Table of Contents | Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court Business Law, Civil Procedure US Supreme Court | United States v. De Jesus-Gomez Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | Vega-Ruiz v. Northwell Health Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | Conboy v. United States Small Business Administration Business Law, Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | Atkins v. CB&I, LLC Civil Procedure, ERISA, Labor & Employment Law US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | National Parks Conservation Ass'n v. EPA Civil Procedure, Environmental Law US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | Transverse, LLC v. Iowa Wireless Services, LLC Civil Procedure, Contracts, Legal Ethics US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | Kirk v. Clark Equipment Co. Civil Procedure, Personal Injury, Products Liability US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | Marcure v. Lynn Civil Procedure US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | Academy of Country Music v. Continental Casualty Co. Civil Procedure, Insurance Law US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | Deal v. Tugalo Gas Company, Inc. Business Law, Civil Procedure US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Hawkins v. Haaland Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | Clark v. Super. Ct. Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law California Courts of Appeal | Curtis v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics California Courts of Appeal | San Francisco CDC LLC v. Webcor Construction L.P. Business Law, Civil Procedure, Construction Law California Courts of Appeal | Agstar Financial Services v. Northwest Sand & Gravel Business Law, Civil Procedure Idaho Supreme Court - Civil | Brockett Company LLC v. Crain Civil Procedure Idaho Supreme Court - Civil | Gomersall v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Personal Injury Idaho Supreme Court - Civil | Reagan v. Idaho Transportation Department Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law Idaho Supreme Court - Civil | Secol v. Fall River Medical PLLC Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice Idaho Supreme Court - Civil | Tech Landing LLC v. JLH Ventures LLC Civil Procedure, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law Idaho Supreme Court - Civil | Barnes v. Honorable Julie Goodman Civil Procedure, Personal Injury Kentucky Supreme Court | Brown v. Chesson Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury Louisiana Supreme Court | Hartman v. St. Bernard Parish Fire Dept. Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury Louisiana Supreme Court | Higgins v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury Louisiana Supreme Court | Melerine v. Tom's Marine & Salvage, LLC Agriculture Law, Civil Procedure Louisiana Supreme Court | Curry v. The Victim Compensation Division Civil Procedure Supreme Court of Mississippi | Navient Corporation v. Mississippi ex rel. Fitch, Attorney General Banking, Civil Procedure, Consumer Law Supreme Court of Mississippi | Contoocook Valley School District v. New Hampshire Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law New Hampshire Supreme Court | Command Center v. Renewable Resources, et al. Business Law, Civil Procedure, Contracts North Dakota Supreme Court | Pioneer State Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bear Creek Gravel, et al. Civil Procedure, Insurance Law North Dakota Supreme Court | Ryberg, et al. v. Landsiedel Civil Procedure, Insurance Law North Dakota Supreme Court | Solberg v. McKennett Civil Procedure, Trusts & Estates North Dakota Supreme Court | Somerset Court, et al. v. Burgum, et al. Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law North Dakota Supreme Court | Allianz Global Risks v. ACE Property & Casualty Ins. Co. Civil Procedure, Contracts, Insurance Law, Products Liability Oregon Supreme Court | Always Busy Consulting v. Babford & Company Business Law, Civil Procedure Supreme Court of Pennsylvania | Gussom v. Teagle Civil Procedure Supreme Court of Pennsylvania | Torrence v. SCDOC Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law South Carolina Supreme Court | In re Texas Education Agency Civil Procedure Supreme Court of Texas | Forrett v. Stone Civil Procedure Vermont Supreme Court | Hester v. Washington Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law Washington Supreme Court |
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Civil Procedure Opinions | Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court | Court: US Supreme Court Docket: 19-368 Opinion Date: March 25, 2021 Judge: Elena Kagan Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure | Ford, incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Michigan, markets, sells, and services its products across the U.S. and overseas and encourages a resale market for its vehicles. Montana and Minnesota courts exercised jurisdiction over Ford in products-liability suits stemming from car accidents that injured state residents. The vehicles were designed and manufactured elsewhere, and originally were sold outside the forum states. The Supreme Court affirmed the rejection of Ford's jurisdictional arguments. The connection between the claims and Ford’s activities in the forum states is close enough to support specific jurisdiction. A state court may exercise general jurisdiction only when a defendant is “essentially at home” in the state. Specific jurisdiction covers defendants less intimately connected with a state if there was “some act by which [defendant] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State” and the claims “must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts” with the forum. Ford purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in both states. There is no requirement of a causal link locating jurisdiction only in the state where Ford sold the car in question or the states where Ford designed and manufactured the vehicle. Specific jurisdiction attaches in cases in which a company cultivates a market for a product in the forum state and the product malfunctions there. Ford advertises and markets its vehicles in Montana and Minnesota and fosters ongoing connections to Ford owners. Because Ford systematically served a market in Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them in those states, there is a strong “relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” | | United States v. De Jesus-Gomez | Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 17-1925 Opinion Date: March 18, 2021 Judge: Boudin Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law | In this civil forfeiture action against a 2008 33' Contender Model Tournament Vessel, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district judge striking Appellants' answer and claims and granted the government's motion for default judgment, holding that the district court did not err. The district court entered default judgment in favor of the government due to Appellants continually missing their discovery deadlines. After Appellants once again missed a discovery deadline, the district court denied their motion for an extension. The court then granted the government's motion to strike Appellants' answer and claims and the motion for default judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district judge was well within her discretion in striking Appellants' answer and claims and granting the government's motion for default judgment. | | Vega-Ruiz v. Northwell Health | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 20-315 Opinion Date: March 24, 2021 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law | The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim as time-barred. The court held that plaintiff's disability discrimination claim arises under the Affordable Care Act for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1658(a), which grants a four-year catchall statute of limitations period for all Acts of Congress enacted after December 1, 1990, and thus the district court erred in applying a three-year statute of limitations period. