Latest 5 Cases: Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Superior Court of Kern County (Civil Procedure), Vosburg v. County of Fresno (Civil ...

When Do Ministers Win and Lose?

LESLIE C. GRIFFIN

UNLV Boyd School of Law professor Leslie C. Griffin describes the legal landscape after the U.S. Supreme Court’s July 2020 decision in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, in which the Court took an expansive view of the ministerial exception. Griffin describes two recent decisions by U.S. Courts of Appeals ruling in favor of an employee and against a religious employer, demonstrating that ministers still have a chance (albeit a small one) of winning their antidiscrimination lawsuits.

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Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Superior Court of Kern County

Docket: F078245(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 9, 2020

Judge: Meehan

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

The underlying Government Code section 12974 civil action was initiated by DFEH in December 2017 by a petition seeking provisional relief to temporarily enjoin Tastries from refusing to sell wedding cakes to same-sex couples. The trial court denied DFEH's requests for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeal granted DFEH's petition for writ of mandate, holding that the trial court's interpretation of a section 12974 civil action as the equivalent of a section 12965 action was incorrect, and its order on the preliminary injunction requested under section 12974 was not a merits-based determination of the merits of the DFEH's Unruh Civil Rights Act (UCRA) claim to be presented in a civil action under section 12965. Furthermore, regardless of the procedural context of the preliminary injunction request, the court held that the trial court's decision on it could not constitute a merits-based adjudication of the UCRA claim: the trial court's order related to an issue of law that was decided with reference to extrinsic factual evidence that had not been fully investigated at the administrative level or fully pleaded in a claim for permanent relief. The court finally held that the trial court's incorrect construction of its preliminary injunction order as a final, merits-based determination of the DFEH's UCRA claim in its order on the motion to enforce the judgment led the trial court to circumscribe DFEH's statutory duties in a manner that violated the separation of powers doctrine.

Vosburg v. County of Fresno

Docket: F078081(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 9, 2020

Judge: Donald R. Franson, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Election Law, Legal Ethics

As the foundation for the application of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 to this case, the Court of Appeal held that an unincorporated association has standing to appear in an election contest as a representative of its members if (1) its members live in the area affected by the outcome of the election, (2) its members would suffer injury from an adverse outcome in the election contest, and (3) the questions involved were of a public nature. In this case, the court held that the unincorporated association met these requirements where it is undisputed that the patients residing at CSH-Coalinga are in an area affected by the referendum vote on Measure C; the members of DACE would have been harmed in at least two ways if the election contest was successful; and the specific challenge of illegal votes raised in this election contest involves questions of a public nature. The court held that the trial court's analysis of DACE's right to intervene in the election contest in the order denying the motion for attorney fees did not accurately reflect California law governing an unincorporated association and (2) DACE qualified for permissive intervention. Furthermore, as a de facto intervenor and based on its unique contribution to the evidence and argument presented in the trial court, DACE qualified as a party for purposes of section 1021.5's "successful party" requirement. The court rejected the remaining contentions, reversing the order denying the motion for attorney fees.

Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Cathy's Creations, Inc.

Docket: F077802(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 9, 2020

Judge: Meehan

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics

An award of attorneys' fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 was properly denied to the prevailing defendants in an action brought by DFEH under Government Code section 12974. This case arose out of an administrative complaint filed with DFEH by a same-sex couple who alleged they were denied services at a bakery because of their sexual orientation. The Court of Appeal held that section 12974's unilateral attorneys' fee provision conflicts with Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, and the two statutes cannot reasonably be harmonized. The court explained that because section 12974 is the more specific, later-enacted statute, it governs. Therefore, the court held that a prevailing defendant in a section 12974 action is not entitled to an award of fees against DFEH under section 1021.5, and the trial court did not err in denying defendants' attorneys' fee request.

In re K.W.

Docket: E073894(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 9, 2020

Judge: Manuel A. Ramirez

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Pursuant to a plea bargain, minor K.W. admitted one count of robbery; counts alleging kidnapping, brandishing, and vandalism were dismissed. After he completed probation, he moved to seal the record under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786. He was not eligible for sealing, because robbery was one of the crimes listed in section 707(b). The trial court reduced the adjudication to the lesser included offense of grand theft, which was not a section 707(b) offense. The court then granted the motion to seal. The State appealed, contending: (1) the juvenile court lacked the authority to reduce the adjudication; and (2) reducing the adjudication violated the plea bargain. The Court of Appeal determined the statutes the juvenile court cited did not give it authority to reduce the conviction. Further, the Court held Welfare and Institutions Code section 782, which would allow the juvenile court to “set aside the findings and dismiss the petition” in the interest of justice, did not authorize the juvenile court to reduce an adjudication, at least when doing so would violate a plea bargain, as it would have here. Judgment was therefore reversed.

City of Brentwood v. Department of Finance

Docket: C086344(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 9, 2020

Judge: Vance W. Raye

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The City of Brentwood (Brentwood) sought reimbursement for construction costs incurred in five redevelopment projects. In City of Brentwood v. Campbell, 237 Cal.App.4th 488 (2015), the Court of Appeal rejected Brentwood’s contention that a statutory exception to the redevelopment dissolution statutes allowed the city to retain funds previously reimbursed under five public improvement agreements (PIA’s) between Brentwood and its former redevelopment agency (RDA). Here, Brentwood sought payment for expenses as yet unreimbursed, contending that the PIA’s were “enforceable obligations” under Health & Safety Code section 34191.4 (b)(1), a 2015 amendment to the dissolution statutes. Brentwood contended that third party construction contracts for the five projects - all but a small fraction of which preceded execution of the PIA’s - were “under” the PIA’s within the meaning of section 34191.4 (b)(2)(C)(i). The trial court ruled that “[i]n order for the contracts to have been 'under’ the PIAs and on behalf of the RDA, the PIAs needed to already exist.” Similarly, Brentwood contended that the PIA’s ratified and incorporated the prior cooperation agreement and findings resolutions that predated third party construction contracts. The Court of Appeal determined no agreement or resolution prior to the PIA’s committed the RDA to reimburse Brentwood for the construction costs of the five redevelopment projects. "Ratification cannot import the terms of the PIA’s into the cooperation agreement and findings resolutions." The Court therefore affirmed denial of reimbursement.