Bringing Home the Supply Chain

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, JONATHAN F. HARRIS

NYU law professors Samuel Estreicher and Jonathan F. Harris describe how the COVID-19 pandemic is forcing the United States to confront the problem of unchecked globalization. Estreicher and Harris argue that once the pandemic subsides, U.S. policymakers should, as a matter of national security, mandate that a minimum percentage of essential supplies be manufactured domestically.

Read More

Unconstitutional Chaos: Abortion in the Time of COVID-19

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN, MARY ZIEGLER

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman and Florida State University law professor Mary Ziegler discuss the abortion bans implemented in several states in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Grossman and Ziegler explain why the bans are constitutional and comment on the connection between the legal challenges to those bans and the broader fight over abortion rights.

Read More

Douglas v. Price

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-1868

Opinion Date: April 13, 2020

Judge: Diane S. Sykes

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Class Action, Legal Ethics

The $8.5 million proposed settlement of a class action that claimed that Western Union violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by sending unsolicited text messages, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). defined the class as: “All Persons in the United States who received one or more unsolicited text messages sent by or on behalf of Western Union.” Price, thinking she was a class member because she had received two text messages from Western, objected, arguing that the settlement inadequately compensated the class; class counsel’s fee request was too high; the plaintiff’s incentive award was too high; the class definition was imprecise; and the list of class members had errors. Western’s records confirmed that Price had enrolled in its loyalty program, checking a disclaimer box consenting to receive text messages. The judge certified the class, ruled that Price was not a member, approved the settlement, and reduced class counsel’s fees. Price did not appeal her exclusion from the class and did not seek to intervene but sought attorney’s fees and an incentive award. Her motion was denied because Price had cited “no authority for the highly questionable proposition that a non‐class member can recover fees and an incentive award under Rule 23.” The Seventh Circuit dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Price is not a party and lacks standing to appeal.

Napoli Shkolnik PLLC v. Trice

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 18-2172

Opinion Date: April 10, 2020

Judge: Jane Louise Kelly

Areas of Law: Legal Ethics

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying Napoli's quantum meruit request for attorney's fees. The court held that the district court did not fail to balance all factors and equities as required under Minnesota law when determining the reasonable value of Napoli's legal services. In this case, Napoli's services harmed, rather than helped, its clients. Therefore, the district court's consideration of additional factors would not have disturbed the district court's conclusion. The court also held that the district court applied the correct legal standard to consider the quantum meruit claims, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering allegations of misconduct, including Napoli's harm to its clients.

O.F. Mossberg & Sons, Inc. v. Timney Triggers, LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 19-1134

Opinion Date: April 13, 2020

Judge: Todd Michael Hughes

Areas of Law: Intellectual Property, Legal Ethics, Patents

After licensing negotiations with Timney failed, Mossberg sued Timney for patent infringement. Instead of answering the complaint, Timney filed for inter partes reexamination. The district court granted a stay. The Patent Office rejected certain claims. Mossberg canceled the rejected claims and added new claims. Before the inter partes reexamination proceeded further, the Patent Office vacated its institution decision because Timney had not identified the real party in interest in its petition. In 2014-2015, Timney filed three ex parte reexamination requests. The examiner ultimately rejected all pending claims over prior art. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board affirmed. Throughout these reexaminations, the district court maintained the stay despite several motions by Mossberg to lift it. Mossberg filed a notice of voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). The district court entered a docket text order stating that the case was dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Timney moved to declare the case exceptional so that it could pursue attorney’s fees, 35 U.S.C. 285. The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Timney was not a “prevailing party” because a Rule 41 dismissal without prejudice is not a decision on the merits and thus cannot be a judicial declaration altering the legal relationship between the parties.

Anthony v. Li

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A156640(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 13, 2020

Judge: Petrou

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics

In 2016, Anthony filed suit seeking to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in a car accident between him and Li. The parties unsuccessfully participated in voluntary private mediation and paid the requested fees. Anthony served a Civil Code 998 offer, seeking to compromise the action for $500,000.00, “each side to bear its own fees and costs.” Li did not accept. Li later made a section 998 offer to settle all claims against him for $175,001.00, with “each party bearing their own attorney fees and costs.” Anthony did not accept the offer. The parties jointly hired a court reporting service to record the trial proceedings. Counsel signed an agreement to share equally the fees for court reporting services. Anthony was billed and paid his share of court reporter fees. A jury returned a verdict finding Li negligent and awarding Anthony damages of $650,235.00., Anthony served a memorandum of costs for $83,048.06, seeking: $62,082.50 for section 998 post-offer expert witness fees; $2,650 for mediation fees, and $6,561.62 for court reporter fees. The court of appeal affirmed an order striking the motion. The parties agreed to share mediation and court reporter fees equally, without providing for the later recovery of those shared fees by a prevailing party.

Nieves v. Office of the Public Defender

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: a-69-18

Opinion Date: April 15, 2020

Judge: Jaynee LaVecchia

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Legal Ethics, Personal Injury, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

This case arose from the representation of plaintiff Antonio Nieves by a state public defender, Peter Adolf, Esq. After his conviction, Nieves was granted post-conviction relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. DNA evidence later confirmed that Nieves was not the perpetrator, and the underlying indictment against him was dismissed. Nieves subsequently recovered damages from the State for the time he spent wrongfully imprisoned. He then filed the present legal malpractice action seeking damages against the Office of the Public Defender (OPD) and Adolf. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA) barred the damages sought because Nieves failed to vault N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d)’s verbal threshold. The motion court concluded that the TCA and its verbal threshold were inapplicable. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that “public defenders are public employees that come within the TCA’s immunities and defenses” and that Nieves’s claim fell squarely within the TCA. The Appellate Division also held that plaintiff’s claim for loss of liberty damages fell within the TCA’s limitation on recovery for pain and suffering in N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d), which Nieves failed to satisfy. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded the TCA applied to Nieves’s legal malpractice action, and his claim for loss of liberty damages failed to vault the verbal threshold for a pain and suffering damages claim under the strictures of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). Defendants were entitled to summary judgment.