When Is Optimism Actually Pessimism? When Trump Is President

NEIL H. BUCHANAN

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan continues his discussion considering the future of the rule of law in the United States. Buchanan argues that even assuming a “long arc of American political history,” knowing that eventually, another group of heroes might rise is comforting only in a vague sense.

Read More

Keach v. New Brunswick Southern Railway Co. Ltd.

Docket: 19-1161

Opinion Date: March 10, 2020

Judge: David J. Barron

Areas of Law: Bankruptcy

In this case arising out of a petition for bankruptcy filed by the Montreal Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMA) the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) upholding the judgment of the bankruptcy court ruling that certain claims filed by creditor railroads should be given priority status pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 1171(b) because they were "Six Months Rule" claims, holding that the claims at issue were priority claims under section 1171(b). In their claims, the creditor railroads sought to recover their share of payments that the MMA was to collect for charges that had been billed to customers that had shipped freight on routes that covered rail systems owned by the MMA and the creditor railroads. The creditor railroads argued that their claims qualified as Six Months Rule claims and so must be paid in full before other claims because the MMA incurred the debt for their share of these payments so close in time to the MMA's bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court agreed with the creditor railroads and concluded that the claims were entitled to priority under section 1171(b). The BAP affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims were priority claims under the statute.

Johnson v. Johnson

Docket: 19-1719

Opinion Date: March 13, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Personal Injury

In this appeal concerning whether a settlement contract under Rhode Island law was formed after a personal injury lawsuit was filed the First Circuit certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court the question of what is the definition of 'civil action' in R.I. Gen. Laws 27-7-2.2. Horace Johnson was the driver and Carlton Johnson was the sole passenger in a car accident. The accident occurred in Rhode Island. Both men were seriously injured. Horace was insured by Arbella Mutual Insurance Company. Arbella accepted Carlton's demand to settle for the policy limit of $100,000. Thereafter, Carlton filed a lawsuit against Horace, Arbella, and other defendants. A federal district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The district court rejected Carlton's argument that Rhode Island's Rejected Settlement Offer Interest Statute, section 27-7-2.2, applied to the case. Carlton appealed, arguing that the statute rendered the settlement contract unenforceable because Arbella failed to accept his settlement offer within the timetable set forth by the statute. At issue was whether the court correctly determined that the statute's "[i]n any civil action" language requires that a legal proceeding in court needs to be underway to trigger the statute's application. The First Circuit certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court a question concerning the definition of "civil action."

Caniglia v. Strom

Docket: 19-1764

Opinion Date: March 13, 2020

Judge: Selya

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The First Circuit held that the special measure of constitutional protection to which police officers, in the motor vehicle context, performing community care taking functions are entitled extends to police officers performing community caretaking functions on private premises, including homes. Plaintiff's person and firearms were allegedly seized after Defendants, police officers, entered his home. Plaintiff brought several claims against Defendants, including claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and under state law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff's federal and state-law claims, concluding that the officers' conduct at Plaintiff's residence constituted a reasonable exercise of their caretaking responsibilities and thus did not violate Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendants' actions did not exceed the proper province of their community caretaking responsibilities.

Photographic Illustrators Corp. v. Orgill, Inc.

Docket: 19-1452

Opinion Date: March 13, 2020

Judge: William Joseph Kayatta, Jr.

Areas of Law: Copyright

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Orgill, Inc. in this case alleging copyright infringement claims, holding that a copyright licensee given the unrestricted right to grant sublicenses may do so without using express language. Orgill markets and sells Sylvania lightbulbs. At issue was Orgill's use of Photographic Illustrators Corporation (PIC) photos of Sylvania lightbulbs in Orgill's electronic and paper catalogs. PIC and Sylvania had negotiated a license setting forth the scope of Sylvania's permission to use PIC's photographs of Sylvania lightbulbs, but Sylvania did not tell Orgill that Orgill needed to abide by an attribution restriction in Sylvania's license. PIC sued Orgill and other Sylvania dealers and distributors claiming copyright infringement. The district court determined that Orgill had a sublicense from Sylvania to use the photos and rejected PIC's argument that sublicensee of copyrights are ineffective absent language expressly granting permission to use the copyrighted work. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) where a licensor grants to a licensee the unrestricted right to sublicense and permit others to use a copyrighted work, a sublicense may be implied by the conduct of the sublicensor and sublicensee; and (2) a reasonable jury could have found that Sylvania granted an implied sublicense to Orgill.

da Silva v. de Aredes

Dockets: 19-2100, 19-2217

Opinion Date: March 13, 2020

Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch

Areas of Law: Family Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decisions of the district court ordering the return of A.C.A., the child that Mother "wrongfully removed" from Brazil, holding that the district court did not err in finding that the two affirmative defenses to return under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction did not apply and did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for a new trial. Without Father's consent or knowledge, Mother took A.C.A. from Brazil, where the parties lived, to the United States. Father filed a Hague Convention petition seeking the return of A.C.A. to Brazil. The district court concluded that Mother had wrongfully removed A.C.A. from Brazil and ordered that A.C.A. be returned to Brazil. Mother moved for a new trial, which the district court denied. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that Mother had not met her burden of proof as to any of her defenses; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's motion for a new trial.