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. | | Conboy v. United States Small Business Administration | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 20-1726 Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Hardiman Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics | The Appellants, with a $594,000 Small Business Administration loan, bought a Harrisburg, Pennsylvania property that became a pub. They executed a note, mortgage, and unconditional guarantees, providing that federal law would control the enforcement of the note and guarantees and that they could not invoke any state or local law to deny their obligations. The Appellants defaulted on the loan and sold the property. The SBA allowed the sale to proceed but declined to release the Appellants from their loan obligations, which were assigned to CBE for collection. The Appellants sued, citing the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681, and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). CBE sought sanctions under Federal Rules 11 and 37, arguing that the Appellants brought frivolous claims and disobeyed discovery orders. The Appellants filed an untimely brief opposing sanctions and summary judgment, which did not include the separate responsive statement of material facts required by Local Rule. The district court granted summary judgment and denied the sanctions motions, reasoning that neither FDCPA not UTPCPL applies to commercial debts and the Appellants identified no material facts supporting their other claims. The Third Circuit affirmed and granted CBE FRAP 38 damages. The Appellants filed a brief that was essentially a copy of the one filed in the district court. The substance of their appeal “is as frivolous as its form.” | | Atkins v. CB&I, LLC | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 20-30004 Opinion Date: March 22, 2021 Judge: Gregg Costa Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, ERISA, Labor & Employment Law | Plaintiffs, five former employees of CB&I who worked as laborers on a construction project in Louisiana, quit before the project ended and thus made them ineligible to receive the Project Completion Incentive under the term of that plan. Plaintiffs filed suit in state court seeking the bonus for the period they did work, arguing that making such employees ineligible for bonuses amounts to an illegal wage forfeiture agreement under the Louisiana Wage Payment Act. LA. STAT.ANN. 23:631, 23:632, 23:634. After removal to federal court, the district court concluded that the incentive program was an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) plan because it required ongoing discretion and administration in determining whether a qualifying termination took place. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the employee benefit at issue—a bonus for completing the project—is not an employee benefit plan under ERISA. The court explained that the plan involves a single and simple payment; determining eligibility might require the exercise of some discretion, but not much; and the plan lacks the complexity and longevity that result in the type of "ongoing administrative scheme" ERISA covers. Therefore, there is no federal jurisdiction over this action. The court vacated and remanded for the case to be returned to state court. | | National Parks Conservation Ass'n v. EPA | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 17-60828 Opinion Date: March 25, 2021 Judge: Per curiam Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Environmental Law | Petitioners filed a petition for review challenging the EPA's 2017 Rule, "Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; State of Texas; Regional Haze and Interstate Visibility Transport Federal Implementation Plan." Petitioners also sought reconsideration of the 2017 Rule, contending that the 2017 Rule was adopted without following notice and comment requirements and that it was unlawful, arbitrary, and capricious in various ways. Petitioners and the EPA then filed a joint motion requesting the petition for review of the 2017 rule be held in abeyance pending the EPA's resolution of the petition for reconsideration and the completion of any reconsideration process. The Fifth Circuit granted the motion. The EPA subsequently issued the 2020 Rule. Petitioners sought review of the 2020 Rule and filed a motion requesting the D.C. Circuit to confirm that venue was proper in that court. Respondent-Intervenors jointly moved for reconsideration of an order denying without prejudice their motion to confirm venue and order transferring this consolidated proceeding to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The Fifth Circuit explained that it has employed a "first-filed" rule, much like the rule set forth in 28 U.S.C. 2112, when faced with a competing challenge to the same administrative action in another court of appeals. The court concluded that the 2020 Rule should be the agency action relied upon for purposes of section 2112 and the "first-filed" rule. Because petitioners first filed their challenge to the 2020 Rule in the D.C. Circuit, that court should be the first to determine the venue question. Finally, Respondent-Intervenors can show no prejudice from the court's orders consolidating and transferring the consolidated cases. Therefore, the court denied the motion for reconsideration. | | Transverse, LLC v. Iowa Wireless Services, LLC | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 20-50271 Opinion Date: March 23, 2021 Judge: Higginbotham Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Legal Ethics | In this long-running contract dispute, at issue is whether the parties are entitled to fee awards. The Fifth Circuit concluded that IWS is entitled to some fees under the Texas Theft Liability Act (TTLA) and remanded for a determination of the proper amount. The court clarified that the mandate of Transverse II did not depart from Texas law governing fee segregation, and fees incurred defending the TTLA claim do not become unrecoverable simply because they may have furthered another nonrecoverable claim as well. The court also concluded that, because the Supply Contract itself does not authorize attorneys' fees, under Iowa law, the district court lacked a basis on which to award Transverse attorney's fees for IWS's breach of this agreement. In this case, IWS has made the showing necessary to prevail under plain-error review, and thus the court reversed the fee award to Transverse on the Supply-Contract claim. Finally, the court rejected Transverse's contention that the district court erred by failing to recognize it as the prevailing party on the Non-Disclosure Agreement claim and refusing to award Transverse the related fees. The court explained that Transverse did not prevail, substantially or otherwise, on this claim and thus there was no error on the district court's part. | | Kirk v. Clark Equipment Co. | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 20-2983 Opinion Date: March 25, 2021 Judge: Joel Martin Flaum Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury, Products Liability | Sterling purchased the Loader new in 2008 from a dealership; it was equipped with a 62-inch bucket and components that increased the Loader’s rated operating capacity (ROC—maximum load) to 1,420 lbs. Kirk regularly used the Loader to scoop up material and move it up a concrete ramp with an approximate 30-degree incline. Kirk claims that on May 12, 2015, while going up the ramp, the Loader began to wobble and tip forward as he raised its lift arms. In an effort to stabilize himself, Kirk braced his foot on the console. His foot slipped out of the cab and he brought the lift-arm down on it. Kirk suffered a permanent leg disability, loss of his job, and medical expenses totaling $433,000. In a strict liability claim against the Loader’s manufacturer, Clark, Kirk’s only expert witness, Pacheco, opined that the Loader was “unreasonably dangerous for its intended and foreseeable use” and that its “design providing for the use of the [62-inch] bucket … made it highly likely" that the bucket would be loaded in excess of"the ROC. The district court granted Clark summary judgment, concluding that Pacheco’s opinions did not meet the Rule 702 and “Daubert” standards. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A court’s determination that an expert possesses the requisite qualifications does not, alone, provide a sufficient basis for admissibility. The court acted within its discretion in finding Pacheco's evidence in support of his opinion unreliable. Pacheco's causation opinion rested on speculation that the weight of the load exceeded the ROC but Pacheco did not know the weight of the load at the time of the accident. | | Marcure v. Lynn | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2978 Opinion Date: March 25, 2021 Judge: St. Eve Areas of Law: Civil Procedure | Marcure sued police officers and others. Before the officers moved to dismiss, Marcure filed notice of an address change from Arizona to Illinois. The court mailed notices, including notices of the motion to dismiss, to the Illinois address; these notices were returned as undeliverable. Based on the returned documents, the court ordered Marcure to show cause why his case should not be dismissed due to his failure to keep the court apprised of his address. Marcure provided notice of a post-office box days later and filed a response to the officers’ motion, nearly a month late and lacking a signature. The court excused the late filing but warned that it would strike the response under FRCP 11(a) if Marcure did not correct the signature deficiency within six days. Marcure filed timely, signed responses to the prosecutors' motions to dismiss but did not correct his unsigned response to the officers’ motion. One week after the deadline to correct that response, the court struck Marcure’s response, then dismissed the claims against the officers solely because their motion was unopposed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While Rule 11(a) requires striking unsigned pleadings, Rule 12(b)(6) requires courts to address the merits of motions to dismiss and any local rule to the contrary is invalid under Rule 83(a)(1). The rule places the burden on the movant to show entitlement to dismissal; courts must address the merits of Rule 12(b)(6) motions even when they are unopposed. | | Academy of Country Music v. Continental Casualty Co. | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 20-55589 Opinion Date: March 22, 2021 Judge: Consuelo Maria Callahan Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law | In 2020, the Academy filed suit in state court alleging that Continental breached an insurance policy by denying coverage for a claim asserted against it by a former executive. After removal to the district court, the district court issued a sua sponte order remanding the case to state court. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court's transmittal of its sua sponte order remanding this civil action to a state court based solely on the notice of removal does not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction. The panel also concluded that despite the district court's characterization of its order, 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) does not bar the panel's review because jurisdiction could not be determined when the district court issued its sua sponte order. The panel explained that section 1447(d) bars review only of a remand order that is based on a colorable section 1447(c) ground. In this case, the district court's requirement that a notice of removal prove subject matter jurisdiction is contrary to Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014), and accordingly, is not a "colorable" ground under section 1447(c). Accordingly, the panel vacated the district court's remand order. | | Deal v. Tugalo Gas Company, Inc. | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-14336 Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Newsom Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure | Plaintiff filed suit against Tugalo, his cousin and Tugalo President Thomas Gilmer, and Tugalo's directors in a 17-count complaint, alleging that Gilmer misappropriated corporate funds and that the company's board let it happen. The district court rejected plaintiff's substantive claims and declined to adjudicate three equitable claims. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions to grant summary judgment to Tugalo on plaintiff's fraud claim for lack of evidence of justifiable reliance (and, separately, to deny plaintiff's motion to defer ruling on the fraud claim). The court also affirmed the district court's decision to deny plaintiff's request to amend his complaint after the pleading-amendment deadline. However, the court reversed the district court's decision to abstain under the Burford abstention doctrine from adjudicating plaintiff's judicial-dissolution count. In this case, there was, and is, no ongoing state administrative proceeding or, for that matter, even any preexisting action by a Georgia state court or executive official to dissolve Tugalo. The court remanded for consideration of that count along with his other two equitable counts. | | Hawkins v. Haaland | Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 20-5074 Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Judith Ann Wilson Rogers Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law | Ranchers in the Upper Klamath Basin region filed suit to prevent the exercise of water rights that interfere with the irrigation of their lands. The district court dismissed the complaint based on lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution. The DC Circuit affirmed the dismissal and concluded that the Protocol Agreement executed by the United States and the Tribes does not delegate federal authority to the Tribes but recognizes the Tribes' preexisting authority to control their water rights under a Treaty in 1864 with the United States. The court explained that there is no concurrence requirement imposed by federal law on the Tribes' reserved instream water rights, whether by the 1864 Klamath Treaty or the federal government’s trust relationship; the McCarran Amendment subjects the Tribes' reserved water rights to state procedural rules in its quantification proceedings, but the substance and scope of the Tribes’ rights remain governed by federal law; Oregon law does not require federal government concurrence to enforce the Tribes' water rights; and thus invalidating the Protocol, and requiring the federal government to independently assess whether it would concur in the Tribes' calls, would not remedy the Ranchers' injuries. Because the Ranchers fail to show their alleged injuries are fairly traceable to federal government action or inaction, or would be redressed by striking the Protocol, they lack Article III standing. | | Clark v. Super. Ct. | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D077711(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Cynthia Aaron Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law | The issue presented for the Court of Appeal in this case centered on whether Alicia Clark exhausted her administrative remedies under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) prior to filing suit against her former employer, Arthroscopic & Laser Surgery Center of San Diego, L.P. (ALSC). Clark filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) alleging ALSC committed various acts of employment discrimination against her. While Clark’s DFEH Complaint contained an inaccuracy as to ALSC’s legal name, it clearly and unequivocally reflected Clark’s intent to name ALSC as a respondent. Specifically, Clark’s DFEH Complaint named, as respondents, “Oasis Surgery Center LLC,” and “Oasis Surgery Center, LP,” which are variants of ALSC’s registered business name, “Oasis Surgery Center.” In addition, Clark’s DFEH Complaint referenced the names of her managers, supervisors, and coworkers. The same day that Clark filed her DFEH Complaint, the DFEH issued a right-to-sue notice and Clark filed this action against “Oasis Surgery Center LLC,” and “Oasis Surgery Center, LP.” One week after filing her DFEH Complaint and the initial complaint in this action, Clark filed an amended complaint in this action, properly naming ALSC as a defendant. Notwithstanding that Clark’s DFEH Complaint clearly identified her former employer as the intended respondent, the trial court granted ALSC’s motion for summary judgment as to all of Clark’s FEHA claims brought against it because Clark “named the wrong entity in her DFEH [C]omplaint, and . . . never corrected that omission.” Clark then filed a petition for writ of mandate to the Court of Appeal, requesting that it vacate the trial court’s order granting ALSC’s motion for summary judgment. After considering the text and purpose of the relevant statutory exhaustion requirement, administrative regulations, and applicable case law, the Court of Appeal concluded Clark exhausted her administrative remedies against ALSC. "This is particularly true in a case such as this, in which the plaintiff’s error could not possibly have hampered any administrative investigation or prejudiced the defendant in any judicial proceedings." Accordingly, Clark’s writ petition was granted and the trial court directed to vacate its order granting ALSC’s motion for summary judgment. | | Curtis v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B292967(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: March 24, 2021 Judge: Feuer Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics | The identity of plaintiff's nontestifying expert is not entitled to absolute work product protection because it is not "a writing" that would reveal his "impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories." However, if an attorney can show that disclosure of the identity of a nontestifying expert would result in opposing counsel taking undue advantage of the attorney's industry or efforts or impair the attorney's ability to prepare and investigate a case, the identity may be entitled to protection under the qualified work product privilege. In that case, the identity is only discoverable if the party seeking discovery can establish that "denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery in preparing that party's claim or defense or will result in an injustice." Plaintiff, an attorney and third-party witness in the underlying action, appeals from an order granting the motion of the California Employment Lawyers Association (CELA) to compel him to provide deposition testimony identifying a nontestifying expert whom plaintiff consulted in prior litigation. In the underlying