| Chavez v. Plan Benefit Services, Inc. |
| Docket: 19-50904 Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Jerry E. Smith Areas of Law: Class Action |
| A district court must engage in a "rigorous analysis" when it certifies a class action. Plaintiffs filed suit against FBG under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), alleging that FBG has acted as a fiduciary and breached its duties. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's certification order, because the district court failed to engage in a rigorous analysis when it certified the class. The court held that the district court analyzed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 superficially, because the district court's order did not identify the common question with any specificity. Having defined the question vaguely, the district court then analyzed it conclusionally and there is no reference to ERISA. Furthermore, the district court did not explain why clarifying FBG's status as a fiduciary will in one stroke resolve an issue that is central to the claims of each one of the class members, and the order neglected to consider asserted differences among class members that could prevent the suit from generating "common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation." Likewise, the district court's analysis of class type was insufficient. |
| |
| Manuel v. Merchants and Professional Bureau, Inc. |
| Docket: 19-50814 Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Higginbotham Areas of Law: Consumer Law |
| Plaintiff filed suit against Merchant's surety, Travelers, alleging claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging that 2017 collection letters were false or misleading and unfair or unconscionable for failing to disclose the time-barred nature of the debt. Plaintiff also alleged a claim under the Texas Debt Collection Act based on the same conduct. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Merchants, but on alternative grounds. The court held that the letters seeking collection of time-barred debt, filled with ambiguous offers and threats with no indication that the debt is old, much less that the limitations period has run, misrepresent the legal enforceability of the underlying debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692e(2) and (10). |
| |
| United States v. Badgett |
| Docket: 19-10146 Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Higginbotham Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed the terms of supervised release and the revocation sentences imposed by the district court. In United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019), the Supreme Court struck down 18 U.S.C. 3583(k), a separate provision of the federal supervised-release statute that imposed a five-year minimum sentence on convicted sex offenders who committed certain specified sex offenses while on supervised release. The court held that there is currently no caselaw from either the Supreme Court or this circuit extending Haymond to 18 U.S.C. 3583(g) revocations, and thus the district court could not have committed any "clear or obvious" error in applying the statute. The court also held that defendant's 48-month revocation sentence is not substantively unreasonable. In this case, defendant failed to identify any objective error in the district court’s within-Guidelines revocation sentence. |
| |
| United States v. Diggles |
| Docket: 18-40521 Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Costa Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit heard this case en banc to resolve inconsistency in its caselaw on one common issue: How does the requirement that a court pronounce its sentence in the presence of the defendant apply to supervision conditions? The court stated that what matters is whether a condition is required or discretionary under the supervised release statute, 18 U.S.C. 3583(d). If a condition is required, making an objection futile, the court need not pronounce it. If a condition is discretionary, the court must pronounce it to allow for an objection. In this case, because the district court adopted the conditions the PSR proposed, it pronounced the three conditions it was required to: the financial disclosure requirement and the gambling and credit restrictions. The court clarified the law governing supervised release conditions in three respects: 1. A sentencing court must pronounce conditions that are discretionary under 18 U.S.C. 3583(d); 2. When a defendant fails to raise a pronouncement objection in the district court, review is for plain error if the defendant had notice of the conditions and an opportunity to object; 3. A sentencing court pronounces supervision conditions when it orally adopts a document recommending those conditions. |
| |
| Cruz v. Maverick County |
| Docket: 18-50885 Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Jennifer Walker Elrod Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that Maverick County willfully violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and that the Deputies were entitled to backpay, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the majority of the class members to participate in the suit; the district court did not commit reversible error by not striking the Deputies' testimony; the district court's finding of willfulness was not erroneous; and the award of attorneys' fees was not an abuse of discretion. The court remanded to the district court to consider an award of attorneys' fees incurred on appeal. |
| |
