How Allen v. Cooper Breaks Important New (if Dubious) Ground on Stare Decisis

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar comments on language in a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Allen v. Cooperdiscussing constitutional stare decisis in the context of state sovereign immunity. Amar points out some of the problems with the Court’s jurisprudence on state sovereign immunity and Congress’s Section 5 power, and he questions the Allen majority’s embrace of a “special justification” requirement for constitutional stare decisis.

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Donkin v. Donkin

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B293127(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 3, 2020

Judge: Frances Rothschild

Areas of Law: Trusts & Estates

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment and held that the trial court correctly interpreted the trust document and correctly rejected trustees' statute of limitations argument. In this case, the trial court correctly concluded that the contested amendment had no effect on Trusts B and C; the trial court correctly determined beneficiaries' claims in the 2010 petition are not a "contest" and thus are not time-barred; and the trust document required distribution of Trusts B and C as soon as is practicable after trustor's death. The court also held that trustees may represent themselves in this dispute without engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.

Tubbs v. Berkowitz

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G056951(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 7, 2020

Judge: Raymond J. Ikola

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Trusts & Estates

Janice Tubbs challenged certain assets her father, Harry William Berkowitz transferred to himself after his wife passed away. Berkowitz and his wife, Janice's parents, created The Berkowitz Family Trust (the Trust). The Trust provided for the allocation of assets to a surviving spouse’s trust and a marital appointment trust (the Marital Trust) upon the death of either Berkowitz or his wife. The surviving spouse’s trust and the Marital Trust included a general power of appointment allowing the surviving spouse to designate a person who would receive the Trust assets. Under that power of appointment, the surviving spouse could designate himself or herself as the person who would receive the assets. Berkowitz exercised this power of appointment after his wife passed away and transferred all the Trust assets to himself, effectively divesting Tubbs and her children who were contingent beneficiaries. According to Tubbs, Berkowitz’s fiduciary duties as the successor trustee limited his exercise of the power of appointment. Berkowitz moved for summary judgment contending he had the right to transfer all assets to himself pursuant to the general power of appointment provisions, which allowed him to act in a nonfiduciary capacity. The court granted Berkowitz’s motion for summary judgment and found the general power of appointment provisions gave him unfettered discretion. Because the power of appointment was given to the surviving spouse, and not the trustee, the court rejected Tubbs’s contention that Berkowitz’s discretion was limited by his role as the successor trustee. On appeal, Tubbs contended the court erred because Berkowitz was bound by his fiduciary duties as trustee when he exercised the general power of appointment. Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment.

In re Colman Family Revocable Living Trust

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 13

Opinion Date: April 2, 2020

Judge: Kristina Pickering

Areas of Law: Trusts & Estates

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court concluding that a secondary beneficiary was entitled to property in a trust created by Paul and decedent Chari Colman, Paul's ex-wife, holding that the plain language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 111.781(1) automatically revokes any revocable disposition from one spouse to another upon divorce. While they were married, Paul and Chari lived in a home Chari owned as her separate property. Later, Chari transferred the property to the family trust but did not change its status as her separate property. The trust named Paul and Chari as the trust's primary beneficiaries and provided that, after their deaths, Tonya Collier was the beneficiary of the property. One month after Paul and Chari divorced, Chari died. Based on section 111.781(1), Collier filed a petition seeking to confirm her status as beneficiary to the property. The district court ordered the property transferred to Collier. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by applying section 111.781 and concluding that it required revocation of Paul's interest in the property; and (2) substantial evidence supported the finding that the property remained Chari's separate property throughout the marriage.

Joyce v. Joyce

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 75

Opinion Date: April 6, 2020

Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle

Areas of Law: Trusts & Estates

This litigation involved a dispute over mineral interests located in Mountrail County, North Dakota, and other property owned by Vera Mitchell and her estate. Tarryl Joyce, as the estate's administrator, appealed a district court judgment granting Steven Joyce’s motion for dismissal of Tarryl's claims against him for actions he took while acting as Vera Mitchell’s attorney-in-fact. In 2006, Vera executed a durable power of attorney appointing her son, Steven Joyce, as attorney-in-fact. Vera executed a last will and testament the same day. In 2008, due to dementia and declining mental health, Steven moved his mother from an assisted living facility in Grand Forks, North Dakota, to a memory care facility in Carrolton, Texas, near his home. In 2011, Steven, as Vera's attorney-in-fact, executed and recorded a quit claim deed transferring all of Mitchell’s mineral interests to himself. Steven also wrote several checks to himself and others and made purchases using Mitchell’s Wells Fargo checking account as Mitchell’s attorney-in-fact. Tarryl alleged Steven made improper investments and purchased property using their mother's assets. When asked for an accounting of Vera's assets, Steven responded that the assets were depleted due to costs incurred for Vera's stay at the nursing facility. Tarryl sued to recover the assets. A settlement was reached, wherein Steven would pay back monies spent out of Vera's assets. The agreement was to be guaranteed by a second mortgagee on Steven's home. After being advised by Texas counsel that the second mortgage might be invalid under Texas law, Tarryl's counsel believed the settlement with Steven would not be binding. Because Steven believed the parties had reached a valid and enforceable settlement, he moved for dismissal when Tarryl sued pursuant to the agreement. The North Dakota Supreme Court concurred with the district court that Tarryl presented no evidence that the second mortgage was invalid under Texas law, so it was proper for the district court to dismiss her case.