Latest 5 Cases: In Re: Nomination Papers of Sherrie Cohen (Civil Procedure), Dean v. Bowling Green-Brandywine (Civil Procedure), Roverano. v. John ...

Banana Republic or Legalistic Lawlessness?

NEIL H. BUCHANAN

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan reflects, based on current trends, on what the legal system in the United States will look in a few years. Specifically, Buchanan considers whether the country will become a “banana republic” or whether instead we will see a system of “legalistic lawlessness.”

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In Re: Nomination Papers of Sherrie Cohen

Docket: 31 and 32 EAP 2019

Opinion Date: February 19, 2020

Judge: Mundy

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

In October 2019, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a Commonwealth Court order and directed that the name of Sherrie Cohen be placed on the November 5, 2019 ballot as an independent candidate for Philadelphia City Council-at-Large. Because the Board of Elections only had until the close of business on October 4, 2019 to add Cohen’s name to the ballot, the Supreme Court issued its order noting that an opinion would follow. By this opinion, the Supreme Court forth its reasons for concluding that Cohen’s withdrawal as a candidate in the Democratic primary election for City Council-at-Large did not preclude her from running in the general election as an independent candidate. On August 16, 2019, the trial court issued an order granting the petitions to set aside Cohen’s nomination papers. In an opinion in support of the order, the court looked to Packrall v. Quail, 192 A.2d 704 (Pa. 1963), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that when a candidate withdraws his nomination petitions for a primary ballot “within the permitted period,” his subsequently filed nomination papers may be accepted. The trial court distinguished Cohen’s case from Packrall because “Cohen required Court intervention to leave the primary ballot.” The court determined this to be the decisive factor in concluding that she was “subject to the 'sore loser’ provision.” Cohen filed a timely appeal to the Commonwealth Court. In a single-judge memorandum and order, the trial court was affirmed, holding “[w]hen a person withdraws of his or her own volition within the time for filing, it 'undoes,’ ab initio, the filing because a person gets to choose whether he or she wants to go through the primary process to seek an office.” Cohen asserted on appeal of the Commonwealth Court’s order that that court erred by failing to consider withdrawal by court order under Election Code Section 978.4 to have the same effect as voluntary withdrawal pursuant to Section 914. The Supreme Court agreed with Cohen that “[t]he Commonwealth Court failed to acknowledge that the important dividing line in this area of the law is between voluntary withdraw[als] and candidates getting stricken from the ballot. … Because there is no principled reason to distinguish between the voluntariness of a withdrawal under Section 914 or Section 978.4, Cohen is entitled to relief from this Court.”

Dean v. Bowling Green-Brandywine

Docket: 26 MAP 2019

Opinion Date: February 19, 2020

Judge: Doughtery

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review centered on the scope and application of the qualified immunity provided under Section 114 of the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA), 50 P.S. sections 7101-7503. On November 20, 2012, twenty-three year-old Andrew Johnson (Andrew) voluntarily admitted himself to Bowling Green-Brandywine Addiction Treatment Center (Brandywine). Andrew sought drug rehabilitation treatment for his addiction to opiates (OxyContin) and benzodiazepines (Xanax), which were first prescribed to him two years earlier for pain and anxiety related to back injuries arising from an ATV accident. He was accompanied by his mother, appellant Melissa Dean, and reported his health history to Brandywine staff. Appellee Mohammad Ali Khan, M.D., a physician at Brandywine, took Andrew’s medical history and performed a physical exam. At approximately 8:15 in the evening of November 28, 2012, the nursing staff informed Khan of Andrew’s elevated vital signs, but Khan declined to examine Andrew, did not issue any new treatment orders, and instructed the nursing staff not to transfer Andrew to the emergency room. The nursing staff again checked Andrew every few hours, noting his vital signs but giving no additional treatment. At approximately 7:50 a.m. the next morning, Andrew was found lying on the floor of his room, face down, without a pulse. He was transferred to a nearby hospital where he was pronounced dead. Andrew’s parents, appellant Dean and Clifton Johnson, as administrators of Andrew’s estate and in their individual capacities, filed suit against Brandywine, Dr. Kahn, and others who treated Andrew, raising medical malpractice, wrongful death and survival claims. Specifically, appellants alleged Andrew died of a cardiac arrhythmia due to the combination of medications prescribed during treatment at Brandywine, and that his death was the result of medical negligence including the failure to properly examine, diagnose, appreciate, and treat his medical condition. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court erred in affirming entry of a compulsory nonsuit and held immunity did not apply under circumstances where: (1) the patient was admitted for and primarily received drug detoxification treatment; and (2) the patient did not receive treatment to facilitate recovery from a mental illness. Consequently, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Roverano. v. John Crane, Inc.

