Hard Cases

JOSEPH MARGULIES

Cornell law professor Joseph Margulies uses the killing of Rayshard Brooks in Atlanta by police to explain some lessons for reform we might learn. Margulies calls upon us to use this case to reexamine the circumstances that should result in a custodial arrest and to shrink the function of police so as to use them only in the very few situations that truly require them.

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Concilio De Salud Integral De Loiza, Inc. v. JC Remodeling, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 18-1199

Opinion Date: June 15, 2020

Judge: Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts

In this qui tam action, the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court denying the request of Concilio De Salud Integral De Loiza, Inc. (CSILO), on the eve of trial, to amend the pretrial order to include a discussion of damages CSILO claimed it was due under the False Claims Act, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied CSILO's request to amend the pretrial order. CSILO, a non-profit organization in Puerto Rico, brought this action under the FCA against JC Remodeling, Inc. (JCR). Three years into litigation and after the close of discovery, CSILO moved the court for leave to amend the pretrial order to include a discussion of damages. The district court denied the request. After a trial, the jury found that JCR had violated the False Claims Act and entered judgment against JCR and imposed on it a $5,500 civil penalty. CSILO appealed, challenging the denial of its request to amend the pretrial order. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it decided that CSILO's request to amend the pretrial order would not have cause it "manifest injustice" and would have instead caused prejudice and hardship to JCR.

Lawes v. CSA Architects & Engineers LLP

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 16-2275

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

In this case where Plaintiff's negligence case collapsed halfway through trial due to the exclusion of his only expert witness pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and Fed. R. Evid. 702 the First Circuit reversed the rulings of the district court under Rule 26 and Rule 702, vacated the entry of judgment against Plaintiff, and remanded this matter for further proceedings, holding that the district court erred. Plaintiff was hit by a car while walking in a construction-affected area near Old San Juan, Puerto Rico. Plaintiff filed a negligence lawsuit against several entities. Plaintiff then retained an expert witness to opine on the standard of care owed to pedestrians in construction-affected areas and to explain how Defendants' negligence caused his accident. After a twelve-day Daubert hearing, the trial court excluded Plaintiff's sole expert witness. The district court subsequently entered judgment as a matter of law for Defendants. The First Circuit vacated the lawsuit's dismissal, holding (1) under Rule 26, preclusion was an overly harsh sanction for Plaintiff's discovery violations; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert testimony under Rule 702.

Gleizer v. Republic of Argentina

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 19-595

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Robert A. Katzmann

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, International Law

Movant filed suit on behalf of plaintiffs, seeking to recover money owed on defaulted Argentina bonds. In 2006, plaintiffs received a judgment in their favor, which went unpaid until plaintiffs settled their claims with Argentina in 2016, without movant's involvement. Movant then moved to enforce his attorney's lien on the settlement proceeds under New York Judiciary Law 475, which the district court denied. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's order, holding that the district court had jurisdiction over movant's claim against Argentina under the commercial activity exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act. In this case, Argentina's settlement with plaintiffs constitutes an act outside the territory of the United States connected with a commercial activity of Argentina elsewhere, and that act caused direct effect in the United States because it ended in long-running litigation in New York. The court also held that movant's lien on his clients' cause of action attached to the settlement proceeds even though he was not involved in the settlement. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings.

Thomas v. Reeves

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-60133

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Election Law

The en banc court unanimously agrees that this court no longer has jurisdiction in this case because it has become moot. The en banc court explained that it is undisputed that the 2019 general election has occurred, and the current district lines will neither be used nor operate as a base for any future election. Therefore, the en banc court vacated the district court's judgment, dismissed the appeal, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Baker v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Dockets: 19-3160, 19-3159

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Joel Martin Flaum

Areas of Law: Aerospace/Defense, Civil Procedure, Environmental Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

From 1906 -1970, the companies manufactured industrial materials at an East Chicago, Indiana Superfund Site. In the 1970s, the East Chicago Housing Authority constructed “West Calumet,” a low-income residential building, on that site. In 2017, former West Calumet tenants sued the companies based on the tenants’ exposure to hazardous substances. Defendant Atlantic Richfield removed the case to federal court, asserting a government contractor defense because its predecessor, ISR, operated during World War II. ISR sold lead and zinc to entities who were under contract with the government to produce the goods for the military. ISR itself held five Army contracts. The materials made by ISR were critical wartime commodities that had to be manufactured according to detailed federal specifications. Other regulations effectively prevented ISR from selling to distributors for civilian applications. Defendant DuPont asserted that the government directed it to build a facility for the government and then lease it from the government to produce Freon-12 and hydrochloric acid solely for the government. The district court remanded, finding that most of the Companies’ government business occurred outside the relevant time frame. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Atlantic Richfield worked "hand-in-hand with the federal government to achieve a task that furthers an end of the federal government.” The Companies’ wartime production was a small but significant portion of their relevant conduct; the federal interest in the matter supports removal. Atlantic Richfield set forth sufficient facts regarding its government contractor defense.

