Latest 5 Cases: Adams v. Bank of America (Banking), Webster v. Superior Court (Constitutional Law), City and County of San Francisco v. All ...

Should Acquittals Require Unanimity?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb considers the policy question of whether, since the Constitution requires jury unanimity to convict a defendant of a serious crime, states should require a unanimous verdict to acquit a defendant, as well. Colb describes the reasons behind jury unanimity convictions and assesses whether they apply similarly to acquittals.

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Adams v. Bank of America

Docket: A156712(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Frank Y. Jackson

Areas of Law: Banking, Real Estate & Property Law

In 2006, Adams obtained a loan secured by a deed of trust against Vallejo residential property. Adams obtained a loan from an individual, Gallegos, secured by a separate deed of trust recorded against the same property. Adams defaulted on the junior loan, resulting in foreclosure and a trustee’s sale in 2008. Gallegos was the purchaser. The property was still subject to the senior loan; Adams remained the "Borrower,” named on the deed of trust. In 2017, Adams filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy. After her discharge, Adams filed a complaint, alleging “Violations of the Homeowners’ Bill of Rights” (HBOR), based on her 2016-2017 negotiations for a loan modification. She claimed that the defendants recorded notices of default and of trustee’s sale on the senior loan and failed to provide her with a single point of contact while her application was pending. The court granted the defendants judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeal reversed. While the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action under the HBOR the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Adams leave to amend. The facts alleged in the complaint together with matters that are subject to judicial notice do not establish that the property is Adams’s principal residence as required under HBOR but there is a reasonable possibility that amendment of the complaint would cure this defect.

Webster v. Superior Court

Docket: E074397(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Fields

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner Jacquelyn Webster, was convicted by jury of two misdemeanor offenses. She was placed on summary probation for two years and ordered not to violate any laws, complete 200 hours of community service, and pay a $235 fine. Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal and requested court-appointed counsel to represent her on appeal. Respondent San Bernardino Superior Court’s Appellate Division, denied her request for appointed counsel on appeal. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate to direct the superior court’s appellate division to: (1) vacate its order denying her request for appointment of appellate counsel; and (2) enter a new order granting her request. Finding that because incarceration could be ordered if petitioner violated probation, the Court of Appeal concluded petitioner fell within the definition of “subject to incarceration” under clear language of California Rules of Court Rule 8.851. Petitioner was therefore entitled to appointment of appellate counsel under the Rule. The writ was issued and the superior court was direct to vacate its prior order.

City and County of San Francisco v. All Persons Interested in Proposition C

Docket: A158645(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Tucher

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

In the November 2018 general election, 61percent of San Francisco voters voted for Proposition C, entitled “Additional Business Taxes to Fund Homeless Services.” San Francisco filed suit to establish that Proposition C has been validly enacted through the voters’ initiative power. The City’s complaint against “All Persons Interested in the Matter of Proposition C” was answered by three defendants: the California Business Properties Association, the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, and the California Business Roundtable (the Associations). The Associations allege that Proposition C is invalid because it imposes a special tax approved by less than two-thirds of the voting electorate as required by Propositions 13 and 218. (California Constitution Art. XIII A, section 4 & Art. XIII C, section 2(d).) The trial court granted the City judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeal affirmed, citing two California Supreme Court cases interpreting other language from Proposition 13 and Proposition 218. The supermajority vote requirements that those propositions added to the state constitution coexist with and do not displace the people’s power to enact initiatives by majority vote. Because a majority of San Francisco voters who cast ballots in November 2018 favored Proposition C, the initiative measure was validly enacted.

Walker v. Superior Court

Docket: A159563(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Tucher

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

As Walker neared the end of a state prison commitment, the People filed a petition to commit him civilly as a sexually violent predator (SVP), supported by two psychologists' evaluations. The evaluations noted Walker’s 1990 conviction for rape and described offenses charged against Walker that did not result in a conviction. In each instance, he was convicted of a different crime against the same victim. The experts obtained details of the conduct underlying these two alleged offenses from a probation report and a police inspector’s affidavit. At a probable cause hearing, Walker objected to the admission of the evaluations, stating they contained inadmissible hearsay. .Walker’s attorney cross-examined the psychologists at length. Walker also testified on his own behalf and called several witnesses, including a third psychologist. After several efforts to have the trial court reverse its finding of probable cause to commit him as an SVP, Walker sought a writ of mandate. The court of appeal denied his petition. The SVP statute, which requires the psychological evaluations as the basis for an SVP petition, also requires the court to consider the evaluations in deciding whether there is probable cause to proceed to an SVP trial. In reviewing the evaluations, the court may consider hearsay contained within them.

David v. Queen of the Valley Medical Center

Docket: A157336(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Barbara J.R. Jones

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law

David worked as an RN at QVMC from 2005-2015, as an hourly employee. David clocked in and out of work using an electronic timekeeping system that automatically rounded time entries up or down to the nearest quarter-hour. After her employment ended, David sued QVMC alleging failure to provide meal and rest periods, and failure to pay minimum wages. David claimed she was not paid for hours worked off-the-clock, such as when she performed charting work, and when her meal and rest periods were interrupted by co-workers and charge nurses who asked her work-related questions. David also claimed she was not paid all wages because of the hospital’s time-rounding policy. QVMC argued that whenever David reported a missed break, she received an extra hour of pay and that it could not be held liable for missed meal or rest periods of which it was unaware. The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of QVMC. QVMC’s rounding policy is neutral on its face and rounds all employee time punches to the nearest quarter-hour without consideration of whether the employer or employee is benefitting from the rounding. QVMC provided the breaks required by law: an employer is not obligated to police those breaks and ensure no work is performed.