action, CELA alleges an unknown CELA member (Doe 1) sent plaintiff, a non-member, information received from a members-only email distribution list in violation of a confidentiality agreement. The Court of Appeal concluded that the identity of Doe 1 is entitled to at most qualified attorney work product protection, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding CELA met its burden to demonstrate denial of disclosure would unfairly prejudice CELA in prosecuting the action and only minimally disadvantage plaintiff. The court agreed with CELA that plaintiff has appealed from a nonappealable discovery order, but the court treated plaintiff's appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal and denied the petition. | | San Francisco CDC LLC v. Webcor Construction L.P. | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A156669(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Sanchez Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Construction Law | The Contractors’ State License Law (Bus. & Prof. Code 7031), allows any person who utilizes the services of unlicensed building contractors to sue for disgorgement of all compensation paid for the performance of any act or contract, even when the work performed is free of defects. CDC brought a section 7031(b) claim for disgorgement against Obayashi in 2017, more than eight years after the completion of construction of the InterContinental Hotel in San Francisco. The issue of licensure came to light during litigation concerning construction defects. The trial court dismissed, citing Code of Civil Procedure 340(a), the one-year limitations period for statutory forfeiture or penalty causes of action. The court of appeal affirmed. The one-year statute of limitations applies to disgorgement claims brought under section 7031, and the discovery rule and other equitable doctrines do not. Even if such doctrines applied to statutory disgorgement claims, they would not apply under the circumstances presented under the pleadings. The court also upheld the trial court’s award of $231,834 in contractual attorney fees; the parties’ agreement contemplated the recovery of attorney fees for non-contractual causes of action that are initiated because of an alleged breach of the parties’ contract. | | Agstar Financial Services v. Northwest Sand & Gravel | Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Docket: 47140 Opinion Date: March 22, 2021 Judge: Stegner Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure | In 2007 and 2008, AgStar Financial Services (AgStar), now Compeer Financial FLCA (Compeer), loaned substantial sums of money to Northwest Sand and Gravel, Inc., Gordon Paving Company, Inc., and Blackrock Land Holdings, LLC (collectively, "Gordon Paving.") As a result of financing these loans, AgStar became a secured creditor of Gordon Paving. In 2012, Gordon Paving defaulted on its $10 million obligation to AgStar, which then resulted in AgStar obtaining a judgment of foreclosure on various parcels of real property Gordon Paving owned. The district court also entered an order allowing the sale of virtually all of Gordon Paving’s business equipment to further satisfy the debt. Gordon Paving appealed the district court’s decision which allowed AgStar to sell the business equipment. In "AgStar I," the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order allowing AgStar to liquidate Gordon Paving’s business equipment, but this decision came long after the business equipment had already been sold at auction. On remand, the district court determined that the correct remedy for Gordon Paving was an award of restitution in the amount of the gross proceeds of the sale plus interest from the date of the sale based on its interpretation of Idaho Code section 28-22-104. Compeer appealed the district court’s order denying it an offset for expenses its predecessor, AgStar, incurred in liquidating Gordon Paving’s business equipment. Compeer also appealed the district court’s order awarding Gordon Paving prejudgment interest on the restitution award from the date the collateral was sold. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order denying Compeer an offset for the auctioneer’s expenses incurred which were never received by AgStar. The Court affirmed the district court’s order awarding Gordon Paving prejudgment interest; however, the district court’s decision allowing prejudgment interest to run from the date of the sale was vacated. | | Brockett Company LLC v. Crain | Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Docket: 47138 Opinion Date: March 22, 2021 Judge: Roger S. Burdick Areas of Law: Civil Procedure | This case arose from an Idaho company’s attempt to bring an action in Idaho against a resident of Oklahoma and a business located in Oklahoma. Brockett Company, LLC appealed a district court order setting aside a default judgment entered against Scott Crain and Texoma MFG., LLC (collectively, Respondents). The district court set aside the default judgment after determining that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Crain or Texoma. On appeal, Brockett Co. argued that the district court erred in setting aside the default judgment by inappropriately considering an affidavit submitted by Crain, failing to consider facts in the record, and determining that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Crain and Texoma. After review of the trial court record, the Idaho Supreme Court determined he district court erred in granting Respondents’ motion to set aside the default judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s order granting Crain and Texoma’s motion to set aside the default judgment, vacated the district court’s judgment dismissing Brockett Co.’s claims, and remanded with instruction to reinstate the previously entered default judgment against Crain and Texoma. | | Gomersall v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center | Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Docket: 47664 Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Brody Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Personal Injury | Greg and Cyndi Gomersall filed suit on behalf of their minor child, W.G.G., claiming he received negligent medical treatment at St. Luke’s Regional Medical Center (SLRMC) in Boise when he was injured in December 2010. W.G.G. was 6 years old at the time of the incident. The Gomersalls filed suit against SLRMC on January 25, 2019, more than eight years after W.G.G. was alleged to have been injured. SLRMC moved for summary judgment on the basis that the Gomersalls’ medical malpractice action was time-barred under Idaho Code sections 5-219(4) and 5-230. The district court granted SLRMC’s motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Gomersalls contended on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court that the district court erred because Idaho Code section 5-230 was unconstitutional. Specifically, they argued that section 5-230 violated W.G.G.’s due process and equal protection rights by failing to toll the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims until the age of majority. They also contended the district court erred when it held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel did not preclude SLRMC’s statute of limitations defense. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of SLRMC. | | Reagan v. Idaho Transportation Department | Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Docket: 47865 Opinion Date: March 23, 2021 Judge: Moeller Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law | In this case, the Idaho Supreme Court was asked to revisit its decision in Idaho v. Clarke, 446 P.3d 451 (2019), and determine whether its holding was applicable in an administrative proceeding regarding the suspension of driving privileges based on an alleged case of driving under the influence (“DUI”). The Idaho Transportation Department (“ITD”) appealed a district court’s decision overturning its one-year suspension of Jasmine Reagan’s driving privileges. ITD based the administrative license suspension (“ALS”) on Reagan’s arrest for misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol and the results of subsequent testing of her blood alcohol content (“BAC”). The arresting officer, acting on a citizen’s report of a possible intoxicated driver, did not personally witness Reagan operating or in control of a vehicle. Reagan failed field sobriety tests administered at her home and, after being arrested, failed a breathalyzer test. Reagan received notice that her driver’s license was suspended for one year, which she appealed. An administrative hearing officer for ITD, relying on Idaho Code section 49-1405, upheld the license suspension. However, on appeal the district court overturned the suspension pursuant to Clarke, reasoning that because the misdemeanor DUI was completed outside the officer’s presence, the arrest required a warrant. On certiorari review, the issues presented were: (1) whether the breathalyzer test was administered pursuant to a lawful arrest; and (2) if the arrest was unlawful, whether test results obtained pursuant to an unlawful arrest are admissible in an ALS hearing before the ITD. The SupremeCourt concluded Idaho Code section 49-1405, as applied in this case, violated the Idaho Constitution. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision to overturn ITD's suspension of Reagan's license. | | Secol v. Fall River Medical PLLC | Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Docket: 47149 Opinion Date: March 22, 2021 Judge: Roger S. Burdick Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice | Plaintiff-appellant Cassie Secol and her four minor children (collectively “the Secols”) challenged several evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and the denial of their motion for a new trial. In late 2016, Damian Secol passed away from a rare form of cancer, T-cell lymphoblastic lymphoma (“T-LBL”). Following his death, the Secols brought a medical malpractice action against Damian’s primary care providers: Kelly Dustin, D.O., Austin Gillette, M.D., and Fall River Medical, PLLC (collectively “Fall River”). At trial, the district court questioned Dr. Jeffery Hancock, Damian’s treating oncologist, in front of the jury concerning the treatment and diagnosis of T-LBL. The Secols moved the district court for a mistrial, arguing the questioning prevented a fair trial. The district court denied the motion. After the jury returned a verdict in Fall River’s favor, the Secols moved the district court for a new trial, which was also denied. The Secols appealed, challenging the district court’s evidentiary rulings, delivery of jury instructions, and the denial of their motion for a new trial. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court, vacated the judgment following the jury verdict, and remanded for a new trial to be conducted by a new district judge. Specifically, the Court determined the district court abused its discretion in denying the Secols’ motion for a new trial because its questioning of Dr. Hancock denied the Secols a fair trial. "Such questioning was an abuse of discretion and necessitates a new trial." Further, the district court abused its discretion in permitting Dr. Hancock to testify as to matters for which no foundation was laid and which were outside the scope of his expertise. And in addition, the district court erred in admitting irrelevant testimony about Dr. Gillette’s and Dr. Dustin’s families and hobbies, and the district court erred in delivering a modified jury instruction on medical negligence, which included prejudicially confusing language concerning direct expert testimony as compared to expert testimony. The district court was affirmed as to the admission of Fall River two experts' testimony on the standard of care because its decision on Fall River’s motion for reconsideration was not part of the record. | | Tech Landing LLC v. JLH Ventures LLC | Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Docket: 46949 Opinion Date: March 23, 2021 Judge: Brody Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law | In 2013, Tech Landing, LLC leased a building to JLH Ventures, LLC (“JLH”) to operate a paintball business. After the building burned down in 2017, Tech Landing sued JLH, alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence. The breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims involved payment of rent after the building was destroyed and the failure to insure the building against fire loss. Those claims were dismissed by stipulation of the parties and were not at issue here. With respect to its negligence claim, Tech Landing alleged the fire was caused by the negligence of JLH. After ruling certain opinions of Tech Landing’s expert witnesses were inadmissible, the district court granted summary judgment to JLH. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling on the admissibility of the expert opinions, but reversed its grant of summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material fact that had to be decided by a jury. | | Barnes v. Honorable Julie Goodman | Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2020-SC-0088-MR Opinion Date: March 25, 2021 Judge: Nickell Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury | The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's request for a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate the denial of her motion to stay discovery in a wrongful death/negligence action, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that denial of the stay would cause her great and irreparable harm, and therefore, a writ was unavailable to her. The wrongful death/negligence action named as defendants Petitioner, her former employer and others. Petitioner sought to stay discovery in the action until a parallel criminal case against her alone was completed. In this action seeking writ relief Petitioner sought to stay all civil discovery until her indictment was resolved so that she could freely exercise her constitutional right to remain silent. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to the requested writ. | | Brown v. Chesson | Court: Louisiana Supreme Court Docket: 2020-CC-00730 Opinion Date: March 24, 2021 Judge: Griffin Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury | In October 2012, plaintiff Donna Brown filed a complaint with the Louisiana Division of Administration against Dr. Ralph Chesson. Subsequently, she was notified of Dr. Chesson’s status as a qualified state health care provider and a medical review panel was convened. After the medical review panel rendered its opinion in favor of Dr. Chesson, Brown filed a petition for damages solely against Dr. Chesson in 2015. In the petition she alleged medical malpractice during a 2011 surgical procedure and requested service on Dr. Chesson at his office. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review in this case to determine whether it was sufficient to request service solely on a qualified state health care provider when that individual was the only named defendant in a medical malpractice suit. Specifically, whether plaintiff’s request for service and citation within ninety days from the commencement of this suit on only the defendant physician satisfied the statutory requirements for service on a state employee. The Supreme Court found that the service was sufficient and the court of appeal erred in sustaining the exceptions of insufficiency of citation and service of process. | | Hartman v. St. Bernard Parish Fire Dept. | Court: Louisiana Supreme Court Docket: 2020-C-00693 Opinion Date: March 24, 2021 Judge: John L. Weimer Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury | The issue presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review centered on whether an employee who suffers from noise-induced hearing loss was entitled to indemnity benefits pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p), which conferred such benefits to employees who sustained “a permanent hearing loss solely due to a single traumatic accident.” James Hartman, Jr. was employed by the St. Bernard Parish Fire Department. During the course of his employment, Hartman was exposed to injurious levels of noise, which resulted in permanent hearing loss. Testing from 2006 to 2017 showed a gradual increase in hearing loss. The Fire Department opposed Hartman's claim for compensation, asserting, among other things, that his claim for work-related hearing loss was not covered by La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p), which applied only where the permanent hearing loss was “solely due to a single traumatic accident.” Finding that cumulative hearing loss incurred as a result of repeated exposure to high noise levels on the job did not constitute “a permanent hearing loss solely due to a single traumatic accident” as required for the award of permanent partial disability benefits pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p), the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments below. | | Higgins v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. | Court: Louisiana Supreme Court Docket: 2020-CC-01094 Opinion Date: March 24, 2021 Judge: Genovese Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury | The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari review in this case to determine whether the court of appeal properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (“Farm Bureau”), where Farm Bureau argued that the “regular use” exclusion in its automobile insurance policy issued to plaintiff precluded uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage, because plaintiff was operating a vehicle owned by his employer at the time of the accident. The plaintiff in this matter, Charles Higgins, was injured in an automobile accident while operating a truck owned by his employer, AT&T. The other driver in the accident was underinsured, and AT&T