Cartwright v. Silver Cross Hospital

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-2595

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Diane S. Sykes

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law, Legal Ethics

In 2015, Cartwright sued his former employer, alleging discrimination based on his race and sex under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; discrimination based on race, 42 U.S.C. 1981; and age discrimination, 29 U.S.C. 623. The judge appointed counsel for the limited purpose of settlement negotiations. The parties did not reach an agreement. The attorney was relieved of the limited representation. Cartwright failed to respond to discovery requests and filed many motions. The judge recruited a lawyer to represent him pro bono but later permitted the attorney to withdraw. The judge recruited another pro bono lawyer. After 14 months and more than 530 hours of work, the third attorney moved to withdraw citing substantial, irreconcilable disagreements with Cartwright. The judge granted the defendants partial summary judgment. Cartwright responded with multiple motions, accusing the judge of bias. The defendants moved to dismiss the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute. The judge recruited another pro bono attorney, then denied the motion as moot. Counsel later was allowed to withdraw. After four years and repeated warnings, the judge dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reminding "judges that they need not and should not recruit volunteer lawyers for civil claimants who won’t cooperate ... Pro bono representation of indigent civil litigants is a venerable tradition ... courts must be careful stewards of this limited resource.”

Seaway Bank & Trust Co. v. J&A Series I, LLC, Series C

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-2425

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: ROVNER

Areas of Law: Banking, Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

In 2012, Seaway Bank sued J&A to collect on loans secured by a mortgage on Chicago property. In 2013, the court entered a judgment of foreclosure. The court approved the sale of the mortgaged property and entered a $116,381 deficiency judgment against the guarantor. In 2017, Illinois regulators closed Seaway. The FDIC was appointed as receiver, set a claims bar date, and published notice. J&A filed no timely claims. Months later, J&A filed a Petition to Quash Service in the 2012 state-court lawsuit. J&A argued that once relief was granted, it was entitled to the property. The FDIC removed the proceeding to federal court and moved to stay the proceedings to allow J&A to exhaust the mandatory claims process under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. 1821(d). The court granted the stay; J&A did not submit any claims by the submission deadline. The FDIC moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust the Act's claims process. J&A asserted that the jurisdiction-stripping provision applied only to claims seeking payment from a failed bank and that J&A did not seek payment but only to quash service and vacate void orders; only if the court granted that non-monetary relief could they pursue “possessory relief,” so that the FDIC’s motion was not ripe because they were not yet seeking the return of the property or monetary relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. The district court lacked jurisdiction over the Petition because J&A failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 18-15890

Opinion Date: June 17, 2020

Judge: Bade

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

The Ninth Circuit affirmed on different grounds the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims for restitution. Pursuant to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), the panel held that federal courts must apply equitable principles derived from federal common law to claims for equitable restitution under California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend her complaint for a third time to reallege the CLRA damages claim. In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she lacked an adequate legal remedy.

Carr v. Commissioner, SSA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-5079

Opinion Date: June 15, 2020

Judge: Scott Milne Matheson, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits

In separate claims, appellees Willie Carr and Kim Minor sought disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). In each case, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied the claim, and the agency’s Appeals Council declined to review. While his case was pending in district court, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) ALJs were “inferior officers” under the Appointments Clause, and therefore must be appointed by the President, a court, or head of the agency. Shortly thereafter, Minor also sued in district court to challenge the denial of benefits in her case. In response to the Supreme Court case, Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), the SSA Commissioner appointed the SSA's ALJs to address any Appointments Clause questions Lucia posed. After the Commissioner’s action, Carr and Minor each filed a supplemental brief, asserting for the first time that the ALJs who had rejected their claims had not been properly appointed under the Appointments Clause. The district court upheld the ALJs’ denials of the claims, but it agreed with the Appointments Clause challenges. The court vacated the SSA decisions and remanded for new hearings before constitutionally appointed ALJs. It held that appellees did not waive their Appointments Clause challenges by failing to raise them in their SSA proceedings. On appeal, the Commissioner argued Appellees waived their Appointments Clause challenges by failing to exhaust them before the SSA. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Commissioner and reversed.

Wild Watershed v. Hurlocker

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-2106

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Timothy M. Tymkovich

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Forest Service approved two forest thinning projects in the Santa Fe National Forest pursuant to authority granted by a 2014 amendment to the Healthy Forests Restoration Act (HFRA). By thinning the forest and then conducting prescribed burns in the project areas, the Forest Service sought to reduce the risk of high-intensity wildfires and tree mortality related to insects and disease. Certain environmental organizations and individuals (collectively Wild Watershed) challenged the projects’ approval under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), asserting the Forest Service failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and HFRA. The district court rejected these claims, and the Tenth Circuit concurred, finding the Forest Service adequately considered the projects’ cumulative impacts as well as their potential effects on sensitive species in the area and the development of old growth forest. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court.

Hyde v. Irish

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 15-13010

Opinion Date: June 17, 2020

Judge: Thapar

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

The Eleventh Circuit joined its sister circuits in holding that a district court may address a sanctions motion based on its inherent powers or 28 U.S.C. 1927 even if it lacks jurisdiction over the underlying case. The court explained that these sanctions, like Rule 11 sanctions, do not require a court to rule on the merits of the underlying case. Furthermore, the purpose of the sanctions outlasts the end of the case. In this case, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for sanctions, because defendant failed to make a showing of bad faith. Defendant's only exhibit submitted to show bad faith could be interpreted in more than one way, and the district court also considered defendant's nearly three-year delay in bringing his sanctions motion.

