Latest 5 Cases: Roussos v. Roussos (Arbitration & Mediation), California v. Rodriguez (Constitutional Law), Daneshmand v. City of San Juan ...

The Upside-Down Treatment of Religious Exceptions Cases in the Supreme Court

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision last week to reject an emergency application from the State of Alabama to lift a stay on the execution of Willie B. Smith III. Professor Dorf observes the Court’s unusual alignment of votes in the decision and argues that, particularly as reflected by the recent COVID-19 decisions, the liberal and conservative Justices have essentially swapped places from the seminal 1990 case Employment Division v. Smith, which established that the First Amendment does not guarantee a right to exceptions from neutral laws of general applicability.

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Roussos v. Roussos

Docket: B293358(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 16, 2021

Judge: Feuer

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation

The Court of Appeal reversed a judgment confirming an arbitration award removing the managing director of two corporations, owned by Ted and his brother Harry Roussos as cotrustees of two trusts, and appointing the director proposed by Harry. The court concluded that the parties cannot contract away California's statutory protections for parties to an arbitration, including mandatory disqualification of a proposed arbitrator upon a timely demand. The court explained that the arbitrator was still a "proposed neutral arbitrator" for the present arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.9 and 1281.91, and under section 1281.91, subdivision (b)(1), the arbitrator was required to disqualify himself upon Ted's timely service of a notice of disqualification. In this case, as the proposed neutral arbitrator, Judge Shook was legally required to make the disclosures set forth in his disclosure report, and Ted had an absolute right to disqualify him without cause. Because the arbitrator refused to disqualify himself, the trial court was required to vacate the award under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(6)(B). The court remanded with instructions for the trial court to vacate its order granting the petition to confirm the arbitration award, and to enter a new order vacating the award.

California v. Rodriguez

Docket: D076917(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 16, 2021

Judge: Judith McConnell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law

In 2007, Juan Rodriguez, a non-citizen, entered a plea agreement in San Diego County that avoided any adverse immigration consequences. After the plea was entered, but before sentencing, Rodriguez was arrested and jailed for another crime in Riverside County. As a result of that arrest, Rodriguez did not appear at the scheduled sentencing hearing. He later agreed to be sentenced in absentia, and the court imposed a sentence subjecting Rodriguez to deportation. Deportation proceedings were initiated after Rodriguez’s release from custody and remain ongoing. In 2019, after amendments to Penal Code section 1473.7, Rodriguez moved to vacate his conviction on the grounds that he had not been sufficiently advised of the immigration consequences he faced. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion. Rodriguez challenged that decision, asserting the court erred by finding he meaningfully understood he would become deportable as a result of the plea. The Court of Appeal concluded the evidence supported Rodriguez’s motion. The Court thus reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to grant Rodriguez’s motion to vacate the conviction.

Daneshmand v. City of San Juan Capistrano

Docket: G058394(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 16, 2021

Judge: Richard D. Fybel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law

In a prior opinion, a panel of the Court of Appeal determined the tiered water rate system used by the City of San Juan Capistrano (the City) violated the California Constitution. The City offered to refund its water ratepayers the difference between what they paid and what they should have paid for a 10-month period of time, in exchange for a release of other claims against the City related to the tiered water rate system. Plaintiffs Hootan Daneshmand, Brian Montgomery, and John Bottjer were ratepayers in the City. Bottjer signed the release and received a refund; Daneshmand and Montgomery did not. Plaintiffs later filed a notice of claim against the City, on behalf of themselves and a putative class of ratepayers, to recover the difference between what they paid and what they should have paid during the entire time the tiered water rate system was in place. The City denied the notice of claim, which was filed more than one year after the last bill under the tiered water rate system was due, as untimely under Government Code section 911.2. The Court of Appeal determined claims of Bottjer and the other ratepayers who obtained a refund from the City were barred by the release those ratepayers signed. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal, the release was valid and enforceable. Further, Plaintiffs’ causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing were properly dismissed by the trial court. Finally, the claims of Daneshmand, Montgomery, and the other ratepayers who did not accept the City’s refund offer were barred because the notice of claim was filed more than one year after the claims accrued. Plaintiffs failed to show that waiver or any other legal or equitable doctrine affected the application of Government Code section 911.2 in this case.

People v. Flores

Docket: B305359(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 16, 2021

Judge: Wiley

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence of drugs and a firearm, holding that the trial court correctly concluded that the facts taken together justified the Terry stop. In this case, defendant saw police and tried to avoid contact with them by ducking down behind a parked car; during defendant's ducking and crouching, he was "toying with his feet" and did not freeze or remain still; and as police approached in an obvious way "with a huge light on him," defendant persisted in his odd crouch position for "far too long a period of time." The trial court concluded that defendant's conduct was more than enough to find there were articulable facts to find suspicion and enough for the officers to detain him, enough for the officers to thereafter question him about identification.

People v. Harris

Docket: B300410(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 16, 2021

Judge: Dennis M. Perluss

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1997, a jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree murder and one count of arson, finding true special circumstance allegations that the murders had been committed while defendant was engaged in the crime of arson and by means of a destructive device, as well as finding true the multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation. Defendant, who was 17 years old at the time of his arrest, was sentenced to concurrent indeterminate terms of 25 years to life for the murders plus a consecutive term of seven years for arson. In 2019, defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code 1170.95, which was denied. The Court of Appeal reversed the superior court's denial and remanded the matter with directions to issue an order to show cause and to proceed consistently with section 1170.95, subdivision (d). The Attorney General concedes that the superior court improperly engaged in factfinding without issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing. The court agreed with defendant that the jury’s arson-murder special-circumstance finding does not necessarily preclude relief in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent clarification in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, of the requirements for finding a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation true. Furthermore, the record of conviction in this case does not establish defendant's ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law.