Gay Pride, Gay Rights

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN, DEBORAH L. BRAKE

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman and University of Pittsburgh law professor Deborah L. Brake comment on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. In this first of a two-part series of columns, Grossman and Brake discuss the history of court decisions interpreting the meaning of “because of sex” under Title VII and describe the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Bostock v. Clayton County.

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Mr. Dooley Meets Mr. Justice Gorsuch: Will the Election Returns Follow the Supreme Court?

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses a claim by Missouri Senator Josh Hawley that the purpose of originalism and textualism is to provide a mechanism for obtaining results that religious conservatives favor on ideological grounds. In light of two recent Supreme Court decisions that disappointed conservatives, Dorf considers how conservatives might respond to these decisions and expresses hope that they might rethink their support for Trump. Dorf observes that while Supreme Court rulings do sometimes follow election returns, the reverse is also sometimes true, and we can’t yet know which direction this year will flow.

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Home Invasion: Warrantless Searches in Brazil and the United States

IGOR DE LAZARI, ANTONIO G. SEPULVEDA

Igor De Lazari, a Brazilian legal scholar, and Antonio Sepulveda, Professor of Law at the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) and at the Fluminense Federal University, offer a comparative analysis of warrantless searches in Brazil and the United States. De Lazari and Sepulveda call for guidance from each country’s high court to help clarify the law and facilitate uniform and predictable rulings on the constitutionality of certain warrantless searches.

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Pike v. Texas EMC Management, LLC

Docket: 17-0557

Opinion Date: June 19, 2020

Judge: Busby

Areas of Law: Antitrust & Trade Regulation, Business Law

This case case arising out of the breakup of a limited partnership created to produce and market a new cement product the Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals largely affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of the limited partnership and a technology-supplying partner, holding that Plaintiffs failed to present legally sufficient evidence of damages and that the technology-supplying partner was not entitled to a permanent injunction for misappropriation of trade secrets. The partnership, its general partner, and the limited partner that supplied the cement-making technology sued the limited partners responsible for funding, the general manager of the partnership, and the companies that foreclosed on and purchased the partnership's assets. Defendants asserted counterclaims. The court of appeals largely affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the damage awards were not supported by legally sufficient evidence; (2) the technology-supplying partner was not entitled to a permanent injunction for misappropriation of trade secrets; and (3) the company that purchased the partnership's assets and promissory note did not prove it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its counterclaim for the partnership's failure to pay a deficiency balance on the note.

Marchbanks v. Liberty Insurance Corp.

Docket: 18-0977

Opinion Date: June 19, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Contracts, Insurance Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that an insurer's payment of an appraisal award barred an insured's claims under the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act (TPPCA), Tex. Ins. Code chapter 542, holding that payment of an appraisal award does not extinguish TPPCA liability as a matter of law. After Insured's property sustained hail and wind damage, Insurer valued the property damage at $387. Believing the damage was undervalued, Insured sued, alleging breach of contract and extra-contractual claims. Insurer successfully moved the trial court to compel appraisal, and the appraisal award exceeded Insurer's prior estimates. Insurer paid the award and then filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that, as a matter of law, Insured could not maintain his TPPCA claim because Insurer paid the appraisal award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals' opinion was inconsistent with this Court's recent decisions on the issue.

Perry v. United Services Automobile Ass'n

Docket: 19-0210

Opinion Date: June 19, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Contracts, Insurance Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that an insurer's payment of an appraisal award barred an insured's claims under the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act (TPPCA), Tex. Ins. Code chapter 542, holding that payment of an appraisal award does not extinguish TPPCA liability as a matter of law. After Insured's property sustained damage from a storm, Insurer valued the property damage at $5,153. Believing the property damage was undervalued, Insured sued, alleging breach of contract and extra-contractual claims and invoking the policy's appraisal clause. Appraisers valued the damage at almost $15,000. Insurer paid the balance of the award and then filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that, as a matter of law, Insured could not maintain his TPPCA claim because Insurer paid the appraisal award. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the court of appeals' opinion was inconsistent with this Court's recent decisions on the issue.

Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Cochran Investments, Inc.

Docket: 18-0676

Opinion Date: June 19, 2020

Judge: Debra Lehrmann

Areas of Law: Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law

In this real estate dispute, the Supreme Court held that where the plain language of a special warranty deed limited the grantor's liability for failures of title to claims asserted by individuals "by, through and under" the grantor, the grantor could not be liable for breach of the covenant of seisin because the plaintiff asserted no such claim. The grantor of property, who purchased the property at a foreclosure sale, and the grantee entered into a residential sales contract, and the grantor conveyed the property by special warranty deed to the grantee. The grantee obtained title insurance from an insurer. When the validity of the foreclosure sale was challenged, the insurer assumed the grantee's defense and settled the suit. As the grantee's subrogee, the insurer sued the grantor for breach of the sales contract and breach of the implied covenant of seisin. The trial court found in favor of the insurer. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court held (1) the special warranty deed barred the insurer's recovery because, regardless of whether it implied the covenant of seisin, the deed limited the grantor's liability for failures of title to claims asserted by individuals "by, through and under" the grantor; (2) because the failure of title did not arise from such a claim, the grantor was not liable for it; and (3) the merger doctrine barred the insurer's breach of contract claim.

In re Commitment of Jones

Docket: 19-0260

Opinion Date: June 19, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's judgment and commitment order on the grounds that the trial court committed harmful error when it declined to submit an instruction explaining that a verdict for Defendant required only ten out of twelve votes, holding that the error was not harmful. The Supreme Court granted a motion for rehearing, withdrew its opinion and judgment of April 24, 2020, and substituted this opinion. At issue was whether a final verdict for a defendant declining to find that the defendant is a sexually violent predator (SVP) must be unanimous. Defendant requested an instruction explaining that an unanimous verdict was required to find that he was an SVP but that only ten out of twelve votes were required to find that he was not an SVP. The trial court declined to submit the requested instruction. The jury returned with a unanimous verdict finding that Defendant was a SVP. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court committed harmful error in declining to submit Defendant's instruction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred when it denied Defendant's proffered jury instruction; but (2) the error was not harmful.