First Mortgage Corp. v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 19-1798

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Wallach

Areas of Law: Banking, Civil Procedure, Government Contracts, Securities Law

Ginnie Mae (GM), established by 12 U.S.C. 1717(a)(2)(A) to provide stability in the secondary residential mortgage market and promote access to mortgage credit, guarantees mortgage-backed securities (MBS). FMC, a private corporation, was an originator and servicer of government-guaranteed home mortgages and an issuer of MBS in GM’s program. GM learned of FMC actions that constituted the immediate default of the Guaranty Agreements. FMC undertook an investigation and provided the results to GM, while also complying with SEC requests. GM later terminated FMC from its program. The SEC initiated a civil enforcement action, which terminated in a consent agreement, without FMC admitting or denying the allegations but paying disgorgement and penalties. The Consent Agreement provided that it did not affect FMC’s right to take positions in proceedings in which the SEC is not a party but FMC agreed to not take any action or permit any public statement denying any allegation in the SEC complaint FMC later sued, alleging that GM had breached Guaranty Agreements when it terminated FMC from its program and denied violating those Agreements. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal. FMC’s breach of contract claims are precluded under the doctrine of res judicata. FMC’s action is essentially a collateral attack on the judgment entered in the SEC action. The SEC and GM are in privity for the purposes of precluding FMC’s claims and “successful prosecution of the second action would nullify the initial judgment or would impair rights established in the initial action.”

Alaska Police Standards Council v. Maxwell

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17079

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Peter J. Maassen

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

A police officer applied for a Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) for several years when he was not eligible to receive one. Following an investigation, the Executive Director of the Alaska Police Standards Council petitioned the Council to revoke the officer’s police certificate on the ground that he lacked good moral character. An administrative law judge recommended against revoking the certificate, finding that the officer’s mistakes were not sufficient to demonstrate dishonesty or a lack of respect for the law. The Council, however, concluded that the officer’s hearing testimony - that he would fill out the applications in the same way if he had to do it over again - showed dishonesty and a lack of respect for the law, and it therefore revoked his certificate. The superior court agreed with the administrative law judge’s analysis of the evidence and the law and reversed the Council’s decision. The Council appeals. The Alaska Supreme Court determined the evidence disproportionately supported the finding of the administrative law judge that the police officer’s PFD applications and hearing testimony, while mistaken about the law, were not sufficient to raise substantial doubts about the officer’s good moral character. The Court affirmed the superior court's decision reversing the Council's revocation of the police certificate.

Arnoult v Webster

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17168

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Craig F. Stowers

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice

A patient filed suit in 2015 for dental malpractice against his periodontist stemming from care he received from October 2011 through December 2012. The doctor moved for summary judgment based on the two-year statute of limitations. The patient responded that the discovery rule applied, and the statute did not start running until October 2013, less than two years before he brought suit. The doctor asserted that the patient was on inquiry notice in January 2013, and therefore the statute of limitations expired months before he brought suit. The superior court granted the motion for summary judgment. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the doctor, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed.

Linda Lewis, n/k/a Linda Miller v. Burl Brim et al.

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17111

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Daniel E. Winfree

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

Burl Brim and related entities (Brim) sued Linda Lewis in Oregon. The Oregon trial court first entered a contempt judgment against Lewis in 2016 for failing to abide by an oral settlement agreement the parties placed on the record six month earlier. Although the court had not incorporated the settlement terms into a judgment, the parties had agreed to a permanent injunction barring Lewis from making public comments about Brim. Brim later registered that contempt judgment, which included a monetary award against Lewis, in Alaska superior court. A few months later, the Oregon trial court entered a final judgment in the main litigation, setting out its version of the terms and conditions of the oral settlement agreement and injunctive relief. Brim registered the second judgment in Alaska shortly thereafter. The issue on appeal to the Alaska Supreme Court centered on the continuing effectiveness of a foreign civil judgment when the judgment was reversed by the foreign jurisdiction's appellate court. On the facts of this case, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded Oregon's appellate reversals of both judgments had to lead to the vacation of the two judgments registered n Alaska, and to the parties' return to their respective positions prior to Alaska enforcement proceedings.

Traugott v ARCTEC Alaska

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17126

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Carney

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

Joseph Traugott suffered from with diabetes and a related foot condition, and developed an infection in his foot while working at a remote site. He required extensive medical treatment for his foot and did not work since developing the infection. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decided the worker’s disability and need for medical treatment were compensable based on an expert opinion that work was the sole cause of the condition’s acceleration even if work was not the most significant cause of the worker’s overall condition. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission reversed, because in its' view, the Board had asked the expert misleading questions. The Commission then concluded, based on a different opinion by the same expert, that the worker had not provided sufficient evidence to support his claim. Traugott appealed, raising issues about the interpretation of the new causation standard adopted in the 2005 amendments to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) and its application to his case. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s decision and remanded for reinstatement of the Board’s award.

