A New Age: New York Repeals Longstanding Criminal Ban on Surrogacy

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments on a recent law passed in New York that legalizes commercial surrogacy.

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State v. Struve

Docket: 19-1614

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Oxley

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that observations of a driver holding a phone in front of his face and actively manipulating the screen for at least ten seconds justified stopping the driver to resolve any ambiguity about whether the driver was violating Iowa Code 321.276. Section 321.276 allows drivers to use cell phones for some limited purposes while prohibiting most others. Defendant was stopped when officers believed he might be violating the statute. In his motion to suppress, Defendant argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that Defendant was committing a traffic violation. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officers had reasonable suspicion Defendant was violating section 321.276 to support an investigatory stop.

State v. Buman

Docket: 19-0981

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Brent R. Appel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for wanton neglect of a resident of a health care facility, holding that the admission of a certain exhibit, when coupled with a certain instruction, posed a serious risk of misleading or confusing the jury. Defendant's conviction arose out of his alleged failure to properly ensure that a facility resident as ordered by the patient's physician. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court's admission of the standard of care in the nursing profession and the subsequent instructions related to the use of the standard of care in this case were improper. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the conviction, holding that the professional standards should have been excluded under Iowa R. Evid. 5.403 and that the court's jury instructions did not mitigate the problem.

In re D.D.

Docket: 20-0330

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: McDermott

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the juvenile court dismissing this child-in-need-of-assistance proceeding in which the child victim of sexual abuse had been returned to the home with the perpetrator and in which the child's mother refused to believe any sexual abuse occurred, holding that dismissal was improper. When a seven-year-old girl was sexually abused by her stepfather, the State initiated a child-in-need-of-assistance proceeding, and the juvenile court removed the girl from the home. After the stepfather had been prohibited from living there, the child was allowed to return to the home. The girl's mother, however, refused to accept the sexual abuse finding against her husband. The juvenile court eventually permitted the stepfather to run to the home and dismissed the child-in-need-of-assistance proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the purposes of the child-in-need-of-assistance order were not accomplished, and the continuation of the child's supervision, care, or treatment through continued proceedings was warranted.

In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Radda

Docket: 19-2088

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Thomas D. Waterman

Areas of Law: Trusts & Estates

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court on declaratory judgment declining to adjudicate the validity of two wills the ward, who was still alive, executed while he was in a voluntary conservatorship, holding that neither Iowa Code 633.637 nor other provisions of the Probate Code permit a challenge to the validity of a will executed by a testator who is still living. The ward's sister and her husband (together, Petitioners) brought this action to determine the validity of the ward's two wills. The conservator bank moved to dismiss the action, arguing that Petitioners lacked standing to challenge the wills while the testator was still alive. The district court denied the motion to dismiss but limited the scope of the action to a determination of the ward's present testamentary capacity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) will contests must await the testator's death, and the Probate Code does not allow this declaratory judgment action to proceed; and (2) the district court erred by ordering Petitioners to pay the conservator's attorney fees without an applicable fee-shifting statute.