Should Acquittals Require Unanimity?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb considers the policy question of whether, since the Constitution requires jury unanimity to convict a defendant of a serious crime, states should require a unanimous verdict to acquit a defendant, as well. Colb describes the reasons behind jury unanimity convictions and assesses whether they apply similarly to acquittals.

Read More

State v. Glenn

Docket: SCWC-16-0000604

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Mark E. Recktenwald

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this criminal case, the Supreme Court held prospectively that once the court receives notice pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 407.5(1) that a defendant's penal responsibility is an issue in the case, the circuit court must advise a defendant of the penal-responsibility defense and obtain a knowing waiver of the defense. During the criminal proceedings in this case, two of the three examiners concluded that Defendant lacked penal responsibility. Defendant insisted that he was not mentally ill and that he did not want to assert a defense based on lack of penal responsibility. The circuit court eventually found Defendant was fit to stand trial, and Defendant was found guilty. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court should have either sua sponte instructed the jury about the defense of criminal responsibility or conduct a colloquy to ensure that he knowingly and voluntarily decided not to raise the defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) going forward, courts have a duty to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of a penal-responsibility defense; and (2) the trial court followed the rules in place at the time of Defendant's conviction and had no duty to sua sponte instruct the jury on lack of penal responsibility.

State v. Means

Docket: SCWC-16-0000810

Opinion Date: June 29, 2020

Judge: Michael D. Wilson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentence for theft in the second degree by shoplifting, holding that, pursuant to State v. Auld, 361 P.3d 471 (Haw. 2015), Defendant's sentence violated his right to a jury determination as to whether he qualified to be sentenced as a repeat offender pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 706-606.5. The circuit court sentenced Defendant as a repeat offender to a mandatory minimum of five years' incarceration without the possibility of parole. The circuit court, however, did not require a jury to find that Defendant qualified as a repeat offender beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by Auld. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment on appeal and the circuit court's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to the protections of Auld; and (2) the State was required to, but did not, prove Defendant's predicate prior convictions to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt prior to imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence as a repeat offender.

Cadiz v. QSI, Inc.

Docket: SCWC-14-0000594

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Michael D. Wilson

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court held that Plaintiff's injury-by-disease was compensable under Hawai'i's workers' compensation law because the employer failed to overcome the presumption in favor of compensability. Plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim for injury-by-disease. The Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) rejected the claim, concluding that the employer's Independent Medical Examinations (IME) reports provided sufficient substantial evidence to overcome the statutory presumption in favor of compensability. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and the LIRAB's decision, holding that the employer's IME reports failed to provide substantial evidence to meet its burden to produce evidence that, if true, would overcome the statutory presumption that the injury was work-related. The Court remanded the case to the LIRAB with the instruction that Plaintiff's injury-by-disease was compensable under Hawai'i's workers' compensation law.

Kalima v. State

Docket: SCAP-18-0000068

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Nakayama

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the circuit court's final judgment granting and apportioning monetary damages to Native Hawaiian beneficiaries after ruling that the State breached its duties as trustee of the Hawaiian Home Lands Trust (Trust), holding that the Fair Market Rental Value (FMRV) model is an adequate method for approximating actual damages. Plaintiffs were a group of Native Hawaiian Trust beneficiaries who claimed that they incurred damages while on the waitlist to receive homestead land due to breaches of trust duties by the State. In 2009, the circuit court ruled that the State breached its duties as trustee of the Trust. In 2018, the circuit court entered a final judgment adopting a FMRV model by which it could estimate the actual loss each individual beneficiary incurred. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the circuit court's judgment, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err by adopting the FMRV model; (2) incorrectly ruled that a beneficiary's damages did not begin to accrue until six years after the State received a beneficiary's homestead application; and (3) did not err in finding that the State breached its trust duties by failing to recover lands that were withdrawn from the Trust prior to statehood.

Kelepolo v. Fernandez

Docket: SCWC-18-0000138

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Richard W. Pollack

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court granted Defendants' petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) manifestly abused its discretion in setting the amount of a supersedeas bond as a condition of staying the enforcement of a judgment and writ of possession pending appeal. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on its complaint for ejectment against Defendants. While Defendants' appeal was pending, Defendants moved for a stay of proceedings to enforce the judgment. The circuit court granted the request and required Defendants to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of $578,000. Defendants then filed a motion for a stay in the ICA. The ICA granted a stay on the condition that it would be effective upon the ICA's approval of a supersedeas bond in the amount of $250,000 (the stay order). Defendants filed a petition for writ of mandamus from the ICA's stay order, arguing that the amount of the supersedeas bond should not exceed $8,000. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) the ICA not apply relevant factors in setting the bond amount, and (2) the stay order lacked a reasonable timeframe in which Defendants would be required to post the bond.