Davis v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B300685(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 15, 2020

Judge: Segal

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

After real party in interest obtained an arbitration award against petitioner, an indigent, self-represented litigant, real party in interest sought to enforce his resulting money judgment by filing an application to take her judgment debtor examination. Petitioner filed ex parte applications and a motion to quash the order requiring her to appear for the judgment debtor examination. The superior court denied petitioner's attempts to quash the order, but did not honor petitioner's timely request for a court reporter and did not allow petitioner to appear at hearings telephonically. Petitioner ultimately failed to appear at the judgment debtor examination and the superior court issued a bench warrant for her arrest. Petitioner then sought a writ of mandate. The Court of Appeals granted the writ and held that Supreme Court precedent and the California Rules of Court require trial courts to protect the right to appellate review by ensuring there is a complete record of the proceedings, and they encourage trial courts to allow all litigants, including those representing themselves, to participate in court proceedings telephonically. In this case, the court held that the superior court's actions were inconsistent with these principles. Therefore, the court directed the superior court to allow petitioner to have a court reporter at the hearings on her motions and to appear at those hearings telephonically.

Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D075328(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Joan Irion

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

San Diego County (County) challenged a judgment, writ of mandate, and injunction directing it to set aside its approvals of a Climate Action Plan (2018 CAP or CAP), Guidelines for Determining Significance of Climate Change, and supplemental environmental impact report (SEIR). The primary issue was whether a greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation measure in the SEIR, called M-GHG-1, was California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)-compliant. The superior court ordered the County to vacate its approvals of the CAP, Guidelines for Determining Significance, and the certification of the SEIR. The court also enjoined the County from relying on M-GHG-1 during review of greenhouse gas emissions impacts of development proposals on unincorporated County land. The Court of Appeal limited its holding to the facts of this case, particularly M-GHG-1. "Our decision is not intended to be, and should not be construed as blanket prohibition on using carbon offsets—even those originating outside of California—to mitigate GHG emissions under CEQA." The Court held: (1) M-GHG-1 violated CEQA because it contained unenforceable performance standards and improperly defers and delegates mitigation; (2) the CAP was not inconsistent with the County's General Plan; however (3) the County abused its discretion in approving the CAP because the CAP's projected additional greenhouse gas emissions from projects requiring a general plan amendment was not supported by substantial evidence; (4) the SEIR violated CEQA because its discussion of cumulative impacts ignores foreseeable impacts from probable future projects, (b) finding of consistency with the Regional Transportation Plan was not supported by substantial evidence, and (c) analysis of alternatives ignored a smart-growth alternative. The judgment requiring the County to set aside and vacate its approval of the CAP was affirmed because the CAP's greenhouse gas emission projections assumed effective implementation of M-GHG-1, and M-GHG-1 was itself unlawful under CEQA. Except to the extent that (1) the CAP is impacted by its reliance on M-GHG-1; and (2) the CAP's inventory of greenhouse gases was inconsistent with the SEIR, the Court found the CAP was CEQA-compliant.

Lak v. Lak

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G056784(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: O'Leary

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits

The Orange County Department of Child Support Services (Department) has withdrawn money from Daniel Lak’s (Father) Social Security Disability Insurance benefits (SSDI) to pay for child/spousal support arrears since 2015. Father disputed the Department's authority to withdraw money, and at a hearing, sought reimbursement for overpayments and maintained the Department violated Family Code section 5246 (d)(3) by collecting more than five percent from his SSDI. The court denied Father’s requests and determined the Department could continue withdrawing money from SSDI for support arrears. On appeal, Father maintaned the court misinterpreted the law and failed to properly consider his motion for sanctions. Finding his contentions lack merit, the Court of Appeal affirmed the court’s order the Department did not overdraw money for arrears, Father failed to demonstrate he qualified for section 5246(d)(3)’s five percent rule, and sanctions were not warranted.

Pacifica First National, Inc. v. Abekasis

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B298292(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 15, 2020

Judge: Wiley

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

After appellant defaulted on a civil case, he appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to set aside the default. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court was right to deny the motion where appellant did not prove the service of process was bad and Pacifica put a proper proof of service form into evidence. The court explained that the burden on appellant then was to prove this apparently-proper document was invalid, which he failed to do. Furthermore, appellant's 12 arguments on appeal are invalid. The court noted that, when appreciable sums are in play, it is mysterious why lawyers on both sides think the small cost of court reporting is a good cost to avoid. The court published this opinion in part to discourage misplaced thrift.

Segal v. ASICS America Corp.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B299184(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 15, 2020

Judge: Currey

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

The Court of Appeal affirmed the district court's order granting in part and denying in part Size It's motion to tax costs. The court held that Size It has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in taxing costs associated with photocopies of exhibits and the creation of closing argument demonstratives; travel expenses for defense counsel; and interpreter fees. The court acknowledged a split in authority over whether costs incurred in preparing models, blowups, and photocopies of exhibits not used at trial may be awarded under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(13). The court published to explain why it has concluded that they may and include its pragmatic take on why having well-prepared counsel is "reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact"—the test for cost recovery under the statute.