did not carry UM coverage on the truck. Higgins subsequently filed the instant suit against his personal UM insurer, Farm Bureau. Because the Supreme Court found the policy’s “regular use” exclusion impermissibly derogated from the requirements of the Louisiana uninsured motorist statute (the “UM statute”), La. R.S. 22:1295, the Court found this exclusion inapplicable and reversed the decision of the court of appeal. | | Melerine v. Tom's Marine & Salvage, LLC | Court: Louisiana Supreme Court Docket: 2020-C-00571 Opinion Date: March 24, 2021 Judge: Crain Areas of Law: Agriculture Law, Civil Procedure | In 2016, a tugboat pushing a barge through the coastal waters of St. Bernard Parish entered an area known as Christmas Lake. Christmas Lake was productive oyster grounds and contained several oyster leases marked by poles extending above the waterline. Down to one engine due to mechanical problems, the captain tried to navigate the tugboat to Hopedale for repairs. An oyster fisherman stopped the tugboat and instructed the captain to turn around, emphasizing the presence of oyster beds and explaining the water was too shallow to travel any further. The captain reversed course and turned southwest, entering oyster-lease grounds held by plaintiff, Marty Melerine. The tugboat crossed the middle of Melerine’s 140-acre lease until grounding on an oyster reef in the southwest corner of the lease. At high tide the next day, the captain freed the tugboat from the reef with the assistance of Melerine. Following directions from Melerine and another area oysterman, the captain piloted the tugboat along the southern boundary of the lease and exited the area. Shortly after the grounding, Melerine retained Dr. Edwin Cake Jr., an oyster biologist, to inspect the oyster beds and determine the extent of any damages caused by the incident. Based on samples and poling data, Dr. Cake concluded Melerine’s damages totaled $7,235,993.27: the cost to repair the damaged reefs ($997,314.77); and lost profits from oysters killed by the grounding incident ($6,238,678.50). Melerine and OFI sued the tugboat captain’s employer, Tom’s Marine & Salvage, LLC, and its insurer, AGCS Marine Insurance Company, seeking damages caused by the grounding. The Louisiana Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in (1) allowing evidence of a regulatory method for determining oyster-lease damages applicable only when a pre-project biological survey was performed; and (2) admitting opinion testimony from an expert witness that is beyond his expertise and not supported by reliable methodology. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for new trial. | | Curry v. The Victim Compensation Division | Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2020-CP-00920-SCT Opinion Date: March 25, 2021 Judge: Michael K. Randolph Areas of Law: Civil Procedure | In 2018, Curtis Curry sent an application for compensation to the Victim Compensation Division of the Mississippi Attorney General’s Office. Curry’s claim arose from an aggravated assault that occurred on December 29, 2016, in Clarksdale, Mississippi. While Curry was in his home, two individuals entered his home, assaulted him at gunpoint, and stole $517. Curry was taken to a hospital via ambulance. After reviewing his petition, the Victim Compensation Division denied his claim on the ground that Curry was under the actual or constructive supervision of the Department of Corrections at the time of the assault, contrary to the requirements for compensation under Mississippi Code Section 99-41-17(1)(j) (Rev. 2020). Curry requested a contested hearing to dispute the Victim Compensation Division’s decision. At that hearing, Curry admitted he was on probation with the Mississippi Department of Corrections as of December 29, 2016, but assailed the constitutionality of Mississippi Code Section 99-41-17(1)(j) on the grounds that it was ambiguous and offensive to his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A hearing officer of the Victim Compensation Division entered an order denying Curry's application for compensation. Curry appealed a circuit court order dismissing his appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Curry argued the circuit court erred by determining it lacked jurisdiction due to his failure to file a cost bond as required by Mississippi Code Section 99-41-13(a) (Rev. 2020). In examining the case de novo, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the circuit court was correct to hold it lacked jurisdiction. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. | | Navient Corporation v. Mississippi ex rel. Fitch, Attorney General | Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2019-IA-01391-SCT Opinion Date: March 25, 2021 Judge: Josiah D. Coleman Areas of Law: Banking, Civil Procedure, Consumer Law | In 2018, the State of Mississippi filed a complaint against Navient Corporation and Navient Solutions, LLC (together, “Navient”), alleging that Navient’s origination of high-cost, subprime loans and predatory practices while servicing student-loan borrowers in Mississippi violated the Mississippi Consumer Protections Act. Navient moved to dismiss on two grounds: failure to state a claim and lack of venue. In 2019, the chancery court denied Navient’s motion; Navient timely petitioned the Mississippi Supreme Court for an interlocutory appeal, arguing that federal law preempted the State’s servicing claims and that injunctive relief under the Act did not apply because the alleged loan-origination misconduct ceased and could not recur. To this the Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court. | | Contoocook Valley School District v. New Hampshire | Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court Docket: 2019-0500 Opinion Date: March 23, 2021 Judge: Donovan Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law | Defendants, the State of New Hampshire, the New Hampshire Department of Education (DOE), Governor Christopher Sununu, and the Commissioner of DOE, Frank Edelblut (collectively, the State), appealed a superior court decision denying, in part, the State’s motion to dismiss and denying its cross-motion for summary judgment, granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on grounds that the amount of per- pupil base adequacy aid set forth in RSA 198:40-a, II(a) (Supp. 2020) to fund an adequate education was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff school districts, and awarding plaintiffs attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs, Contoocook Valley School District, Myron Steere, III, Richard Cahoon, Richard Dunning, Winchester School District, Mascenic Regional School District, and Monadnock Regional School District, cross-appealed the trial court’s failure to find RSA 198:40-a, II(a) facially unconstitutional; its determinations regarding the sufficiency of the State’s funding of transportation, teacher benefits, facilities operations and maintenance, and certain services; its failure to find that the State’s system of funding education violates Part II, Article 5 of the State Constitution; and its denial of their request for injunctive relief; and its dismissal of their claims against the Governor and the Commissioner. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the Governor and the Commissioner in their individual capacities, and its denials of the State’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the State’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. However, the Court reversed that portion of the trial court’s order granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and awarding attorney’s fees, and remanded for further proceedings. | | Command Center v. Renewable Resources, et al. | Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2021 ND 59 Opinion Date: March 24, 2021 Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Contracts | Shawn Kluver and Little Knife Disposal, LLC (“Little Knife”), appealed an amended judgment entered after a bench trial that awarded Command Center, Inc., monetary damages, interest, attorney’s fees and costs against Renewable Resources, LLC, and Kluver, jointly and severally. The amended judgment also awarded Renewable Resources damages and interest against Kluver and Little Knife, jointly and severally, and ordered them to indemnify Renewable Resources for all damages, interest, attorney’s fees, and costs awarded to Command Center. Command Center provided temporary labor services. Command Center sued Renewable Resources in small claims court, claiming unpaid amounts totaling $14,631.20, relating to temporary labor services that Command Center provided under agreements with Renewable Resources. Renewable Resources removed the case to district court. Command Center obtained leave of court to file an amended complaint, naming Kluver and Little Knife as additional defendants. Kluver had been the manager of Renewable Resources. Although Renewable Resources was billed and had paid