Latest 6 Cases: Granite Re, Inc. v. Nat'l Credit Union Adm. Board (Banking), Franklin v. Franklin County, Arkansas (Civil Procedure), Carter v. ...

Rethinking Retroactivity in Light of the Supreme Court’s Jury Unanimity Requirement

MICHAEL C. DORF

In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Monday in Ramos v. Louisiana, in which it held that the federal Constitution forbids states from convicting defendants except by a unanimous jury, Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses the Court’s jurisprudence on retroactivity. Dorf highlights some costs and benefits of retroactivity and argues that the Court’s refusal to issue advisory opinions limits its ability to resolve retroactivity questions in a way that responds to all the relevant considerations.

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Granite Re, Inc. v. Nat'l Credit Union Adm. Board

Docket: 18-2674

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Grasz

Areas of Law: Banking, Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Contracts

The National Credit Union Administration Board ("NCUAB"), the self-appointed conservator of Citizens Community Credit Union ("Citizens"), repudiated a letter of credit Citizens issued to Granite Re, Inc. Granite filed a complaint for damages against the NCUAB, claiming wrongful repudiation and wrongful dishonor of a letter of credit. The NCUAB moved to dismiss with prejudice, arguing 12 U.S.C. 1787(c) authorized it to repudiate the letter of credit with no liability for damages, and section 1787(c) preempted conflicting North Dakota Law. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The Eighth Circuit determined that were it to adopt the NCUAB's construction of section 1787(c), the NCUAB could "quietly appoint itself conservator and repudiate letters of credit with no liability to the injured beneficiary. Absent the ability to predict an impending conservatorship, a clean letter-of-credit beneficiary like Granite is subject to repudiation with no recourse." The Court determined NCUAB's construction was inconsistent with the language of the statue, which provided a limited remedy for damages determinable at the point of conservatorship, but did not negate recovery entirely. The Court also determined it was premature to declare section 1787(c) preempted North Dakota law. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Franklin v. Franklin County, Arkansas

Docket: 19-1854

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Arnold

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

After Cody Franklin died in police custody, his father, as administrator of his estate, sued the police officers who struggled with Franklin the night he died, and against the municipalities who employed them. The elder Franklin asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for excessive force, and claims under state law for battery and wrongful death. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the municipalities and all but two of the officers. Those officers filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing they were entitled to qualified immunity on all claims. After review, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the officers with respect to the federal claims, and remanded. With respect to the state claims, the Court remanded for further proceedings, including a determination whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.

Carter v. Pulaski CO Special School Dist

Docket: 19-1426

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: William Duane Benton

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Marion Carter sued the Pulaski County Special School District for race discrimination under Arkansas state and federal laws. Carter taught at the Joe T. Robinson High School in the School District. She also coached the cheer and dance teams. In 2017, the school's principal recommended to the District Superintendent that Carter's cheer and dance duties not be renewed for the 2017-2018 school year, and that she be offered a teaching contract only. The principal cited: (1) lack of student participation in cheer and dance in the previous two years; (2) inappropriate cheer routines at sporting events; and (2) inappropriate behavior of cheerleaders during out-of-town travel. After a hearing, the District's School Board accepted the recommendation not to renew Carter's cheer and dance contract. The District filled the cheer position with an African-American woman, and eliminated all dance teams district-wide. The Eighth Circuit concurred with the district court's grant of summary judgment to the District on all claims. The Court found Carter's allegations were insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

Goffin v. Ashcraft

Docket: 18-1430

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Kobes

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Based on a report by the burglary victim, Goffin’s uncle, Officer Ashcraft tried to arrest Goffin for burglary and stealing handguns, bullets, and prescription pain medication. Before the arrest, several witnesses told Ashcraft that Goffin was armed, possibly intoxicated, and dangerous. When Goffin broke free from arrest, fled toward a group of bystanders, and moved as though he was reaching into his waistband, Ashcraft shot him once in the back. Goffin claims (and Ashcraft disputes) that he was patted down by another officer (Hines) just before he fled. The pat-down removed nothing from Goffin; the officer failed to discover that Goffin was carrying a loaded magazine and extra bullets. Officer Hines claims that Goffin fled before he completed the pat-down. Stolen guns were discovered within reach of where Goffin had been sitting in acar, but Goffin did not have a weapon on him. In Goffin’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Officer Ashcraft is entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time of the shooting that a pat-down that removes nothing from a suspect eliminates an officer’s probable cause that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm.

Mbonyunkiza v. Beasely

Docket: 18-3611

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: James B. Loken

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Iowa inmate Napolean-Ahmed Mbonyunkiza was a practicing Muslim whose religious beliefs forbade consumption of pork or pork by-products. In 2017, he filed four separate grievances against the Newton Correctional Facility claiming he had eaten or was served food containing pork. Unsatisfied with the outcome of the grievances, Mbonyunkiza filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action in federal district court, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the correctional facility. The Eighth Circuit, reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, concluded Mbonyunkiza failed to show defendants deprived him of a constitutional right and therefore affirmed.

Wells Fargo & Company v. United States

Docket: 17-3578

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Bobby E. Shepherd

Areas of Law: Tax Law

Wells Fargo, a U.S. corporation, entered into a structured trust advantaged repackaged securities transaction (STARS) with Barclays, a United Kingdom corporation. Wells Fargo asserts its purpose was to borrow money at a favorable interest rate, to diversify its funding sources, to reduce its liquidity risk, and to provide a stable source of funding for five years. The government claimed that STARS was an unlawful tax avoidance scheme, designed to exploit the differences between the tax laws of the two countries and generate U.S. tax credits for a foreign tax that Wells Fargo did not, in substance, pay. Wells Fargo claimed foreign-tax credits on its 2003 federal tax return arising from STARS. The IRS disallowed those credits and notified Wells Fargo that it owed additional taxes. Wells Fargo paid the resulting deficiency and sued to obtain a refund. The government sought to impose a “negligence penalty” as an offset defense because Wells Fargo underpaid its 2003 taxes after claiming this credit. The Eighth Circuit affirmed that Wells Fargo was not entitled to a tax credit and was liable for a “negligence penalty.” The "sham-transaction" or "economic-substance" doctrine allows the IRS and courts “to distinguish between structuring a real transaction in a particular way to obtain a tax benefit, which is legitimate, and creating a transaction to generate a tax benefit, which is illegitimate.” STARS’s trust component had no real potential for profit outside of its tax implications and Wells Fargo had no valid purpose other than tax considerations.