State Comp. Ins. Fund v. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D075942(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Cynthia Aaron

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law

Defendant ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. (ReadyLink) was a nurse staffing company that placed nurses in hospitals, typically on a short-term basis. Plaintiff State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF) was a public enterprise fund created by statute as a workers' compensation insurer. Premiums that SCIF charged were based in part on the employer's payroll for a particular insurance year. SCIF and ReadyLink disputed the final amount of premium ReadyLink owed to SCIF for the 2005 policy year (September 1, 2005 to September 1, 2006). ReadyLink considered certain payments made to its nurses as per diem payments; SCIF felt those should have been considered as payroll under the relevant workers' compensation regulations. The Insurance Commissioner concurred with SCIF's characterization of the payments. A trial court rejected ReadyLink's petition for a writ of administrative mandamus to prohibit the Insurance Commissioner from enforcing its decision, and an appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. SCIF subsequently filed the action underlying this appeal, later moving for a judgment on the pleadings, claiming the issue of the premium ReadyLink owed for the 2005 policy year had been previously determined in the administrative proceedings, which was then affirmed after judicial review. The trial court granted SCIF's motion for judgment on the pleadings. On appeal, ReadyLink conceded it previously litigated and lost its challenge to SCIF's decision to include per diem amounts as payroll for the 2005 insurance year, but argued it never had the opportunity to challenge whether SCIF otherwise properly calculated the premium amount that it claims was due pursuant to the terms of the contract between the parties, or whether SCIF's past conduct, which ReadyLink alleged included SCIF's acceptance of ReadyLink's exclusions of its per diem payments from payroll in prior policy years and SCIF's exclusion of per diem amounts in paying out on workers' compensation claims filed by ReadyLink employees, might bar SCIF from being entitled to collect that premium amount under the contract. To this, the Court of Appeal concurred the trial court erred in granting SCIF's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Judgment was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Trilogy Plumbing, Inc. v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G057796(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Richard D. Fybel

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Insurance Law

Defendant Navigators Specialty Insurance Company (Navigators) appealed a trial court order denying its special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. Plaintiff Trilogy Plumbing, Inc. (Trilogy) alleged that Navigators, as Trilogy’s insurer, gave instructions with which Trilogy did not agree to attorneys Navigators had retained to defend Trilogy and wrongfully negotiated settlements without Trilogy’s consent. Navigators contended the alleged conduct constituted protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17 (e)(2) and, therefore, the trial court erred by denying the anti-SLAPP motion. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed: the allegations challenged by the anti-SLAPP motion described Navigators’ mishandling of the claims process with regard to 33 different lawsuits involving Trilogy. While the alleged acts were generally connected to litigation, they did not include any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body and therefore did not constitute protected activity under section 425.16.

Colorado v. Meagher

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 CO 56

Opinion Date: June 15, 2020

Judge: Gabriel

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Colorado State Engineer, and the Division Engineer for Water Division 3 (the “Engineers”), brought claims against Nick Meagher for injunctive relief, civil penalties, and costs, arising from Meagher’s failure to submit Form 6.1, "Water Use Data Submittal Form," as required by Rule 6.1 of the Rules Governing the Measurement of Ground Water Diversions Located in Water Division No. 3, The Rio Grande Basin (the “Measurement Rules”). Meagher appealed the water court’s orders denying his motion to dismiss the Engineers’ claims and granting the Engineers summary judgment on those claims, contending the court erred by: (1) denying his motion to dismiss because the Engineers’ claims were mooted by his ultimate submission of Form 6.1; (2) granting summary judgment for the Engineers based on an erroneous interpretation of Rule 6.1 and section 37-92-503, C.R.S. (2019), and notwithstanding the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to his culpable mental state and the amount of the civil penalties to be imposed; (3) enjoining future violations of Rule 6.1; and (4) awarding costs and fees to the Engineers. Finding no reversible error, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the water court's judgment.

Garcia v. Colorado Cab Co.

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 CO 55

Opinion Date: June 15, 2020

Judge: Brian D. Boatright

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

A driver for Colorado Cab Company LLC (“Colorado Cab”) picked up an intoxicated Curt Glinton and one of Glinton’s friends. After stopping at their destination, the driver told Glinton the total fare. Glinton became upset, started yelling at the driver, and eventually grabbed and punched the driver from behind. Meanwhile, Jose Garcia had called a cab from a house nearby. When he saw the cab occupied by Glinton drive by, he thought that it might be the cab he had called, and he began to follow it. When he was roughly a block away from the cab, he heard the driver screaming for help. Garcia ran to the cab and, through the cab’s open driver’s-side door, told Glinton to stop. Glinton shifted his aggression to Garcia, telling him to “mind his own business.” This gave the driver the chance to exit the vehicle. Glinton also exited the vehicle, escalated his aggression toward Garcia, and began to throw punches at Garcia. Garcia was then hit over the head, causing him to fall to the ground. Glinton then entered the driver’s seat of the still-running cab and started driving. He hit the still-down Garcia once with the cab, then backed up and again ran Garcia over. As a result, Garcia suffered several severe injuries. Garcia filed a negligence action against Colorado Cab, arguing that Colorado Cab had knowledge of forty-four passenger attacks on its drivers in the previous three years but had failed to install partitions or security cameras in its cabs. In asserting his claim, Garcia relied on the rescue doctrine. Colorado Cab countered that it owed no duty to Garcia to prevent intentional criminal acts, and that even if it was negligent, Garcia was comparatively negligent because he “[made] a decision to get involved in the situation.” The jury found for Garcia and awarded him $1.6 million in total damages. It allocated 45% of the fault to Colorado Cab (for a sum of roughly $720,000), 55% to Glinton, and 0% to Garcia. The trial court denied Colorado Cab's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Colorado Supreme Court held that for a person to qualify as a rescuer under the rescue doctrine, he must satisfy a three-pronged test: plaintiff must have (1) intended to aid or rescue a person whom he, (2) reasonably believed was in imminent peril, and (3) acted in such a way that could have reasonably succeeded or did succeed in preventing or alleviating such peril. The Supreme Court concluded that, on the facts of this case, Garcia satisfied this test at trial.