Command Center $20,000 for the temporary labor services, Renewable Resources alleged that the temporary labor services were provided for the benefit of Little Knife, and that Kluver did not have authority to contract on behalf of Renewable Resources for the temporary labor services that benefited Little Knife. On review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that evidence presented at trial supported the district court’s findings of fact and, further, that Kluver and Little Knife were rearguing the evidence and challenging the district court’s weight and credibility determinations. "We will not second-guess the district court’s clear findings on appeal. On this record, we conclude the district court’s findings are not clearly erroneous." | | Pioneer State Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bear Creek Gravel, et al. | Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2021 ND 53 Opinion Date: March 24, 2021 Judge: Daniel J. Crothers Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law | Pioneer State Mutual Insurance Company appealed a declaratory judgment that found the automobile policy issued by Pioneer to Ty Kirby provided insurance coverage. In 2017, Kirby was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Mary Miller. Kirby was driving a 2002 Dodge Ram owned by his employer, Bear Creek Gravel, Inc. One of Kirby’s co-workers had forgotten his lunch and Kirby instructed him to meet him at the intersection of two nearby highways where Kirby would bring him a sandwich. After purchasing the sandwich, filling the 2002 Dodge Ram with fuel, and delivering the sandwich to his co-worker, Kirby began crossing the intersection. Kirby proceeded through the intersection and collided with Miller, who died as a result of the collision. Kirby purchased an automobile insurance policy from Pioneer effective from April 1, 2017 to October 1, 2017. The policy covered Kirby even if he was driving a vehicle he did not own. However, the policy excluded coverage for any vehicle “furnished or available for [Kirby’s] regular use.” The regular use exclusion was the basis for Pioneer’s denial of liability coverage for the accident. The district court concluded the 2002 Dodge Ram was not furnished for Kirby’s regular use because several restrictions existed for Kirby’s use of the vehicle. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded evidence and inferences about restrictions on Kirby's use of the vehicle supported the district court's decision the regular use exclusion did not apply. Therefore, the district court's judgment was affirmed. | | Ryberg, et al. v. Landsiedel | Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2021 ND 56 Opinion Date: March 24, 2021 Judge: Daniel J. Crothers Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law | Jason Ryberg appealed the dismissal of his complaint with prejudice after the district court granted Defendant Darren Landsiedel’s motion to enforce a settlement agreement. Nodak Insurance Company (“Nodak”) appealed the court’s order denying its motion to intervene in the case. In November 2016, Ryberg’s wife, Heather Ryberg, was killed when Landsiedel’s vehicle hit her on a rural Burleigh County highway in the early morning hours. In March 2018, Ryberg sued Landsiedel for the wrongful death of his wife. Landsiedel was insured by Allstate Insurance Company and had liability policy limits of $25,000. Ryberg was insured by Nodak, with “substantial” underinsured motorist (“UIM”) limits. Allstate offered Ryberg policy limits to settle his wrongful death claim. Ryberg notified Nodak of Allstate’s offer of the policy limits for “full and final settlement” of the wrongful death claim. Nodak agreed to advance payment of $25,000 to Ryberg to maintain its reimbursement or subrogation rights under N.D.C.C. 26.1-40-15.5. A week before the scheduled trial on Ryberg’s wrongful death action against Landsiedel, Nodak and Ryberg agreed to settle Ryberg’s UIM claim for $100,000, in addition to the $25,000 Nodak already paid under the statute. After being notified, Landsiedel’s counsel filed a notice of settlement with the district court, and the case was taken off the calendar. Because no closing documents were filed, the court set a status conference for February 27, 2020. On the day of the status conference, Nodak moved to intervene in the action, seeking to preserve its right of reimbursement or subrogation. Landsiedel filed a substitution of counsel, moved for an extension of time, and subsequently opposed the motion to intervene. The court denied Nodak’s motion to intervene, finding it was untimely. In June 2020, Landsiedel filed a motion to enforce a settlement agreement. Ryberg opposed the motion and requested oral argument. The district court granted Landsiedel’s motion. Judgment was entered dismissing the case with prejudice. The North Dakota Supreme Court found no evidence established the terms by which the parties intended to settle Ryberg’s action, thus, the district court erred in granting Landsiedel’s motion seeking to enforce a settlement agreement. The Court vacated the order denying intervention and reversed the judgment of dismissal. | | Solberg v. McKennett | Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2021 ND 44 Opinion Date: March 24, 2021 Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Trusts & Estates | Glenn Solberg appealed a district court judgment dismissing his complaint against Richard McKennett. This action was related to Solberg’s litigation involving the Estate of Lyle Nelson. Lyle Nelson was married to Solberg’s mother Lillian (Solberg) Nelson, who died in 2003. Lyle died in 2012, and McKennett was the attorney for the personal representative of Lyle's estate. In June 2013, Solberg filed a petition for allowance of claim against Lyle's estate, asserting that under his mother’s 1985 will and 1997 codicil he was entitled to 100 mineral acres and had an option to purchase certain property. The district court dismissed Solberg’s claim, concluding the 100 mineral acres and the option property were never held by the estate, and were never under the control of or owned by Lyle Nelson. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Solberg’s claim. In April 2020, Solberg sued McKennett for fraud and injury to person. Solberg alleged McKennett committed fraud by misleading him during the probate of Lyle Nelson’s estate and by dismissing his claim against Nelson’s estate. Solberg requested $400,000 in damages. McKennett moved to dismiss the lawsuit, claiming Solberg’s complaint did not specify the circumstances constituting fraud, and on statute of limitations grounds. The district court concluded Solberg's claims were time-barred because Solberg was aware of McKennett's alleged wrongdoing before April 2014. The North Dakota Supreme Court concurred Solberg's claims against McKennett were time barred, thus the district court did not err in granting McKennett's motion to dismiss. | | Somerset Court, et al. v. Burgum, et al. | Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2021 ND 58 Opinion Date: March 24, 2021 Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law | Appellants Somerset Court, LLC, and Kari Riggin appealed a district court judgment dismissing their action seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of the North Dakota Governor’s executive orders. This case began as a challenge to the Governor’s statutory powers in issuing executive orders during the COVID-19 pandemic relating to the operations of certain North Dakota businesses. In April 2020, Somerset, an assisted living facility with an in-house salon, and Riggin, a licensed cosmetologist operating the salon as an independent contractor, claimed the executive orders prohibited Somerset and Riggin from engaging in their business and profession, and placed limitations as to their business and profession. Appellants argued the executive orders were beyond the Governor’s statutory powers; the executive orders involved fundamental rights requiring the application of the strict scrutiny standard of review; and that a declaratory judgment should have been issued as a matter of law and enforced by an appropriate writ. Because Appellants failed to adequately challenge the district court’s conclusion the case was moot, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. | | Allianz Global Risks v. ACE Property & Casualty Ins. Co. | Court: Oregon Supreme Court Docket: S067017 Opinion Date: March 25, 2021 Judge: Thomas A. Balmer Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Insurance Law, Products Liability | Daimler-Benz AG acquired Freightliner Corporation (Freightliner) from Consolidated Freightways (now Con-Way) in 1981. As part of the transaction, it liquidated Freightliner’s assets and liabilities into a subsidiary, Daimler Trucks North America LLC (Daimler). Between 1952 and 1982, Freightliner and then Daimler had engaged in business activities, primarily the manufacture of trucks, that subsequently led to several environmental remediation proceedings, including claims related to the Portland Harbor Superfund cleanup, and to some 1,500 asbestos personal injury claims. Plaintiffs Allianz Global Risk US Insurance and Allianz Underwriters Insurance Company (Allianz) insured Freightliner in 1981 and Daimler from 1981 to 1986 through a general commercial liability insurance policy. Daimler also purchased from Allianz another policy to provide coverage for future claims that might be made against Freightliner based on its past operations that were “incurred but not yet reported.” By the time it filed the operative complaint in this action in 2014, Allianz had spent more than $24 million defending and paying environmental and asbestos claims against Daimler and the now-dissolved Freightliner arising from Freightliner’s business operations between 1952 and 1982. In this litigation, Allianz sought contribution for the payments it has made and will make in the future based on those environmental and asbestos claims from insurance companies that insured Freightliner -- either directly or through its parent, Con-Way -- from 1976 to 1982. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' holding that Daimler did not assume the contingent liabilities of Freightliner (including the liabilities at issue here) and affirmed the jury verdict on that issue. On Allianz's appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the question of whether, because of side agreements between Con-Way/Freightliner and the insurers, those insurers had a "duty to defend or indemnify Freightliner" -- that question was to be decided by the trial court as a matter of law based on the relevant policies. As to the "London pollution exclusion", the Supreme Court agreed with Allianz that it was error for the trial court not to provide a legal interpretation of a key provision in the policy as part of the jury instructions. The Court also concluded that the jury instructions regarding the London pollution exclusion should be similar to those regarding the Domestic exclusion. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. The limited judgments of the trial court were affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. | | Always Busy Consulting v. Babford & Company | Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 11-13 WAP 2020 Opinion Date: March 25, 2021 Judge: Doughtery Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure | The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to consider whether a notice of appeal filed at a single docket number corresponding to the lead case of multiple consolidated civil cases should have been quashed for failing to satisfy the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 341(a) as interpreted in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018). The Superior Court relied on Walker to quash the appeal below at one docket number, but the Supreme Court held Walker was inapplicable to the particular facts of this case and therefore reversed. | | Gussom v. Teagle | Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 12 EAP 2020 Opinion Date: March 25, 2021 Judge: Max Baer Areas of Law: Civil Procedure | In this case, the Superior Court affirmed a trial court order that dismissed a plaintiff’s complaint based upon plaintiff’s failure to timely serve her complaint upon the defendant despite the fact that plaintiff’s actions did not amount to intentional conduct. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to address whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicted with Lamp v. Heyman, 366 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1976) and its progeny, and responded in the negative. Consistent with the Superior Court’s decision, the Supreme Court held that a trial court has the discretion to dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff fails to offer proof that she diligently attempted to serve process on a defendant in a timely manner and there was no evidence to indicate that the defendant had actual notice of the commencement of the action in the relevant time frame, regardless of whether the plaintiff acted or failed to act intentionally. Because the Superior Court reached the correct result in this matter, judgment was affirmed. | | Torrence v. SCDOC | Court: South Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 28017 Opinion Date: March 24, 2021 Judge: John W. Kittredge Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law | The issue this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on whether an order of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) that includes a remand to a state agency is a final decision, and thus appealable. Petitioner South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) appealed an adverse ruling rendered by the ALC. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as interlocutory. After review, the Supreme Court determined the ALC's order here was a final decision notwithstanding the remand to the SCDC. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the court of appeals to address the merits of SCDC's appeal. | | In re Texas Education Agency | Court: Supreme Court of Texas Docket: 20-0404 Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Eva Guzman Areas of Law: Civil Procedure | The Supreme Court denied Relators' request for mandamus relief, holding that Tex. Gov't Code 22.004(i)'s prohibition on counter-supersedes refers to a particular procedural process, not an appellate court's temporary orders under other authority. In this ultra vires dispute, state regulators appealed an adverse temporary injunction. The trial court allowed Plaintiff, a school district, to counter-supersede the injunction so the regulators could not undertake unauthorized actions absent success on appeal. The court of appeals reversed the counter-supersedeas order, concluding that it was contrary to section 22.004(i) and Tex. R. App. P. 24.2(a)(3), but issued its own temporary order continuing the injunction pending disposition of the appeal. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding that the appellate court's temporary order did not conflict with section 22.004(i) because it was not counter-supersedes relief within the meaning of the statute. | | Forrett v. Stone | Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2021 VT 17 Opinion Date: March 19, 2021 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Procedure | Defendant Orion Stone appealed a trial court’s order extending a relief-from-abuse (RFA) order against him. He argued the plain language of 15 V.S.A. 1103(e) required plaintiff Meghan Forrett to seek her extension before the initial order expired, and because she failed to do so, the court lacked jurisdiction over her request. Defendant maintained that plaintiff’s belated request could not be considered “excusable neglect” under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b). Defendant further argued the trial court was required and failed to make findings that he abused plaintiff and that there was a danger of further abuse. The Vermont Supreme Court construed section 1103(e) to allow plaintiff’s filing here; however, the Supreme Court concluded there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s decision to extend the RFA order. Because the Court concluded that the hearing did not provide plaintiff a sufficient opportunity to present relevant evidence, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. | | Hester v. Washington | Court: Washington Supreme Court Docket: 98495-6 Opinion Date: March 25, 2021 Judge: Johnson Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law | This case involved a challenge to former RCW 43.43.120(23)(a) (2001), which excluded certain overtime from the calculation of the monthly pension benefit granted under the Washington State Patrol Retirement System (WSPRS). Four Washington State troopers (Troopers) hired before the statute became effective claimed this exclusion of voluntary overtime from the calculation of their monthly pensions was an unconstitutional impairment of their contract with the State in violation of article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution and article I, section 23 of the Washington State Constitution. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled: (1) the statute of limitations was three years and accrued at retirement; (2) there remained issues of material fact regarding whether the change was offset by comparable benefits; and (3) the change was reasonable and necessary to serve a legitimate public purpose. After review of that ruling, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings on the statute of limitations and on comparable benefits. However, the Court vacated its legitimate public purpose ruling as premature given that the issue of comparable benefits remained for trial. The matter was remanded for additional proceedings. | |
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