Pope Francis’s Statement Endorsing Same-Sex Civil Unions Undermines the Moral Legitimacy and Legal Arguments in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia

DAVID S. KEMP, CHARLES E. BINKLEY

David S. Kemp, a professor at Berkeley Law, and Charles E. Binkley, MD, the director of bioethics at Santa Clara University’s Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, consider the implications of Pope Francis’s recently revealed statement endorsing same-sex civil unions as they pertain to a case currently before the U.S. Supreme Court. Kemp and Binkley argue that the Pope’s statement undermines the moral legitimacy of the Catholic organization’s position and casts a shadow on the premise of its legal arguments.

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Stigma and the Oral Argument in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia

LESLIE C. GRIFFIN

UNLV Boyd School of Law professor Leslie C. Griffin explains why stigma is a central concept that came up during oral argument before the Supreme Court in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. Griffin points out that some religions have long supported racial discrimination, citing their religious texts, but courts prohibited such discrimination, even by religious entities. Griffin argues that just as religious organizations should not enjoy religious freedom to stigmatize people of color, so they should not be able to discriminate—and thus stigmatize—people based on sexual orientation.

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TriNet Group, Inc. v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 19-10997

Opinion Date: November 5, 2020

Judge: Tjoflat

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Tax Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of TriNet in an action brought by TriNet, as the successor-in-interest of Gevity, a professional employer organization (PEO). Gevity claimed tax credits from 2004 to 2009 based on its payment of FICA taxes on the tip income of its client companies' employees. The IRS asserts that such credits were not allowed because Gevity was not the "employer" entitled to claim the credits as that term is defined in 26 U.S.C. 3401(d). The court concluded that, under the statutes applicable to the period at issue, Gevity was the statutory employer entitled to claim the FICA tip credit because it—not its client companies—controlled the payment of the wages subject to withholding.

Douglas Companies, Inc. v. Walther

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 Ark. 365

Opinion Date: November 5, 2020

Judge: Wynne

Areas of Law: Tax Law

In this tax refund case centering on Arkansas's excise tax on tobacco products other than cigarettes the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment for the Director of the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (DF&A) and dismissing Plaintiffs' claims for refund, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granting DF&A's cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff, seven companies that alleged that they overpaid Other Tobacco Products (OTP) taxes from 2011 through 2013, filed suit under the Arkansas Tax Procedure Act, Ark. Code Ann. 27-18-406, seeking declaratory relief in the form of a judgment that they overpaid OTP taxes. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for refund. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a full or partial refund of the $3,223,200 they paid in excise taxes to the state during the time period in question.

Manson Construction Co. v. County of Contra Costa

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A159144(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 2, 2020

Judge: Petrou

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Tax Law

Manson owns heavy marine construction and dredging equipment, including 60 specialized vessels and over 50 barges. After the Contra Costa County Assessor’s Office assessed property taxes on the value of Manson’s vessels for tax years 2013 and 2014, Manson filed administrative appeals, claiming some of its vessels were exempt from taxation under the Vessel Use Exemption, which provides that “[v]essels of more than 50 tons burden in this State and engaged in the transportation of freight or passengers” “are exempt from property taxation,” Cal. Const. art. XIII, section 3(l). The Board denied Manson’s appeals. The trial court and court of appeal affirmed. Manson did not establish that anyone owned or controlled the sludge it dredged, or that the dredged material could be considered goods, delivered from a consignor to a consignee. The dump scows and barges were moved from the harbor to disposal sites for the purpose of being emptied out so that they could return to the harbor and continue to perform the work for which they were hired; the carrying of the dredged material from the harbor to the disposal sites was merely a necessary byproduct of, and incidental to, that dredging work. Manson’s vessels were engaged in dredging, not in the transportation of goods for hire.

K & J Investments, LLC v. Flathead County

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 MT 277

Opinion Date: November 4, 2020

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Tax Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing K&J Investments, LLC's petition and complaint for judicial review, rescission, and unjust enrichment against the Flathead County Board of Commissioners and Flathead County Treasurer, holding that the district court properly dismissed all claims for want of jurisdiction. K&J, an investment company, purchased a tax sale certificate from Flathead County for the property at issue for $1,512. K&J later filed an application for refund and abatement due to alleged erroneous property assessments. The Flathead County Board of Commissioners denied the application. K&J filed a petition for judicial review seeking to reverse the Commissioners' denial of tax refund and abatement and including a complaint for rescission of the tax sale certificate and seeking relief for all taxes paid under a theory of unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed the petition and complaint, ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because K&J did not follow the required process for seeking reassessment and exhausting administrative remedies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mont. Code Ann. 15-16-604 did not grant the district court authority to consider K&J's claims.

Athens v. McClain

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-5146

Opinion Date: November 5, 2020

Judge: Donnelly

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Tax Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the court of appeals' judgment upholding the General Assembly's enactment of laws that centralize the collection and administration of net-profits taxes but reversed the portion of the judgment upholding the portion of the legislation allowing the state to retain .5 percent of the collected taxes, holding that the retention provision exceeds the General Assembly's authority. Appellants, several cities and villages, all impose a net-profits tax, which is a tax on income earned within their boundaries. After the General Assembly passed laws imposing centralized administration of those taxes Appellants brought this lawsuit arguing that the legislation violates their home-rule authority and exceeds the General Assembly's constitutional power to limit the power of municipalities to levy taxes. The Supreme Court held (1) the laws imposing centralized administration constitute an act of limitation within the General Assembly's explicit constitutional authority; and (2) the law providing for the state's retention of .5 percent of municipal net-profits taxes a fee or a tax for the state's centralized administration is unconstitutional.