Crowder v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S19G0931

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Warren

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

This case stemmed from an October 2016 incident at the Atlanta airport during which law enforcement officers seized $46,820 in cash from Shara Cumins, James Crowder’s daughter. In the ensuing in rem forfeiture proceeding, the trial court awarded Crowder the property. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari review to address : (1) in an in rem forfeiture, whether the forfeiture complaint could be served by publication in the first instance when an interest holder resides out of state; and (2) whether a trial court had to rule on a pending motion for a more definite statement before striking a claimant's answer as insufficient. As to the first question, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals properly interpreted OCGA 9-16-12 (b) (3) as permitting service by publication in an in rem forfeiture proceeding if the owner of the subject property resided outside of Georgia, and properly rejected Crowder’s claims that personal service was required and that the State’s complaint should have been dismissed based on its failure to personally serve him. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals had to remand the case to the trial court for it to address Crowder’s claim that the State’s service by publication did not satisfy due process. As for the second question, the Supreme Court concluded OCGA 9-16-12 (c) (2) required a trial court to first rule on a motion for a more definite statement before dismissing a claimant’s answer. Because the Court of Appeals implicitly answered this question in the negative, that portion of the Court of Appeals’s judgment was reversed.

Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers Compensation

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S19G0447

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Keith R. Blackwell

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

Rochelle Frett was injured when she slipped and fell at her place of employment during a scheduled lunch break. She filed a claim for benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act, but the State Board of Workers’ Compensation denied her claim. Frett appealed, and the superior court upheld the denial of her claim. Frett then appealed the decision of the superior court, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Relying on Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v. Farr, 178 SE 728 (1935), the Court of Appeals held that Frett suffered no injury compensable under the Act because she sustained her injury during a scheduled break, and her injury, therefore, did not arise out of her employment. The Georgia Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to reconsider Farr and reviewed the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case. The Supreme Court overruled Farr, and reversed the decision below.

In re Office of Information Practices Opinion Letter No. F16-01

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-16-0000568

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

In this appeal stemming from James Smith's "complaint to initiate special proceeding," the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the circuit court's final judgment dismissing Smith's complaint, holding that the circuit court should have construed Smith's complaint as an original action under Haw. Rev. Stat. 92-12(c) seeking declaratory relief. The circuit court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the Office of Information Practices (OIP), concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Smith's appeal and that Smith's remedies lay in Haw. Rev. Stat. 92-12. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court held (1) although Smith, at times, referred to his complaint as a Haw. Rev. Stat. 92F-43 appeal, it contained numerous references to Haw. Rev. Stat. Ch. 92, the Sunshine Law at issue in the OIP opinion, and therefore, the circuit court should have construed the complaint as an original action seeking declaratory relief; (2) the ICA erred in ruling that Smith was not permitted to name OIP as a defendant; and (3) the "palpably erroneous" standard, rather than the "de novo" standard, applies to a review of OIP opinions pursuant to a seciton 92-12(c) lawsuit.

Travelers Insurance v. Ultimate Logistics, LLC

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46840

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Roger S. Burdick

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law

Travelers Insurance Co. appealed a district court decision to affirm a final order of the Idaho Department of Insurance in favor of Ultimate Logistics, LLC (“Ultimate”). The Department of Insurance’s final order upheld a hearing officer’s determination that two mechanics working for Ultimate were improperly included in a premium-rate calculation made by Travelers. In its petition for review, Travelers argued the Department of Insurance acted outside the scope of its statutory authority in determining that the mechanics could not be included in the premium-rate calculation. The district court rejected this argument. Finding no reversible error in the district court's order, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.

State v. Garcia

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 112502

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Carol A. Beier

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Immigration Law

The Supreme Court vacated its decision reversing the lower courts' conclusions that the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) did not preempt Defendant's prosecution for identity theft, holding that, in accordance with the decision of the United States Supreme Court on certiorari in this case, Defendant's prosecution was not preempted by the IRCA. A district court judge found Defendant guilty after denying his motion to dismiss charges based on representations in his W-4 employment form and I-9 form. On appeal, Defendant argued that the IRCA preempted identify theft prosecutions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that IRCA preempted Defendant's prosecution. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that state law prosecutions for identity theft were not preempted by the IRCA. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed in accordance with the decision of the United States Supreme Court.