Docket: 26 EAP 2018

Opinion Date: February 19, 2020

Judge: Mundy

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Products Liability

In this appeal by allowance, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review was whether the Fair Share Act, 42 Pa.C.S. 7102, required a factfinder to apportion liability on a percentage, as opposed to per capita, basis in strict liability asbestos actions. William Roverano was exposed to a variety of asbestos products from 1971 to 1981 in the course of his employment as a helper and a carpenter with PECO Energy Company. Additionally, he smoked cigarettes for approximately thirty years until 1997. In November 2013, Roverano was diagnosed with lung cancer in both lungs. In 2014, Roverano brought a strict liability lawsuit against thirty defendants, including John Crane, Inc. (Crane) and Brand Insulations, Inc. (Brand), asserting that exposure to their asbestos products caused his lung cancer. His wife, Jacqueline Roverano, filed a loss of consortium claim. Before trial, several defendants, including Crane and Brand, filed a motion in limine seeking a ruling that the Fair Share Act applied to asbestos cases. The Supreme Court concluded the Act’s plain language was consistent with per capita apportionment in asbestos cases, the Act does not specifically preempt Pennsylvania common law favoring per capita apportionment, and percentage apportionment in asbestos cases was impossible of execution. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s order, which vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded this case for a new trial to apportion damages on a percentage basis. Additionally, the Supreme Court considered whether the Act required a factfinder to apportion liability to bankrupt entities that entered into a release with the plaintiff. To this, the Court concluded that upon appropriate requests and proofs, bankruptcy trusts that were either joined as third-party defendants or that have entered into a release with the plaintiff could be included on the verdict sheet for purposes of liability only. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the trial court to consider whether Appellees submitted sufficient requests and proofs to apportion liability to the settled bankruptcy trusts.

Pennsylvania v. Tighe

Docket: 57 MAP 2018

Opinion Date: February 19, 2020

Judge: Dougherty

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

On the night of May 29, 2012, appellant Patrick Tighe, then 58 years old, sexually assaulted a minor female victim, J.E., then 15 years old. In this discretionary appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court examined whether the trial court improperly limited appellant’s right to self-representation in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution when, during appellant’s jury trial, the court prohibited appellant, who was proceeding pro se, from personally conducting cross-examination of the victim-witness, and instead required stand-by counsel to cross-examine the witness using questions prepared by appellant. The Supreme Court concluded there was no constitutional violation and affirmed the order of the Superior Court.

Young v. PA Board of Probation & Parole

Docket: 1 MAP 2019

Opinion Date: February 19, 2020

Judge: Donohue

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Thirty years ago, Appellee Otto Young was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison after he was convicted of aggravated assault, burglary, terroristic threats, and conspiracy. He was repeatedly released on parole and his parole was repeatedly revoked. On three occasions, the revocations were due to crimes that Young committed while at liberty on parole. This case presented a straightforward issue for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review, namely whether the Board of Probation and Parole (the “Board”) had the statutory authority to rescind a previous grant of credit for time spent at liberty on parole. The Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth Court’s determination that the Board lacked any such statutory authority and thus affirmed its order.