Latest 5 Cases: California v. Aguilera (Constitutional Law), California v. Reneaux (Constitutional Law), Sandlin v. McLaughlin (Constitutional Law)

California v. Aguilera

Docket: D075381(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 17, 2020

Judge: Guerrero

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The State of California, represented by the San Diego County District Attorney, appealed the dismissal of all criminal charges against defendants Mario Aguilera, Jesus Castaneda, Ricardo Eaton, Daniel Gracia, William Sherman, and Jose Villanueva. Defendants were charged with multiple felonies, including robbery and carjacking arising from an aborted illegal drug transaction. The trial court found that defendants' constitutional right to due process was violated because the federal government refused defendants' requests to produce potentially exculpatory evidence in the possession of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that neither due process nor any other constitutional provision required dismissal of the charges against defendants under the circumstances here. The dismissal order was therefore reversed.

California v. Reneaux

Docket: C082186(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 17, 2020

Judge: Harry E. Hull, Jr.

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Jessie Reneaux was convicted by jury of inflicting corporal injury on his girlfriend, L.E., with whom he was cohabiting, guilty of false imprisonment of his girlfriend, and guilty of dissuading his girlfriend from testifying against him. He appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court violated his right to confront witnesses against him by allowing the girlfriend’s out of court testimonial statements to be admitted into evidence; and, (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed consecutive rather than concurrent terms. In supplemental briefing, defendant contended that in light of the recent passage of Senate Bill No. 1393 (SB 1393), this matter should have been remanded to permit the trial court to consider whether it should exercise its newly-legislated discretion to strike or dismiss the prior serious felony conviction enhancements imposed under Penal Code section 667(a). To this, the State agreed. The Court of Appeal concluded defendant forfeited, by his own wrongdoing, his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine L.E., and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to consecutive prison terms. The Court therefore affirmed judgment of conviction, but remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion under Penal Code sections 1385 and 667(a) to strike or dismiss the prior serious felony conviction enhancements.

Sandlin v. McLaughlin

Docket: G057264(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 17, 2020

Judge: Richard M. Aronson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

Petitioner Bill Sandlin filed a petition for mandamus relief to challenge the candidate statements submitted by Real Parties in Interest Ed Pope, Jaci Woods, and Frank McGill (Real Parties) in their candidacy for positions on the Irvine City Council. Petitioner alleged Real Parties’ candidate statements would mislead voters about the current city council’s actions and the facts concerning a failed referendum to relocate the site of a planned state veterans cemetery. Real Parties opposed the petition and filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. While Real Parties’ anti-SLAPP motion was pending, the trial court denied the mandamus petition in its entirety, finding Petitioner’s challenge to Pope’s candidate statement was untimely, and finding he failed to establish Woods’s or McGill’s candidate statements were false, misleading, or otherwise barred by the Elections Code. The court then denied Real Parties’ anti-SLAPP motion as moot, and further found it was barred by the public interest litigation exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute. After reviewing their anti-SLAPP motion de novo, the Court of Appeal concluded the motion was not moot, the public interest litigation exemption was inapplicable, and the motion should have been granted.

In re S.J.

Docket: A157266(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 17, 2020

Judge: Mark B. Simons

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

In October 2018, S.J. (born September 2001) consumed alcohol and drove. He veered off the road and hit a parked car and a fence. Responding officers observed signs of intoxication. A breath test showed S.J.’s blood-alcohol level was 0.12%. A petition under Welfare and Institutions Code 602(a) alleged: misdemeanor driving under the influence; misdemeanor driving while having a blood-alcohol level of 0.08% or more; and misdemeanor driving without a license. In February 2019, the juvenile court found S.J. not suitable for informal supervision, commenting “a standard term in adult-land for a DUI is search and seizure for alcohol. … it’s particularly important when we have a minor . . . whose … mother has allowed ... the minor to consume alcohol. … I just don’t see how, in a DUI with a .12 and a minor who also smokes marijuana, we can effectively supervise and ensure rehabilitation without a search and seizure clause, which is foreclosed in an informal probation setting.” The court sustained two allegations, dismissing the driving without a license allegation, declared S.J. a ward of the court, and directed the Probation Department to supervise him at home. The court imposed a $75 restitution fine, a $390 fine for violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, and $1,355 in penalties. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of informal supervision but remanded for recalculation of the penalties, most of which were inapplicable in this noncriminal proceeding.

In re J.M.

Docket: B298473(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 17, 2020

Judge: Frances Rothschild

Areas of Law: Family Law

Mother challenged three juvenile court orders regarding her sons. The Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court committed reversible error when it denied mother's modification petition, because she established a substantial change in circumstances by resolving the domestic violence underlying the initial dependency petition. The court also held that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding placement with mother would not be in J.M.'s best interests. Therefore, the juvenile court's May 15, 2019 and September 30, 2019 orders denying mother's Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petitions and the juvenile court's September 30, 2019 order pursuant to section 366.26 are reversed.