State v. Morales

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 111904

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Carol A. Beier

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Immigration Law

The Supreme Court vacated its decision reversing the judgment of both the court of appeals and district court concluding that the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) did not preempt Defendant's prosecution for identity theft and making false information, holding that, in accordance with the decision of the United States Supreme Court on certiorari in this case, Defendant's prosecution was not preempted by the IRCA. A district court judge found Defendant guilty after denying his motion to dismiss charges based on representations in his W-4 employment form. On appeal, Defendant argued that the IRCA preempted identify theft and making false information prosecutions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that IRCA preempted Defendant's prosecutions. The United State Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that state law prosecutions for identity theft and making false information were not preempted by the IRCA. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed in accordance with the decision of the United States Supreme Court.

Morton v. Belk

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2019-IA-00061-SCT

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Josiah D. Coleman

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

After an automobile accident in 2015, Reericka Belk and Tracey Crayton filed suit against Victoria Morton in the Lee County Court. The case was tried by jury in September 2017, and the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Morton. Belk and Crayton filed a motion for a new trial, claiming that the jury disregarded the instructions of the court and rendered a verdict contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The court granted the motion for a new trial. Morton petitioned the Mississippi Supreme Court for an interlocutory appeal. After review, the Supreme Court determined the jury was properly instructed on the law and was informed of all the relevant facts. The verdict returned by the jury was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The Court found the trial judge abused his discretion by granting the motion for a new trial. Therefore, the Cout reversed the trial court’s order granting a new trial, and reinstated the trial court’s judgment entered on the jury’s verdict.

Parsons v. Walters

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2018-CA-01272-SCT

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Chamberlin

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law, Legal Ethics, Personal Injury, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Vernon Walters was injured in a work-related incident in October 2006; the vehicle he was driving was struck by an oncoming train. After receiving workers’ compensation benefits, he and his wife, Donyell Walters, filed a third-party claim against the company operating the train involved in the collision, Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KCSR). The Walterses hired the Parsons Law Firm to represent them in their suit, and Tadd Parsons took the case. The Walterses’ lawsuit against KCSR was ultimately dismissed with prejudice in September 2010 for, among other reasons, failure to prosecute, failure to comply with discovery obligations and fraud upon the court. Tadd never told the Walterses that their case had been dismissed and led them to believe their case was ongoing. Three years after the case had been dismissed, Tadd admitted he fabricated a settlement offer from KCSR in the amount of $104,000 and advised the Walterses to accept the offer, which they did. When eight months passed after Tadd informed the Walterses about the fabricated settlement, the Walterses demanded to meet with Jack Parsons, the other general partner at the Parsons Law Firm. Jack offered the Walterses $50,000 to settle any claims they may have had against Tadd based on his conduct in representing them in the KCSR lawsuit. The Walterses refused Jack’s offer and then filed a claim against Tadd, Jack and the Parsons Law Firm, alleging claims of fraud, defamation, negligent representation, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for the Walterses on the matter of liability, finding that Tadd and the Parsons Law Firm were liable for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court then held a jury trial on damages. The jury verdict awarded the Walterses $2,850,002 in compensatory damages, which exceeded what the Walterses had demanded in compensatory damages in their complaint and in their motion to set damages. Finding the jury’s verdict shocked the conscience, the court remitted the damages to $1,034,666.67 in a second amended final judgment. Parsons appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court, and the Walterses cross-appealed. The Supreme Court determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding irrelevant evidence about the underlying KCSR lawsuit because the value of the lawsuit had no bearing on the damages the Walterses sustained due to Tadd Parsons’s and the Parsons Law Firm’s fraud and IIED. Further, the Court determined the remitted verdict’s award of damages was excessive and not supported by substantial evidence. The trial court was therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the matter remanded for a new trial on damages.

M. A. B. v. Buell

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S066752

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Nelson

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law

Petitioner M.A.B. applied for a Family Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) protective order against respondent on October 9, 2017. Respondent and petitioner were married in 2014. Together, they had a son, J, who was born in 2015. During the marriage, respondent suffered from depression, for which he took medication. He sometimes also drank to excess. Petitioner testified that respondent raped her twice: once in March 2017 and once in May 2017. The incident in May included respondent dragging petitioner away from J while petitioner was breast feeding. In June 2017, petitioner expressed her unhappiness with the marriage. Respondent replied that, if petitioner left or divorced him, he would kill her and take J. In July 2017, petitioner took J, moved in with her parents, and filed for dissolution. After the separation, respondent made frequent attempts to contact petitioner by phone, email, and text message. At prearranged meetings, respondent regularly exhibited anger toward petitioner. After a hearing, the trial court continued the protective order in its entirety. On appeal, respondent conceded that the trial court’s findings were sufficient to establish that he had abused petitioner within 180 days of petitioner seeking the protective order. Respondent argued, however, that the evidence was insufficient to establish the two other elements: that petitioner was in imminent danger of further abuse from respondent and that respondent presented a credible threat to petitioner’s physical safety. The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that the evidence was insufficient to show that petitioner was in imminent danger of further abuse from respondent. The court, as a result, reversed the trial court’s order without considering whether respondent represented a credible threat to petitioner’s physical safety. Because the appellate court did not consider whether respondent represented a credible threat to petitioner’s physical safety, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the appeals court to determine that issue in the first instance.

