicata and collateral estoppel barred it from reaching the merits. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that issue preclusion under the rubric of collateral estoppel should not have been applied to defeat the School District’s ability to obtain merits review of its substantive arguments in the intermediate court. The Commonwealth Court's judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for a merits disposition of the consolidated cross-appeals.

Lamar Advantage v. City of Pgh ZBA, et al.

Docket: 5 WAP 2020

Opinion Date: January 20, 2021

Judge: Wecht

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

For many years, Lamar Advantage GP Co. displayed an electronic advertisement on a billboard perched atop Mount Washington, which overlooked downtown Pittsburgh. In 2016, Lamar ratcheted a static, vinyl sign over the electronic advertisement and the underlying structure. Believing that this action “enlarged” or “replaced” the sign, the City of Pittsburgh cited Lamar for breaching the City’s Zoning Code. Pittsburgh’s Zoning Board of Adjustment upheld the citation, agreeing with the City that Lamar’s actions enlarged or replaced the sign. On appeal, the Court of Common Pleas reversed the Board. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the lower court. Both courts held that the Board’s conclusion was unsupported by the record. After its review of the case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concurred with the common pleas and Commonwealth courts: the record here did not support the Board's legal conclusion that by draping the vinyl static sign over the existing electronic sign and sign structure, Lamar violated the zoning code.

PennDOT Bureau of Driver Lic. v. Middaugh

Docket: 45 MAP 2019

Opinion Date: January 20, 2021

Judge: Thomas G. Saylor

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted certiorari review in this matter to determine whether the Department of Transportation (PennDOT) was precluded from suspending an individual’s driving privileges based on a DUI conviction, where there was a lengthy delay between the conviction and the time the driver was notified of the suspension. Under the facts of this case, the Court concluded the trial court’s finding – that Appellee would suffer prejudice if the suspension were to be imposed at this juncture – was supported by competent evidence of record, and moreover, it demonstrated that prejudice would follow from the fact of the delay itself. Additionally, there was no dispute that Appellee did not accrue any additional Vehicle Code violations after his predicate DUI conviction. The Court therefore agreed with the Commonwealth Court majority that a suspension at this late date will have lost much of its effectiveness with regard to its underlying legislative purposes, result in prejudice which can be attributed to the delay, and ultimately deny fundamental fairness.

Pennsylvania v. Cochran II

Docket: 77 MAP 2018

Opinion Date: January 20, 2021

Judge: Mundy

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on whether a line of superior court cases changed the procedural requirements of Section 1106 of the Pennsylvania Judicial Code requiring restitution be set at the time of sentencing. Appellant Steven Cochran, II, briefly stayed at a vacation home owned by his grandparents. In late 2016, Appellant’s grandparents visited the home and found Appellant intoxicated. An altercation ensued, during which Appellant threatened and assaulted his grandmother, and deliberately destroyed various items of personal property. Also during the altercation, a fire was ignited, causing additional damage to the premises and personal property. Appellant was arrested and charged with terroristic threats, simple assault, two counts of criminal mischief, and three counts of harassment. At the beginning of the plea hearing, both counsel informed the trial court that the total restitution claimed exceeded $65,000.00, but that Appellant disputed whether he was responsible for that total amount because some of the destroyed or damaged property had belonged to him. Appellant entered a plea of guilty to one count each of terroristic threats, simple assault, and criminal mischief. In the non-restitution proceedings on June 29, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate terms of three to 23 months' incarceration, minus time served. A restitution hearing was set for August 28, 2017. Appealing the eventual amount of restitution ordered, Appellant objected to the trial court's jurisdiction, arguing more than 30 days had passed since the June 2017 order, and that the Commonwealth failed “to make a recommendation for restitution and the trial court failed to set restitution at the time of sentencing on June 29, 2017, as required by 18 Pa.C.S. 1106(c)(2).” A panel of the superior court agreed the trial court erred in failing to set restitution at the time of sentencing, reversed, and remanded fur resentencing. The Supreme Court determined that the superior court erroneously presumed that the “time of sentencing” for the purpose of section 1106 occurred solely on June 29, 2017. Because the final complete sentencing order was entered on September 15, 2017, the Supreme Court concluded Appellant had no basis to challenge the sentencing court’s jurisdiction under Section 1106 (c)(2).

Pennsylvania v. Montalvo

Docket: 776 CAP

Opinion Date: January 20, 2021

Judge: Debra McCloskey Todd

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A court of common pleas granted Appellant Noel Montalvo's petition for post-conviction relief by granting a new guilt-phase trial. The Commonwealth appealed the PCRA court’s grant of a new guilt-phase trial; it did not challenge the PCRA court’s grant of a new penalty-phase trial. Appellant cross-appealed to challenge the trial court's rejection of "a myriad of additional bases for granting him a new guilt-phase trial." Appellant was accused of killing, or acting as an accomplice to the killing of his brother's estranged common law wife and the man she may have briefly dated. Appellant's brother was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of burglary, for which he was sentenced to death. Appellant would be convicted by jury on first-degree murder charges for the death of his brother's wife, the second-degree murder of her companion, conspiracy to commit murder and burglary. The jury determined the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances in Appellant's case, and recommended a sentence of death. The PCRA court granted appellant's petition for relief on grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the PCRA court that appellant established his ineffectiveness claim, and therefore, a new guilt-phase trial was warranted. In light of this conclusion, the Court did not address the issues raised by appellant in his cross-appeal.

PBS Coals, et al v. PennDOT

Docket: 41 WAP 2019

Opinion Date: January 20, 2021

Judge: Donohue

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Transportation Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”)’s petition seeking review of a Commonwealth Court holding that a de facto taking of an unmined coal estate, owned by Penn Pocahontas and leased to PBS Coals, Inc. (collectively “the Coal Companies”), occurred under the Eminent Domain Code, 26 Pa.C.S. sections 101-1106 (“Code”), when PennDOT’s construction of Highway 219 on an adjoining parcel destroyed options for constructing rights-of-ways to the coal estate’s surface. In reaching that conclusion, the Commonwealth Court held that the feasibility of mining the coal, as measured by the probability of obtaining a legally required permit from the Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”), was relevant only to damages. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s decision, agreeing with PennDOT that the legality of extracting the coal went directly to the trial court’s duty to determine whether a taking occurred. Furthermore, the Court held the Commonwealth Court erred by failing to remand the case for consideration of whether consequential damages are available to the Coal Companies. The matter was remanded to the Commonwealth Court with instructions to remand to the trial court with respect to the Coal Companies’ consequential damages claim.