Latest 5 Cases This Week: Spell v. Edwards (5th Cir.), Merck & Co., Inc. v. United States Department of Human and Health Services (D.C. Cir.), ...

Hard Cases

JOSEPH MARGULIES

Cornell law professor Joseph Margulies uses the killing of Rayshard Brooks in Atlanta by police to explain some lessons for reform we might learn. Margulies calls upon us to use this case to reexamine the circumstances that should result in a custodial arrest and to shrink the function of police so as to use them only in the very few situations that truly require them.

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Spell v. Edwards

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-30358

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Costa

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Health Law

Plaintiffs, a Louisiana church and its pastor, filed suit seeking to enjoin stay-at-home orders restricting in-person church services to ten congregants. The Fifth Circuit held that the appeal of the denial of injunctive relief and related request for an injunction under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a)(1) are moot because the challenged orders expired more than a month ago. In this case, plaintiffs failed to cite any authority applying the "capable of repetition" exception to support an injunction against an order that is no longer in effect.

Merck & Co., Inc. v. United States Department of Human and Health Services

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 19-5222

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Patricia Ann Millett

Areas of Law: Drugs & Biotech, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

Drug manufacturers challenged the Department's rule that broadly requires drug manufacturers to disclose in their television advertisements the wholesale acquisition cost of many prescription drugs and biological products for which payment is available under Medicare or Medicaid. The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the drug manufacturers, holding that the Department acted unreasonably in construing its regulatory authority to include the imposition of a sweeping disclosure requirement that is largely untethered to the actual administration of the Medicare or Medicaid programs. The court explained that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the price that the rule compels manufacturers to disclose bears little resemblance to the price beneficiaries actually pay under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Therefore, the court held that there is no reasoned statutory basis for the Department's far-flung reach and misaligned obligations, and thus the rule is invalid and is hereby set aside.

Conservatorship of Jose B.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B292172(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Feuer

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

Objector, a conservatee subject to conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, contested the petition to reappoint a public guardian as his conservator. On appeal, objector contends the trial court violated Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350, subdivision (d)(2), and denied him due process by failing to commence the jury trial within 10 days of his demand for trial. The Court of Appeal was deeply troubled by the significant delay of over four months in holding a trial on objector's petition, especially given the lack of any justification by the court for most of the delay. The court emphasized the statutory obligation of trial courts to hold a jury trial within 10 days, with only a limited exception for a 15-day continuance if requested by the proposed conservatee. However, the court held that the trial court's failure to commence trial within 10 days of the jury trial demand did not support dismissal of the petition. Rather, the time limit in section 5350, subdivision (d)(2), is directory, not mandatory, because the Legislature has not expressly provided for dismissal of the conservatorship petition if a trial is not held within 10 days. Furthermore, objector was not prejudiced and denied due process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Elkhorn Baptist Church v. Brown

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S067736

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Health Law

The Oregon Governor issued executive orders in response to the coronavirus pandemic in early 2020. Because the virus spread through close personal contact and through the air, some of the orders have restricted the size of gatherings and required that people maintain specified distances between themselves and others. Relatedly, other orders have closed schools and businesses. The restrictions have had substantial consequences for individuals and entire economies. "It is unknown how long those consequences will last, just as it is unknown how long it will be before there is a cure or vaccine for COVID-19." Plaintiffs Elkhorn Baptist Church and several other churches and individual churchgoers, challenged the executive orders that the Governor issued, asking the circuit court to enjoin the enforcement of the Governor’s orders while their civil action was pending. They based their request on their claim that the orders have expired by operation of law. Among other things, they argued that the orders violated a statutory time limit. The circuit court issued the requested preliminary injunction. It did so based on its conclusion that, as plain- tiffs argued, the duration of the orders had exceeded a statutory time limit. The Governor sought mandamus relief from the Oregon Supreme Court to vacate the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in concluding that the Governor’s executive orders violated a statutory time limit as plaintiffs had argued. "The circuit court’s statutory analysis cannot be reconciled with the statutory text and context, and is directly at odds with how the legislature intended the statute to apply." Because the circuit court’s conclusion about the statutory time limit was fundamental to its issuance of the preliminary injunction, the Supreme Court deemed it necessary to vacate the preliminary injunction.

Gass et al. v. 52nd Judicial District

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 118 MM 2019

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Thomas G. Saylor

Areas of Law: Class Action, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

At issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was a challenge to a local judicial district’s policy prohibiting the use of medical marijuana by individuals under court supervision, such as probationers. Relevant here, the applicable statutory authority, the Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act, contained an immunity provision protecting patients from government sanctions. In September 2019, the 52nd Judicial District -- comprised of the Lebanon County Court of Common Pleas (the “District”) -- announced a “Medical Marijuana Policy” under the issuing authority of the president judge. The Policy prohibited “the active use of medical marijuana, regardless of whether the defendant has a medical marijuana card, while the defendant is under supervision by the Lebanon County Probation Services Department.” Petitioners were individuals under the supervision of the Lebanon County probation agency who filed suit in the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction to challenge the validity of the Policy in light of the MMA's immunity provision. Separately, Petitioners filed an application for special relief in the nature of a preliminary injunction. Soon thereafter, the Commonwealth Court proceeded, sua sponte, to transfer the case to this Court, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief. The District then filed its response in this Court opposing preliminary injunctive relief. It claimed, among other things, that Petitioners were unlikely to prevail on the merits, arguing, inter alia, that the General Assembly didn’t intend the MMA to override the courts’ ability to supervise probationers and parolees. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Petitioners' request for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Policy was deemed to be contrary to the immunity accorded by the MMA, and as such, should not be enforced. "[N]othing impedes a revocation hearing or other lawful form of redress, where there is reasonable cause to believe that a probationer or other person under court supervision has possessed or used marijuana in a manner that has not been made lawful by the enactment."