Easton Area Sch. Dist. v. Miller

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 13 MAP 2019

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Dougherty

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred in determining a school bus surveillance video sought in a request for public records pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL) was not exempt from disclosure under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. 1232g. Rudy Miller, on behalf of The Express Times (collectively, Requester), submitted a RTKL request to the District. Therein, Requester sought information in connection with an incident involving an elementary school teacher who, according to Requester, had roughly physically disciplined a child on a school bus outside of the school. Although its rationale departed from the analysis of the Commonwealth Court, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order, with instructions to redact students’ images from the video prior to disclosure.

Harrison v. Health Network Lab, et al.

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 51 MAP 2019

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Dougherty

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law

In a discretionary appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether the superior court erred in holding the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) did not preclude a wrongfully terminated employee from filing a court action for retaliatory discharge under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law when the plaintiff reported discriminatory conduct made unlawful by the PHRA, but was not herself the subject of the underlying discrimination. After careful review, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err in so holding, and therefore affirmed.

In Re: J.W.B. & R.D.B.

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 93 MAP 2019

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Donohue

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law

In a discretionary appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether the superior court erred in its application of Pennsylvania law to find that L.B., a Colorado resident, was foreclosed from challenging the validity of his consent to permit the adoption of his minor children under the Pennsylvania Adoption Act, but not the requirements of the corresponding Colorado statute. After review, the Court concluded the superior court did not err, and affirmed the termination of L.B.'s parental rights to his children.

Brown v. Sojourner

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 27982

Opinion Date: June 17, 2020

Judge: Donald W. Beatty

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Trusts & Estates

Respondent Tommie Rae Brown sought to establish she was the survivor of the late entertainer James Brown, who died in 2006. An issue arose in the context of Respondent's claims for an elective or omitted spouse's share of Brown's estate. There was uncertainty as to Respondent's marital status because she did not obtain an annulment of her first recorded marriage until after her marriage ceremony to Brown. In January 2004, Brown filed an action to annul his marriage to Respondent, indicating the parties had recently separated. Brown alleged he was entitled to an annulment because Respondent never divorced her first husband, so their purported marriage was void ab initio. Brown asked that Respondent "be required to permanently vacate the marital residence" and noted the parties had executed a prenuptial agreement that resolved all matters regarding equitable division, alimony, and attorney's fees. Respondent's omitted spouse claims were transferred to the circuit court, which granted her motion for partial summary judgment, and denied a similar motion by the Limited Special Administrator and Trustee (LSA). The circuit court found that as a matter of law, Respondent was Brown's surviving spouse. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari review of claims made by several of Brown's children, and after such review, concluded Respondent was not Brown's surviving spouse. Consequently, the court of appeals' decision affirming the circuit court was reversed, and the matter remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. The circuit court was directed upon remand to promptly proceed with the probate of Brown's estate in accordance with his estate plan.

W.H. v. Olympia School Dist.

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 97630-9

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Charles Wiggins

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington certified two questions to the Washington Supreme Court in connection with the meaning of the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), chapter 49.60 RCW. The federal trial court asked: (1) whether a school district was subject to strict liability for discrimination by its employees in violation of the WLAD; and (2) if yes, then did "discrimination," for the purposes of this cause of action, encompass intentional sexual misconduct, including physical abuse and assault? Gary Shafer was hired by the Olympia School District in 2005 as a school bus driver. It was undisputed that Shafer, during his employment, abused passengers on school buses, including P.H. and S.A., the minor plaintiffs in this case. Plaintiffs sued the school district in federal court, naming multiple defendants, and claiming both state and federal causes of action. Defendants moved for summary judgment, which was granted in part and denied in part. In response to the Washington Supreme Court's decision in Floeting v. Group Health Cooperative, 434 P.3d 39 (2019), plaintiffs successfully moved to amend their complaint to include a claim under the WLAD. The amended complaint alleges that the minor plaintiffs’ treatment constituted sex discrimination in a place of public accommodation. The Supreme Court answered "yes" to both certified questions: a school district may be subject to strict liability for discrimination in places of public accommodation by its employees in violation of the WLAD; and under the WLAD, discrimination can encompass intentional sexual misconduct, including physical abuse and assault.

H&P Advisory Ltd. v. Randgold Resources Ltd.

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 WY 74

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Boomgaarden

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts

In this contract dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing H&P Advisory Limited's complaint against Randgold Resources, Limited and Barrick Gold Corporation for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that the undisputed facts and all reasonable inferences in H&P's favor did not support personal jurisdiction over Defendants in Wyoming. Randgold, a Jersey (Channel Islands) corporation, and Barrick, a Canada corporation, were two of the world's largest gold mining companies. H&P, a United Kingdom private limited company, served as a neutral broker between the two companies in a merger deal. Those involved in the merger met in Jackson, Wyoming to participate in a series of negotiations. Randgold and Barrick subsequently announced the merger but did not list H&P as an advisor and offered to pay H&P a "small fee" for its role in the merger. H&P sued Randgold and Barrick in the Ninth Judicial District in and for Teton County, Wyoming alleging breach of contract. The district court dismissed the complaint on personal jurisdiction grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that it lacked specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants.